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SUMMARY  
Criminal gang activity presents a substantial threat to the lives of, in particular, the 
Cape Flats community in the Western Cape. This dissertation investigates the 
legislative response in holding gang members responsible, namely Chapter 4 the 
Prevention of Organised Act 121 of 1998 (“POCA”).  
POCA was promulgated in order to better address a trinity of crimes, namely money 
laundering, racketeering and criminal gang activity (generically known as “organised 
crime”). Despite significant strides in combating money laundering and racketeering, 
the same cannot be said for criminal gang activity. In fact, the incidence of gang-
related crimes has increased since the promulgation of the Act. During the 2017/2018 
financial year, for example, more than one in every five murders (21,6%) committed in 
the Western Cape was gang-related.  
This dissertation opens by investigating the proliferation of criminal gangs in the 
Cape Flats communities as well as the need for additional legislation in dealing with 
gang activity, rather than relying on existing means. The main reason for the 
promulgation of POCA was said to be the ineffective common law modalities used in 
dealing with group-based crime, namely the common purpose doctrine (in particular), 
conspiracy, incitement and public violence. These modalities were therefore 
scrutinised for two reasons. Firstly: to determine to what extent (and why) the common 
law inadequately addressed gang activity. Secondly: if the common law is still useful 
and how it can be developed to more effectively deal with gang activity.  
A critical and comparative analysis of the threshold requirements (under Chapter 1 
of POCA), specific crimes, as well as related sentencing for gang-related activity 
follows. Foreign and international law relating to organised crime is consulted for 
interpretive guidance. This analysis must be read together with the analysis of 
Chapters 1 and 4 of POCA under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996. It considers both the fair trial rights of the accused, as well as in terms of the 
State’s constitutional duty to protect its inhabitants. These analyses cumulatively 
elucidate the interpretive, substantive, institutional and constitutional issues with 
Chapters 1 and 4 of POCA. It is ultimately found that Chapter 4 of POCA is both weak 
and substantially similar to the common law. If we accept the assumption that the 
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common law is ineffective in dealing with gang activity as true, then we must conclude 
that a statutory manifestation thereof is equally as ineffective. Based on this argument, 
immediate statutory amendment, supplementation or replacement of both Chapters 1 
and 4 of POCA is called for.  In this regard, alternative legal mechanisms, as well as 
foreign and international law is consulted. International law is consulted in particular 
to address the further punishment of gang leaders which is dealt with inadequately 
under POCA. 
This dissertation concludes as well as making substantive suggestions for 
amendments to the text of POCA as well as a new crime addressing the liability of 
gang leaders.   
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OPSOMMING 
Kriminele bende-aktiwiteit bied 'n wesenlike bedreiging vir die lewens van veral die 
Kaapse Vlakte-gemeenskap in die Wes-Kaap. Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek 
wetgewende reaksie wat bendelede aanspreeklik hou, naamlik Hoofstuk 4 die Wet op 
die Voorkoming van Georganiseerde Wet 121 van 1998 ("POCA"). 
POCA is gepromulgeer om 'n triologie van misdade naamlik geldwassery, 
rampokkery en kriminele bende aktiwiteit (generies bekend as “georganiseerde 
misdaad”) beter aan te spreek. Ten spyte van beduidende vordering in die bestryding 
van geldwassery en rampokkery, kan dieselfde nie vir kriminele bende-aktiwiteite gesê 
word nie. In werklikheid het die voorkoms van bendeverwante misdade sedert die 
promulgering van die Wet toegeneem. Gedurende die 2017/2018-boekjaar, 
byvoorbeeld, is meer as een uit elke vyf moorde (21,6%) wat in die Wes-Kaap gepleeg 
was, aan bedes togeskryf. 
Hierdie proefskrif begin deur die verspreiding van kriminele bendes in die Kaapse 
Vlakte-gemeenskappe te ondersoek, asook die behoefte aan bykomende wetgewing 
in die hantering van bendeaktiwiteite (eerder as om op bestaande middele te staat te 
maak). Die hoofrede vir die promulgering van POCA was die ondoeltreffende 
gemeenregtelike meganismes wat gebruik is in die stryd teen groepsgebaseerde 
misdaad, aan te vul. Hierdie meganismes is die gemeenskaplike oogmerk-leerstuk 
(veral), sameswering, aanhitsing en openbare geweld. Hierdie meganismes is 
gevolglik weens twee redes ondersoek. Eerstens: om te bepaal tot watter mate (en 
waarom) die gemenereg ondoeltreffend was om bendeaktiwiteit aangespreek. 
Tweedens: indien die gemenereg steeds nuttig is en hoe dit ontwikkel kan word om 
meer doeltreffend bendeaktiwiteit aan te spreek. 
'n Kritiese en vergelykende analise van die drempelvereistes (ingevolge Hoofstuk 
1 van POCA), spesifieke misdade, asook verwante vonnisoplegging vir 
bendeverwante aktiwiteite volg. Vreemde en internasionale reg rakende 
georganiseerde misdaad word geraadpleeg vir leiding rakende die uitlegging van 
POCA. Hierdie ontleding moet met die analise van Hoofstukke 1 en 4 onder die 
Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1996, saamgelees word. Dit oorweeg 
beide die beskuldigde se reg op ‘n billike verhoor, sowel as die Staat se grondwetlike 
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plig om sy inwoners te beskerm. Hierdie analises lig kumulatief die uitleggings-, 
substantiewe, institusionele sowel as grondwetlike kwessies van Hoofstukke 1 en 4 
van POCA uit. Daar word uiteindelik bevind dat Hoofstuk 4 van POCA beide swak 
sowel wesenlik dieselfde isas die gemenereg. As ons die aanname dat die gemenereg 
ondoeltreffend was in die bestryding van bende-aktiwiteit as waar aanvaar, dan moet 
ons tot die gevolgtrekking kom dat 'n wetgewende manifestasie daarvan ewe 
ondoeltreffend is. Op grond van hierdie argument, word daar ‘n beroep gedoen vir die 
onmiddellike wetgewende wysiging, aanvulling of vervanging van beide Hoofstukke 1 
en 4 van POCA. In hierdie verband word alternatiewe regsmeganismes, sowel as 
vreemde en internasionale reg, geraadpleeg. Internasionale reg word veral oorweeg 
om die verdere bestrawwing van bendeleiers aan te spreek, wat onvoldoende onder 
POCA hanteer word. 
Hierdie proefskrif sluit sowel af met substantiewe voorstelle vir wysigings aan die 
teks van POCA asook 'n nuwe misdaad rakende aanspreeklikheid van bendeleiers. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1 1  Research problem and objectives 
South African criminal law is based on the notion of individual criminal liability.1 
When a person satisfies all the elements of a criminal act, through his or her personal 
conduct and fault, that person will be labelled as a perpetrator.2 Accomplice liability 
furthermore arises when another person assists in the commission of a crime (either 
before or after its completion) but does not personally satisfy the definitional 
requirements of that crime.3 Conceptual and legal difficulties arise, however, when 
groups of individuals perpetrate crimes in concert.4 Issues pertaining to the complicity 
and causal contribution of each individual becomes apparent when the State attempts 
to prosecute various people for a single criminal act.5 In contrast to crimes committed 
by individuals, group-based crime facilitates the commission of crimes due to its 
organised nature, sheer manpower and potential criminal networking opportunities.6 
Previous incorporations of group-based liability in South African law, such as the 
                                            
1 See G Kemp, S Walker, R Palmer, D Baqwa, C Gevers, B Leslie & A Steynberg Criminal Law in South 
Africa 2 ed (2015) 258-260; Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2016) 5 ed 29-32; M Cowling “Fighting 
organised crime: comment on the Prevention of Organised Crime Bill 1998” (1998) 11 South African 
Journal of Criminal Justice 350 368. Also see A Kruger Organised Crime and Proceeds of Crime Law 
in South Africa 2 ed (2014) 69. 
2 Burchell Principles 475-477; A St Q Skeen & S Hoctor “General Principles: Participation” in WA 
Joubert & JA Faris LAWSA 6 2 ed (2010) para 116; Kemp et al Criminal Law 274; see also DC van der 
Linde ŉ Patroon van kriminele bende-aktiwiteite: Die oplossing tot Suid Afrika se bendemisdaad of ŉ 
wit olifant? ŉ Kritiese, regsvergelykende en konstitusionele studie van Hoofstuk 4 van die Wet op die 
Voorkoming van Georganiseerde Misdaad 121 van 1998 LLM dissertation, Stellenbosch University 
(2015) 21.  
3 See Cowling (1998) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 368. 
4 See KJM Smith The Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity (1991) 19 where the author 
also refers to the “[p]rocedural, substantive and evidentiary complexities” that have traditionally been 
associated with criminal complicity.   
5 Cowling (1998) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 368; also Van der Linde ŉ Patroon van 
kriminele bende-aktiwiteite 9. 
6 See Cowling (1998) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 368. 
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controversial common purpose doctrine, have led to harsh and impractical results and 
even resulted in an international outcry against the doctrine.7  
South Africa and in particular the Western Cape has a significant criminal gang 
presence.  This form of group-based crime currently contributes disproportionately to 
national and provincial crime statistics.8 The South African Police Service crime 
statistics, for example, indicated that 21,6% of the 3 379 murders in the Western 
Province were gang-related.9 That translates into more than one in every five murders 
– approximately 808. Los Angeles, which is the epicentre of the US gang problem, 
had 491 murders over a period of three years.10 Despite the comparable population 
densities of Los Angeles (approximately four million)11 and the Western Cape 
(approximately 6,5 million),12 this translates into a disproportionately high incidence of 
gang-related murders per year.  
The South African Legislature implemented an intervention in 1999 by promulgating 
the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (“POCA”) after a period during the 
transition into our constitutional democracy plagued by criminal gang activities and 
                                            
7 See generally for critique against the common purpose doctrine L Sisilana “What's wrong with common 
purpose” South African Journal of Criminal Justice (1999) 287 300-301; Cameron “When Judges Fail 
Justice” (2004) 120 South African Law Journal; M Reddi “The Doctrine of Common Purpose Receives 
The Stamp of Approval” (2005) 122(1) South African Law Journal 59 63-64. See the unfair 
consequences of the doctrine in S v Safatsa and Others 1988 (1) SA 868 (A) at 892, where accused 
number 4 was sentenced to death due to her inciting the actual perpetrators of the murder. See also 
Van der Linde ŉ Patroon van kriminele bende-aktiwiteite 24 fn 94. 
8 Kruger Organised Crime 70.  
9 South African Police Service “Crime Situation in RSA Twelve Months 01 April 2017 to 31 March 2018” 
(11-09-2018) South African Police Service 
<https://www.saps.gov.za/services/long_version_presentation_april_to_march_2017_2018.pdf> (date 
accessed 26 October 2018) (see pages 17 and 24). 
10 Los Angeles Police Department “Gangs” Los Angeles 
<http://www.lapdonline.org/get_informed/content_basic_view/1396> (accessed 01-12-2018).  
11 See United States Census Bureau “QuickFacts Los Angeles city, California, Los Angeles County, 
California; California” United States Census Bureau (01-07-2016) 
<https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/losangelescitycalifornia,losangelescountycalifornia,CA/
PST045216> (accessed 01-12-2017);  S Grad “Los Angeles hits a milestone: 4 million people and 
counting” Los Angeles Times (02-05-2017) <http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-historic-
population-20170501-htmlstory.html> (accessed 01-12-2017).  
12 Statistics South Africa Mid-year population estimates 2017 (2017) 2. 
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vigilantism. The epicentre of these activities was, and still remains, the Cape Flats 
area in metropolitan Cape Town. 
Gang-related crime in South Africa has however not subsided after this legislative 
intervention. It has in fact increased significantly.13 Newspapers and media outlets are 
rife with reports of gang violence in the Cape Flats.14 It was revealed during a 
Parliamentary Committee on Police that a seemingly impressive number of gang-
related arrests were made from 1 April 2016 to 31 July 2017 – approximately 3 892.15 
This impressive number of arrests is immediately tempered by the number of people 
actually convicted under POCA: 42.16 This number is somewhat confusing as only 
data of twenty of those convictions were supplied.17 Considering the lack of available 
case law interpreting and implementing Chapter 4 of POCA as well as a dearth of 
academic commentary on the subject, it is submitted that it is imperative to understand 
why the State’s legislative intervention is so patently ineffectual. Furthermore, what 
can be done to remedy the situation? 
The objective of this study is to provide a critical and comparative analysis of South 
Africa’s anti-gang legislation. This is achieved by identifying and analysing the 
objective (physical) and subjective (mens rea) requirements of the offences contained 
in Chapter 4 of POCA (read with the definitions in Chapter 1 and Schedule 1), as well 
as by determining the proper legal rationale for these crimes. The aim is to provide a 
comprehensive framework for the interpretation of South Africa’s anti-gang legislation 
                                            
13 See Chapter 2 below. 
14 See Chapter 2 below, especially 2 2 for an overview of the impact of gangs on these communities. 
15 Portfolio Committee on Police “Briefing by the Management of SAPS on the Anti-gang Strategy: 
Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape” Parliamentary Monitoring Group (23-08-2017) 
<http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/170823Anti-Gangsterism.pdf> (accessed 
01-09-2017). Also see Portfolio Committee on Police “Hawks Illegal Firearms Unit; SAPS Anti-Gang 
Strategy; Quarter 1 performance; Vetting Senior Management” Parliamentary Monitoring Group (23-
08-2017) <https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/24881/> (accessed 01-09-2017).  
16 Portfolio Committee on Police “Briefing by the Management of SAPS on the Anti-gang Strategy: 
Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape” Parliamentary Monitoring Group. 
17 See Portfolio Committee on Police “Briefing by the Management of SAPS on the Anti-gang Strategy: 
Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape” Parliamentary Monitoring Group 22-23. According 
to the tables, the total number of people convicted in the Western Cape for gang-related crimes during 
the aforementioned period is 32 and that includes convictions for common law crimes such as murder 
and dealing in drugs. This author is uncertain why the Portfolio Committee decided to omit information 
of the other 22 convictions from the presentation. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 4 
 
and do so by means of statutory interpretation with reference to comparative foreign 
law as well as relevant international law.  
Flowing from the aforementioned analysis will be specific recommendations for 
judicial interpretation and legislative reform of the current legal framework relating to 
criminal gang activities in order to better address the phenomenon.  
1 2  Assumptions  
Certain key assumptions underlie this study. Firstly: Criminal gang activity is a major 
problem affecting South African communities, especially areas in the Western Cape, 
and is a disproportionately large contributor to the national and provincial crime 
statistics. The current policing structures in the Western Cape are furthermore not 
adequately equipped or designed to deal with criminal gang activity. 
Secondly, South Africa’s current legal framework relating to criminal gang activities 
(as contained in Chapter 4 of POCA) as well as the available common law 
mechanisms, have failed to effectively curb this phenomenon. Chapter 4, in turn, has 
failed to make any noticeable impact on the criminal justice system, evidenced mainly 
by the lack of case law, apparent low conviction rates of gang-related offences under 
POCA, and no apparent decrease in gang-related crimes.  
The criminal justice system is only one means to address the phenomenon of 
criminal gang activity. A comprehensive strategy also depends on governmental 
interventions on societal and criminological levels such as:  socio-economic conditions 
in the poorest neighbourhoods, prison culture and overcrowding, lack of youth 
development and intervention in terms of the creation of job opportunities and youth 
mobility, and adequate education opportunities. This is in fact the approach that the 
State has taken in its new anti-gangsterism strategy which is addressed below. POCA 
and the criminal justice system as a whole are not a means to solve the gang problem 
in South Africa but merely to hold those who have been involved in such activities 
accountable and potentially reform them.  
The State (the executive, legislative and to a lesser extent judicial branches) has 
for many years (prior to the enactment of POCA) failed to keep up with the 
development of transnational organised crime, including criminal gang activities, and 
consequently failed to uphold its constitutional (and international law) duties in terms 
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of section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution.18 In terms of this obligation, the State is obliged 
to protect the safety and security of its citizens (and provide for mechanisms to realise 
this right). Due to the aforementioned and other contributing factors, criminal gang 
activity has flourished.  
South Africa is not the only country struggling with organised crime and criminal 
gang activities. It is therefore useful to consider foreign jurisdictions (especially the 
United Kingdom, United States of America and Canada) that have made significant 
strides in addressing criminal gangs or organised criminality in general. These 
jurisdictions serve as useful sources to take cognisance of and to analyse with an eye 
on possible legislative reform in South Africa. It is so that the three mentioned 
jurisdictions are all developed countries from the “Global North”. However, it is 
precisely because of the similarities between the largely urban phenomenon of 
criminal gang activities in these countries as well as that in South Africa that the legal 
comparative aspects featured in this dissertation is justified. 
International criminal law does not deal with the phenomenon of criminal gangs or 
criminal gang activities per se. However, the general part of international criminal law 
is very well developed in terms of group-based, systemic, and collective criminality 
(principles concerning joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility spring to 
mind). So, while criminal gang activity does not fall within the subject matter of 
international criminal law, this dissertation will explore the possible lessons which 
domestic South African criminal law can take from the general part of international 
criminal law in terms of modes of liability and other aspects relevant for complex group-
based, collective and systemic criminality.  
1 3  For whom does the bell toll?  
1 3 1  Understanding the elusive concept of a “gang” 
The concept of gangsterism and what precisely constitutes a criminal gang remains 
contentious. The meaning of “criminal gang” has been legislatively defined through 
                                            
18 12(1)(c) states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes 
the right to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources”.   
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POCA. Unfortunately, the definition lacks clarity due to its broad terms and is subject 
to criticism.19 The definition in Chapter 1 reads that a  
'criminal gang' includes any formal or informal ongoing organisation, association, or 
group of three or more persons, which has as one of its activities the commission of 
one or more criminal offences, which has an identifiable name or identifying sign or 
symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in 
a pattern of criminal gang activity[.] 
Over and above this definition, section 11 of POCA proves five factors a court may 
take into consideration in determining whether a person is a member of a gang 
(a) admits to criminal gang membership; 
(b) is identified as a member of a criminal gang by a parent or guardian; 
(c) resides in or frequents a particular criminal gang's area and adopts their style of 
dress, their use of hand signs, language or their tattoos, and associates with known 
members of a criminal gang; 
(d) has been arrested more than once in the company of identified members of a 
criminal gang for offences which are consistent with usual criminal gang activities; 
(e) is identified as a member of a criminal gang by physical evidence such as 
photographs or other documentation. 
                                            
19 See especially 4 5 1, 5 3 2 2 and 7 2 below. 
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Several commentators (mainly in the fields of criminology,20 psychology21 and other 
social sciences)22 have tried to identify common themes in an attempt to capture the 
essence of a criminal gang.  
There is value in understanding generic perceptions or academic descriptions of 
what gangs exactly are in order to better understand and interpret Chapter 4 of POCA 
and to inform policy decisions.23 Standing, however, admits that South African 
scholarship is characterised by “brief, superficial definitions”.24 
Gastrow reckons that it is problematic to encapsulate one single definition of what 
a gang is and writes that it may not “ever be adequate or comprehensive enough to 
cover all the shades and variations”.25 He does offer certain trite characteristics such 
                                            
20 Prominent examples include Don Pinnock (see D Pinnock Gangs, Rituals and Rites of Passage 
(1997); D Pinnock The Brotherhoods: Street Gangs and State Control in Cape Town (1984); D Pinnock 
Gang Town (2016); D Pinnock Towards and Understanding of the Structure, Function and Causes of 
Street Gangs in Cape Town MA thesis University of Cape Town (1982)) & André Standing (see A 
Standing “Re-Conceptualising Organised Crime” (2003) 12(3) African Security Review 102; A Standing 
“The threat of gangs and anti-gangs policy: Policy discussion paper” (2005) Paper 116 Institute for 
Security Studies 1; A Standing Organised Crime: A study from the Cape Flats (2006)). 
21 Prominent examples include Wilfried Schärf (see W Schärf & C Vale “The Firm – organised crime 
comes of age during the transition to democracy” Social Dynamics: A journal of African studies (1996) 
22(2) 30; W Schärf “The Resurgence of Urban street gangs and community responses in Cape Town 
during the late eighties” in D Hansson & D Van Zyl Smit (eds) Towards Justice: Crime and State Control 
in South Africa (1990) 232) & Brian van Wyk (see BE Van Wyk & WH Theron “Fighting gangsterism in 
South Africa:  a contextual review of gang and anti-gang movements in the Western Cape” (2005) 18(3) 
Acta Criminologica 51 51). 
22 Prominent examples include Irvin Kinnes (see I Kinnes Contested Governance: Police and Gang 
Interactions PhD thesis (Criminology) University of Cape Town (2017); I Kinnes “Gangs, drugs and 
policing in the Cape Flats” (2014) 2 Acta Criminologica14; I Kinnes From urban street gangs to criminal 
empires: The changing face of gangs in the Western Cape (2000), Institute for Security Studies), 
Marcelle Wijnberg (see M Wijnberg Exploration of Male Gang Members’ Perspectives of Gangs and 
Drugs MA (Social Work) thesis University of Stellenbosch (2012)) & Derica Lambrechts (see 
Lambrechts D The Impact of Organised Crime of Social Control by the State: A Study of Manenberg in 
Cape Town, South Africa DPhil thesis University of Stellenbosch (2013)). 
23 See Standing Cape Flats 251. 
24 Standing Cape Flats 251. 
25 P Gastrow “Organised Crime in South Africa: An Assessment of its Nature and Origins” (08-1998) 
ISS <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Mono28.pdf> (accessed 14-11-2016). Also see 
I Kinnes “From urban street gangs to criminal empires: The changing face of gangs in the Western 
Cape” (2000) ISS <https://oldsite.issafrica.org/uploads/Mono48.pdf> (accessed 01-11-2015); Burchell 
Principles 909-910.  
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as that gangs are often “territorially based” and their criminal operations are less 
sophisticated than syndicates, they consist of youths rather than older persons and 
lastly that they are definable by a (common) name. This view is echoed by Shaw, who 
holds that syndicates operate at a higher degree of sophistication and at a wider level 
than gangs. He further submits that gangs typically operate at “street level” and are 
often employed by these syndicates to do their “dirty work”.26 The author constructs 
the following definition: 
A criminal gang consists of an organised group of members which has a sense of 
cohesion, is generally territorially bound, which creates an atmosphere of fear and 
intimidation in the community and whose members engage in gang-focused criminal 
activity either individually or collectively.27 
This definition differs substantially from the legal definition as it does not require a 
minimum number of members and the impact on the community is emphasised and is 
reminiscent more of a definition of terrorism.28 It is however trite, from media reports 
                                            
26 M Shaw “The development and control of organized crime in post-apartheid South Africa” in S 
Einstein & M Amir (eds) Organized crime: Uncertainties and dilemmas (1999) 99. Also see Standing 
Cape Flats 251. 
27 Gastrow “Organised Crime in South Africa: An Assessment of its Nature and Origins” ISS. The author 
states that he obtained elements of this defection from  
G Cronje, PJ van der Walt, GM Retief & CMB Naudé The Juvenile Delinquency in Society (1982).  
28 The Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004 
defines an array of activities as a “terrorist activity” in terms of section 1 of the Act. Relevant here is 
paragraph (b)(ii) which reads that a terrorist activity as an activity  
(b)   which is intended, or by its nature and context, can reasonably be regarded as being 
intended, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, to- 
(…) 
(ii)   intimidate, or to induce or cause feelings of insecurity within, the public, or a 
segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its economic security, or to 
induce, cause or spread feelings of terror, fear or panic in a civilian population [.] 
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and the preamble to POCA,29 that the communities of the Cape Flats area are in fact 
terrorised and traumatised by gang-related activities.30 
Kinnes lists certain elements that are present in prevailing gang definitions:31  
 Gang members may range in age from youngsters (‘corner kids’) to adults 
between 20 and 40 years of age. 
 The nature and activities of gangs are mainly determined by their social context. 
 Membership of gangs may include persons both inside and outside of jails. 
 Gang members may be anything from street level operators to sophisticated 
syndicate bosses. 
 They may belong to the category regarded by the government and its agencies 
as being at risk of becoming involved in criminal activities or may make a choice 
to become involved with full cognisance of the associated risks. 
 Gangs may be involved in criminal activities for the sake of survival, or may be 
high-level, structured criminal organisations. 
Standing is critical of this lack of clarity (and consensus) in the definition of gangs, 
while there is no “open disagreement” among leading commentators, who seem to 
tacitly accept this elusive concept that has no universally accepted definition. The 
author states that during an interview with a senior member of the Department of 
Community Safety, that member stated that “[t]here is no confusion, we all know who 
is a gangster and who isn’t. That’s not a problem”.32  
Wijnberg correctly refers to the fact that no single or universal definition exists for a 
gang and posits that every gang is unique in nature. This unique nature of the gang is 
determined by several factors such as environment, socio-political and economic 
                                            
29 It is stated in the preamble that  
(…) [T]he pervasive presence of criminal gangs in many communities is harmful to the well 
being [sic] of those communities, it is necessary to criminalise participation in or promotion of 
criminal gang activities [.] 
30 These reports shall be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
31 I Kinnes “From urban street gangs to criminal empires: The changing face of gangs in the Western 
Cape” (2000) ISS.  
32 Standing Cape Flats 253. 
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contexts. Furthermore, internal belief systems differ between gangs.33 Gangs 
additionally vary in size, structure and type of criminal activity.34 The concept of a 
cohesive and organised criminal gang may not always be the case. Structures often 
evolve, merge or dissolve frequently and may be venture-specific.35  An attempt to 
create an all-encompassing or universal definition for a “criminal gang” is thus a close 
to impossible task.36 It can be argued that the current statutory regime is aimed at a 
very specific species of criminal gangs and ignores their inherently flexible nature. 
Statutory definitions may then also pose the risk of causing gangs to become wise of 
statutory proscriptions and then develop in order to circumvent them.37 In this sense a 
flexible or elastic definition (albeit constitutionally suspect) may prove to be extremely 
useful to the State. 
Legal definitions aside, there seems to be some experiential, common sense or 
popular understanding of what (criminal) gangs entail. Pinnock observes how young 
children in gang-affected communties, when asked to provide a definition of a gang, 
instead pointed out gang members. In a different community, when asked the same 
question, a group of men proudly identified themselves as a gang.38 This illustrates 
the elusive nature of a definition of the concept of a criminal gang despite an underlying 
understanding thereof. The inability for people to provide a definition just emphasises 
how ineffective it is to attempt to define the term. It can therefore be argued that the 
concept, understanding or definition of a gang falls outside the scope of a strict legal 
understanding and again underscoring that a flexible or elastic definition may be 
required to cast the criminal net wide enough. 
Before we get to the legal analysis, then, it is first necessary to look at the 
phenomenon of gangsterism in the broad, sociological sense of the word. The starting 
point is to identify a typology of the phenomenon of gangsterism. 
                                            
33 See Wijnberg Exploration (2012) 38. Also see the testimony by Professor Catherine Ward for the 
Khayelitsha Commission Towards a Safer Khayelitsha: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Allegations of Police Inefficiency and a Breakdown in Relations between SAPS and the Community of 
Khayelitsha (2014) 340. 
34 RW Lee “Transnational Organised Crime: An Overview” in T Farer (ed) Transnational Crime in the 
Americas (1999) 12; Burchell Principles 910; Khayelitsha Commission Khayelitsha Report (2014) 168.  
35 P Gastrow “Organised Crime in South Africa – An Assessment of its Nature and Origins” ISS.  
36 See Burchell Principles 909-910. 
37 Burchell Principles 909-910. 
38 D Pinnock Gang Town (2016) 90. 
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1 3 2  Brief overview of the types of gangs 
Pinnock identifies certain variations of gangs which are prevalent particularly in the 
Western Cape.39 The author describes merchant gangs as the “face” of gangs as this 
appears to be the most common or well-known type of gang. Merchant gangs 
predominantly buy and sell drugs to members of the community; with collateral 
activities being gun violence and robbery. The genesis of so-called gang wars can 
often be attributed to the expansion and retention of gang territories.40 The situation 
might be slightly more nuanced. In areas such as Manenberg, which is relatively 
densely populated, the issue is often rather loyalty towards certain drug merchants of 
certain gangs. Competitive pricing and a better-quality drug may cause a client to 
change suppliers and consequently cause inter-gang conflict.41 Pinnock succinctly 
describes the situation as follow: 
(…) [D]rugs largely drive Cape Town’s stratospheric level of interpersonal violent 
crime. Users rob and steal to get them, gangs murder to retain their sales turf and drug 
lords hold neighbourhoods in thrall by violence.42  
Prison gangs, which are not the focus of this study,43 operate mainly within prisons. 
The most infamous prison gangs are the 26s, 27s and 28s – collectively known as “the 
Numbers gangs”. These gangs have strict codes of conduct, their own languages and 
often-violent gang initiations.44 “Ordinary” gangs (who operate on “street-level”) 
appropriating the strict hierarchal organisation of prison gangs have become 
commonplace both to ensure compliance with orders from higher ranking members as 
                                            
39 See Pinnock Gang Town 83-130. 
40 South African Police Service Annual Crime Report 2015/2016: Addendum to the SAPS Annual Report 
(2016) 80.  
41 See Pinnock Gang Town 111. 
42 Pinnock Gang Town 225.  
43 Despite the fact that gang criminality is rife under amongst the prison population, the State’s priority 
is not to prosecute and pursue these activities but rather those affecting the general population. This is 
clear from the preamble, case law and parliamentary discussions and media reports. This dissertation 
is therefore focused on interpreting Chapter 4 of POCA through the lens of gangs affecting the general 
population (or “ordinary gangs”).  
44 Pinnock Gang Town 98-107. 
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well as to provide organisational resistance to sophisticated criminal syndicates that 
wanted to encroach on their drug territories.45  
POCA is indiscriminate in its application. It applies equally to those who are corner 
kids as to those who are hardened killers. The only question in terms of POCA is 
whether these persons were members or active associates (where applicable) of the 
gang.   
1 4   The four pillars and the State 
It is imperative to contextualise this study, which focuses predominantly on the legal 
aspects of dealing with gang-related activity, within the current policy framework of the 
South African Government. The National Anti-Gang Strategy (“the Strategy”) was 
approved in February of 2017 and focuses on pillars which must work in synergy. 
The first pillar is human development which focuses on school safety; social 
cohesion and sustainable communities; the promotion of healthy communities; 
improving service delivery; economic development. The aim of this pillar seems to be 
empowerment and development of communities which in part then also addresses 
unemployment, poverty and inequality.46  
The second pillar focuses on social partnerships. The partnership here is between 
(local) governments and communities, and local communities are advised to utilise the 
policy to implement community safety forums as well as to provide structures for 
partnerships where communities can address their safety concerns.47 The Department 
of Social Development is then responsible for the coordination and monitoring to 
delivery and progress of an Integrated Crime Prevention Strategy. The National Youth 
Development Agency is further tasked with implementing a Youth Strategy which 
creates and implements youth programmes.48 
                                            
45 Pinnock Gang Town 105. 
46 Western Cape Department of Community Safety “Implementing the National Anti-Gangsterism 
Strategy” (02-12-2017) <https://www.westerncape.gov.za/assets/departments/community-
safety/presentation_nags_workshop_gang_strategy.pdf> Western Cape Government (accessed 01-
10-2017). 
47 Western Cape Department of Community Safety “Implementing the National Anti-Gangsterism 
Strategy” Western Cape Government. 
48 Western Cape Department of Community Safety “Implementing the National Anti-Gangsterism 
Strategy” Western Cape Government. 
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Special design is listed as the third pillar. This relates to the “redesign of public 
spaces and homes” which must alleviate overcrowding and “build integrated 
community facilities” in gang-plagued areas.49   
Arguably the most important pillar (at least in the context of this study) is the fourth 
pillar, namely the criminal justice process. Community mobilisation and safety is 
additionally highlighted – which is done through community safety forums and 
community policing forums.  
1 5   Research method 
1 5 1  Methodology & sources  
This dissertation is predominantly analytical and doctrinal in nature and will be 
conducted by means of a literature review of various relevant sources, including 
legislation, international instruments, case law, policies and academic literature 
(including textbooks, journal articles and opinions) pertaining to group-based criminal 
liability. 
The focus of the study will be the phenomenon of criminal gang activities. The South 
African common law (including the historical origins and judicial development) prior to 
the promulgation of POCA will be analysed in order to identify the difficulties the State 
faced in the prosecution of individuals involved in criminal gang activities. Thereafter 
the State’s legislative response, in the form of POCA, will be constructed. Such a 
construction will have to take place largely from a theoretical and doctrinal perspective 
considering the lack of case law and academic literature specifically pertaining to 
Chapter 4 of POCA. This construction and interpretation will also include comparable 
case law on Chapter 2 of POCA, namely offences relating to racketeering activities.50 
It should be mentioned that POCA does not criminalise organised criminality in the 
generic sense. 
                                            
49 Western Cape Department of Community Safety “Implementing the National Anti-Gangsterism 
Strategy” Western Cape Government. 
50 STEP forms part of the Californian Penal Code. To date, there has been only one reported case 
implementing and interpreting Chapter 4 of POCA Chapter 2, on the other hand, which deals with 
offences relating to racketeering activities, has a rich body of case law and a comparable model of 
criminalisation to Chapter 4. Furthermore, the parent legislation of Chapter 4 (STEP) is based on the 
RICO-model of the USA, while Chapter 2 is also based on the RICO model.  
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This study is also strongly comparative in nature. Although several jurisdictions will 
be referred to and relied on throughout this study, two jurisdictions, namely the United 
States of America (“United States”) and Canada, will form the bulk of the comparison. 
The aforementioned jurisdictions were chosen for very specific reasons (and not solely 
because of the obvious common heritage in English criminal law doctrine which also 
strongly influenced the development of general principles of South African criminal 
law).51 Chapter 4 of POCA is largely based on American legislation, namely the 
California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act of 1988 (“STEP”).52 In 
order to adequately understand Chapter 4 of POCA, it is unavoidable and essential to 
analyse its “parent” legislation. This comparative methodology will go further by 
reviewing the four main models of criminal gang liability in various other jurisdictions 
and comparing them with the South African approach. These models will be reviewed 
by illustrating the implementation of these models in various foreign jurisdictions 
(through legislation and its interpretation in case law). Canada offers a dynamic and 
arguably quite a harsh solution for punishing gang leaders.53 Considering South 
Africa’s lack of express gang leadership criminalisation, it would be useful to analyse 
the Canadian perspective. 
Throughout the study, reference will be made to South Africa’s constitutional and 
international law duties. Firstly, it has to be determined whether the required 
constitutional balance between the protection of the safety and security of South 
African citizens (entrenched in section 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”)) and the protection of the rights of an accused (in 
terms of section 35(3)) have been achieved. The Constitution plays a significant role 
in this dissertation. The role of the Constitution is dual-functional. It firstly serves as a 
                                            
51 South African (substantive) criminal law was, of course, also influenced by Roman-Dutch and German 
criminal law principles. 
52 SG Lebeya Defining organised crime: a comparative analysis LLD thesis UNISA (2012) 104; M 
Cowling (1998) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 370. 
53 According to section 467.13(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code (“the Criminal Code”), the so-called 
“instructing offence” is committed by  
[e]very person who is one of the persons who constitute a criminal organization and who 
knowingly instructs, directly or indirectly, any person to commit an offence under this or any 
other Act of Parliament for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, the criminal 
organization is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life. 
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normative framework in which all law must operate. This is quite patent from section 
2 of the Constitution which holds that it is “(…) the supreme law of the Republic; law 
or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be 
fulfilled”.54 The Constitution also serves as a protection mechanism and this is patent 
from the rights and protections afforded in particular Chapter 2 – the Bill of Rights. It 
has also been said that “[t]he primary, traditional role of human rights is to afford 
protection from the criminal law”.55  It will thus be impossible, at least for purposes of 
this dissertation, to facilitate a conceptual separation between the Constitution as a 
normative document and the Constitution as a protection mechanism.  
Further, reference must be made to the fact that South Africa is a party to the United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols 
Thereto (“the Palermo Convention”).56 The aim of this Convention is, inter alia, to 
assist in the investigation and prosecution of (transnational) organised crime through 
the adoption of new statutory crimes that are in line with the guidelines contained in 
it.57 It will be investigated whether South Africa has satisfied its obligations in terms of 
this instrument, considering the growing transnational nature of organised crime 
threatening the security and economy of countries throughout the African continent.58 
It was noted previously that criminal gangs/criminal gang activities are not 
criminalised under international criminal law. None of the existing international criminal 
tribunals (including the International Criminal Court) can at present exercise 
                                            
54 Own emphasis.  
55 F Tulkens “The Paradoxical Relationship between Criminal Law and Human Rights” (2011) 9 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 577 579. Also see especially 5 1-5 3 below.  
56 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto 
(adopted 14 December 2000, entered into force 20 February 2004) 40 ILM 335. Also see 4 3 2 below.  
57 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime “Legislative Guides for The Implementation of The United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and The Protocol Thereto” (2004) United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/legislative_guides/Legislative%20guides_Full%20version.pdf> 
(accessed 06-06-2015) xvi. 
58 P Gastrow Penetrating state and business: organised crime in Southern Africa (2003) 1. Also see 
Mohunram and Another v NDPP and Another (Law Review Project as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (2) SACR 
145 (CC) para 144 where Sachs J elaborates on the reasons for the promulgation of POCA (as found 
in the long title); Standing Cape Flats 45 where the author refers to the former Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development who criticized the previous government for its failure to keep up with 
transnational organised crime.  
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jurisdiction over the crime of criminal gang activities (or similar offences). However, 
the general part of international criminal law (notably the modes of liability, including 
the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise and the notion of command responsibility) may 
potentially be useful in terms of the development of general principles for the criminal 
liability of members of a criminal gang; or participants in criminal gang activities. 
Reference will thus be made to relevant principles of international criminal law. 
1 5 2  Delineations  
Certain delineations or demarcations of this dissertation must be emphasised. This 
dissertation falls squarely in the field of criminal law – with necessary interactions with 
the law of evidence; criminal procedure; constitutional law; foreign and international 
law. Although there will be frequent reference to local history, social science and 
criminology (in particular this chapter, Chapter 2 and to a lesser extent Chapter 4), this 
author does not purport this study to be one falling within those fields. The 
aforementioned references to the social sciences are utilitarian in nature to 
contextualise key concepts.  
Sociological aspects such as the functioning and composition of individual gang 
types, criminal syndicates and organised crime in the generic sense are similarly not 
under consideration. References to these concepts shall however be made, again, for 
contextual purposes. 
1 6   Structure of chapters  
Chapter 2 explains the historical background to the phenomenon of criminal gang 
activity in South Africa. It will explore the impact of gang activity in the most affected 
area, namely the Cape Flats in the Western Cape. A broad overview of past 
governmental strategies as well as available statistics will be provided. The Chapter 
will additionally investigate the causative factors and history that led to the 
development and proliferation of gangs towards the late 1990s and the eventual 
legislative intervention that led to the promulgation of POCA. Finally, the rationale for 
the further criminalisation of existing criminal offences will be discussed. For example, 
it is already an offence to aid and abet a crime (for example murder); or to be a co-
conspirator or inciter to a crime; or a participant in a common criminal plan under the 
common law. But under POCA (chapter 4) it may also constitute a crime if such a 
person “wilfully aids and abets any criminal activity committed for the benefit of, at the 
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direction of, or in association with any criminal gang”.59 Two preliminary answers arise 
to the question of what the rationale is to further criminalise existing criminal conduct. 
The first is that the new crime may cover conduct that may fall outside the scope of 
existing crimes. The second is that the sentencing regimes might differ between the 
two crimes. The possibilities shall be discussed in depth in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Chapter 3 analyses and provide a comprehensive framework to the research, 
focusing on the common law measures which deal with group-based crimes. These 
common law mechanisms include the inchoate or incomplete crimes of incitement,60 
conspiracy and attempt,61 as well as the common purpose doctrine.  
One of the reasons underlying legislative intervention by means of POCA was the 
perceived deficiency of the common law and legislation that have failed to keep up 
with the organised crime, racketeering, money laundering and criminal gang activity.62  
It will also be investigated to what extent the common law and statutes have failed to 
be judicially developed. Furthermore, it will be shown that the lack of development 
caused the common law and statutory measures to lag behind the growing 
phenomenon of transnational organised crime.63 Snyman contends that the 
aforementioned incomplete crimes somewhat overlap with section 9 of POCA and 
questions whether these statutory measures are necessary if they are only common 
law crimes under the guise of new crimes.64 This claim shall be evaluated in this and 
the subsequent Chapter. Finally, it shall continuously be evaluated whether these 
measures are still useful in the fight against gang-based crimes; and whether these 
measures could still be advantageous via judicial development.65 There will be a focus 
on the common purpose doctrine and its doctrinal and constitutional issues as it is 
probably the closest measure the common law has to offer in terms of group 
                                            
59 Section 9(1)(a) of POCA. 
60 In terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956. 
61 Snyman (1999) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 218; JM Burchell South African Criminal 
Law & Procedure Vol I 4 ed (2011) 537. 
62 See 3 1 below.  
63 Standing Cape Flats 45.  
64 Snyman (1999) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 217 as well as Chapters 3 and 4 below. 
65 Section 39(2) of the Constitution states “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights”.  
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criminality. The joint criminal enterprise doctrine, developed in international criminal 
law (notably the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia) and which is comparable to the South African common purpose doctrine, 
will be analysed with an eye on the development of existing general principles.66 
 
Chapter 4 will provide an overview of the legislative background to the promulgation 
of POCA towards the end of the 1990s. Anti-gang legislation of the US and Canada 
shall also be discussed as interpretive tools in understanding and constructing the 
elements of POCA (Chapter 4). Chapter 2 of POCA, which deals with racketeering 
and which is analogous in structure to Chapter 4, shall also be discussed, considering 
the lack of case law and academic materials interpreting POCA Chapter 4.  
Comparable international law will also be analysed and discussed. This approach 
is reaffirmed by section 233 of the Constitution, which states that courts must prefer a 
reasonable interpretation of legislation that is in conformity with international law above 
an interpretation that is inconsistent therewith. As mentioned previously, South Africa 
is a party to the Palermo Convention. The Palermo Convention imposes the obligation 
on member states to promulgate legislation to deal with, inter alia, the participation in 
an “organized criminal group”.67 It will be determined whether Chapter 4 of POCA 
satisfies its minimum obligations in terms of the Palermo Convention.  
The developed strategies of European jurisdictions are also instructive in this 
regard. The Council of Europe has adopted a joint action and made it a criminal 
offence to participate in a criminal organisation in the Member States of the European 
Union.68 This joint action will also be analysed and compared (for definitional 
assistance) with the Palermo Convention, which echoes the joint convention by 
creating similar group-based criminal offences.69  
The main focus of this Chapter is to identify and analyse the objective and 
subjective requirements of the crimes listed in Chapter 4 of POCA. This will be done 
through an analysis of the traditional elements of the crime, namely the requisite actus 
                                            
66 For example, the joint decision by the Privy Council and the House of Lords in R v Jogee [2016] 
UKSC 8. 
67 Article 5(1). 
68 Official Journal of the European Communities L 351/1. 
69 See GP Kemp “The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime: A milestone 
in international criminal law” (2001) 14 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 152 155-156. 
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reus (unlawful conduct), causation and mens rea (fault). There will however be specific 
focus on the requisite actus reus and mens rea. The latter element was drafted 
vaguely, as well as ambiguously by the legislature.  
The elements of the definition of a “criminal gang” and “a pattern of criminal gang 
activity” shall also be identified as these definitions are extremely important to the 
function of Chapter 4 of POCA.  
Continuing the discussion started in Chapter 3, it shall be analysed to what extent 
the crimes enumerated in POCA Chapter 4 differ from crimes that pre-existed POCA. 
It is vital to the justification of POCA that the crimes under POCA differ from the pre-
existing crimes otherwise POCA Chapter 4 should be considered redundant.  
An additional important aspect to consider is the sentencing regime under POCA. 
Section 10 of POCA prescribes certain ranges of punishment including imprisonment 
with the option of a fine in certain instances. A nuanced sentencing regime is also vital 
for the justification of POCA. Important considerations such as restorative and child 
justice shall also be considered here. Restorative justice may be a viable consideration 
as communities are left harmed by gang-related crime. The Child Justice Act 75 of 
2008 (“the CJA”) provides for diversion orders which is aimed keeping children out of 
the harsh criminal justice system.70 Alternative (non-punitive) measures may be 
utilised and these measures often include restorative processes.71  
 
Chapter 5 will investigate whether Chapter 4 of POCA is constitutionally sound. 
The Chapter shall however first be contextualised as POCA creates a constitutional 
dichotomy. The State is firstly obliged to protect its inhabitants from all forms of 
violence,72 which requires the enactment and enforcement of criminal laws. However, 
on the other side of this dichotomous relationship is the constitutional rights of the 
accused which are equally as important to protect.73   
Several constitutional concerns arise from reading POCA Chapter 4. One of the 
main concerns is the use of previous convictions (which is usually considered as 
irrelevant and prejudicial during the trial stage) to form the required pattern of criminal 
                                            
70 See especially Chapter 8 of the CJA. 
71 See 4 5 3 below.  
72 Section 12(1)(c).  
73 Mainly entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution.  
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gang activity, which is the core of POCA Chapter 4. The legal basis for punishing this 
crime must ultimately be determined and considered whether it does not offend 
against an accused’s right to a fair trial in section 35(3) of the Constitution. Once again, 
the foreign jurisdictions of Canada and the US will be used as a comparative tool. 
Secondly, POCA Chapter 4 (with reference to the definitions in Chapter 1) will be 
scrutinised in light of the principle of legality – which is also enshrined in section 35(3) 
of the Constitution. Section 10(3) of POCA provides for increased punishment of gang 
members for crimes which are not gang-related and merely because they are gang 
members. This provision shall be scrutinised as it may offend the freedom of 
association, as well as other relevant constitutional and criminal law norms.  
Chapter 6 will analyse foreign law and international law strategies utilised to combat 
criminal gang activities and complex, group-based crimes. These will be compared 
with the relevant South African criminal law principles. An overview of the four main 
models for the criminalisation of organised crime structures will be provided. These 
models74 are: the conspiracy model;75 the participation model;76 the enterprise model77 
and the labelling/registration model.78 Several foreign jurisdictions will be utilised to 
illustrate these including the Singaporean Societies Act 56 of 1966 (which makes it an 
offence to belong to an unlawful society); the New South Wales Crimes (Criminal 
Organisations Control) Act 2012 no 9 and US civil law injunctions. It will be evaluated 
whether South Africa’s regime is currently effective compared to these foreign models 
and if one of the other models could be applied in the South African context.  
International criminal law will once again be discussed here as a means to find an 
appropriate model for the criminalisation of gang leaders. It must be emphasised that 
Chapter 4 of POCA does not contain express provisions criminalising the conduct or 
                                            
74 See A Schloenhardt Palermo on the Pacific Rim: Organised Crime Offences in The Asia Pacific 
Region (2009) 15-17. 
75 As described in the Palermo Convention and found in Australia, Singapore and Malaysia. See 
Schloenhardt (2009) 15.  
76 Also found in the Palermo Convention, the US STEP Act, Canada, New South Wales, New Zealand 
and Taiwan. See Schloenhardt (2009) 15.  
77 The most well-known example being the United States RICO Act.  
78 Found in jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, Japan and South Australia. See Schloenhardt (2009) 15. 
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involvement of gang leaders.79 Of particular importance in this context is the doctrine 
of command responsibility. This doctrine provides for a form of vicarious liability for 
military and civilian leaders under international law and is commonly used in 
international criminal tribunals. It will be argued that gangs operate in a comparable 
fashion and that gang leaders should bear the responsibility for the deeds of their 
subordinates. It will be argued that the leaders can be held liable through an adjusted 
form of this doctrine – both in the active and the passive form. The active form 
criminalises criminal orders given by a leader while the passive form relies on the 
leader’s failure to act and prevent harm caused by their subordinates.80 
Another doctrine flowing from international as well as foreign law is the doctrine of 
innocent agent or control through an organisation. Organisationsherrschat (in terms of 
German law)81 and control through an organisation under the Rome Statute of the 
ICC82 provide for the responsibility of a superior in a hierarchal relationship to be held 
responsible for the actions of his or her subordinates, independent of the criminal 
responsibility of the subordinate.  
 
Chapter 7 draws conclusions based on the findings of the preceding chapters. 
Specific suggestions for judicial development and legislative reform will be made. 
  
                                            
79 As will be noted below, the closest provision is section 9(2)(b) which criminalises the inducement to 
contribute to criminal gang activities. Section 2(1)(f) criminalises the management of an enterprise 
under the racketeering provisions of POCA. This is however a distinct offence and does not directly 
punish a gang leader for his role as such. See 4 4 1-4 4 5; 4 5 2 5; 6 2, 6 4 & 6 5 below. 
80 Danner & Martinez (2004) California Law Review 120-121. 
81 In terms of section 25 of the German Criminal Code 1998 (Strafgesetzbuch). 
82  Article 25(3)(a).  
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Chapter 2 
The development of criminal gangs in the Cape Flats 
and the rationale for criminalisation  
 “Today we have hundreds of police protecting us but we never have that in our 
communities. We demand our right to be protected and to be safe in our 
communities.”83 
2 1  Introduction  
This Chapter aims to contextualise the modern state of criminal gang activities in 
South Africa. For illustrative purposes the Chapter will discuss the development of 
criminal gangs in the Western Cape and the reasons for their proliferation. Finally, the 
underlying rationale for the criminalisation of gangs will be investigated and whether 
criminalisation is in fact the appropriate response to this phenomenon.  
2 2  Criminal gang activities in modern South Africa  
Criminal gang activity is not a recent phenomenon; to started intensify and gained 
national and governmental attention since the early 1990s.84 During the period 
between 1997 and 1999 gang membership had increased somewhere between 32% 
and 100%.85 Certain estimates suggest that the cumulative gang membership ranges 
between 80 000 and 100 000 gang members in the Cape Flats alone86 and these 
gangs contribute up to 70% of all crime committed within the Cape Flats area in the 
                                            
83 Statement by Roegshanda Pascoe, chairperson of the Manenberg Safety Forum during a march on 
Freedom Day to parliament protesting the violent presence of gangs in the Manenberg community – C 
Booysen “March because gang violence victims ‘are not free’” (28-04-2017) IOL 
<http://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/march-because-gang-violence-victims-are-not-free-8846044> 
(accessed 05-08-2017).  
84 A Standing Organised Crime: A study from the Cape Flats (2006) ix. It must also be noted, firstly, that 
reliable regarding gang-related incidents statistics of crime were dearth and seemingly (sometimes) 
subject to speculation.  
85 BE Van Wyk & WH Theron “Fighting gangsterism in South Africa:  a contextual review of gang and 
anti-gang movements in the Western Cape” (2005) 18(3) Acta Criminologica 51 51.  
86 I Kinnes “From urban street gangs to criminal empires: The changing face of gangs in the Western 
Cape” (2000) Monograph 48 ISS 10.  
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Western Cape.87 It is believed that approximately 130 gangs88 (in various 
manifestations and factions) operate in this area and that one of these gangs, the 
Americans, has 5 000 members.89 Gangs of this size are known as “supergangs” and 
may, due to their size, infrastructure and influence, start operating as 
international/transnational syndicates.90  
The State appears to have only focused on reporting gang-specific data from the 
2000s. Towards the end of the 1990’s the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) however 
conducted a survey in the Western Cape concerning gang violence in that province. 
In the ISS report, it was indicated that approximately 28% of assaults, 40% of sexual 
assaults and 41% of robberies in the province were gang-related.91  
When the State eventually decided to report gang-specific incidents of violence, it 
was typically grouped together with other types of crime, such as racially and politically 
motivated incidents under, for example, assault. In a report by Statistics South Africa 
on crime between 2011 to the end of 2015, gang-related incidents of violence 
contributed approximately 8,3% (23 541 incidents) towards assault.92 Gang or group-
motivations have furthermore contributed approximately 12,8% (2 317 incidents) 
towards the reported incidents of murder.93 At the end of the 2015/2016 year of 
reporting, the South African Police Service finally recognised gang-related offences as 
a priority crime-type and reported it individually in its yearly reports. The Report did 
however acknowledge that the “motive or causative factors” of only 59,3% of analysed 
                                            
87 Kinnes Criminal Empires ix. 
88 The reliability and accuracy of these figures have however been doubted. See Standing Cape Flats 
37-38. 
89 Standing Cape Flats 38.  
90 See Standing Cape Flats 103; D Pinnock Gang Town (2016) 98-100. 
91 L Camerer, A Louw, M Shaw, L Artz & W Scharf “Crime in Cape Town: Results of a City Victim 
Survey” (04-1998) ISS <https://oldsite.issafrica.org/uploads/Mono23Full.pdf> (accseed 01-12-2017) 
52-53. 
92 Statistics South Africa Crime Statistics Series Volume III: Exploration of selected contact crimes in 
South Africa (In-depth analysis of Victims of Crime Survey Data) 2011-2014/15 (2016) 68. 
93 Statistics South Africa Crime Statistics Series Volume III 69. 
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cases of murders have been clearly established.94 An astonishing 13,4% of those 
murders in the Western Cape were gang-related. This was also the second-highest 
national contributor to murders (2,1%) due to “group behaviour” – second only to 
incidents of mob justice or vigilantism.95 In 2014 it was reported that gangs have 
previously contributed 18% of the provincial murder rate.96 The most recent statistics 
from the 2017/2018 financial year painted an increasingly worrisome picture with 
21,6% of the provincial murder rate being attributed to gangs.97  
The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (“POCA”) has seemingly made 
no significant impact on the criminal justice system. Reports of low conviction rates of 
Cape Town gangs have started to surface – especially since 2015. In 2017 it was 
reported that only 3% of the 1 886 gang-related murders that occurred over the past 
five years in Cape Town led to successful prosecutions.98 Claims about a dismal 
conviction rate in the media caused tension within the provincial government. For 
instance, the Premier of the Western Cape, Helen Zille, criticisedcriticised the criminal 
justice system for an alleged conviction rate of only 0,7% in Mitchell’s Plain.99 The 
National Prosecuting Authority (“NPA”), the provincial Department of Community 
                                            
94 South African Police Service Annual Crime Report 2015/2016: Addendum to the SAPS Annual Report 
(2016) 11-13. The 59,3% amounted to 1 727 murders out of a total of a sample of 2 2912 incidents. 
The total number of reported numbers however amounted to 18 673 The sample thus only represented 
15,6% of the reported incidents. The 2015/2016 murder rate continued an upward trend started in 
2012/2013 and has come close to the highest recorded rate during the 2006/2007 period (19 106).  
95 South African Police Service Crime Report 2015/2016 (2016) 14-15. Gang-related murders in the 
Eastern Cape made up 3,1% of the analysed incidents. The 2015/2016 year may have shown particular 
increase in group or mass action in part to the #FeesMustFall campaign. See Crime Report (2016) 50. 
96 I Kinnes “Gangs, drugs and policing the Cape Flats” (2014) 2 Acta Criminologica 14 17.  
97 The amount of gang-related murders amounted to 808 while the total amount of persons murdered 
in the province (where the motive could be determined) amounted to 3 729 – South African Police 
Service “Crime Situation in RSA Twelve Months 01 April 2017 to 31 March 2018” (11-09-2018) South 
African Police Service 
<https://www.saps.gov.za/services/long_version_presentation_april_to_march_2017_2018.pdf> (date 
accessed 26 October 2018) (pages 17 and 24). Compare with the 2016/2017 rate of 19,3% – see South 
African Police Service “SAPS Crimestats” (24-10-2017) South African Police Service 
<https://www.saps.gov.za/services/crimestats.php> (accessed 01-11-2017). 
98 S Sesant “Gang guilty verdicts at 3%” (28-03-2017) IOL <http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-
courts/gang-guilty-verdicts-at-3-8378062> (date accessed 24-06-2017). Cf D Adriaanse “Where did 
Zille get stats for gang convictions?” (07-06-2016) IOL <http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/where-
did-zille-get-stats-for-gang-convictions-2031652> (date accessed 24-06-2017). 
99 D Adriaanse “Where did Zille get stats for gang convictions?” IOL. 
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Safety as well the national Department of Justice and Constitutional Development all 
subsequently denied these claims. The Provincial Head (Western Cape) of the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (“DJCD”), Hishaam Mohamed, 
intimated that the statistics are not readily ascertainable. The reason for this is “that 
there was no offence described as “gang-related” [and thus] made it extremely difficult 
to establish which offences were considered”.100 Mr Mohamed submitted that there 
was rather an 85% conviction rate between the 1st of April 2015 and the 31st of March 
2016 – and 133 out of 156 cases had reached a verdict. Furthermore, 65 of the cases 
that reached a verdict were gang-related.101 These statements could be construed as 
somewhat misleading. There is no indication how many of those 65 cases reached a 
conviction. It is merely stated that a verdict was reached in those cases. There is also 
no indication as to how many cases could not even reach the trial stage.  
The Western Cape provincial government, partially due to the ineffectual legislative 
efforts by the National Government and unsuccessful gang-fighting strategies, 
decided to implement additional measures earlier in this decade to combat this 
growing phenomenon. The Western Cape Minister of Community Safety has however 
voiced his disappointment in the four-pronged approach adopted by the Province. The 
approach, aimed to work in synergy, consisted of intelligence management; project-
driven gang investigation; community mobilisation and strategic deployment of police 
officers in order to create visible policing in gang-affected areas.102 The Minister also 
voiced his concern about the yearly increase (during the 2013-2014 period) of gang-
associated crimes like murder and drug-related offences.103 A further complication to 
this matrix is the fact that 85% of police stations are understaffed which further 
                                            
100 D Adriaanse “Where did Zille get stats for gang convictions?” IOL. The meaning of this statement is 
however unclear. Section 9 of POCA is labelled as “gang-related offences” and it is doubted that the 
Provincial Head of the DJCD was suggesting that no such crime exists. More likely it means that that 
phrase, used in a generic fashion and not it its strict legal context, appears nowhere in the analysed 
cases, which is likely due to the underutilisation of POCA. 
101 D Adriaanse “Where did Zille get stats for gang convictions?” IOL. 
102 D Plato “MEC Dan Plato: Briefing on provincial policing needs and priorities” (14-04-2015) Western 
Cape Government <https://www.westerncape.gov.za/news/police%E2%80%99s-gang-strategy-not-
stopping-scourge-gang-and-drug-related-crimes> (accessed 21-04-2015).  
103 Plato “MEC Dan Plato:  Briefing on provincial policing needs and priorities” Western Cape 
Government. 
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complicates the policing of criminal gang activities.104 The Premier of the Western 
Cape, in 2013, additionally released a joint-statement with the executive mayor of 
                                            
104 Plato “MEC Dan Plato:  Briefing on provincial policing needs and priorities” Western Cape 
Government. See also JM Pienaar, W Du Plessis & NJJ Olivier “Onrus en Geweld: 2014 (2)” (2014) 29 
Southern African Public Law 566 566 where the authors describe the factors contributing to the crime 
problem in South Africa, inter alia the understaffed police stations. There also seems to be a significant 
lower graduate level at the SAPS academy, amounting to “a more than 50% aggregate drop in trained 
officer output compared to the two financial years before that”. See DA “50% decline in Police Academy 
graduates is shrinking already under-staffed SAPS” (16-05-2016) DA 
<https://www.da.org.za/2016/05/50-decline-in-police-academy-graduates-is-shrinking-already-under-
staffed-saps/> (accessed 21-03-2017). This issue was highlighted by the Khayelitsha Commission – 
Khayelitsha Commission Towards a Safer Khayelitsha: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Allegations of Police Inefficiency and a Breakdown in Relations between SAPS and the Community of 
Khayelitsha (2014) (see for example page 246). Gross inequities in police distribution were quite glaring. 
Evidence was submitted to the Commission that Harare had a ratio of 634,5 residents per SAPS 
member; Khayelitsha Site B had 688,05 persons to SAPS member and Lingelethu West had 275,03 
per SAPS member. These areas are poorer in the socio-economic context and the first two areas also 
have a gang presence. Other areas in Cape Town, which have a stronger economic population and 
have lower crime rates, have disproportionately highly staffed police stations. Stellenbosch had 140,54 
persons per SAPS member; Claremont 130,79 per SAPS member and Sea Point 118,76 per SAPS 
member. On page 394 the Commission notes that  
One of the questions that has most troubled the Commission is how a system of human 
resource allocation that appears to be systematically biased against poor black communities 
could have survived twenty years into our post-apartheid democracy. 
And further on page 449 that 
[t]his research suggests that the residents of the poorest areas of Cape Town that bore the 
brunt of apartheid are still woefully under-policed twenty years into our new democracy and are 
often the police stations with the highest levels of serious contact crime. This pattern needs to 
change as a matter of urgency. 
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Cape Town, setting out radical plans to address the phenomenon in the province.105 
This rededication to the anti-gang fight was prompted by an outbreak of gang violence 
that year around the gang-plagued Manenberg area. This outbreak was partially due 
to the release of several prominent gang leaders from prison.106 It is clear from the 
statement that the local, provincial and national governments are left powerless in both 
the investigation and conviction of crimes and can merely fulfil a supervisory 
                                            
The Khayelitsha Commission also stated that Nyanga, which is also a gang hotspot, is one of the most 
understaffed police stations in the Western Cape (see page 449). In fact, the Social Justice Coalition 
(which is one of the complainant organisations that advocated for the establishment of the Commission) 
also pointed out that at the time of the findings of the Commission, that it was the most understaffed 
police station in the Western Cape and has the highest murder rate in the Western Cape as well as in 
the country – see Social Justice Coalition “Commission of Inquiry” Social Justice Coalition 
<http://www.sjc.org.za/commission_of_enquiry> (accessed 01-12-2017). The 2017 crime statistics also 
reveal that Nyanga is still the murder capital of the Western Cape (see South African Police Service 
“SAPS Crimestats” (24-10-2017) South African Police Service 
<https://www.saps.gov.za/services/crimestats.php> (accessed 01-11-2017). The Social Justice 
Coalition and Equal Education also made an application to the Equality Court citing unfair discrimination 
based on race and poverty by the Minister of Police, National Commissioner of Police, the Western 
Cape Police Commissioner as well as the Western Cape Minister for Community Safety. The Notice of 
Motion is available at 
<https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/socialjusticecoalition/pages/225/attachments/original/148518
4706/Notice_of_Motion_-_Equality_Court.pdf?1485184706>. 
See also C Booysen “Victims of gang violence have little to celebrate on #FreedomDay” (28-04-2017) 
IOL <http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/victims-of-gang-violence-have-little-to-celebrate-on-
freedomday-8850049> (accessed 05-08-2017) where the chairperson of the Manenberg Safety Forum 
stated that “[t]oday we have hundreds of police protecting us but we never have that in our communities. 
We demand our right to be protected and to be safe in our communities”. She however did admit that 
police officers are also slain due to gang members (see Booysen “March because gang violence victims 
‘are not free’” IOL).   
105 H Zille & P De Lille “Gang violence:  Western Cape Government and City of Cape Town's 
interventions: Joint Statement by Western Cape Premier Helen Zille and Executive Mayor of the City of 
Cape Town, Alderman Patricia De Lille” (13-08-2013) South African 
Government<http://www.gov.za/gang-violence-western-cape-government-and-city-cape-towns-
interventions-joint-statement-western-cape> (accessed 21-04-2015).  
106 Zille & De Lille “Gang violence: Western Cape Government and City of Cape Town's interventions: 
Joint Statement by Western Cape Premier Helen Zille and Executive Mayor of the City of Cape Town, 
Alderman Patricia De Lille” South African Government. 
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function.107 This supervisory function could however not be executed efficiently due to 
the alleged unwillingness of the previous Minister of the Police, Nathi Mthethwa, to 
cooperate with the Western Cape Government.108  The statement furthermore 
highlighted five interventions that addressed gang violence specifically. The most 
significant proposal calls for the re-establishment of the specialised gang and drug 
units which was disbanded by former police commissioner Jackie Selebi.109 It was 
alleged that these units were disbanded in order to protect gang leaders.110 Since the 
disbandment in 2004, there has been a sharp rise in drug-related crimes – which are 
often associated with gangs and often form the crux of their criminal operations.111 In 
fact, the Western Cape experienced a 181% increase in these crimes from the 
2003/2004 period to the 2011/2012 period.112 Shockingly, it was also reported that 
40% of the crimes committed in the Western Cape that year occurred within six areas 
                                            
107 In terms of section 206 of the Constitution, which confers powers to the local and provincial 
government. Especially of significance are sections 206(3)(a) and (b) which states that that provinces 
are entitled to monitor police conduct; “oversee the effectiveness and efficiency of the police service, 
including receiving reports on the police service”. 
108 H Zille & De Lille “Gang violence: Western Cape Government and City of Cape Town's interventions: 
Joint Statement by Western Cape Premier Helen Zille and Executive Mayor of the City of Cape Town, 
Alderman Patricia De Lille” South African Government. 
109 On 8 October 2018, a new 95-member Anti-Gang Unit was launched by SAPS. The operational area 
is within the Nyanga cluster, Bishop Lavis and Bonteheuwel. See L Daniel “Cape Flats gets new anti-
gang unit thanks to national police ministry” (01-11-2018) The South African 
<https://www.thesouthafrican.com/cape-flats-gang-unit-national-government/> (accessed 02-11-
2018); EWN “Cele Hails Success of Cape's New Anti-Gang Unit” (15-11-2018) Eyewitness News 
<https://ewn.co.za/2018/11/14/cele-hails-success-of-cape-s-new-anti-gang-unit> (accessed 15-11-
2018). 
110 Zille & De Lille “Gang violence: Western Cape Government and City of Cape Town's interventions: 
Joint Statement by Western Cape Premier Helen Zille and Executive Mayor of the City of Cape Town, 
Alderman Patricia De Lille” South African Government. 
111 M Wijnberg Exploration of Male Gang Members’ Perspectives of Gangs And Drugs MA (Social Work) 
thesis University of Stellenbosch (2012) 67-79 (especially) where the author discusses the relationship 
between gangs and drug use. Also see Department of Community Safety Provincial Policing Needs 
and Priorities (PNP) Report for the Western Cape 2015/16 (2016) where it was reported that the police 
stations that reported the most drug-related offences were also those that were greatly affected by gang 
activity.  
112 D Kohler Barnard “DA Challenges Minister To Re-establish Anti-drug And Gang Units” (18-06-2013) 
DA <http://www.da.org.za/2013/06/da-challenges-minister-to-re-establish-anti-drug-and-gang-units/> 
(accessed 21-04-2015).   
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of Cape Town – areas that are all known for its gang presence.113 Mitchell’s Plain in 
Cape Town is also known for a substantial gang presence and a staggering number 
of 25 575 crimes were reported at the Mitchell’s Plain police office during the 
2013/2014 period – the highest rate in the country.114  
There have also been suggestions of interventions by the South African National 
Defence Force (“SANDF”) to “stabilise gang hotspot areas” – thereby giving SAPS the 
liberty to investigate and arrest offenders in these areas. The request was denied, 
allegedly because the SAPS was deemed to have the capacity to deal with this matter 
efficiently.115 This determination was probably misdirected, considering that the ratio 
of citizens to officers is three times bigger than the provincial average.116 The Western 
Cape Department of Community Safety has also referenced understaffed police 
stations as a priority problem provincially, and this is also an issue in numerous police 
stations.117 Commentators like Kinnes are opposed to the deployment of the SANDF 
to fight gangs. The author correctly argues that the SANDF is trained to engage in 
situations of war and not to stabilise civilian criminal problems like criminal gang 
situations. He also doubts whether the SANDF will be able to identify gang members 
because not even the police seem to be able to distinguish them from the general 
public.118 The deployment of the Tactical Response Team in Manenberg has also 
                                            
113 JM Pienaar, W Du Plessis & NJJ Olivier “Onrus en Geweld: 2014 (1)” (2014) 29 Southern African 
Public Law 207 208. These areas are Philippi East, Gugulethu, Harare, Khayelitsha, Lingelethu West 
and Nyanga.  
114 Pienaar, Du Plessis & Olivier (2014) Southern African Public Law 566. 
115 Zille & De Lille “Gang violence: Western Cape Government and City of Cape Town's interventions: 
Joint Statement by Western Cape Premier Helen Zille and Executive Mayor of the City of Cape Town, 
Alderman Patricia De Lille” South African Government. It is pointed out in the statement that there were 
115 murders in Manenberg which had a shocking conviction rate of only 25%. This clearly illustrates an 
institutional failure (at least in part) by the SAPS.   
116 Zille & De Lille “Gang violence: Western Cape Government and City of Cape Town's interventions: 
Joint Statement by Western Cape Premier Helen Zille and Executive Mayor of the City of Cape Town, 
Alderman Patricia De Lille” South African Government. It is pointed out in the statement that there were 
115 murders in Manenberg but had a shocking conviction rate of only 25%. This clearly illustrates an 
institutional failure (at least particularly) by the SAPS. See Pienaar, Du Plessis & Olivier (2014) Southern 
African Public Law 566. 
117 See Department of Community Safety Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) Report for the 
Western Cape 2015/16 (2016) 79. 
118 Kinnes (2014) Acta Criminologica 23. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 30 
 
increased the disdain of the community towards the police.119 There has been a 
deployment of the SANDF in 2015 as part of Operation Field-reclaim.120 This 
operation, though not focused on specifically addressing criminal gang activities, has 
seen the implementation of a multi-agency approach with the ambitious goal of 
“eliminating criminality and general lawlessness”.121 Government agencies, including 
the Department of Home Affairs (with immigration services), the Department of 
Community, SARS, border police, public order police, cluster police, and the second 
hand goods component of the police were participating.122 The SANDF was only 
involved from late April until the end of June.123 The operation also faced harsh 
censure due to its disproportionate effect on illegal immigrants and the appearances 
of “state-sponsored xenophobia”.124 
The social impact of gangs on communities in the Western Cape is also undeniable. 
Kinnes points towards the closing of government services due to gang activities, 
                                            
119 Kinnes (2014) Acta Criminologica 23. 
120 Parliament of South Africa “Parliament on results of Operation Fiela” (15-05-2017) South African 
Government <http://www.gov.za/speeches/results-operation-fiela-reclaim-noted-15-may-2015-0000> 
(accessed 06-08-2017).  
121 Parliament of South Africa “Operation Fiela” (2015) South African Government 
<http://www.gov.za/operation-fiela> (accessed 06-08-2017).  
122 Parliament of South Africa “Operation Fiela” (2015) South African Government.  
123 Africa News Agency “SANDF are no longer part of Operation Fiela – Mapisa-Nqakula” (07-09-2015) 
eNCA <http://www.enca.com/south-africa/sandf-are-no-longer-part-operation-fiela-%E2%80%93-
mapisa-nqakula> (accessed 06-08-2017). 
124 Africa News Agency “SANDF are no longer part of Operation Fiela – Mapisa-Nqakula” eNCA. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 31 
 
including the closing of schools,125 health service providers126 and transport 
services.127 This offends constitutional rights, such as the right to education,128 right to 
access to health care,129 children’s rights130 as well as the right to freedom from 
violence.131  It has previously been indicated that 61,6% of 22 schools in areas 
prevalent with gang activities, were affected.132 During a five-month period in 2016 
alone, 99 incidents of gang violence, shootings and presence on school grounds were 
reported to the Safe Schools call centre leading up to 63% student absenteeism in the 
Manenberg area alone. Students there and in other affected areas have to resort to 
                                            
125 See P Saal “Schools reopen after bullets fly in gang turf wars” (01-06-2017) TimesLive 
<https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-06-01-schools-reopen-after-bullets-fly-in-gang-
turf-wars/> (accessed 24-06-2017). Here, turf wars in Lavender Hill caused four schools to close and 
two teachers suffered mild strokes due to the stress from the ongoing violence. Only about 50% of the 
learners returned to the school after they reopened. Also see M Charles “At least 15 killed in ongoing 
#BishopLavis gang violence” (01-08-2017) IOL <http://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/at-least-15-killed-in-
ongoing-bishoplavis-gang-violence-10583599> (accessed 06-08-2017) where, as the title suggests, 
fifteen people were killed in an outbreak of gang violence in Bishop Lavis. Among those victims were 
two school learners who had died in the crossfire.  
126 See also P Saal “Cape Flats clinic to reopen after two staff members were caught in gang wars” (02-
06-2017) TimesLive <https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-06-02-cape-flats-clinic-to-
reopen-after-two-staff-members-were-caught-in-gang-wars/> (accessed 24-06-2017). “Gang wars” in 
Lavender Hill led to the temporary closure of clinic and relocation of patients after two of the employees 
of the clinic were wounded in the crossfire.   
127 Kinnes (2014) Acta Criminologica 16.  
128 In terms of section 29 of the Constitution. This is especially an infringement of section 29(1) which 
guarantees everyone the right to a basic education.  
129 In terms of section 27(1)(a). 
130 Section 28(1)(c) promises the right to, inter alia, basic health care and social services.  
131 Section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution. This section is also discussed below in Chapter 7. Also C 
Booysen “March because gang violence victims ‘are not free’” IOL. The chairperson of the Manenberg 
Safety Forum stated that the community is effectively being “held hostage by gangsters” and highlighted 
the impact on their community, including the death of children (especially through gunfire), the rape of 
women as well as the death of police officers in the line of duty. 
132 Western Cape Government Integrated Provincial Violence Prevention Policy Framework (2013) 12. 
Also see Anonymous “Gang wars force pupils to move to safe exam location” (23-06-2017) IOL 
<http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/gang-wars-force-pupils-to-move-to-safe-exam-
location-9934630> (accessed 24-06-2017). It was indicated in the article that students feel traumatised 
by hearing gunshots during school hours. They are also conflicted due the fact that schools criticised 
gangsterism violence, but it is a normal way of life at home. 
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hiding weapons as “protection from rival gangs”.133 The omnipresence of gangs leads 
to the eventual normalisation of gangsterism and gang violence in the affected areas. 
Children also often join gangs and “mimic the violence”.134 Children also join gangs 
purely out of self-preservation.135 They face the impossible choice of either joining a 
gang in order to receive protection and “immunity” from that gang or not join a gang 
and remain vulnerable to all threats. Schools are used as market places for the sale 
of drugs136 and girls may fall victim to human trafficking.137 There seems, despite these 
tragedies, a lack of political willpower to remedy the situation.138  
2 3  An overview of the development of criminal gangs in South Africa (in
 particular the Cape Flats)  
The evolution of the criminal gang phenomenon in South Africa must be described 
in the context of the transformation of the nature of organised crime in general. This 
transformation, according to Standing, can mainly be ascribed to three broad 
factors.139 Firstly, during the transitional phase of South Africa after the 
democratisation in 1994, there was a weakening of the previous regime’s “police 
state”.140 There was a shift under the new constitutional regime, where the power of 
the police was restricted and there was strong focus on human rights and due process. 
The vast and virtually unrestricted powers of the apartheid state’s security apparatus 
                                            
133 I Fredericks “Gang war hits Cape schools hard” (06-06-2016) IOL <http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-
courts/gang-war-hits-cape-schools-hard-2030999> (accessed 06-08-2017).  Also see S Fisher 
“Learner Dies After Being Stabbed at Kraaifontein School” (14-06-2017) Eyewitness News 
<http://ewn.co.za/2017/06/14/grade-8-learner-stabbed-to-death-at-kraaifontein-school> (accessed 06-
08-2017) where a student was died after an apparent gang-related stabbing by a fellow-pupil in a school 
in Kraaifontein.  
134 Anonymous “Gang wars force pupils to move to safe exam location” IOL. 
135 Anonymous “Gang wars force pupils to move to safe exam location” IOL. 
136 See Department of Community Safety Provincial Policing Needs and Priorities (PNP) Report for the 
Western Cape 2015/16 (2016) 55. 
137 A Standing “The threat of gangs and anti-gangs policy: Policy discussion paper” (2005) Paper 116 
Institute for Security Studies 1 3. 
138 See J Jansen “The Big Read: The kids who dodge bullets” (01-06-2017) 
<https://www.timeslive.co.za/ideas/2017-06-01-the-big-read-the-kids-who-dodge-bullets/> TimesLive 
(accessed 24 June 2017). Here, Professor Jonathan Jansen writes critically on the lack of pollical 
willpower to tackle the gang crisis in the Cape Flats.    
139 Standing Cape Flats 38. 
140 Standing Cape Flats 38-39. 
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(including the police) were greatly curtailed by the constitutional and legislative 
transformation of the post-apartheid era. This also required the retraining of police 
officers.141 Various criminal groups (including foreign groups) took advantage of the 
perceived new lenient policing mechanisms by the new SAPS. The period of political 
transition thus afforded criminal groups the opportunity to flourish.142  
This leads to the second contributing factor, namely the proliferation of criminal 
groups owing to the weakening of the state borders. South Africa was greatly isolated 
from the international community during the apartheid-era but after the reopening of 
the borders, various criminal influences from across the African continent (significantly 
Nigeria) were able to make their way to South Africa.143 Local gangs, for the first time 
since the closing of the trade borders under the apartheid regime, now had the 
opportunity to cooperate with transnational144 syndicates to grow their criminal 
                                            
141 Standing Cape Flats 38-39. The transition can also be described, as famously stated by Etienne 
Mureinik, as a transition between a culture of authority to a culture of justification. He says 
If the new Constitution is a bridge away from a culture of authority, it is clear what it must be a 
bridge to. It must lead to a culture of justification - a culture in which every exercise of power is 
expected to be justified; in which the leadership given by government rests on the cogency of 
the case offered in defence of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force at its command. 
E Mureinik “A bridge to where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 South African Journal 
of Human Rights 31 33. Also see D Dyzenhaus “Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik's Conception of 
Legal Culture” (1998) 14 South African Journal of Human Rights 11. 
142 Standing Cape Flats 38-39. Also see Cowling (1998) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 351-
352.  
143 Standing Cape Flats 38-39. Also see See P Gastrow “Organised Crime in South Africa: An 
Assessment of its Nature and Origins” (08-1998) ISS 
<https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Mono28.pdf> (accessed 14-11-2016). There was 
also the influence (as the author calls it) “fortune seekers” during the 1980s from countries such as 
Britain, Portugal and France forged relationships in African countries (such as Zambia, Zaire and 
Zimbabwe). The author points out that the so-called white fortune seekers could more easily smuggle 
the goods illicit goods (such as Mandrax, diamonds and precious metals) into the country than 
smugglers from African countries due to the harsh border control during Apartheid. This problem was 
however alleviated for the African smugglers after the fall of the Apartheid State.  
144 The Palermo Convention classifies a crime as transnational in article 2 when 
(a) It is committed in more than one State; 
(b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or 
control takes place in another State; 
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markets.145 Foreign syndicates also identified South Africa as a breeding ground for 
their criminal activities, due to the sophisticated infrastructure (including banking, 
transport and telecommunication).146 The foreign influence – which stretches beyond 
the African continent and includes Russian, American and Chinese criminal groups – 
introduced their criminal networks to local gangs and consequently elevated their level 
of structural and criminal organisation.147 Relatively rudimentary criminal endeavours 
morphed into sophisticated, organised criminal operations. During the 1980s, local 
gangs like the Hard Livings, used to, amongst other things, gamble and extort 
businesses within their local communities. Post-democratisation their operations 
began to stretch their tentacles outside of their base in Manenberg and they became 
involved in, for example, the sex industry. Their influence and income grew to the 
extent where they could invest the proceeds of the illicit income back into their 
communities during the 1990s.148 In reaction to certain syndicates encroaching on 
their territories, larger gangs, that mainly operate on the streets, , began to adopt the 
hierarchal structure including a strict chain of command, language and code of conduct 
to organise their members, expand their network as well as “control their 
customers”.149 
The main consensus surrounding the reasons behind the flourishing of gang 
activities in the Cape Flats is centred on the displacement of families due to the impact 
of the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 (“the Act”). The Act made possible the displacement 
                                            
(c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal 
activities in more than one State; or 
(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.  
145 See Kinnes (2000) ISS 10. See generally on the proliferation of criminal groups and their infiltration 
into global markets E Mylonaki “The manipulation of organised crime by terrorists: Legal and factual 
perspectives” (2002) 2 ICLR 213 213. 
146 Standing Cape Flats 38-39. Also see M Cowling “Fighting organised crime: comment on the 
Prevention of Organised Crime Bill 1998” (1998) 11 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 350 351-
352. 
147 Standing Cape Flats 38-39 (where the author relies on B Haefele “Gangsterism in the Western Cape” 
in Anon. Criminal economy, gangs and child abuse in the Western Cape Town (2003) 31.  
148 See Kinnes (2000) ISS 10. 
149 Pinnock Gang Town 105. Pinncok points out by 2000, syndicates have predominantly become 
suppliers of gangs, and gangs at that stage controlled about 90% of the dagga, madrax and cocaine 
markets.  
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of approximately 700 000 Coloured and African Families from the homes in the inner-
city of Cape Town over a period of 32 years (1950-1982).150 This displacement to the 
Cape Flats disrupted the social cohesion and a level of informal social control that 
communities and extended families had over each other.151 Although small gangs 
were in existence in areas such as District Six (an area adjacent to Cape Town CBD), 
they appeared to still be subject to the informal social control. 152 These criminal youth 
groups developed due to increasing overcrowding impacting on living conditions.153 
The overcrowding in the affected areas limited income opportunities in the informal 
markets such as hawking, prostitution and shebeens which necessitated engagement 
in criminal activities in order to survive and demarcate territory.154 These groups were 
mainly dealt with without resorting to imprisonment and were generally regarded more 
of a nuisance than a serious criminal threat. They were issued fines by the police and 
were directed to farms to labour while “under sentence”.155 This situation remained 
relatively stable leading up to the harsh implementation of the Group Areas Act, 
referred to above.156 
Pinnock notes that the character of these groups began to transform during the 
1940s. Previously predominantly benign groups of youths transformed into organised 
criminal groups, which coincided with the increase in illegal gambling and shebeens. 
Crimes committed by the gangs became violent and boys were often necessitated to 
join due to self-preservation.157 This transformation evoked reaction both from the 
State as well as the community. The State intervened with a Special Squad with wide 
powers in 1946. This squad however made the most of their wide powers and 
seemingly believed in guilt by association. Part of the modus operandi was to also 
arrest family members of the alleged gang members.158  
                                            
150 BE Van Wyk & WH Theron “Fighting gangsterism in South Africa: a contextual review of gang and 
anti-gang movements in the Western Cape” (2005) 18(3) Acta Criminologica 51 53. 
151 Pinnock Gang Town (2016) 17-18. 
152 TR Samara Cape Town After Apartheid: Crime and Governance in the Divided City (2011) 93-94. 
153 See Van Wyk & Theron (2005) Acta Criminologica 53. 
154 Samara Cape Town After Apartheid 93; Pinnock Gang Town 18-19. 
155 Pinnock Gang Town 18-19. 
156 Pinnock Gang Town 18-19. 
157 Pinnock Gang Town 19-20. 
158 Pinnock Gang Town 20. 
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During the 1950s, a group called the Globe emerged. This group seemed to first 
have the intention of protecting the community against criminal gang activities but 
later, ironically, transformed into a sophisticated criminal gang itself selling marijuana, 
as well participating in smuggling and gambling operations.159  
Van Wyk and Theron describe the Struggle Period in South Africa as a period of 
“demise” for gangs (as well as anti-gang movements).160 So-called “defence” gangs 
were formed. Youth members grouped together to shield themselves from falling 
victim to gang activities. Older men also grouped together to form the “Peacemakers”. 
These self-protection mechanisms by communities (which was necessitated by the 
seeming disinterest by the provincial administration in the gang problem) were 
however thwarted due to the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 (“RAA”). The RAA 
prohibited the gathering of non-white persons to prevent political dissention.161 From 
around the 1960s towards the end of the 1970s (particularly 1976) a significant number 
of non-white inhabitants of the country were involved in the collective struggle against 
the apartheid regime.162 Cross points out that gang members were employed in the 
political movement and “brought with them some of the anarchy, self-assertion, and 
spirit of defiance of the streets”.163 Street violence seemed to have been re-focused 
towards the governmental oppression.164  
There was a resurgence of criminal gangs towards the end of the struggle period 
and inception of the democratic dispensation (1986-1996).165 Gangs and potential 
gang members were no longer required in the liberation struggle. This was because 
the final phases of the liberation struggle were done predominantly through (peaceful) 
negotiations.166 This once again enticed people to join and re-focus their collective 
strategies to criminal activities.  
The transition to a democratic society towards the mid-1990s also did not provide 
job opportunities as expected by many communities, including those affected by 
                                            
159 Pinnock Gang Town 20-27. 
160 Van Wyk & Theron (2005) Acta Criminologica 53. 
161 Van Wyk & Theron (2005) Acta Criminologica 54. 
162 M Cross “Youth, Culture, and Politics in South African Education: The Past, Present, and Future” 
(1993) 24(4) Youth & Society 377 386; Van Wyk & Theron (2005) Acta Criminologica 54. 
163 Cross (1993) Youth & Society 385.   
164 See Cross (1993) Youth & Society 387-388. 
165 Van Wyk & Theron (2005) Acta Criminologica 54.  
166 Van Wyk & Theron (2005) Acta Criminologica 54. 
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gangs. Once again, just as with the first manifestations of gangs, modern era gangs 
were stimulated due to a lack of financial opportunities.167 As described above, the 
democratic and constitutional dispensation brought about a severe limitation on the 
powers of the so-called police state. The control which the State could previously 
exercise over gang areas were thus restricted to the extent where gangs were given 
the opportunity to flourish under the new political dispensation168 with its greater focus 
on human rights and due process.  
Gangs emerged as a prominent threat against the young South African democracy, 
especially towards the end of the 1990s. Vigilante group, PAGAD (People Against 
Gangsterism and Drugs), created a war-like atmosphere in the Cape Flats and brought 
about the apex of the 1990s gang war, which was characterised by a tense and fearful 
atmosphere to not only those living in the Cape Flats but also the greater Cape Town 
area.169 The aim of PAGAD was to eradicate gang activities in the affected areas which 
often resulted in violent home invasions.170 Their activities were however not only 
limited to gang members but the so-called gang war also involved clashes with the 
police and claimed the lives of dozens of non-gang members of the public.171  
Gangs started to change tactic. The high-profile killing of a suspected drug dealer 
leader by PAGAD appeared to have frighten gang members and leaders into operating 
more covertly.172 The PAGAD gang war (at least partially) and the increased gang 
presence in the 1990s prompted the Government to react with the enactment of 
POCA.173 
The “post-PAGAD” and post-POCA era has been marked by a new tumultuous 
period with several particularly violent outbreaks of gang violence which have occurred 
with depressing regularity, specifically in 1996, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2011 and 2013.174 
Kinnes posits that the spikes in gang violence are associated with periods of political 
                                            
167 See Kinnes (2000) ISS 10-11. 
168 Van Wyk & Theron (2005) Acta Criminologica 54. 
169 See Standing Cape Flats 43. 
170 Van Wyk & Theron (2005) Acta Criminologica 53. 
171 See Standing Cape Flats 43; Van Wyk & Theron (2005) Acta Criminologica 53. 
172 Standing Cape Flats 43; See Kinnes (2000) ISS 10-11. 
173 Standing Cape Flats 43. 
174 Kinnes (2014) Acta Criminologica 17. There was also a violent outbreak in 1993 but does not fall 
within this category.  
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and social strife and occur mostly in periods just after school holidays.175 The ensuing 
gang wars are also lasting significantly longer. Previously (between the 1970s and the 
1990s), inter-gang conflicts would last a few days and at most a few weeks. Several 
of the inter-gang conflicts, especially after 2010, have lasted in some instances 
between six and eight months.176 Such conflicts are difficult for SAPS to control and 
must also be understood in the context of approximately 85% of police stations being 
understaffed and ill-equipped to deal with quasi-war situations. These conflicts mainly 
appear to revolve around the expansion or control of drug territories.177 The retention 
and expansion of drug territories is extremely important to criminal gangs (especially 
marijuana, cocaine and mandrax), as proceeds from drugs often constitute their main 
source of income. Consequently, innocent members of the public are terrorised by 
inter-gang wars and are often fatally wounded.178 
From the discussion above, one notices that gangs have taken on several 
manifestations throughout the decades. The basic evolutionary forms include a means 
of basic survival and camaraderie; comrades in the freedom struggle; members of 
sophisticated crime syndicates; and perpetrators of domestic warfare. This, once 
again, underscores the complexities of dealing with organised crime in general and 
criminal gang activities in particular. Neither social nor legislative interventions have 
made a significant impact on the gang problem in the Western Cape. Gang-related 
crimes seem to have increased along with an intensification of legislative and social 
strategies. It remains to be seen whether a programme such as the National Anti-Gang 
Strategy that aims to work holistically rather than addressing gang convictions or 
providing social programmes in isolation, will live up to its promise.  
  
                                            
175 Kinnes (2014) Acta Criminologica 17. 
176 Kinnes (2014) Acta Criminologica 17. 
177 See South African Police Service Annual Crime Report 2015/2016: Addendum to the SAPS Annual 
Report (2016) 80.  
178 See A Standing “The threat of gangs and anti-gangs policy: Policy discussion paper” (2005) Paper 
116 Institute for Security Studies 1 2.  
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2 4  The rationale for the criminalisation of gangs 
2 4 1  Introduction  
It is at this point that two broad questions must be posed. Firstly, what is the 
rationale for criminalising criminal gang activities when there are already existing 
common law and statutory mechanisms available to address criminal conduct 
associated with criminal gangs? And, secondly, whether sanctions through criminal 
law are in fact the appropriate response to the phenomenon of criminal gangs.179  
2 4 2  The criminalisation of an existing wrong  
Modern societies have tended to attach criminal sanctions to four categories of 
factors or considerations, namely public morality, the preservation of the state, the 
protection of human interests, and the promotion of public welfare.180 Two of these 
interests stand out in the context of criminal gang activities: protection of human 
interests and the promotion of public welfare. The discussion above details the human 
interests that criminal gang activities endanger.181  Chapter 5 below will also provide 
an exposition of the relevant constitutional interests, namely fair trial rights of the 
accused on the one hand and the public’s right to be free from violence on the other 
hand.182 The protection of human rights (especially bodily integrity) in the broader 
context of human interests however does not explain why the participation in criminal 
gang activities should receive separate criminalisation while the underlying crimes are 
all already criminal acts. In other words, the rationale for separate criminalisation 
should therefore transcend the mere underlying criminal activities that criminal gangs 
engage in. The same argument holds for the promotion of public welfare. Whether 
acts of violence are, for example, perpetrated by a gang, or whether those same acts 
of violence are perpetrated by a single criminal: the public welfare is threatened 
nonetheless.  
                                            
179 Cf Khayelitsha Commission Towards a Safer Khayelitsha: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Allegations of Police Inefficiency and a Breakdown in Relations between SAPS and the Community of 
Khayelitsha (2014)168.  
180 GP Kemp, S Walker, R Palmer, D Baqwa, C Gevers, A Steynberg Criminal Law in South Africa 2 ed 
(2015) 7-10; H Gross A Theory of Criminal Justice (1979) 119. 
181 See especially 2 2 above.  
182 See especially 5 1-5 3 below.  
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 Duff argued183 that criminalisation of conduct should only take place when three 
preconditions are met:  There must firstly be a moral wrong and the conduct will be 
morally reprehensible based on the harm caused or the substantial risk that the 
conduct carries. Secondly, the conduct demands a State response on behalf of victims 
and/or the wider community. Lastly, it must be necessary to underscore the 
wrongfulness of the vexed conduct “as something that needs to be collectively marked 
and censured”.184 Whether the criminalisation of criminal gang activity is perfectly 
suitable under Duff’s modern model, is deserving of further discussion. 
The harm is in fact reprehensible in that it causes substantial risk to the health, 
safety, security, property and most importantly lives of the inhabitants of the country. 
This is patent from the contextualisation of gang activities discussed under 2 3 above. 
The State therefore has a vested interest in not only protecting inhabitants from the 
underlying crimes but also from the particular (in a sense, systemic) modus operandi 
of criminal gangs.  
Is the risk and the direct harm afflicted by and through criminal gangs however 
morally enough reprehensible to justify (separate) criminalisation? The “pervasive 
presence” and harmful impact on local communities is acknowledged in the preamble 
to POCA and evidenced in the previous section of this chapter; thus signalling the kind 
of rationale for criminalisation of criminal gang activities which we need to interrogate 
further. Criminal endeavours which strike at the fabric of the community (as illustrated 
above at 2 2 above) as such may be considered to be the foundation upon which 
criminalisation of the systemic aspects, the criminal gang activities, rests.  
Gang members themselves are often equally victim to their circumstances. Binns-
Ward J, in considering an appropriate sentence for gang members, addressed the 
systemic aspects (the gang culture) and stated the following 
I am acutely conscious of the very real disadvantages to which young persons like the 
accused are subject in [Manenberg]. The circumstances are such that they and their 
peers are under significant temptation and enticement to become involved in gang 
membership and activity. This comes about not only because of pervasive poverty and 
                                            
183 L McNamara “Criminalisation Research in Australia” in T Crofts & A Loughnan (eds) Criminalisation 
and Criminal Responsibility in Australia (2015) 33 35; A Duff “Towards a Modest Legal Moralism” (2014) 
8(1) Criminal Law and Philosophy 217 226-228. 
184 McNamara in Crofts & A Loughnan (eds) Criminalisation (2015) 35 where the author refers to Duff. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 41 
 
unemployment, but also because of the prevailing social norms in the area, which 
seem to accept gang culture as part of the way of life. This is manifest by the way in 
which the various gangs that operate in the area have carved out territories within the 
suburb in which one or other of them holds sway and influence. It is also borne out by 
the evidence that such is the hold of gang culture in the area that there is little respect 
for the forces of law and order. The police are openly defied and disregarded on 
occasion. It is a place where life is treated cheaply, and killings and revenge killings 
are the order of the day. It is clear from the evidence that the unlawful possession of 
firearms and ammunition is commonplace in the area and that such munitions are 
regularly used to lethal effect.185 
The Court therefore acknowledges an element of “moral condemnation” due to a 
general disregard for law and the safety and security of others. Although Binns-Ward 
J admits that this condemnation should be somewhat tempered due to difficult socio-
economic circumstances, it does not absolve gang members from accountability.186 
More importantly for present purposes is the sentiment which directly speaks to the 
systemic nature of criminal gang activities, that is, the “gang culture” which needs to 
be confronted in a meaningful way. 
Keeping the sentiments above in mind, it cannot be denied that additional State 
intervention is necessitated, and it must manifest in the criminalisation of conduct. The 
pervasive presence of gang-related activity in the Western Cape is undeniable. Legal 
intervention is justified considering the State’s constitutional duty to protect its citizens, 
and especially the most vulnerable and marginalised communities. 
Protection of the public from a wrong is however not limited to the criminalisation of 
conduct to effect remedy or protect the inhabitants from the moral wrong. Other public 
policy responses may prove to be useful.187 Poverty is at the core of the inception and 
continuation of the criminal gang phenomenon in South Africa. Allocating additional 
resources to job creation may thus steer potential gang members away from joining a 
criminal gang. Youth programmes, as the youth often fall victim to gang recruitment, 
may serve a similar purpose. The Western Cape Government has employed various 
non-punitive strategies and interventions to deal with criminal gangs, including a four-
                                            
185 S v Jordaan and Others WCC 07-02-2018 case no CC20/2017 (“Jordaan”) para 3.  
186 Jordaan para 4. 
187 See McNamara in Crofts & A Loughnan (eds) Criminalisation (2015) 41. 
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pronged approach (intelligence management; project-driven gang investigation; 
community mobilisation and strategic deployment of police officers).188  
The role of the criminal law as a deterrent should also not be ignored. As Simester 
and von Hirsch plainly put it, criminal law does not politely ask “̔[d]o not assault others, 
please.’ It tells: ‘Do not assault others, or else’”.189 It is questionable whether the 
promulgation and implementation of POCA has threatened gang members from 
committing gang-related crimes on the threat of punishment in the Simester and von 
Hirsch sense of the word. The incidences of gang-related crimes and the occurrence 
of gang wars has, in fact, increased since the inception of POCA. Viewed from a pure 
crime-prevention standpoint, POCA does not seem to have made a significant impact 
on the South African criminal justice system. In fact, there seems to be only one 
reported case on POCA Chapter 4 since its promulgation in early 1999.190 The 
particulars and critical assessment of POCA Chapter 4 will be discussed more 
comprehensively in subsequent chapters of this dissertation.191 
As alluded to above, there are, for the most part,192 already existing crimes in both 
statute and common law which criminalise the underlying criminal gang activities 
(murder, assault, rape, robbery, drug-related offences and so forth). Why then 
criminalise criminal gang activities as a subspecies? It might be instructive to compare 
criminal gang activities with the phenomenon of terrorism in this regard. 
Zedner refers to Waldron’s inconsistency in categorising acts of terror, on the one 
hand, as just a manifestation of the underlying crime, and on the other hand as 
something that transcends the underlying criminal offence.193 In the first instance 
Waldron argues that the September 11 2001 attacks “were murders in a quite 
                                            
188 D Plato “MEC Dan Plato: Briefing on provincial policing needs and priorities” (14-04-2015) Western 
Cape   Government <https://www.westerncape.gov.za/news/police%E2%80%99s-gang-strategy-not-
stopping-scourge-gang-and-drug-related-crimes> (accessed 21-04-2015). See above at 1 4. 
189 AP Simester & A von Hirsch Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation (2011) 
5.  
190 See also JM Mujuzi “Ten Years of The South African Prevention of Organised Crime Act (1999–
2009): What Case Law Tells Us?” (2009) 10 where the author, at that time (2009), did a comprehensive 
study of the case law since the promulgation of POCA in its first decade of operation. The author found 
that there had been no reported cases implementing sections 9 and 10 of the Act.  
191 See Chapter 4. 
192 See Chapters 3 and 4 below for a comprehensive exposition on the overlap between common law 
and statutory mechanisms in dealing with criminal gang activities.  
193 L Zedner “Terrorizing Criminal Law” (2014) 8 Criminal Law and Philosophy 99 112-113. 
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straightforward sense (…)” and “[t]hey were murder pure and simple”.194 In the second 
instance he admits that there is “a special sort of moral outrage” which transcends the 
moral outrage associated with non-terroristic acts of, for example, murder or 
destruction of property.195 The latter sentiment seems to encapsulate the motivation 
for criminalising criminal gang activities. Waldron’s latter sentiment is reminiscent of 
Moseneke J’s justification of the common purpose doctrine in S v Thebus and Another 
(“Thebus”).196 The common purpose doctrine is seen as a necessary tool in the fight 
against “collective criminal conduct” which is a “significant societal scourge” and the 
particular difficulty to prove such conduct due to the evidentiary hurdles associated 
with group-based crimes.197 It was submitted that without the common purpose 
doctrine certain participants of crime would escape prosecution and this “would not 
accord with the considerable societal distaste for crimes by common design”.198 
To be clear: terrorism is a phenomenon which may or may not be worthy of 
criminalisation; common purpose is a mode of liability. But they both share the 
underlying rationale, namely that the normal principles of criminal law, which tend to 
focus on the harmful conduct directly committed by an individual, are adjusted to 
express outrage about secondary effects or motive (in the case of terrorism) and 
assign criminal responsibility to individuals associated with criminal conduct under 
conditions where the normal modes of liability would be inadequate (common purpose 
doctrine).  
We have seen that gangs and the culture of gangs are undeniably a scourge 
affecting not only individuals, but communities as such - especially in the Western 
Cape’s poorest and most marginalised communities. It is perhaps not self-evident that 
their underlying crimes are more of a scourge than crimes committed by individual 
perpetrators detached from some or other broader context or complex and therefore 
                                            
194 J Waldron “Civilians, Terrorism, and Deadly Conventions” in Torture, terror and trade-offs: 
Philosophy for the White House (2010) 80 108. 
195 J Waldron “Terrorism and the Uses of Terror” in Torture, terror and trade-offs: Philosophy for the 
White House (2010) 108. See L Zedner “Terrorizing Criminal Law” (2014) 8 Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 113. 
196 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC). 
197 Thebus para 34. The most significant evidentiary hurdle is pinpointing the main actor(s) causally 
responsible for the unlawful consequence. The argument that certain participants of crime would escape 
conviction is fundamentally flowed and is critiqued below at 3 3 4.  
198 Thebus para 40 (own emphasis). 
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deserving of some sort of super-criminalisation. Moseneke J is however of the opinion 
that “collaborative misdeeds strike more harshly at the fabric of society and the rights 
of victims than crimes perpetrated by individuals”.199 Snyman rejects this argument 
and asserts that there is no difference between an infringement of rights by an 
individual or by a group,200 which echoes Waldron’s first sentiment. A harm is, simply, 
a harm. 
Snyman also rejects Moseneke J’s submission that without the common purpose 
doctrine certain participants of crime would escape prosecution and this “would not 
accord with the considerable societal distaste [public opinion] for crimes by common 
design”.201 The author in support relies on the Constitutional Court judgment in S v 
Makwanyane (“Makwanyane”)202 where the Court rejected societal and public opinion 
as grounds to retain the death penalty.203 It can be however be safely assumed that, 
considering the rampant nature of crime in South Africa,204 public opinion in favour of 
criminalisation and punishment remain strong. Regardless, it will become clear 
throughout this dissertation that the rationale for the criminalisation of group-based 
crimes like criminal gang activities, and the justification for the application of modes of 
liability such as the common purpose doctrine and the doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise in the context of criminal gang activities, should not simply be regarded as 
pragmatic “crowd-pleasing” exercises, but rather as principled efforts to confront the 
very real problem of criminal gang activities in a legally and constitutionally defensible 
way.  
An additional consideration is the principle of fair labelling.205 There should be 
appropriate “labelling” for the wrong that has been committed because not all crimes 
are equal: some are lesser, and some are more serious in nature. Placing crimes in 
broad, generic categories, such as crimes against the person or property, and not 
                                            
199 Thebus para 40. 
200 Snyman Criminal Law 262-263 fn 55. 
201 Thebus para 40. 
202 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
203 Makwanyane at paras 88-89.  
204 See for example S v Nombewu 1996 (2) SACR 396 at 422-423 where the court mentions “state of 
lawlessness prevailing in the country” in public perceptions of the ineffectual criminal justice system 
allowing criminals to escape justice brought about (inter alia) due to police incompetence. Also see S v 
Soci 1998 (2) SACR 275 (E) at 295. 
205 See Chapter 3 for a further discussion of the doctrine of fair labelling.  
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differentiating further seems somewhat detached from any meaningful labeling. The 
crimes must with sufficient precision indicate the exact nature and seriousness and 
underlying protected interest.206 Thus, it may be insufficient to label a member of a 
criminal gang based solely on his most recent offence (of, say, assault). Criminal gang 
activity, the repeated or habitual pattern of criminal conduct causing systemic fear, risk 
and harm in the affected communities, should simply be viewed as more than the sum 
of any number of individual crimes. There is a difference between Mr X, who is a 
common thief and Mr Y, who is a gangster. Mr Y is immediately associated with a 
myriad of unidentified crimes, which are associated with the “gangster lifestyle”, and 
this is the underlying cause of harm to the community. But, at the same time, this 
“labelling” by the community can be unfair, because Mr Y may just have committed 
relatively minor gang-related offences but is now painted with the same broad brush 
along with Mr Z, a man responsible for several brutal murders.  
Let’s return for a moment to the terrorism example: Acts of terror often occur on a 
grandiose scale – evoking immense fear and panic in the process. Indeed, to cause 
fear is the most obvious element of terrorism (together with motive). If death occurs in 
such a mass attack, the deaths may not be forensically or legally distinct from mass 
murder by an individual. That is also the case with a gang attack. If a criminal gang 
carries out a group assault, murder, or drug deal, those underlying crimes are still, for 
the most part, objectively and definitionally, identical to instances of crime committed 
by a single perpetrator. This sense of terror is also evoked in gang related crime. 
Indeed, as we have seen from earlier discussion, the prevalence of criminal gang 
activities in certain communities in the Western Cape is so systemic, amounting to a 
“gang culture”, that there should in principle be no reason to view the justification for 
the criminalisation of terrorism any differently from the criminalisation of criminal gang 
activity.  
It is therefore perhaps not surprising to find broader rationales mentioned in the 
preamble to POCA. There is firstly a general statement indicating that organised crime, 
money laundering and criminal gang activities infringe the rights of the inhabitants of 
the Republic. Next, it is stated that the inhabitants have the right to be protected from 
fear, intimidation and physical harm. This objective is also echoed in the Constitution. 
Section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution, 1996, protects the unqualified constitutional right 
                                            
206 Simester & von Hirsch Criminalisation (2011) 202-204. 
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of being free from violence from private or public sources.207 The trinity of crimes 
addressed in POCA, individually and collectively “present a danger to public order and 
safety” which poses a risk to cause social damage. The harmful impact of criminal 
gangs is acknowledged due to their “pervasive presence” and harmful impact on those 
communities. It is therefore clear that the preamble to POCA is not simply a rhetorical 
flourish added to three groups of crimes previously unknown to South African criminal 
law. The preamble serves as a reminder of the rationale for the criminalisation of 
crimes that affect interests deeper and broader than the individual criminal acts that 
form the predicate offences of systemic and complex crimes such as racketeering, 
money laundering and criminal gang activities.  
 The second important reason for the criminalisation of criminal gang activities goes 
beyond the underlying protected interests and focuses on the more operational 
question of the effectiveness of the existing common law and statutory law arsenal for 
purposes of combating the type of crimes associated with criminal gang activities. 
Effectiveness in this context is understood in terms of the utility of existing common 
law and statutory crimes (murder, robbery, theft, public violence and so on) in order to 
achieve successful prosecutions of behaviour that fall within the parameters of what 
were earlier identified as gang-related activities in certain communities, such as in the 
Cape Flats. These issues will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3 and beyond. 
2 5 Concluding remarks  
At the end of this chapter we need to ask the question: Is specific anti-gang 
legislation truly necessary? The answer to this question can only be in the affirmative 
if the legislation supplements previously existing common law and statutory offences 
in a meaningful way and in a way which is congruent with public policy. And public 
policy, presumably, should reflect the interests of society, including the interests of the 
most vulnerable and the most marginalised. This question will provisionally be 
answered in Chapter 3 (investigating common law pertaining to group or collaborative 
criminality) and Chapter 4 (investigating the crimes created by POCA). The outcome 
of both chapters will then further be subjected to comparative and international law 
analyses before a final submission is made regarding the current dispensation and the 
way forward for the criminalisation of gang activity in South Africa.  
                                            
207 This will be discussed in detail below in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 3 
The common law and group or collaborative 
criminality  
3 1 Introduction 
Before the enactment of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 1998 (“POCA”), 
certain common law mechanisms were available that could be utilised in the fight 
against gang or group-based crimes. Various new crimes have however been created 
in terms of Chapter 4 of POCA that assist in the anti-gang fight.  
The effectiveness of criminalising gang-related crime has been questioned. 
Burchell, for example, suggests that the common law is more flexible in dealing with 
the phenomenon of criminal gang activities instead of proscribing “specific conduct in 
advance” by presupposing that gangs share certain immutable characteristics.208  
It has also been argued that the crimes enumerated in Chapter 4 of POCA are not 
legislative innovations but in fact resemble various common law and statutory offences 
that were available before the promulgation of POCA.209 These include the crimes of 
common law and statutory incitement, conspiracy, attempt, public violence and also 
liability under the common purpose doctrine. The common purpose doctrine may be 
considered to be the closest mechanism under the common law to specifically address 
group-based criminality.   
This chapter will firstly provide an overview of the aforementioned mechanisms that 
were available prior to the enactment of POCA. One of the main motivations for the 
legislative intervention is the perceived inability of the common law and statutory law 
to effectively address the growing phenomenon of criminal gang activity and also to 
                                            
208 Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2016) 5 ed 909-910. This is certainly a valid point of critique and 
will be discussed below. The effectiveness of the crimes enumerated in POCA do function greatly on 
the hypothesis that gangs operate in certain fashions.  
209 CR Snyman “Die nuwe statutêre misdaad van deelname aan 'n kriminele bende” (1999) 12 South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 213 217-221. 
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keep in pace with international measures210 such as the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime (“the Palermo Convention”).211 This chapter 
will additionally investigate to what extent the crimes under section 9 of POCA overlap 
or interact with the aforementioned common law crimes and modes of liability, notably 
the common purpose doctrine. Furthermore, it will be discussed whether these 
common law crimes and modes of liability are still useful in the fight against gang-
based crimes and if they could still be advantageous through judicial development or 
legislative intervention.  
3 2 Constitutional imperatives  
The development the common law is in line with the constitutional obligation placed 
on the judiciary in terms of section 39(2)212 to develop the common law and to promote 
the “spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights” when doing so. In fact, the 
Constitutional Court in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security (“Carmichele”)213 
confirmed that, in terms of section 39(2) (read with section 173)214 of the Constitution, 
this is an obligation and not a discretionary function when there is a deficiency in the 
                                            
210 This is undoubtedly one of the reasons behind the promulgation to POCA. The preamble clearly 
states that “(...) the South African common law and statutory law fail to deal effectively with organised 
crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities, and also fail to keep pace with international 
measures aimed at dealing effectively with organised crime, money laundering and criminal gang 
activities.” The Constitutional Court in Mohunram and Another v NDPP and Another (Law Review 
Project as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (2) SACR 145 (CC) at para 144 also discussed the rationale behind 
POCA. Sachs J, in his separate judgement, described the rationale behind POCA as two-pronged. 
Firstly, to address, inter alia, criminal gang activities which had become an “international problem and 
security threat”. POCA was secondly aimed at punishing the leaders of criminal organisations that were 
usually far removed from the actual execution of crimes by his or her criminal enterprise. See also 
Chapter 1 and 2 above; A Standing Organised crime: A study from the Cape Flats (2006) 45.  
211 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto 
(adopted 14 December 2000, entered into force 20 February 2004) 40 ILM 335.  
212 “When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every 
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”. 
213 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC).  
214 This section confirms the inherent powers of the higher courts (the Constitutional Court, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and the High Court of South Africa) which includes the powers “to develop the common 
law, taking into account the interests of justice.”  
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common law.215 The Court went further to state that there is a two-stage inquiry 
regarding the development process that a court has to undertake. An empowered 
Court must firstly evaluate whether the common law necessitates reconsideration in 
terms of the objectives set in section 39(2) and if that is in fact the case, the court must 
then evaluate how to develop the common law in order to bring it in line with the 
objectives in section 39(2).216 In fact, the constitutional obligation of courts goes further 
than merely adopting an interpretation that does not limit the rights contained in the 
Bill of Rights,217 courts should rather seek to adopt an interpretation that would both 
avoid limiting those rights and also promote them.218 In the context of the development 
of the criminal law, one should be mindful that section 39(2) should not be applied 
overzealously and courts must adhere to the principle of legality, notably the aspect of 
ius strictum.219 
                                            
215 Carmichele para 39. Also see Makate v Vodacom Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC) (“Makate”) reaffirms 
this position and refers to the Court’s own previous judgement in Fraser v ABSA Bank Limited 2007 (3) 
SA 484 (CC) (“Fraser”) where section 39(2) was interpreted to be a mandatory tool of interpretation to 
which all statutes must be construed.  
216 Carmichele para 39. This test has been formulated somewhat differently in subsequent judgements 
by the CC.  Moseneke J in S v Thebus and Another 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) (“Thebus”) at para 32. 
Moseneke J (in the majority decision by the Constitutional Court) in S v Thebus and Another 2003 (6) 
SA 505 (CC) (“Thebus”) at para 32 held that the “threshold analysis” was whether a rule of the common 
law limits one of the entrenched rights in the Constitution. If that is in fact the case and the limitation is 
also not “reasonable and justifiable” then a court would be obliged to develop it in order to bring it in line 
with the constitutional right it is in conflict with. The CC in Makate at para 88 more recently held that 
section 39(2) is “activated” when a court is involved in statutory interpretation and the relevant provision 
“implicates or affects rights in the Bill of Rights”.  There are slight, nuanced differences here. The 
approach in Thebus requires a limitation of rights while there is a broader approach in Carmichele which 
only requires a “deficiency” in the common law requiring “reconsideration”. Makate follows a different 
approach by requiring there to be some sort of rights-implication to activate the constitutional duty. This 
provides a substantially broader sphere for courts to embark on a section 39(2) development. The 
Carmichele and Makate approaches are more closely reminiscent of the wording of section 39(2) in that 
it does not necessarily require a rights conflict for the common law to be developed. 
217 Fraser para 43. 
218 Makate para 89. 
219 See CR Snyman “Extending the Scope of Rape – A Dangerous Precedent” (2007) 124 South African 
Law Journal 677 678-682 in particular. Also see K Phelps “A Dangerous Precedent Indeed—A 
Response to CR Snyman’s Note on Masiya” (2008) 128(4) South African Law Journal 648 for a 
response to Snyman’s censure of the judgement in Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria 
and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies and Another, Amici Curiae) (“Masiya”) 2007 (5) SA 30 
(CC). 
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3 3  The common purpose doctrine 
3 3 1 Origins and introduction into South African law 
The common purpose doctrine is, in certain instances, a departure from traditional 
individual criminal liability which punishes a participant’s own involvement and 
contribution to a criminal consequence. The doctrine originates from English law and 
was first incorporated into South African law via the Native Territories Penal Code Act 
24 of 1886 (“the Penal Code”).220 Section 78 stated that 
[i]f several persons form a common intention to prosecute any unlawful purpose, and 
to assist each other therein, each of them is a party to every offence committed by 
anyone of them in the prosecution of such common purpose, the commission of which 
offence was, or ought to have been, known to be a probable consequence of the 
prosecution of such common purpose. 
In R v Garnsworthy (“Garnsworthy”),221 one of the earliest cases dealing with the 
common purpose doctrine, a group of miners participated in a strike and forced others 
to stop their labour through the use of firearms. The eight parties who resisted the 
force of the group were killed.222 This case incorporated and “recognised” the doctrine 
as part of the South African common law (rather than its exclusive Cape Colony 
jurisdiction).223 In Garnsworthy, the Court expressed the common purpose doctrine as 
follows: 
Where two or more persons combine in an undertaking for an illegal purpose, each 
one of them is liable for anything done by the other or others of the combination, in the 
furtherance of their object, if what was done was what they knew or ought to have 
known, would be a probable result of their endeavouring to achieve their object. If on 
the other hand what is done is something which cannot be regarded as naturally and 
reasonably incidental to the attainment of the object of the illegal combination, then the 
law does not regard those who are not themselves personally responsible for the act 
as being liable; but if what is done is just what anybody engaging in this illegal 
                                            
220 See generally PN Makiwane The Nature of Association and Dissociation for Common Purpose 
Liability LLM thesis University of South Africa (1999) 2.  
221 (1923) WLD 17. 
222 Garnsworthy at 17. 
223 Burchell Principles 479 fn 31. 
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combination would naturally, or ought naturally to know would be the obvious and 
probable result of what they were doing, then all are responsible. 
3 3 2  Rationale for the rule and prominent applications 
The common purpose doctrine once again rose to relevance and public 
consciousness after the violent confrontation originating from an unprotected strike at 
the Lonmin platinum mines in Marikana in August of 2012.224 The National Prosecuting 
Authority (“NPA”) in the North West province expressed its intention to charge 270 
miners with murder under the common purpose doctrine after the death of 34 other 
miners who died as a result of injuries sustained during the violence and chaos that 
occurred at Marikana. This decision was met with great public backlash and media 
attention.225 The following month, the NPA decided not to go forward with this course 
of action.226 The proposed use of the common purpose doctrine was met with 
questions concerning the legitimacy of the doctrine reminiscent of the international 
outcry against the doctrine after the so-called “Sharpeville Six” trial in S v Safatsa.227 
The common purpose doctrine is however still the law of the land in South Africa.  
                                            
224 See Marikana Commission of Inquiry Report on Matters of Public, National and International 
Concern Arising out of The Tragic Incidents at The Lonmin Mine in Marikana, in The North West 
Province 46; 57ff. in GN 699 GG 38978 of 10-07-2015. 
225 See J Grant “Common purpose: Thebus, Marikana and unnecessary evil” (2014) 30 South African 
Journal of Human Rights 1 16; J Grant “Marikana: 'Common purpose not outdated or defunct'” (31-08-
2012) M&G <http://mg.co.za/article/20120831marikanacommonpurposenotoutdatedordefunct> 
(accessed 28-03-2016); Anonymous “South African Marikana miners charged with murder” (30-08-
2012) BBC <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19424484> (accessed 17-05-2016). The then-
minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Jeff Radebe, even commented that “[t]here is no 
doubt that the decision has induced a sense of shock, panic and confusion within the members of the 
community and the general South African public” – see J Herskovitz “South Africa shocked by move to 
charge miners with massacre” (31-08-2012) Reuters Africa 
<http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFBRE87U0MC20120831> (accessed 17-05-2016).  
226 M de Waal “Marikana: NPA drops 'common purpose' charges, but critical questions remain” (03-09-
2012) Daily Maverick 
<http://www.dailymaerick.co.za/article/20120903marikananpadropscommonpurposechargesbutcritical
questionsremain/#. Vvhmg_l96hc> (accessed 28-03-2016).  
227  1988 (1) SA 868. For general criticism against the doctrine, see L Sisilana “What's wrong with 
common purpose” South African Journal of Criminal Justice (1999) 287 300-301; Cameron “When 
Judges Fail Justice” (2004) 120 South African Law Journal; M Reddi “The Doctrine of Common Purpose 
Receives The Stamp of Approval” (2005) 122(1) South African Law Journal 59 63-64.   
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The common purpose doctrine, a mode of liability under the common law, has been 
one of the few available measures to specifically address group-based criminal 
activity.228 The conduct of persons who commit a criminal act in concert, is imputed to 
one another regardless of their actual degree of participation or causal contribution. 
This imputed liability is extremely advantageous in situations of group-based crimes 
where the prosecution (and subsequently even the courts) are unable to determine 
who were causally responsible for bringing about the unlawful act, especially 
consequence crimes229 such as murder.230 In R v Morela (“Morela”),231 it could not be 
determined which one of three burglars fired the shot that killed the deceased or even 
who had been in possession of the firearm. The State however did show that the 
accused in question was one of these burglars and that one of them, at least, was in 
possession of the firearm in question. Rabie posits that the Court accepted the 
argument that the accused parties foresaw the possibly that the firearm could be used 
to kill someone in the commission of their unlawful act and furthermore recklessly 
reconciled themselves with that possibility.232  
                                            
228 The other significant measure under the common law to address group-based criminal activity is the 
crime of conspiracy, which will be discussed below at 3 4.  
229 The Constitutional Court in Makhubela v The State; Matjeke v The State [2017] ZACC 36 
(Makhubela) re-affirmed the law pertaining to the use of the common purpose doctrine in circumstance 
crimes – specifically the unlawful joint-possession of firearms.  Mhlantla J refers to Burchell who 
correctly points out that the common purpose doctrine, when applied to circumstance crimes, does not 
operate in the same fashion as it does with consequence crimes (Makhubela para 48; Burchell 
Principles 483-484). Court unanimously finds that the court a quo erred in its finding that the applicants 
“that the applicants had the intention to exercise possession of the firearms through the perpetrators 
who had firearms in their possession” (para 56). Mhlantla J approvingly refers to and relies on the test 
in S v Nkosi 1998 (1) SACR 284 (W) (“Nkosi”). It was held there that the group must possess both the 
requisite intention “to exercise possession of the guns through the actual detentor” and secondly that 
“the actual detentors had the intention to hold the guns on behalf of the group” (Nkosi at 286). The 
Constitutional Court therefore finds that these requirements would only be present in very limited 
scenarios – especially because of the difficulty in proving the possessor’s intention to hold the firearms 
on behalf of the group. Joint-possession of firearms can therefore not be described as pure common 
purpose (in either of its forms) but a permutation thereof.  
230 See Safatsa at 898 for the comments concerning imputed liability by Botha JA. Also see MA Rabie 
“The Doctrine of Common Purpose in Criminal Law” (1971) 88 South African Law Journal 227 230 
where the author mentions that the doctrine is almost exclusively applied to murder cases. This still 
holds true today. Also see Snyman Criminal Law 258. 
231 [1947] (3) All SA 310 (A).  
232 See Rabie (1971) South African Law Journal 231; Morela 136. 
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Crimes perpetrated in groups are also perceived as a greater societal affront than 
crimes committed by individuals.233 The doctrine thus serves a perceived societal 
interest by punishing crime that may otherwise have gone unpunished if the actual 
perpetrator of the crime cannot be identified beyond a reasonable doubt.234 This 
however is a false dilemma, as stated above, because participants in group-based 
crimes may be held liable through other inchoate crimes.235 
Although the doctrine is best known for its application in murder cases, it can equally 
as usefully be applied to where groups of perpetrators are involved in cases of arson, 
malicious damage to property,236 public violence or assault. 
Common purpose, as a mode of liability, is a departure from the traditional principles 
of criminal law, which aims to identify an individual’s personal contribution to an 
unlawful act and then appropriately punishing that individual.237 This fundamental 
principle of criminal liability is also known as the principle of individual criminal 
                                            
233 See above at 2 4 1 for reference to Moseneke J’s majority judgment in Thebus at para 40 referring 
to the necessity of the common purpose doctrine and Snyman’s rebuttal (Snyman Criminal Law 262-
263 fn 55) – using Makwanyane as authority. 
234 See Kemp et al Criminal Law (2015) 258; Snyman Criminal Law 256.  
235 See 2 4 2 above.  
236 SeeThebus para 34 while illustrating the usefulness of the doctrine. 
237 This principle has also received significant attention in international ad hoc tribunals. See for example 
Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) (“Tadić”) where the Appeals Chamber International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) (per Nieto-Navia J) at para 186 refers to this 
principle, specifically in the context of Article 7(1) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY Statute”) which specifically refers to individual criminal liability. Nieto-Navia 
J further refers to (at fn 228-229) article 27(1) of the Italian Constitution 1947 (Costituzione della 
Repubblica Italiana) which simply states that criminal responsibility or liability is personal or “[l]a 
responsibilità penale è personale”) as well as the article 121-1 of the French Code Pènal 2016 which 
states - “[n]ul n'est responsable pénalement que de son propre fait” or “[n]o one is criminally liable 
except for his own conduct”). At fn 230 he states that the principle is only tacitly expressed in case law. 
This may be the situation in terms of South African criminal law, as it appears that there is no express 
law or constitutional provision establishing individual criminal responsibility. See generally with regards 
to group-based crimes being a departure from the general principles of criminal law M Cowling “Fighting 
organised crime: comment on the Prevention of Organised Crime Bill 1998” (1998) 11 South African 
Journal of Criminal Justice 350 368.  
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responsibility. This principle is also expressed in the maxim nulla poena sine culpa.238 
Individual criminal responsibility can be traced to the philosophical notions of free will 
and self-determination.239 Individuals are (subject to certain exceptions such as mental 
illness) autonomous actors and agents of their free will. Autonomous individuals face 
daily choices between engaging in illegal activity or not. Based on those assumptions, 
criminal responsibility should only arise when an individual has personally acted.  
The common purpose doctrine is consequently a departure from that principle due 
to the imputation of criminal liability to individuals who may or may not have, through 
their autonomous actions, contributed to the commission of an unlawful act. The State 
does still need to prove that the actions of the accused parties, either individually or 
collectively, caused the unlawful consequence.240 The element of causality does not 
fall away. The crime did not simply appear out of thin air; it was, of course, caused. 
What falls away is the need to causally link each individual perpetrator’s conduct to 
the criminal outcome (for instance, death of another human being, in the case of the 
crime of murder).  
                                            
238 It is however an accepted principle, for example in international criminal law, that this is not an 
absolute rule and may be negated in certain circumstances See (for example) especially paras 189-
190 of the Tadić appeal by Nieto-Navia J where he explains that it is clear from the wording of the ICTY 
Statute that not only persons “who actually carry out the actus reus of the enumerated crimes but 
appears to extend also to other offenders (…) including conspiracy, incitement, attempt and complicity”. 
Nieto-Navia J comes to the conclusion that the ICTY State also aims to include those “participating in 
the commission of crimes which occur where several persons having a common purpose embark on 
criminal activity that is then carried out either jointly or by some members of this plurality of persons”. 
239 See G Kemp, S Walker, R Palmer, D Baqwa, C Gevers, B Leslie & A Steynberg Criminal Law in 
South Africa 2 ed (2015) 14-15. 
240 Paizes submits that common purpose is often misunderstood as disposing of the causal element 
and refers to this as “[t]he illusion of the disappearing causal element” – which has even confused the 
Constitutional Court in Thebus (see paras 37-38). The author correctly submits that the causal element 
remains in proving the specific crime, for instance murder. See A Paizes “Why do we so often get 
common purpose wrong” (2017) 2 Criminal Justice Review 4 4. Although the crux of this argument is 
accurate, it is not completely true. A causal contribution is attributed to other participants of the common 
plan who may or may have not physically contributed to the unlawful consequence, where their 
contribution to the scheme cannot be proven by the State. Proof of the causation element is absent for 
them. That is the entire function of the doctrine. 
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The application of the common purpose doctrine can be seen as an affront to the 
so-called principle of fair labelling.241 This principle requires that the verdict imposed 
on an accused to be a fair and accurate reflection of what the individual accused had 
in fact done.242 A criminal conviction inflicts an iniuria on a convicted individual, viewed 
through the impact that a conviction holds on his or her human dignity; the stigma of 
a conviction as a human stain.243 It follows, then, that the principle of fair labelling is 
offended in certain cases where the common purpose doctrine is applied. When the 
prosecution decides to employ the common purpose doctrine in a situation where 
three suspects are involved in a shooting and it is not determinable who fired the fatal 
shot, an application of the principle of fair labelling will tell us that two of the accused 
could potentially be unfairly labelled in relation to their criminal contributions. It should, 
however, be noted that the principle of fair labelling is not prominent in the case law 
or literature on the topic of common purpose in South African criminal law. 
Back to the case law and literature on common purpose: The Appellate Division 
stated in Safatsa that requiring the element of causation in common purpose cases 
would stretch the concept of causation and would even ultimately lead to courts 
resorting to “psychological causation” which would “border on absurdity”.244 This 
construction of the doctrine was later confirmed by the Constitutional Court in S v 
Thebus and Another (“Thebus”).245 
The modern formulation of the doctrine has been coined by Burchell and Milton and 
has approvingly been relied on in Thebus:  
Where two or more people agree to commit a crime or actively associate in a joint 
unlawful enterprise, each will be responsible for specific criminal conduct committed 
by one of their number which falls within their common design. Liability arises from 
their ''common purpose'' to commit the crime […]246 
                                            
241 Kemp et al Criminal Law 21. The author points out that this principle has not yet received explicit 
recognition in South African courts but this should be the case as an embodiment of the right to human 
dignity in terms of section 10 of the Constitution.  
242 Kemp et al Criminal Law 20. 
243 Kemp et al Criminal Law 20. 
244 Safatsa 900-902. 
245 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC).  
246 See Burchell Principles 477; Thebus para 18. 
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3 3 3 Application: Prior agreement and active association 
Liability on the basis of common purpose can arise either from prior agreement or 
active association. If there is a prior agreement to commit an unlawful act, common 
purpose liability will be imputed to each of the parties to that agreement. If, for 
example, X and Y agree to kill Z but the State is unable to prove who carried out the 
murder, both X and Y could be held liable as co-perpetrators in the murder in terms of 
common purpose.247 Unlike in cases of active association, a party to a common 
purpose via prior agreement need not be present at the scene of the unlawful act.248 
The active association form of the doctrine is the more doctrinally and 
constitutionally problematic manifestation of the doctrine. This is due to the fact that 
that there is often less reliable evidence on which to prosecute and “acts of 
association” are sufficient to attract liable.  
Where there is no proof of a prior agreement, common purpose liability may arise 
from active association in an unlawful act. The Appellate Division in S v Mgedezi 
(“Mgedezi”)249 elucidated the special requirements for common purpose by active 
association.  The accused must firstly have been present at the scene of the unlawful 
act. Then, secondly, the accused must be aware of the commission of the unlawful 
act. Next, the accused must have had the intention to make common cause with the 
actual perpetrators of the unlawful act. The accused must also importantly, though an 
overt act of association, manifest his or her shared common purpose with the 
perpetrators. Lastly, the accused must possess the requisite mens rea, specifically 
intent and the Court specified that dolus directus or dolus eventualis would satisfy the 
fault requirement. That means that the accused must have intended for the deceased 
to be killed or must foresee the possibility of the aforementioned consequence and 
perform an “act of association with recklessness as to whether or not death was to 
ensue.250  
In S v Mzwempi (“Mzwempi”)251 the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court 
suggested a limitation to active association by recommending that in order to secure 
                                            
247 See for example the facts of Morela above.  
248 Kemp et al Criminal Law 262. 
249 1989 (1) SA 687 (A). 
250 Mgedezi 705-706. 
251 2011 (2) SACR 237 (ECM). 
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a conviction based on common purpose liability, it must be shown that the accused 
had actively associated with the particular conduct that brought about the unlawful 
consequence and not any consequence that occurred in the commission of any 
unlawful act.252 In other words, an accused must have the specific intent for a certain 
unlawful consequence to occur and not merely foresight. This will be discussed in 
more detail below.  
3 3 4   Problems with the doctrine 
3 3 4 1 Constitutional issues 
The common purpose doctrine is one of the most controversial doctrines in South 
African law. It received constitutional affirmation especially in the active association 
form by the Constitutional Court in Thebus. Moseneke J delivered the majority 
judgment for the Court and gave several reasons for his finding. There are still however 
several issues that could be subject to constitutional scrutiny and debate.  
The doctrine has largely been justified based on public policy considerations. It has 
been reasoned that the doctrine addresses the societal need to “criminalise collective 
criminal conduct” which is a “significant societal scourge” and also to relieve the legal 
difficulties in proving the causal contribution of each participant in such collective 
criminal conduct.253 This disempowers these criminal groups, which would usually be 
able to hide under a legal guise where the prosecution could not prove causal 
contribution of each or any of the accused parties involved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It must however be noted once more that this argument mainly holds true for the 
substantive offence committed (for example murder or assault) but not for associated 
inchoate crimes (such as incitement or conspiracy to commit said substantive offence).    
The Court in Thebus disagreed with the broad contention that the doctrine offended 
any constitutional rights and even went as far as to state that “(…) there is no objection 
to this norm of culpability even though it bypasses the requirement of causation” 
because it is a means to address group-based crime.254 Moseneke J asserted that 
that there is no inherent common law requirement for crimes to have a causation 
element and that principle applies to the common law as well as statutory offences. 
                                            
252 Mzwempi paras108-109 especially. 
253 Thebus para 34. 
254 Thebus para 40. 
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Crimes are however required to be constitutionally compliant and according to the 
Court, this means that 
[i]t may not unjustifiably limit any of the protected rights or offend constitutional 
principles. Thus, the criminal norm may not deprive a person of his or her freedom 
arbitrarily or without just cause. The 'just cause' points to substantive protection against 
being deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without an adequate or acceptable reason and 
to the procedural right to a fair trial.255  
It was pointed out by the Court that the constitutionally protected rights of an accused 
may also not be infringed upon unless it is based on a justifiable reason – here relying 
on O’Regan J’s separate opinion in S v Coetzee (“Coetzee”).256 There it was said that 
the specific form of culpability must “justify the deprivation of freedom without giving 
rise to constitutional complaint”.257  
The more pertinent constitutional issue was, possibly, the alleged violation of an 
accused’s presumption of innocence in terms of section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution, 
which forms part of an accused’s right to a fair trial. This argument was based on the 
contention that because the doctrine negates the requirement of causation, it lessens 
evidentiary burden of the State to prove all elements of the crime and therefore offends 
an accused’s presumption of innocence by creating the possibility of conviction despite 
there being reasonable doubt as to their innocence. In addressing this alleged 
violation, Moseneke J refers to S v Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso (“Bhulwana”)258 where the 
importance of the presumption of innocence was re-affirmed and the Court confirmed 
that the prosecution bares the onus to prove “all the elements of a criminal charge”.259 
The context in that case was the effect of presumptions on the burden of proof which 
relieved the prosecution of part of its evidentiary burden of proving all the elements of 
a particular crime.260  
                                            
255 Thebus para 39. 
256 1997 (3) SA 527.  
257 Coetzee para 178; Thebus paras 36-37. 
258 1996 (1) SA 388. 
259 Bhulwana para 15 in turn relying on S v Zuma and Others 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (SA) (“Zuma”) para 
33. Also see JC de Wet “Strafreg” 4 ed (1985) 193 where the author also addressed the issue of the 
circumvention of the most basic tenants of criminal liability when applying the common purpose 
doctrine.  
260 Bhulwana para 15. 
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Moseneke J then justifies the negation of the causal nexus in common purpose 
cases by stating that it neither constitutes a reverse onus nor a presumption and that 
“(…) there is no reasonable possibility that an accused person could be convicted 
despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to his or her guilt.”261 That is highly 
debateable. Criminal liability is based on proving all of the elements of a particular 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. That statement can consequently not be supported 
when one considers the stark departure from the traditional principles of criminal law. 
If the rationale in Bhulwana had to be applied to the application of the common purpose 
doctrine, then it is clear that the prosecution is relieved of its heavy evidentiary burden 
in establishing causation in group-based crimes.  
The rationale in Bhulwana can be traced back to the judgment in S v Zuma and 
Others.262 There Kentridge AJ posited that the common law rules pertaining to the 
burden of proof are inherent in the fair trial rights under the Interim Constitution.263 This 
postulation was based on the “centuries-old” principle of English law which was 
famously expressed by Sankey LC Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions 
(“Woolmington”),264 namely that “at the end of the evidence it is not for the prisoner to 
establish his innocence, but for the prosecution to establish his guilt”.265 This 
fundamental principle of criminal law should not be circumvented merely for policy 
considerations of crime control.  
It is not sufficient, as Moseneke J posited, “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all 
the elements of the crime charged under common purpose” because it imputes a 
                                            
261 Thebus 530-531. It has however been suggested that this the doctrine does in fact constitute a 
reverse onus when a party to it decides to disassociate themselves with the common scheme due to 
the substantial evidentiary burden in proving this. Kemp et al point to the Appellate Division’s phrasing 
in S v Nduli and others 1993 (2) SACR 501 (A) (“Nduli”).261 There it was held (at 504) that the greater 
an accused’s conduct was in the unlawful act, “(…) the more pertinent and pronounced his conduct will 
have to be to convince a court, after the event, that he genuinely meant to disassociate himself (…)”. 
See Kemp et al Criminal Law 266-267. This was also the opinion of the SCA in S v Lungile and another 
1999 (2) SACR 597 (SCA) (“Lungile”). The SCA stated that mere withdrawal would be insufficient in 
cases where an accused had a substantial contribution in the execution of the common purpose. Acts 
such as a notification to the other members of the common purpose or “nullification or frustration” of the 
common purpose would suffice in such instances (see Lungile para 20). 
262 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (SA).  
263 Especially subsections 25(2) and (3)(c) as well as (d). See Zuma para 33.  
264 [1935] AC 462 (HL).   
265 Woolmington at 481.  
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causal connection to an accused who may have not contributed in a sufficient fashion 
to be held liable otherwise. In other cases, an accused could still rebut or contest that 
his conduct causally contributed to the unlawful outcome but it is impossible here. It is 
submitted that it even goes so far as to violate section 35(3)(i) of the Constitution which 
forms part of the fair trial rights of an accused “[including] the right to adduce (…) 
evidence”. Here, the accused is prevented from the opportunity to even adduce 
evidence that his acts did not, at least to the extent that it may cause reasonable doubt, 
causally contribute to the unlawful consequence. This imputation, as Burchell also 
points out, is far more extreme than a reverse onus or a presumption (as in Bhulwana 
and Zuma).266 It must be kept in mind that proving the requirements for the common 
purpose doctrine (thus the imputation of liability) is not the same as proving the 
traditional elements of the substantive crime. The doctrine (which is a mode of liability) 
is merely a mechanism to relieve the evidentiary and legal hurdles in proving a crime 
committed in concert.267  
Moseneke J, when referring to O’Regan J’s separate opinion in Coetzee, however 
does not rely on O’Regan J’s further statements including that all the elements of the 
specific crime have to be proven before a conviction can be secured.268 Applying the 
doctrine to cases such as murder, it does not become necessary to prove all of the 
elements of the crime. Even though it is true that causation is not an element in all 
crimes, it is an element in the crimes in which the doctrine is mostly applied to, namely 
the crime of murder. It is unfair to negate the causation requirement merely because 
of the difficulties in prosecuting group-based crimes. If it is justifiable to negate the 
causation requirement in order to satisfy public policy considerations, why not apply it 
to other problematic areas of the law?269 This rationale for the negation of the causal 
requirement also does not extend to all instances where the common purpose rule is 
applied. Grant points out that the necessity for the State to negate this element mostly 
                                            
266 Burchell Principles 481-482. 
267 Compare with joint enterprise doctrine in English law where the participants to a joint criminal 
enterprise are not convicted as co-perpetrators. See 3 3 6 1 below. 
268 Coetzee para 189. 
269 See Grant (2014) South African Journal of Human Rights 16. The author uses the example of rape 
and that it is notoriously difficult to prove the absence of consent requirement. By using the reasoning 
by Moseneke J in Thebus, this requirement could be disposed of in favour of facilitating easier 
prosecutions.  
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occurs in “mob-attack situations” where it is difficult to prove which participants 
factually contributed to the unlawful act.270 This was indeed the case in Safatsa, 
Thebus and to an extent Mzwempi. This is not usually true in pure prior agreement 
cases, where it is often possible to discern which accused contributed to which 
unlawful acts.271 The normal rules for criminal liability (as well as accomplice liability, 
incitement, and conspiracy)272 could be applied in these cases and the common 
purpose doctrine is rendered quite superfluous in the aforementioned circumstances.  
In Coetzee, Sachs J (per separate judgment), also emphasised the importance of 
the presumption of innocence and that the State’s burden cannot be relieved due to 
the serious nature of the crime.273 If regard had to be given to the nature of the crime, 
the presumption of innocence would merely be a vestige in a sea of serious offences 
which are rife in South Africa. Furthermore, the public interest in protecting innocent 
persons from being convicted, outweighs the bringing of a specific accused to 
justice.274 Thus, the “societal interest” in convicting those who act in concert should 
not alleviate the State’s onus in proving all of the elements with reference to each 
accused beyond a reasonable doubt. This is, after all, what one should expect from a 
mode of liability in the strict sense of the word.  
Moseneke J ultimately concluded that no constitutional rights (especially arbitrary 
deprivation of freedom) are violated through the application of the common purpose 
doctrine in its current form.275 The learned Justice submits, unconvincingly, that this 
departure from the traditional approach to criminal liability is justified because of the 
difficulties in prosecuting group-based crimes.276 This pragmatic approach is, 
however, not an adequate justification for the deviation from the fundamental 
principles of criminal law, specifically the principles regarding modes of liability 
premised on the fundamental notion of individual (not collective) guilt. This objection, 
in a word, is a doctrinal objection.  
                                            
270 Grant (2014) South African Journal of Human Rights 16. 
271 Grant (2014) South African Journal of Human Rights 16. 
272 Grant (2014) South African Journal of Human Rights 17.  
273 See Coetzee para 220.  
274 See Coetzee para 220. Also see SE van der Merwe “A basic introduction to criminal procedure” in 
JJ Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 12 ed (2017) 3 20-21. 
275 Thebus para 40. 
276 Thebus para 34. 
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3 3 4 2 Doctrinal issues  
The criticism directed at the common purpose doctrine essentially boils down to a 
concern about the far-reaching application of the doctrine. That is, the doctrine of 
common purpose holds the risk of removing criminal liability too far from the 
fundamental notion of individual guilt. It is a question of where to draw the line so that 
“JCE” – joint criminal enterprise – does not become “JCE” – just convict everyone. 
This is especially true of the doctrine in its active association form. The problems 
associated with this manifestation of the doctrine were highlighted in Mzwempi.  There, 
Alkema J criticised the Appellate Division’s interpretation and application of the 
doctrine in its active association form in S v Nzo and Another (“Nzo”)277 and stated 
that Nzo should not be considered as authoritative case law on the extended scope of 
the doctrine. This judgment in fact laid down principles in direct conflict with the Court’s 
previous judgment in Mgedezi (which carries constitutional affirmation) – which was 
delivered just one year prior to Nzo.  
The most pertinent facts of Nzo deserve brief mentioning. The victim, Mrs Tshiwula, 
threatened to expose her husband’s harbouring of members of an alleged ANC 
terrorist group to the police. The first appellant, who was one of the harboured parties, 
reported this threat to one Joe who in turn threatened to kill Mrs Tshiwula. The first 
appellant overheard this threat to Mrs Tshiwula’s life. Three weeks after this threat 
was uttered, Joe in fact did murder Mrs Tshiwula. The Court held that it could not find 
the parties guilty as co-perpetrators because neither of them had physically executed 
the murderous act.278 They could also not be found guilty for the murder on the basis 
of common purpose. The court a quo, however, found both the appellants279 guilty of 
murder on the basis of the common purpose doctrine through another avenue. The 
court a quo justified this by stating that the appellants were legally responsible for Mrs 
Tshiwula’s death because “the murder had been foreseen by the appellants and since 
they had associated themselves with and persisted in furthering the common design 
despite such foresight […]”.280 According to the court a quo, the terrorists, in their acts 
of sabotage had to foresee that in the execution of their activities (which involved the 
                                            
277 1990 (3) SA 1 (A). 
278 See Nzo 3-4.  
279 Appellant 1 shall be the focus of this discussion.  
280 Nzo 4. 
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use of explosives) could lead to a fatality.281 To bolster this line of reasoning even 
further, that Court refers to certain ANC pamphlets that labelled parties who had turned 
as State witnesses as traitors and were threatened with their lives and that action 
would be taken against them before these disclosures were made instead of after. 
This all led to the reasonable conclusion that the type of exposure Mrs Tshiwula spoke 
of would be met with her death – in other words a foreseen possibility.282 Hefer AR 
consequently found that the appellants were liable, especially under the dictum in S v 
Madlala (“Madlala”).283 This is due to their continued “participation in the execution of 
the common design, despite their foresight of the possibility of murder (…)”.284  
The Court in Mzwempi correctly doubts whether this “extended liability” in Nzo has 
found any application in South African criminal law. It was pointed out that Nzo has 
not been used as authority in any cases, except on the matter of disassociation.285 
Alkema J illustrated why Nzo has “far reaching and profound implications” and is 
destructive to the principles laid down in Safatsa and Mgedezi.286 The Court 
additionally criticised Nzo’s rejection of the appellant’s contentions relating to the 
imputation a collective intention to all the accused parties, rather than focusing on a 
particular accused’s specific intention with regards to a particular crime.287 Alkema J 
found that this was especially in conflict with the principles of Safatsa and Mgedezi 
and their subsequent approval by the Constitutional Court. It was furthermore shown 
that except for intention (in the form of dolus eventualis) the factual scenario in Nzo 
did not comply with the Appellate Division’s (own) other requirements as per 
Mgedezi.288 The appellant, for example, was not even at the scene of the unlawful act 
or even aware of this. There was also no overt act of association to manifest the shared 
                                            
281 Nzo 4. 
282 Also see Nzo 6 where the Court states that “evidence overwhelmingly points to her being killed in 
order to silence her (…)”.  
283 1969 (3) 637 (A) at 642. The Court stated their liability could arise if “[the accused] a party to a 
common purpose to commit some other crime, and he foresaw the possibility of one or both of them 
causing death to someone in the execution of the plan, yet he persisted, reckless of such fatal 
consequence, and it occurred (…)”.  
284 Nzo 7.  
285 Mzwempi para 96. 
286 Mzwepi para 106 and then 107-112 for the crux of his contentions.  
287 Mzwempi para 109 referring to Nzo at 7. 
288 Also see JM Burchell “S v Nzo 1990 (3) SA (A) – Common Purpose Liability” (1990) 3 South African 
Journal of Criminal Justice 345 348-349.  
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common cause with the actual perpetrator. There was also no proof of an intention to 
make common cause with Mrs Tshiwula’s murderer. All that was and could be proven 
is the general intention to share in the campaign of the specific ANC cell – which was 
not proven to include the murder of Mrs Tshiwula.289 There was no mention of an act 
of association, presence at the scene or knowledge of the crime. In fact, there was no 
mention of the Mgedezi requirements or Safatsa.290 These judgments are however 
mentioned by Steyn JA in his dissenting judgment.  
Another logical consequence of the extended liability in Nzo is that it leaves open 
the possibility of imputing criminal liability to each person involved in an unlawful 
activity or, like in Nzo, members of an armed struggle.291  
Let us take a contemporary example to illustrate the pitfalls of the common purpose 
doctrine, especially when applied in the context of collective conduct and the fluid 
association of people in a free society. The #FeesMustFall Movement arose in 2015 
mainly as a nationwide response by the collective body of university students in South 
Africa to protest the Minister of Higher Education’s announcement of a university fee 
increase of 8%, which was deemed unaffordable. Despite the seemingly legitimate 
aims of the movement, it is the case that #FeesMustFall often involved instances of 
unlawful protests, property damage, violence, the disruption of university activities and 
                                            
289 See Burchell (1990) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 349 where the author states that “(…) 
subscribing to the overarching policies of an organisation is not and should not be sufficient to link 
members (such as the appellants in this case) to the specific murder committed by another member 
(…).” 
290 Mgedezi para 90. 
291 See Mzwempi para 111. 
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even death.292 Insofar as the #FeesMustFall movement shared a common goal and a 
shared modus operandi, and insofar as one can potentially apply the logic of South 
African case law relating to the common purpose doctrine, it is arguably not too far-
fetched to see the possibility (if not probability) of a creative prosecutor linking leading 
figures in the #FeesMustFall movement to a common plan, thus applying a mode of 
liability originally meant to be based on a much closer association towards a criminal 
outcome. Say for instance that a group of protesting students at Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University293 was charged with malicious damage to campus property, 
threatening students and stoning the police. Could liability be imputed not only to 
anyone involved at that campus but also campuses in other provinces, such as the 
University of Stellenbosch or the University of Johannesburg as well, based on the 
rationale in Nzo?  
It was clear from the reasoning in Nzo that a common design between persons of 
an organisation (where one or more of the objectives is unlawful) and where 
foreseeability of unlawful consequences is present and there is a persistence in the 
furtherance of the common design, may result in criminal liability. Towards the climax 
of the #FeesMustFall protests, one could perhaps have made the argument that there 
                                            
292 #FeesMustFall shall also be utilised as an example in Chapters 4 and 5. The #FeesMustFall 
Movement must however be further contextualised. This movement must be understood in the particular 
political climate in which occurred. During the same year, the #RhodesMustFall movement emerged in 
a call by students of the University of Cape Town students to have the statue of Cecil Rhodes removed 
from the campus grounds, as he represented South Africa’s colonial past. Students of the University of 
the Free State joined by creating their own hashtags, namely #SwartMustFall and #SteynMustFall – 
which called for the removal of former President of the Republic of South Africa, CR Swart and MT 
Steyn who was the President of the Orange Free State. Furthermore, the controversial “Luister” 
(Contraband Cape Town “Luister (video)” (20-08-2015) YouTube 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sF3rTBQTQk4> (accessed 01-12-2017)) documentary was 
released in which Black and Coloured students shared their experiences dealing with racism and 
segregation at Stellenbosch. See T Luescher, L Loader & T Mugume “#FeesMustFall: An Internet-Age 
Student Movement in South Africa and the Case of the University of the Free State” (2017) 44(2) 
Politikon 231 235-240; Hotz and Others v University of Cape Town 2017 (7) BCLR 815 (CC) para 1; 
Concerned Association of Parents and Others for Tertiary Education at Universities v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University and Another ECC 10-11-2016 case no. 4976/2016 (“Concerned Parents”) paras 
5-6; J Duncan “Opinion: Why Student Protests in SA Have Turned Violent (30-09-2016) EWN 
<http://ewn.co.za/2016/09/30/OPINION-Why-student-protests-in-South-Africa-have-turned-violent> 
(accessed 01-12-2017). 
293 As per the facts in Concerned Parents para 7. 
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was reasonable foreseeability that at least one of the objectives, by at least some of 
the members, was unlawful, despite the legitimacy of the underlying cause.  
The reasoning in Nzo could equally hold true for gang activity. Known gang 
members (or those who were merely unlucky enough to be apprehended) could be 
prosecuted for the crimes committed by unknown gang members but could 
successfully be linked to a particular gang. For example, where a leader of a particular 
gang is shot by a rival gang294 (and such a fact can be established on the evidence), 
criminal liability may potentially ensue for any member of said gang if certain 
“elements” are proven (gang members share an unlawful common design; 
foreseeability of unlawful consequences as well as persistence in the furtherance of 
the common design).  But of course, Nzo is not the end of the analysis. 
In Mzwempi, Alkema J made a constitutional argument on the basis of equality. It 
was contended that persons could either incur or escape liability, depending on 
whether a court follows a Mgedezi-Safatsa approach or follows Nzo. The latter 
approach does not carry Constitutional approval (although it is submitted here that 
Thebus is based on equally unsteady constitutional grounds). Alkema J did however 
concede that Nzo was decided before the constitutional era.295 Legal uncertainty might 
additionally arise when a factual scenario is broad enough to fall within the scope of 
Nzo – such as Mzwempi.296 
Hoctor finds Alkema J’s characterisation of the factual scenario in Nzo as active 
association doubtful; it is according to Hoctor rather a matter of prior agreement. 
Consequently, the Court’s apprehension over the applicability of the Nzo to the case 
was thus not warranted.297 Burchell submits that the situation is a “hybrid”.298 It was 
hybrid in the sense that there was a prior agreement to commit a range or series of 
terroristic acts and secondly, there was alleged active association to commit the 
murder. This approach, on the facts, is the correct one and better encapsulates the 
                                            
294 A Hyman “‘Gang war’ fears in Cape Town as six shot after failed Donkie Booysen hit” (03-08-2018) 
TimesLive <https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-08-03-gang-war-fears-in-cape-town-
as-six-shot-after-failed-donkie-booysen-hit/> (accessed 22-10-2018). 
295 Mzwempi para 113. 
296 Even though no reported cases have been found applying Nzo in this fashion.  
297 See S Hoctor “The state of common purpose liability in South Africa – S v Mzwempi [2011] 
ZAECMHC 5, 2011 (2) SACR 237” Journal of Commonwealth Criminal law (2012) 180 187. 
298 Burchell Principles 478-479. 
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problems in both Nzo and Mzwempi: the fact that the vexed crimes fell outside the 
scope of the prior agreement or mandate of the group. There are practical differences 
in the groups in both Nzo and Mzwempi and other instances of common purpose. The 
membership consisted of large numbers of people who acted fairly autonomously and 
were evenly distributed across the country, such as in Nzo’s case. These groups 
should be differentiated from the more common example of a small group of persons 
acting in concert to commit a crime.299 The small group will more likely have a singular 
intention while undesired and unfair consequences could be attached in the context of 
a larger group.  
The #FeesMustFall example is admittedly provocative; it mixes good and bad 
apples and muddies the waters. But it goes to show that where an identifiable group, 
however amorphous its membership may seem, is associated with some criminal 
conduct (some of it even very high-profile, such as the destruction of university 
property and burning of books) the temptation is there to employ a mode of criminal 
liability primarily designed for collective criminality. Dogmatic and constitutional 
factors, as outlined above, together with the exercise of sensible prosecutorial 
discretion, should safeguard against an abuse of the common purpose doctrine in the 
context of politically sensitive and broadly sympathetic cases emanating from 
collectivities such as the #FeesMustFall movement. But if one takes the political and 
popular elements out of the equation, if one would only focus on criminal conduct 
associated with large and relatively stable groups which share the same broad goals 
(mega-gangs, for instance), then one is still left with the same doctrinal and 
constitutional issues discussed up to this point. Hence the apparent rationale to take 
legislative action in an attempt to focus the criminal justice response to address a 
particular problem (gangs) and to try and circumvent the pitfalls presented by a mode 
of liability (common purpose doctrine) which clearly carries a lot of historical, doctrinal 
and constitutional baggage. But we will return to POCA. Before we do that, it is 
necessary to fully engage with the common law principles to see if there are any 
redeeming factors or useful features which could either meaningfully complement 
POCA Chapter 4, or even make that piece of legislation superfluous.  
                                            
299 See Burchell Principles 478 where the author draws attention to this important distinction.  
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 So, a more restrictive interpretation of the active association aspect of common 
purpose was demonstrated recently in Dewnath v S (“Dewnath”).300 In Dewnath, the 
appellant and his parents orchestrated the murder of the appellant’s sibling through a 
contract killer. The hitman eventually executed this task but in the course of the crime 
also attempted to kill the deceased’s wife. The appellant, together with his parents, 
were all convicted on the basis of common purpose for the murder of the deceased 
and only the parents were convicted of the attempted murder of the wife.301 Only the 
appellant received special leave to appeal and the crux of his contention was that there 
was insufficient evidence to link him to the murderous plot through common purpose 
in its active association form. The main question before the court was whether there 
was sufficient evidence linking the accused to the common purpose and furthermore 
that he had acted with the requisite mens rea.  
It was argued that the appellant was not involved in the negotiation process and 
that the main link between the crime and the appellant was the following words:  
But why are you asking for so much money? The person that we are asking you to kill 
is absolutely worthless. I would understand if he was a member of the taxi business. If 
I wasn’t involved in the police, with the police, I would kill him myself.302 
It was additionally argued on behalf of the appellant that even if these words did create 
a sufficient connection to the murderous enterprise that there was “insufficient 
proximity with the final result” to justify the conviction.303 
The court pointed out that “the most critical requirement of active association is to 
curb too wide a liability”.304 It further submitted that the principles in Mgedezi had 
received constitutional approval and served a dual purpose. It firstly ensures that there 
is a sufficient proximity between the conduct establishing the active association and 
the result. This active association must secondly be significant and not insufficient 
participation removed from actual execution.305 The SCA ultimately decided that the 
appellant’s participation was insignificant, limited and too far removed from the actual 
                                            
300 SCA 17-04-2014 case no 269/13. 
301 The facts appear from Dewnath paras 1-6 of the judgment.  
302 Dewnath para 5. 
303 Dewnath para 14.  
304 Dewnath para 15. 
305 Dewnath para 15. Also see Van der Merwe (2017) Criminal Justice Review 6. 
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execution of the unlawful acts. There were furthermore no grounds to conclude that 
there was any intention to kill the deceased.306 
Dewnath illustrates a strict and proper interpretation of the requirements in Mgedezi.  
Steyn JA in his dissenting judgment in Nzo also stated that common purpose was 
originally based on the so-called doctrine of proximity, requiring both factual and legal 
proximity to the crime before liability may be imputed.307 This appropriately restricts 
the application of the doctrine which does not lead to theoretical irrationalities like in 
Nzo. The SCA and Constitutional Court have yet to make any direct pronouncements 
about the extended scope of the doctrine as per Nzo.  
The AD also offered some further limitation in S v Goosen (“Goosen”).308 Van 
Heerden JA set out the principle that there will be no common purpose liability for an 
accused where there is a substantial deviation in the causal chain of events postulated 
by the accused where there is a reliance on dolus eventualis by the State.309 The 
application of this rule, it would appear, is limited to very exceptional circumstances, 
such as in the case of Goosen where the accused was below average intelligence and 
could not properly postulate all the likely outcomes of his actions or where the unlawful 
consequence occurred in a “truly freakish” fashion.310 This rule is similar to the 
fundamental difference  rule in terms of JCE in the United Kingdom.311 The South 
African rule seems to be extremely limited in scope while the fundamental difference 
rule has a broader, more flexible application.  
The prudent thing to do is indeed that judges should opt for a limited rather than an 
expansive view of active association as an element of common purpose. When dealing 
with cases of active association, the association must be with specific conduct in order 
to qualify as the requisite actus reus and not “association with the general design” of 
an organized group.312 These sentiments were also echoed by the SCA in Toya-Lee 
van Wyk v The State SCA 28-03-2013 case no 575/11 (“Van Wyk”) where Pillay JA 
held that  
                                            
306 Dewnath paras 16-17. 
307 Nzo 16. 
308 1989 (4) SA 1013. 
309 Goosen at 1026. Also see Kemp et al Criminal Law 230-231. 
310 Kemp et al Criminal Law 212. 
311 See 3 3 6 1 2 below.  
312 See Mzwempi paras 108-109. 
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(…) care needs to be taken to avoid lightly inferring an association with a group activity 
from the mere presence of the person who is sought to be held criminally liable for the 
actions of some of the others in the group.313  
The Appellate Division in Mgedezi,314  and the SCA in Van Wyk, Dewnath as well as 
S v Le Roux and others (“Le Roux”)315 emphasised a court’s responsibility in 
determining the liability of each participant to a group-based criminal enterprise and 
thus avoiding situations of guilt merely by association. This seems to be more in line 
with the core or origins of the common purpose doctrine.  
A recent judicial development of the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”) by 
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
will be referred to below316 in order to further bolster this proposed limitation of liability. 
In turn, JCE under international criminal law will also be considered in order to detect 
trends, pitfalls and limitations in the context of group-based modes of liability.  
3 3 5  Interaction between POCA and the common purpose doctrine 
There are several instances and scenarios where application of the common 
purpose doctrine and Chapter 4 of POCA would overlap. Scenarios, however, in which 
there is a (once-off) active association should not be utilised for the purposes of 
Chapter 4 of POCA. A strict interpretation of POCA requires an ongoing structure 
which would naturally exclude instances where groups formed sporadically or on an 
ad hoc basis.  
In considering the application of the common purpose doctrine or Chapter 4 of 
POCA, four factual matrixes can be identified. Firstly: where the members of a criminal 
gang agree to commit an offence and eventually do execute that offence then they 
may all be held liable for that offence in terms of the common purpose doctrine. The 
State may elect not to pursue a prosecution in terms of Chapter 4. This could be due 
                                            
313 Van Wyk para 16. Also see Gubuza v State WCC 04-03-2014 case no 511/2013 paras 18-21. 
314 “A view of the totality of the defence cases cannot legitimately be used as a brush with which to tar 
each accused individually, nor as a means of rejecting the defence versions en masse.” (Mgedezi at 
703). 
315 2010 (2) SACR 11 (SCA). The Court in Le Roux at para 17 warned against an “all-embracing” 
determination of guilt of multiple accused persons involved in one criminal enterprise based on the 
principles in Mgedezi.  
316 See below especially 3 3 6 1 3. 
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to several reasons, including the lack of evidence to prove the existence of such a 
criminal gang or insufficient crimes to form the required pattern of criminal gang 
activities or simply to expedite the proceedings. Secondly: The State may use the 
underlying offence(s) committed by the gang as a predicate offence in terms of 
Chapter 4. Where the gang, for example, commits arson, they could be held liable in 
terms of the common purpose doctrine for the arson and then subsequently be held 
liable for one of the offences in Chapter 4 where the arson is used as a predicate 
offence. Thirdly: The State could also, where there is sufficient evidence of each 
individual’s causal contribution to the crime, not rely on the common purpose doctrine 
and merely charge the gang with a relevant offence in terms of Chapter 4. Finally: a 
court may also, in terms of section 10(3) of POCA, use the fact that an accused was 
a member of a criminal gang at the time of the commission of the offence, as an 
aggravating factor at the sentencing stage. This appears to be popular in the evolving 
and germinal practice surrounding criminal gang prosecutions. Section 10(3) was, for 
example, applied to a vast number offences, to almost each of the nineteen co-
accused in S v Thomas (“Thomas”).317  
As mentioned above, the value of legislating against criminal gang activities 
becomes apparent when one considers the difficulties in prosecuting larger groups 
where certain persons may act outside of the scope of the alleged mandate or common 
design. Chapter 4 of POCA does not impute liability as with the common purpose 
doctrine. Thus, merely because A, B and C are all members of gang Z, does not mean 
that they will all be held liable for the unlawful actions of C unless they causally 
contributed to said action. Section 9(1)(a) (read with the definitions in section 1), for 
example, will only be applicable if the accused is an active participant or member of a 
criminal gang and will only be held liable if he or she “wilfully aids and abets any 
criminal activity committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with 
any criminal gang”. The predicate acts of fellow gang members may however be 
imputed to one another to satisfy the requisite pattern of criminal gang activities.  
It can be noted that that section 9(1)(a) (read with the definitions in section 1) 
contains a situation comparable with the common purpose doctrine. To be held liable 
                                            
317 2015 JDR 1932 (WCC). Section 10(3) is however constitutionally suspect, due to the fact that it may 
be punishing mere gang membership without an accompanying gang-related act thus offending an 
accused person’s freedom of association in terms of section 18 of the Constitution. 
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under POCA Chapter 4, an accused must either be an active participant in or a 
member of a criminal gang, coupled with the relevant crimes under sections 9 or 
sentence enhancements under section 10. It is however clear that these forms of 
active participation differ greatly.  POCA requires active association in a general sense 
rather than with a specific crime, which is apparent from the phrase “(…) actively 
participates in (…) a criminal gang”.318 A person who has participated in criminal gang 
activities once should therefore not be held liable under POCA but could well be held 
liable under the common purpose doctrine – probably in terms of prior agreement (his 
membership to the gang).  
Active participation under POCA appears to be a quantitative rather than a 
qualitative issue (save for the sentence enhancements as described above). A court 
would have to quantify the activities of a particular accused in the relevant gang 
(through participating in a “pattern of criminal gang activities”) rather than evaluate 
their qualitative involvement in a particular crime (how much he or she contributed to 
a crime). The definition of a “pattern of criminal gang activities” requires a person to 
have committed at least two offences in Schedule 1, no matter how minute their 
involvement was. A court will, conversely, have to evaluate an accused’s qualitative 
involvement in a common purpose scheme. The latter issue is the crux of the court’s 
consideration in determining common purpose liability in the active association form. 
This was also the approach followed by Californian Courts applying STEP.319 STEP 
has however been challenged several times on the alleged vagueness of the term 
“active participation”.320 The California Supreme Court however has rejected the 
interpretation321 that an accused, to qualify as an active participant, must dedicate a 
substantial amount of time to the criminal gang and held that all that is required is for 
the State to show that a defendant’s participation has been “more than nominal or 
passive”.322 This position is also vague and uncertain.  
                                            
318 Section 9(1) of POCA.  
319 See People v. Green 278 Cal.Rptr. 140 (1991) (“Green”).  
320 See 5 3 2 4 1 1 below. 
321 See People v. Castenada 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906 (2000) (“Castenada”) for the conclusion on this saga 
of cases as well as Chapter 4 below. 
322 Castenada 909. See Chapter 5 3 2 4 1 1 below for a discussion on the constitutionality of this 
provision in the US context and Chapter 4 for a discussion on its practical implementation. 
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It is submitted that POCA Chapter 4 does not render the common purpose doctrine 
obsolete, even in the context of group-based criminal activities. To be clear, the 
common purpose doctrine is a general mode of liability, so it has an existence in 
general principles of criminal law, whereas POCA creates specific offences 
(racketeering, money laundering and criminal gang activities). The question is whether 
the scope and utility of the common purpose doctrine is such that it makes redundant 
the offences created in POCA Chapter 4. There are distinct scenarios where only one 
would be applicable but also areas of great overlap. The common purpose doctrine is 
more desirable from a crime control perspective due to its potentially broad and 
relative elastic nature and relatively simple requirements – which are especially 
effective in the prosecution of ad hoc criminal groups. A prosecutor may therefore find 
the common purpose doctrine more desirable compared to the complex web of 
requirements that Chapter 4 (read with Chapter 1) of POCA requires.  
The common purpose doctrine however appears to lack the inherent ability to act 
as a deterrent to prevent people from engaging in criminal gang activities in the first 
place.323 The doctrine also poses a great risk of including fringe or even innocent 
parties within its ambit. This is also true when one considers the directory nature of 
the requirements in POCA. 
3 3 6   Foreign law and international law 
3 3 6 1 The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise in England324 
3 3 6 1 1  Introduction  
Considering the fact that the South African manifestation of the common purpose 
doctrine originates from English law, it becomes useful to analyse this doctrine as 
interpreted by English courts. The South African common purpose doctrine has 
however developed a rich and independent body of case law interpreting and applying 
this doctrine and, at least in its modern application, has not been influenced greatly by 
                                            
323 See House of Commons Justice Committee Joint Enterprise: Eleventh Report of Session 2010–12 
(2012) at paras 32-33 where the Committee suggested that there was no definitive evidence that joint 
criminal enterprise served as a deterrent for gang-related offences.  
324 Lords Hughes and Toulson in Jogee show disfavour in the term “joint enterprise liability” and stat it 
has caused “public misunderstanding” and has been interpreted as a form of “guilt by association or of 
guilt by mere presence” (see Jogee para 77). The term parasitic accessorial liability is preferred.   
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English judgments. It must also be differentiated from joint criminal enterprise which 
developed in terms of customary international law and as applied by international 
tribunals.  
3 3 6 1 2 General principles  
The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”), just as the common purpose 
doctrine, will hold each of the participants to agreed joint criminal venture criminally 
liable, if those acts fall within their common design.325 Previously and also analogous 
with the common purpose doctrine is the fact that participants to this joint enterprise 
could also be held liable for acts that fall outside of the ambit of the common design 
provided that the participant(s) had the requisite mens rea.326 This was the case until 
2016 and it would have been sufficient in these cases for the Prosecution to prove that 
the participant possessed dolus eventualis. This situation has however significantly 
changed.  
Prior to 2016, the principles relating to joint enterprise as applied in England and 
other common law jurisdictions were established in Chan Wing-siu v. R. (“Chan”).327 
In Chan, the Privy Council held that unlawful acts committed by a principal offender to 
a joint enterprise will be imputed to the secondary party in situations where the 
secondary party foresaw the possibility of the unlawful act but did not necessarily 
possess the requisite intent it.328  The criminal liability thus arises from participating in 
such a criminal joint venture with the aforementioned foresight. This approach 
necessarily laid down the principle that where Accused Y and Z agree to commit the 
crime of robbery and during the execution of that robbery Accused Y murders 
someone, Accused Z would also be held liable for murder if he foresaw the possibility 
of his accomplice committing such an act, irrespective of his own intention relating to 
the crime of murder. This seems to be analogous to the South African position, and 
even more so under Nzo. 
                                            
325 B Mitchell “Participating in Homicide” in A Reed & M Bohlander (eds) Participation in Crime – 
Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (2013) 7 9. 
326 Mitchell “Participating in Homicide” in Participation in Crime 9. 
327 [1985] A.C. 168. 
328 Chan 175. 
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Parties who have engaged in a joint criminal enterprise may receive some limitation 
to their liability in terms of the fundamental difference rule.329 This rule applies in cases 
where the principal offender in the joint enterprise has fundamentally deviated from 
the original enterprise; acted outside the scope of the criminal scheme or there has 
been a fundamental departure “from the assumptions of the other parties to the 
offence”.330 This typically occurs when the principal offender uses a different weapon 
to which the co-offender anticipated or when a fundamentally different or unexpected 
offence is committed.331 Wilson and Ormead point out that this rule will only apply 
where there is a “substantial variation” from the enterprise where this deviation 
converts the criminal enterprise into “a different kind of enterprise” than envisioned by 
the co-offender.332 Thus, where X assists Z in his plot to assault A with a cricket bat, 
X would still be liable if Z uses a different but similar weapon such as a baseball bat. 
X could however escape liability where Z plots to use a cricket bat in an act of assault 
but during the attack uses a gun and murders A.333 The rationale for this rule is 
succinctly described by Simester.334 When a co-offender joins a joint criminal 
enterprise, he or she accepts liability for criminal deeds committed in pursuance of the 
common purpose.335 This acceptance also extends to liability for incidental offences 
committed in the joint pursuance and where the offender is no longer in control of the 
outcome as the principal offender is an autonomous agent. This liability should 
however not extend to offences not foreseen by the co-offender or radically radically 
depart from the common purpose or enterprise.336 
It must be noted in cases where it can be proven who delivered the fatal blow in a 
joint enterprise, the other parties will not be held liable as perpetrators but as 
                                            
329 Mitchell “Participating in Homicide” in Participation in Crime 11; R Buxton “Jogee: upheaval in 
secondary liability for murder” (2016) 5 Criminal Law Review 324 326-327. 
330 Buxton (2016) Criminal Law Review 326-327 
331 Mitchell “Participating in Homicide” in Participation in Crime 11-12. 
332 W Wilson & D Ormerod “Simply harsh to fairly simple: joint enterprise reform” (2015) Criminal Law 
Review 3 14-15. 
333 Mitchell “Participating in Homicide” in Participation in Crime 11; Wilson & Ormerod (2015) Criminal 
Law Review 3 14-15. 
334 AP Simester “The Mental Element in Complicity” (2006) Law Quaterly Review 578 599. See also 
The Law Commission Participating in Crime (2007) para 3.52-3.53, where the Law Commission refers 
and agrees to this argument by Simester. 
335 This links with the principles of free will and self-determination as described above at 3 3 2. 
336 Simester (2006) Law Quaterly Review 599. 
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accessories. This is not the case in South African law. All parties held liable in terms 
of the common purpose doctrine will be held liable as co-perpetrators. 
3 3 6 1 3 Judicial intervention 
The judicial intervention, which will be discussed below, was only the apex of an 
ongoing concern about JCE. This concern was expressed in reports by the Law 
Commission (England and Wales)337 and also manifested in national campaign 
groups338 as well as criticism from the academic sphere due to the perceived 
overbroad application of the doctrine.339 Empirical research by Mitchell and Roberts 
has indicated that there was a strong public disfavour for the doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise and the associated sentencing.340 The crux of the perceived unfairness lies 
in the reduced level of mens rea required to secure a conviction as well as the 
mandatory life sentencing rules. Mitchell points out that “[l]ittle more than evidence of 
association” (such as gang membership) is required in joint enterprise cases.341 The 
Director of Public Prosecutions of England and Wales also acknowledges the 
                                            
337 These reports include: The Law Commission Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging Crime 
(2007) as well as The Law Commission Participating in Crime (2007). 
338 See Wilson & Ormerod (2015) Criminal Law Review 3 fn 88 where the author refers to groups such 
as the Committee on the Reform of Joint Enterprise and the Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association 
(or “JENGbA”).  
339 Wilson & Ormerod (2015) Criminal Law Review 19. 
340 See B Mitchell & JV Roberts Public Opinion and Sentencing for Murder: An Empirical Investigation 
of Public Knowledge and Attitudes in England and Wales (2010) 37-39. The respondents were provided 
with two “typical” hypothetical joint enterprise scenarios. In Case A, Jim and Steve started to fight. 
During this fight, Jim revealed a knife and stabbed Steve to death. Pete stood at the sidelines and 
encouraged this criminal act. In Case B, Mike and Bob decided to rob a bank. Although Bob only drove 
the getaway vehicle, he knew that Mike had a loaded gun. Only Mike went in to commit the act of 
robbery, consequently shooting a cashier who activated an alarm. Only 21% agreed that the co-offender 
should be liable for murder in Case A while 22% agreed that the co-offender should be liable for murder 
in Case B. 58% of the respondents agreed that in Case A, the co-offender should be liable for 
manslaughter while only 41% believed that the co-offender in Case B should be held liable for 
manslaughter. 21% of the respondents felt that there should be no liability for either murder or 
manslaughter in Case A while 37% felt that there should be no liability for either murder or 
manslaughter.  
341 Mitchell “Participating in Homicide” in Participation in Crime 11.  
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disproportionate and unfair sentencing associated with joint criminal enterprise in 
scenarios where the co-offender had a relatively insignificant role.342 
In R v Jogee (“Jogee”),343 in a joint decision by the United Kingdom Supreme Court 
and the Privy Council, the scope of the joint enterprise doctrine was narrowed by 
holding that the principles established by the Privy Council in Chan could not be upheld 
and have been applied incorrectly over the past few decades.  
The Court in Jogee based its decision on several important considerations, are 
extremely useful to consider in the broader context of the development of the common 
purpose doctrine in South Africa. Jogee pointed out that the Privy Council in Chan 
decided the case on the supposition that its authority established rules regarding the 
establishment of joint responsibility and more importantly what type of mens rea would 
be sufficient in such cases.344 Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson went on to state that the 
Privy Council conflated foresight and authorisation.345 Authorisation denotes a 
situation where two persons agree to commit a crime and under certain circumstances, 
one or both would be authorised to commit other “collateral” offences (and usually 
more serious) offences. For example, where two bank robbers only intend to commit 
the robbery but if they are met with resistance, they are authorised to use firearms. 
One can furthermore not automatically infer authorisation of those other collateral 
offences where there is a continued participation in the original criminal scheme and 
where foresight of those collateral offences is present.346 It was furthermore accurately 
pointed out that the foresight of an unlawful consequence does not necessarily 
translate into an intention of desire to materialise but this may serve as (sometimes 
“powerful”) evidence of such an intention.347  
A comment relevant to this discussion was made by Lords Hughes and Toulson. 
They refer to Lord Hutton’s comments in R v Powell and R v English (“Powell and 
                                            
342 House of Commons Justice Committee Joint Enterprise: Eleventh Report of Session 2010–12 (2012) 
13. Also see Mitchell “Participating in Homicide” in Participation in Crime 12-13. 
343 [2016] UKSC 8.  
344 See Jogee para 64. 
345 Jogee para 65. 
346 Jogee para 66. 
347 Jogee para 66. Here the Court refers to the comments by Lord Brown in R v Rahman [2009] 1 AC 
129. Also see Jogee para 73 where it was stated that “[f]oresight may be good evidence of intention but 
it is not synonymous with it (…)”, referring to the House of Lords decision in R v Powell and R v English 
[1999] 1 AC 1.  
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English”)348 in relation to public policy requiring effective means to address crimes 
committed by gangs.349 The Lords however stated there was no evidence that the law 
pre-Chan was insufficient. This is a powerful statement, considering that the common 
purpose doctrine was largely constitutionally justified based on this reasoning. 
The Lords ultimately rejected the principle as formulated in Chan and stated that 
“(…) the introduction of the principle was based on an incomplete, and in some 
respects erroneous, reading of the previous case law, coupled with generalised and 
questionable policy arguments”.350 The Court “prefers” the formulation as relied on in 
R v Mendez (“Mendez”) 351 favouring the application of the ordinary principles of 
secondary liability: 
The only peculiarity of joint enterprise cases is that, once a common purpose to commit 
the offence in question is proved, there is no need to look for further evidence of 
assisting and encouraging. The act of combining to commit the offence satisfies these 
requirements of aiding and abetting. Frequently, it will be acts of encouragement which 
provide the evidence of the common purpose. It is simply necessary to apply the 
ordinary principles of secondary liability to the joint enterprise.352 
In other words, where parties agree to commit unlawful acts, they will be held liable 
for acts for which they have given their express or implied assent and will also be liable 
where they commit these acts without prior agreement. The latter could occur via 
“support by words or deeds”.353 These instances, on their own, are enough to evoke 
secondary liability based on the ordinary principles of criminal law and render the 
extended liability and consequently the principles in Chan superfluous.  
                                            
348 [1999] 1 AC 1 25. 
349 Jogee para 75. Also see House of Commons Justice Committee Joint Enterprise: Eleventh Report 
of Session 2010–12 (2012) paras 29-30. Submissions made to the Justice Committee pointed to public 
concerns relating to gang-related and group violence. It was posited that this public concern combined 
with the ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding the law, could lead to over-charging in gang-related 
crimes. The Justice Committee (at paras 32-33) stated that the welcomed further evidence to prove 
joint enterprise serves as a deterrent to potential gang-offenders. The Committee furthermore 
suggested that over-charging may deter witnesses from coming forward for fear of being charged due 
to their mere associating, thus “impeding the justice process”.  
350 See Jogee pas 76 and 79. 
351 [2011] QB 876.  
352 Mendez para 17 relying on JC Smith & B Hogan Criminal Law 12 ed (2008) 207. 
353 Jogee para 78. These statements are especially reminiscent of the facts in Safatsa.  
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The crux of the decision is that a secondary party must possess the same direct 
intent as the primary offender in order to be held liable where the primary party 
commits a criminal act contemplated by the secondary party but which did not fall 
under the scope of their common design.354 Merely having foreseen an unlawful 
consequence is no longer sufficient.  
Jogee highlights the dangers relating to group-based criminal liability under JCE 
and by extension the common purpose doctrine. In fact, if one looks at the genesis of 
the common purpose doctrine/JCE in English and South African law, it is clear that 
two forces have always been at work, moulding a mode of liability which sits rather 
uncomfortably within the general part of two modern criminal law systems. These two 
forces are, on the one hand, the pragmatic, and sometimes opportunistic prosecutorial 
need to deal with the reality of group-based criminality. On the other hand is the 
dogmatic and normative/constitutional considerations that restrict the scope of 
common purpose/JCE – not for the sake of it, but for the sake of fairness and an 
adherence to a principled approach to criminal liability which is (should be!) based on 
individual guilt in the true sense. But criminal law does not exist in a utopian dream 
world; it responds to the real world. So, if we can take as a preliminary conclusion that 
there is something to be said for common purpose/JCE as a mode of liability, it is 
perhaps useful to explore this proposition further with regards to JCE under 
international criminal law – a field primarily concerned with collective conduct and 
group-based criminality. 
To be clear, again: it is the case that criminal gang activities are not (yet) crimes 
under international law. Modes of liability associated with international criminal law, 
such as command responsibility and JCE, can therefore not simply be applied to 
crimes under domestic criminal law. The discussion in the next section should 
therefore be seen as a theoretical exploration with an eye on possible lessons for the 
development of domestic criminal law principles. 
                                            
354 Jogee para 90. 
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3 3 6 2 JCE in international criminal law  
3 3 6 2 1 Introduction and rationale355 
The point of departure in determining liability under international criminal law is 
individual criminal liability, just as in most modern domestic legal systems. History has 
shown this to be extremely complex due to the fact that human rights atrocities and 
mass violations of international humanitarian law are, by their nature, often effectuated 
by groups or collective state action – usually in the form of military or quasi-military 
fashion.356  The criminal contribution of each of these actors varies in intensity and 
proponents argue that liability should not be limited to the physical perpetrators.357 
These complexities do however not discharge the prosecuting body from proving 
individual criminal liability and each actor’s contribution to the alleged crime.358  
Because of the collective nature of crimes under international law, and in the 
absence of satisfactory modes of liability to address this, the doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise (JCE) was first created at the international level by the judges of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”). In Prosecutor v 
Tadić 359 the ICTY Appeals Chamber highlighted the fact that criminal liability for 
violations of international humanitarian law cannot be limited to individual criminal 
liability but extends to other categories of joint offenders that do not meet the traditional 
elements of crimes.360 The ICTY in fact noted that “[m]ost of the time these crimes do 
not result from the criminal propensity of single individuals” but rather groups of 
                                            
355 The comparative nature of this dissertation was discussed above in Chapter 1 and will be 
contextualised further in Chapter 6. For the time being, it is important to point out that this type of 
comparative study is supported by the Constitution. Section 39(1)(b) specifically instructs forums, 
tribunals and courts to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. This section uses 
the word “must” and is therefore peremptory in nature. Section 39(2), which deals with the development 
of the common law and the interpretation of legislation, the aforementioned forums “must promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights” (own emphasis). The ensuing section deals with the 
development of the common law, in particular in the light of constitutional principles. It is therefore 
appropriate to rely on international law in this context.    
356 G Werle Principles of International Criminal Law (2009) 2 ed para 441. 
357 Prosecutor v Tadić IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) para 192. 
358 G Werle Principles of International Criminal Law (2009) 2 ed para 441. 
359 IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999). 
360 Tadić para 189-190. 
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persons acting in concert in pursuance of their common design.361 Cassese et al note 
the following:   
To obscure responsibility in the fog of collective criminality and let the crimes go 
unpunished would be immoral and contrary to the general purpose of criminal law of 
protecting the community from deviant behaviour that causes serious damage to the 
general interest.362 
This moral justification for the existence of JCE is substantially similar to the 
arguments of Moseneke J in Thebus in which he highlighted the societal need to hold 
those who act in concert responsible for their actions and also the societal distaste for 
group criminality.363  
The doctrine of JCE as it known today was first formulated in Tadić where the ICTY 
identified three broad categories of common purpose. The ICTY signified a shift from 
an “objective” to a “subjective” determination of responsibility. An objective 
determination is said to take place where there is a factual determination as to whether 
the relevant accused has fulfilled at least one of the objective (or physical) elements 
of the crime. Only those who have contributed to the crime by fulfilling at least one of 
the objective elements will attract criminal liability. In contrast to this approach, the 
subjective approach looks as to whether the perpetrator in question has contributed to 
the commission of the crime through shared intent in the commission of the crime. 
Only those persons shall subsequently be regarded as principles to the crime.364  
As noted, JCE, in its international context, is largely a judicial and prosecutorial 
innovation by the ICTY365 (based on a series of post-World War II judgments). The 
subjective elements in each category differ and will be discussed below. The basic 
objective elements however remain the same for all three categories. There must 
firstly be a “plurality of persons”; secondly the existence a common purpose or design 
                                            
361 Tadić para 191. 
362 A Cassese, MD Fan, V Thalmann, S Zappala “Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Antonio Cassese 
and Members of The Journal of International Criminal Justice on Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine” 
(2009) 20 Criminal Law Forum 289 301. 
363 Thebus para 34.  
364 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04/ 01/06 (29 January 2007) (“Dyilo 2007”) paras 
328-329. 
365 A Danner & JS Martinez “Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, 
and the Development of International Criminal Law” (2004) 93 California Law Review 75 103-104. 
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(which may be tacit or explicit) to commit a crime or crimes as per the ICTY Statute 
and thirdly there must be participation in one of the crimes in the ICTY Statute.366  
It must be borne in mind that the categories of crimes that fall under the scope of 
the JCE doctrine in international law cover crimes that are international by nature, that 
is, crimes that offend the international community as a whole (genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity).367 But JCE did not develop only with respect to the 
nature of the crimes. It developed in the jurisprudence of the ICTY and subsequent 
tribunals because of the nature of criminal conduct committed by groups and 
collectives. It is for that reason that we need to explore the usefulness of the full 
spectrum of JCE for purposes of domestic and transnational forms of collective and 
complex criminality, such as organised crime and criminal gang activities. But first it is 
necessary to look at the various forms of JCE as developed under international 
criminal law and to compare that with the forms of common purpose and JCE that exist 
under domestic law, notably South African and English law, as earlier discussed. 
3 3 6 2 2 The three categories of JCE under international criminal law and 
the two models under article 25(3)(d) of the Statute of Rome 
The first category (also known as JCE I) relates to a situation where the co-
perpetrators all possess the same intention while acting to fulfil the common design. 
In other words, the requisite actus reus is the voluntary participation through 
assistance or facilitation of a criminal offence with the same mens rea to bring about 
the criminal offence.368 It is not necessary under this model that the co-accused 
personally bring about the unlawful consequence but they must at least, in some way, 
contribute to it in pursuance of their unlawful common design.369 It should be obvious 
that JCE I corresponds to a large extent with the common purpose doctrine and JCE 
under South African and English criminal l law. 
                                            
366 Tadić para 227-228. Also see K Ambos “Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility” 
(2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 159 167.  
367 See Also Ambos (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 167. 
368 Tadić para 196. 
369 Tadić para 196. Nieto-Navia J (at para 197 and fn 233) refers to Trial of Otto Sandrock and three 
others British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals (1945) UNWCC vol. I 35 where a British Court 
held three German co-perpetrators liable under the “common enterprise” doctrine. All three accused 
had the same intention of killing the deceased but had varying degrees of participation in executing 
their common enterprise. 
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The second category, JCE II, which is considered a variant370 of the first category 
rather than a truly distinct form, relates to persons acting ex officio in the administrative 
or military hierarchy where they were accused of systematically mistreating prisoners 
or killing them during the execution of a common purpose or design. This category of 
cases is commonly referred to as “concentration camp” cases due to the fact that 
military and administrative staff in charge of the facilities were held liable under this 
category of the doctrine.371 It is par excellence a model of JCE aimed at fixed 
institutional settings where crimes are committed due to the institutional setting itself. 
Three requirements must be satisfied before liability arises.372 There must firstly be an 
organised system to facilitate the ill-treatment of prisoners or detainees and 
consequently execute the crimes in question. The accused must secondly possess 
awareness of the nature of the system of alleged ill-treatment. He or she must lastly 
have actively contributed or participated in the enforcement of the system to actualise 
the common criminal design.373 It is doubtful that JCE II has much relevance as a 
mode of liability under domestic criminal law (that is, outside the specific context of 
institutional settings).  
The third category, JCE III, also known as the “extended form” of the doctrine, 
holds persons who have participated in a common criminal plan liable for foreseen 
criminal actions committed by others – and where the conduct falls outside of the 
original common plan.374 This category requires the parties to have the intention to 
participate in the common purpose or design and also to foresee (through, at least, 
dolus eventualis) that additional or unplanned criminal consequences may arise by 
participants to their common design.375 The ICTY Appeals Chamber, in its final 
decision before the closing down of this ad hoc tribunal, in the case of Prlic et al,376 
                                            
370 See Tadić para 203.  
371 Tadić para 202. See fn 249 where Nieto-Navia J refers to the British Military Court judgement in Trial 
of Josef Kramer and 44 others (1945) UNWCC vol. II  1 (“Kramer”). Also see S Manacorda & C Meloni 
“Indirect Perpetration versus Joint Criminal Enterprise Concurring Approaches in the Practice of 
International Criminal Law?” 9 (2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 159 162. 
372 Tadić para 202 referring to Karmer 1. 
373 Tadić para 202. 
374 Tadić para 204; 218. 
375 SeeTadić para 206; 220. 
376 Prosecutor v Jadranko Prlic, Bruno Stojic, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petkovic, Valentin Coric & 
Berislav Pusic IT-04-74-A (29 November 2017).  
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confirmed that JCE (including the extended form of the doctrine) forms part of 
customary international law. It was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber that the 
appellants were criminally responsible on the basis of the joint criminal enterprise for 
committing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of the laws 
and customs of war and crimes against humanity. They were accordingly convicted 
pursuant to section 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. It was found that, although certain of the 
established crimes did not form part of the initial common criminal plan, the appellants 
were nevertheless responsible for a number of these crimes, pursuant to JCE III. The 
Appeals Chamber stated as follows: 
[It] is the settled jurisprudence of the Tribunal that the three forms of JCE, as forms of 
commission of a crime, have been established in customary international law since at 
least 1992. The Appeals Chamber has repeatedly affirmed the relevant analysis in 
Tadic, which examined post-World War II war crimes cases extensively in concluding 
that joint criminal enterprise as a mode of criminal responsibility is firmly established 
in customary international law, and has recognised three forms of this mode of liability 
– JCE I, JCE II, and JCE III. The Appeals Chamber has also held that “the long and 
consistent stream of judicial decisions, international instruments, and domestic 
legislation in force at the time” provided “reasonable notice that committing an 
international crime on the basis of participating in a JCE incurs individual criminal 
liability”.377 
The confirmation by the ICTY Appeals Chamber that JCE (including the extended 
form) is part of customary international law constitutes one of the ICTY’s most 
important contributions to the development of the general part of international criminal 
law. But is it generally the case that JCE is considered to be now firmly established in 
international criminal law? The position is a bit more nuanced if one takes into account 
the jurisprudence of other international criminal tribunals. For instance, the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), in Sesay et al378 on appeal held that the jurisprudence 
of the ICTY and ICTR correctly reflects customary international law, and joint criminal 
enterprise can therefore serve as a basis for criminal liability.379 The Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) came to a different conclusion. It held 
                                            
377 Prlic et al para 587.  
378 SCSL-04-15-A (26 October 2009). 
379 Sesay et al paras 400-402; 475 and 485. 
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in its Decision on the Appeals against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint 
Criminal Enterprise (JCE)380 that JCE III was not recognised as a mode of criminal 
responsibility applicable to violations of international humanitarian law. 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) presents yet another 
view. Article 25(3)(d), on modes of liability, provides for liability based on contribution 
to a crime by a group acting with a common purpose. The text of section 25(3)(d) holds 
the following:  
In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a 
crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be 
intentional and shall either: 
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the 
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court; or 
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime [.] 
That is reminiscent of JCE, but does it include all forms of JCE, including the extended 
form? ICC decisions thus far seem to regard article 25(3)(d) as constituting narrow 
JCE and a residual form of accessorial liability, and not JCE in all its manifestations.381 
Article 25(3)(d) creates two modes of criminal responsibility. The first mode, under 
article 25(3)(d)(i), punishes the intentional contributions “furthering the criminal activity 
or criminal purpose of the group”. Said activity or purpose involves the perpetration of 
a crime under the ICC’s jurisdiction. This wording is typical of what is expected of a 
codification of JCE I or the common purpose doctrine. Article 25(3)(d)(ii), however, 
creates a second mode of liability which is not quite JCE in the extended form. The 
contribution here shall “[b]e made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit the crime”. Ohlin submits that the wording is “so syntactically obtuse that it is 
barely grammatical”.382 The gist of this provision is seemingly aimed at persons who 
may provide background contributions, but who are not personally executing the 
crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC. This would include assistance through 
providing firearms, ammunition or vehicles while knowing the unlawful intention of the 
criminal group but not personally using these means to perpetrate the relevant crimes. 
                                            
380 Case No 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (20 May 2010). 
381 See, for instance, Dyilo 2007, at paras 336 and 337. 
382 Ohlin (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 78. 
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Rather than pure JCE III as developed and confirmed by the ICTY, the second mode 
of liability under article 25(3)(d)(ii) of the Rome Statute can therefore best be described 
as a form of accessorial or accomplice liability. 
3 3 6 2 3  Criticism against the doctrine  
The JCE doctrine is not universally accepted and has been subject to criticism, 
especially due to its potentially wide and far-reaching nature. JCE III, the extended 
form as developed by the ICTY and confirmed by that tribunal’s Appeals Chamber, 
shares some similarities with the broad application of the common purpose doctrine in 
earlier South African cases, notably Nzo.383 Indeed, as we have seen, common 
purpose/JCE, as modes of liability, cast a potentially wide net. The ICTY held that 
individuals are liable because an unlawful consequence was the “predictable 
consequence (…) and the accused was either reckless or indifferent to that risk”.384 
Similar concerns raised with respect to Nzo in South Africa were also raised with 
respect to the extended form of JCE. Danner and Martinez note that this extended 
mode of liability is dangerously uncertain and susceptible to broad judicial 
interpretation and prosecutorial abuse.385 The authors refer to Prosecutor v. Kvočka, 
Kos, Radić, Zigić & Prcać (Judgment) (“Kvočka”)386 where the range of the doctrine 
was illustrated by the Trial Chamber which stated, albeit obiter, that extended JCE 
could equally be utilised for a group of bank robbers and to “the systematic slaughter 
of millions during a vast criminal regime comprising thousands of participants”.387 The 
likelihood of a conviction for a larger criminal campaign and common purpose is 
greater because prosecutors can use the formulation of charges as a broad, almost 
all-encompassing tool to target a large cohort of accused persons.388  
Those who criticise the JCE and common purpose doctrines often encounter 
pushback in the form of a normative and policy justification, namely the so-called 
                                            
383 See Nzo 4 and for a criticism of this approach 3 3 4 2 above.  
384 Tadić para 204. 
385 Danner & Martinez (2004) 93 California Law Review 135. Also see JD Ohlin “Three Conceptual 
Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise” (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 69 81-85. 
386 IT-98-30/1-T (2 November 2001).  
387 Kvočka para 307. See Danner & Martinez (2004) 93 California Law Review 135. 
388 Danner & Martinez (2004) 93 California Law Review 136. 
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“principle of effectiveness”. This principle is a major consideration in the extended form 
of JCE followed by the ICTY and to a lesser extent the ICTR. This principle dictates 
that a tribunal is “entitled” to more robust modes of liability, based on the theory that 
international criminal law is also a concretisation of international human rights law; 
which is to say, an international trial is not only about the guilt of the individual accused, 
but also about the rights of victims of mass criminality.389 This justification for JCE and 
common purpose as double functional instruments (i.e. modes of liability and broad 
shields for the enhancement of human rights/victims’ rights) corresponds to some 
extent with the policy consideration in Thebus, where the protection of society through 
the relatively broad criminalisation of collective criminal conduct found favour with the 
Constitutional Court.390  
JCE also qualifies the traditional criminal law approaches to individual criminal 
responsibility or personal guilt.391 Danner & Martinez point out that the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, where modern international criminal law was born, noted the importance of 
the principle of individual (personal) guilt. The Tribunal nevertheless noted that there 
should not be hesitation in a determination of criminal guilt of a group merely because 
it is a novel concept – but this must be done carefully in order to avoid the punishment 
of innocent persons.392 The judges of the ICTY, as we have seen, took this sentiment 
much further with the formalisation of JCE in three distinct forms, and with the 
confirmation that it is indeed part of customary international law. The fact that many of 
the other international criminal tribunals (including the ICC) declined to follow the 
ICTY’s expansive view of common purpose mode of liability (especially in the 
expanded form of JCE) is to a significant degree the result of widespread and 
consistent critique of the doctrine of JCE.393 South African and English law on common 
purpose and JCE, and the increasingly restrictive application of these modes of 
                                            
389 A Orakhelashvili “Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the Recent Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights” (2003) 14(3) European Journal of International Law 529 534; Danner 
& Martinez (2004) 93 California Law Review 133. 
390 See Thebus para 34.  
391 Danner & Martinez (2004) 120 California Law Review; S Manacorda & C Meloni “Indirect 
Perpetration versus Joint Criminal Enterprise:  Concurring Approaches in the Practice of International 
Criminal Law?” 9 (2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 159 166. 
392 See Danner & Martinez (2004) 93 California Law Review 85. 
393 For a good summation of the critique, see MG Karnavas “The ICTY legacy: A defence counsel’s 
perspective” (2011) 3 Goettingen Journal of International Law 1053. 
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liability, regardless of the justification in public policy and victims’ rights, are therefore 
fundamentally in line with developments in international criminal law.  
3 3 6 2 4  Concluding remarks on JCE under international criminal law 
There is a clear rationale for a common purpose/joint criminal enterprise mode of 
liability in international criminal law. The nature of mass criminality and systemic 
violence necessitates a mode of liability which goes beyond the individual perpetrator’s 
liability. While the rationale for JCE under international criminal law seems clear, the 
same cannot be said about the precise scope of JCE as developed and applied by the 
international tribunals (the ICTY, first and foremost). The general trend seems to be 
away from the extended form of JCE and towards JCE in the two narrower forms 
(“pure” common purpose or JCE I, and “concentration camp cases” or JCE II). In 
addition, the Rome Statute of the ICC seems to favour a mode of liability for group-
based crimes which can best be described as accessorial liability. So there is some 
uncertainty as to the precise meaning and scope of JCE under international criminal 
law. For now, we can draw some general conclusions: 
 JCE (at least in the narrower forms of JCE I and II) is probably part of 
customary international law. This is so because of the jurisprudence of the 
various international tribunals. 
 It is doubtful that the extended form of JCE is part of customary international 
law, despite pronouncements to this effect by the ICTY. The fact that many 
other international tribunals have strong reservations about the extended 
form of JCE supports the tentative conclusion that extended JCE is not part 
of customary international law. 
 The existence of JCE in international criminal law supports the general 
argument in favour of the retention of common purpose and JCE as modes 
of liability for group-based crimes under domestic criminal law. This is not to 
say that principles of international criminal law are directly applicable to 
domestic criminal law. But it makes the argument in favour of retention more 
cogent if one looks at the underlying rationale of modes of liability in criminal 
law, whether at the international or domestic levels. 
 Section 232 of the Constitution, 1996, provides that customary international 
law is law in South Africa, unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or 
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with an Act of Parliament. So JCE, at least in the narrower form, is part of 
South African law, but obviously only with respect to the crimes for which 
international JCE were developed, namely genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. It cannot simply be transposed to organised crime 
or criminal gang activities, regardless of the destructive and systematic 
nature of these forms of organised criminality. 
 International JCE and domestic common purpose/JCE share a common 
justification in the sense that these modes of liability were not only developed 
to hold individuals who act in complex groups or collectivities criminally liable, 
but also to provide a potentially powerful tool in the hand of the prosecution 
to advance the protection of systematic human rights and the interests of 
large groups of innocent civilians and members of the public. This rationale 
we have seen in the jurisprudence of some of the international criminal 
tribunals, and it was hinted at in Thebus before the South African 
Constitutional Court.  
3 3 7  Possible saving grace: Section 36 of the Constitution 
In the preceding paragraphs we have investigated the comparative and 
international rationales for the common purpose doctrine. To return now to the 
domestic setting, it can be noted that the common purpose doctrine has never been 
subjected to the limitations clause in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. This is 
due to the fact that the Constitutional Court in Thebus did not reach a conclusion of 
unconstitutionality to even reach this stage.  
It is trite in South African constitutional law that the rights in the Bill of Rights are 
not absolute and subject to limitations. The rights are limited through internal 
qualifiers394 or through section 36 of the Constitution. The latter is also known as the 
                                            
394 Section 35(5) of the Constitution, for example, states that  
Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if 
the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the 
administration of justice. 
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general limitations clause. A limitation of rights analysis usually involves an initial two-
step enquiry: a court must firstly ascertain whether or not there has been a violation of 
the specific right(s) in question and secondly whether that violation was justifiable in 
terms of the limitations clause.395 A true South African constitutional analysis can 
therefore only be concluded by moving onto the second step of, in this case 
hypothetical (or abstract), enquiry.  
Section 36(1) states that rights in the Bill of Rights may only be limited by a law of 
general application and only to the extent “that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom”. Furthermore, a relevant court must take all the relevant factors into account 
when making such a determination, including the nature of the right,396 the importance 
of the purpose of the limitation,397 the nature and extent of the limitation,398 the relation 
between the limitation and its purpose399 and whether there are less restrictive means 
available to achieve this purpose.400 
                                            
This section pertains to the rights of arrested, detained and accused persons under section 35. It clear 
that evidence obtained in such a fashion must be excluded only upon a judicial analysis when the 
evidence has been obtained in a manner that violates a right in the Bill of Rights and furthermore if the 
admission of such evidence renders the trial unfair or is otherwise detrimental to the admiration of 
justice. Evidence obtained in a fashion that violates a right in Chapter 2 of the Constriction will not ipso 
facto be excluded and thus in certain circumstances will limit the rights of arrested, detained and 
accused persons. For a comprehensive discussion on section 35(5), see Van der Merwe & Schwikkard 
Principles Chapter 12. 
395 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2013) 6 ed 165-166.  
396 Section 36(1)(a). 
397 Section 36(1)(b). 
398 Section 36(1)(c). 
399 Section 36(1)(d). 
400 Section 36(1)(e). 
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The common purpose doctrine is undoubtedly a law of general application as the 
law in question does not have to be statutory law but also includes the common law 
and customary law.401  
The purpose of the limitation on the presumption of innocence is rooted in public 
policy. That is, specifically to deal with the “significant society scourge” (as described 
in Thebus)402 that is group criminality and to relieve the prosecution in having to prove 
the causation element in these cases – where the latter is often difficult to establish. 
This is certainly an important governmental purpose to pursue and the State cannot 
truly be faulted for wanting to curb group criminality.403  
A further consideration here is the nature and the extent of the violation, that is, the 
violation of the presumption of innocence through the State not having to prove all of 
the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. At least not all of the elements 
are negated but only the requirement of causation. The violation is nevertheless 
serious in nature as this is an extreme departure from the traditional principles of 
criminal law. The last factor, whether there are less restrictive means to achieve this 
goal, is possibly the most important consideration.  
                                            
401 The Constitutional Court has considered whether the “law of general application” requirement is 
satisfied by the common law. In President of The Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 
(4) SA 1 (CC) the court relied on jurisprudence from the Canadian Supreme court as well as the 
European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) in The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom (1979) 2 
EHRR 245 para 49 (“Sunday Times”). In Sunday Times, the ECHR considered whether the common 
law would fall within the scope of “prescribed by law” within article 10(2) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950 entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221. 
The ECHR consequently held that two requirements had to be satisfied, firstly that the relevant rules 
must be “adequately accessible” to the public. Secondly, it must be “formulated with sufficient precision 
to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct”. This test is quite reminiscent of the tests for satisfying ius 
certum under the principle of legality. See Chapter 5 below for a detailed discussion on the principle of 
legality including ius certum (5 3 2 2 1). 
402 Thebus para 34. 
403 See example S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo 1996 (2) SA 464 (CC) para 16 where the Constitutional Court, 
also in the context of an infringement of the presumption of innocence, held that 
The contention was that the provision is intended to ensure effective policing and to facilitate 
the investigation and prosecution of crime as well as to ease the prosecution's task of securing 
convictions for contraventions under the Act. Such an objective is truly laudable and its 
importance, in the current climate of very high levels of violent crime, cannot be overstated.  
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Lesser forms of liability such as conspiracy, incitement or even attempt to commit 
a crime are worthy and less restrictive means to deal with a charge of murder or 
assault (which are the cases which most often employ the common purpose doctrine). 
These measures may not serve the retributionist societal interest or need to hold 
someone responsible for the substantive crime of murder or assault to the same 
extent, but the principle of fair labelling must prevent the overemphasis this societal 
need. The same objective can therefore still be achieved through these measures. 
The most dramatic example is certainly S v Makwanyane (“Makwanyane”)404 where 
lifelong imprisonment was held to be an appropriate and less restrictive manner in 
achieving the same governmental goals as the death penalty.405 In response to the 
debate of whether life imprisonment was an acceptable means to achieve the same 
goals406 as the death penalty, Chaskalson P held that 
(…) [T]he question is not whether criminals should go free and be allowed to escape 
the consequences of their anti-social behaviour. Clearly they should not; and equally 
clearly those who engage in violent crime should be met with the full rigour of the 
law.407 
This is equally as true for the common purpose doctrine. Criminals will not escape 
punishment. They will be punished in line with what the State would prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt and not allow the State to rely on the crutch of guilt by imputation. 
This in turn also gives effect to the fair labelling doctrine. Employing other secondary 
means of liability will not translate into a limitation of the presumption of innocence. All 
elements will have to be proven for conspiracy and incitement or to be found guilty as 
                                            
404 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).  
405 See for example Makwanyane at para 212 where Kriegler J held that  
[n]o empirical study, no statistical exercise and no theoretical analysis has been able to 
demonstrate that capital punishment has any deterrent force greater than that of a really heavy 
sentence of imprisonment. 
406 These goals were enumerated as deterrence; prevention and retribution. See Makwanyane paras 
116-131 for Chaskalson J’s analysis of these goals. Also see Currie & De Waal Handbook 166. 
407 Makwanyane para 117.  
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an accomplice. These available and less restrictive measures are (or must be) 
preferred408 to the common purpose doctrine that negates the causation requirement.  
Thus, purely from a constitutional perspective, it is submitted here that the common 
purpose doctrine would likely not survive constitutional scrutiny under section 36. To 
be clear: there are seemingly good rationales for the existence of common 
purpose/JCE under both international and domestic criminal law, as we have seen 
previously. But those rationales may not be enough to save the common purpose 
doctrine under South African criminal law, if viewed through a constitutional lens.  
3 3 8  Evaluation  
The following broad evaluations and recommendations flow from the discussion 
above.  
The common purpose doctrine, in its current form, applies not only to groups or 
complex collective criminal matters, but also to individuals acting in small and 
opportunistic groups. The doctrine negates the causation requirement and 
consequently prima facie offends the presumption of innocence and has oppressive 
and unfair consequences. It is therefore unjustifiable within our current constitutional 
regime.  
Judicial intervention and development would promote constitutional and doctrinal 
compliance and is in line with the constitutional order in terms of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution.  
The true utilitarian application of the doctrine is when it is applied to “mob-like” 
scenarios such as in Thebus or Safatsa where it is impossible to determine which of 
the accused persons causally contributed to the unlawful consequence. These 
scenarios are mostly associated with active association cases, where the negation of 
the causal element is more apposite. Active association and prior agreement cases, 
where it can be determined which of the accused parties causally contributed to the 
unlawful consequence, should rather be dealt with in terms of other inchoate offences 
or in terms of accomplice liability. This approach is especially preferred in prior 
agreement cases where more evidence would likely available regarding each 
                                            
408 Currie and De Waal correctly point out that if the same goals can be achieved where the rights in 
question are not restricted at all (or less invasively) such means should be preferred – see Currie & De 
Waal Handbook 170. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 94 
 
participant’s contribution to the criminal scheme. The use of the common purpose 
doctrine in these scenarios is superfluous and the limitation of the constitutional rights 
of accused parties here is consequently unnecessary.  
The principle of fair labelling is an important consideration here.  If one considers 
that a person, under the same factual scenario, can be held liable as a co-offender 
(under the common purpose) or as an accomplice (or some other lesser form of 
liability), it becomes patent that courts should favour imposing a lesser form of liability 
when it is clear who factually and legally contributed to the unlawful consequence; or 
to what extent. The UK approach under the joint enterprise doctrine is to hold accused 
parties falling in this category liable as accomplices and furthermore also distinguish 
between several degrees of murder or killing.409 South African courts often do not 
appropriately consider each participant’s contribution (when it is ascertainable) to the 
crime at the sentencing stage,410 or differentiate between degrees of murder, which 
would alleviate some of the draconian consequences of the doctrine. Fair labelling 
would thus be promoted by following the UK approach or at least by appropriately 
appraising the contribution of each participant at sentencing. Arguments underlying 
judgmentjudgments such as Thebus, where it is suggested that that criminals will 
escape liability if not for the common purpose doctrine, are thus flagrantly inaccurate 
and hold no water.  
It would furthermore, considering the recent developments of the joint enterprise 
doctrine, be advantageous to apply the element of dolus more strictly and be cognizant 
of overzealous inferential reasoning with regards to dolus eventualis. This is a 
considerably broad category of intent and considering that causation is completely 
ignored, it may be fairer to an accused to be held liable for consequences where he 
or she in fact intended (more specifically, dolus directus).  
Dolus eventualis is however a well-accepted and established form of intent in South 
Africa. The SCA confirmed dolus eventualis as an acceptable form of intention in 
common purpose cases. In S v Nkosi (“Nkosi”),411 one of the robbers was fatally shot 
during the execution of their common purpose. The SCA found that the appellant had 
the requisite mens rea in the form of dolus eventualis. He was well aware and foresaw 
                                            
409 See Kemp et al Criminal Law 267 (and fn 51). 
410 See Burchell Principles 477; Kemp et al Criminal Law 267. 
411 2016 (1) SACR 301.  
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the risks associated with their criminal endeavour (although the death was not his 
direct intent) and therefore the need for loaded firearms.412 It was naturally foreseen 
that the firearms would be used and the use thereof would lead to fatalities.  
Hoctor highlights the importance and usefulness of dolus eventualis in criminal trials 
as the most important form of intention and even posits that it is the “cornerstone of 
criminal liability”.413 The possibility that the SCA or the Constitutional Court would 
intervene like the courts in Jogee seems highly unlikely. This does not mean that it is 
infallible or immune to scrutiny. Considering that this form of intention requires a court 
to make certain inferences and postulations from surrounding circumstances, a finding 
on the presence of dolus eventalis is a significant exercise into the subjective state of 
mind of an accused. This additionally requires postulations and inferences with 
regards to an accused’s own evaluations on the state of mind of his co-accused. 
Questions regarding the limitation (or even the inclusion) of the recklessness (or 
volitional) requirement for dolus eventalis are thus appropriate.414  
Inferential reasoning in cases involving common purposes and dolus eventualis 
could also lead to far-reaching consequences.415 When there is a change in the 
criminal objectives originally associated with, a co-perpetrator (other than the one 
physically committing the unlawful act) may only be held liable if he or she associates 
with the new criminal objective.416 This is especially true in scenarios like Nzo where 
it was emphasised that the accused belonged to an ANC terrorist group and the Court 
inferred that any and all consequences flowing from this group can be attributed to the 
accused because they were foreseen. It can be argued that significant weight was 
attached to the fact that he was a member of a banned and clandestine terrorist group 
and because of that should be liable.417  
                                            
412 Nkosi para 6.-7. 
413 S Hoctor “The Concept of Dolus Eventualis in South African Law – An Historical Perspective” (2008) 
14(2) Fundamina 14 14.  
414 See Hoctor (2008) 14(2) Fundamina 9. 
415 Kemp et al Criminal Law 267. In Lungile (para 16) the SCA was mindful (and also refers to previous 
cases where this caution was expressed) of this type of inferential or deductive reasoning in dealing 
with dolus eventualis. The Court referred to the subjective nature of the enquiry as well as the 
accompanying thought processes involved in any particular factual scenario. 
416 Kemp et al Criminal Law 264. This is somewhat reminiscent of the fundamental difference rule under 
JCE in English law (see 3 3 6 1 2 above).  
417 Also see Burchell (1990) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 349. 
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3 3 9 Recommendation: Statutory regulation of the common purpose  
doctrine 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the common purpose doctrine as currently 
understood in South African common law is not an adequate form of addressing 
organised crime in terms of the Palermo Convention. Article 5 of the Convention, for 
example, requires that a member state “adopt such legislative and other measures as 
may be necessary to establish as criminal offences (…)”.418 The common purpose 
would be disqualified here because it is not a legislative (or administrative) measure. 
The doctrine would furthermore probably not comply with the requirement prerequisite 
of an “organized criminal group,”419 which requires the group to exist for a period of 
time. Even in cases of common purpose by agreement, the groups are not necessarily 
“organized” or participate in “organized crime” in the generic sense. It would thus not 
be sufficient to regulate criminal gang activities exclusively through the common law. 
The answer to this may be that there be some form of legislative intervention to codify 
to common purpose doctrine: not only for it to be utilised in the fight against criminal 
gang activities (and complying with the Palermo Convention) but for it to be 
substantially fairer in every application – even when not utilised for criminal gang 
activities.   
The regulation of group-based crimes should occur within statutory regulation rather 
than the broad and unpredictable common purpose doctrine. It is suggested here that 
a statutory intervention takes place in this regard. The controversial genesis of JCE 
under international criminal law also provides support for the argument that this mode 
of liability should rather be codified. The temptation of an ever-expanding notion of 
JCE caused a backlash among commentators and even some international judges, as 
we have seen. Rather than having to deal with an amorphous doctrine, susceptible to 
                                            
418 Own emphasis.  
419 Article 2(a) states that an “organized criminal group”  
shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting 
in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in 
accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other 
material benefit [.] 
Also see the discussion of this definition below at 4 3 2 as well as Article 5(1)(a)(i) of the Palermo 
Convention.  
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abuse (regardless of the laudable reasons for its existence) it is better to codify it in 
clear terms, and preferably as part of a coherent legislative framework dealing with 
group-based and complex crime (such as the atrocity crimes under the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, organised crime, and criminal gang activities). We will return to this point 
later. But first it is necessary to look at conspiracy, incitement, and public violence as 
complementary or, if necessary, alternative bases for prosecuting group-based 
criminality, including gang related activities. 
3 4  Conspiracy  
3 4 1  Introduction and definition  
Burchell describes a conspiracy (in the generic sense) “(…) as an agreement 
between the two or more persons to commit, or to aid or procure the commission of, 
a crime”.420 The author notes that there has not been a popular application (like in the 
USA) of the crime with other possible options such as the common purpose doctrine 
available to the State.421 A person commits the crime of conspiracy in terms of section 
18(2)(b) Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956 (“RAA”), which reads as follows:  
(2) Any person who- 
(a)   conspires with any other person to aid or procure the commission of or to commit 
(…) 
any offence, whether at common law or against a statute or statutory regulation,  
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to the punishment to which a 
person convicted of actually committing that offence would be liable.  
Conspiracy, just as does the crime of incitement, constitutes an independent offence 
and conviction does not require further acts towards the commission of the proposed 
offence.422 What is required, however, is a subjective agreement between the co-
conspirators, which constitutes the actus reus.423 
                                            
420 Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure vol I 551. 
421 Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure vol I 550. 
422 Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure vol I 551. The author notes that the common law 
position differed in that it required some act towards the commission of the crime before an accused 
can be found guilty of the crime. 
423 R v Harris (1927) 48 NLR 330; Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure vol I 551. 
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The rationale behind criminalising anticipatory conduct is, once again, to address 
the dangers associated with group criminality. It furthermore seeks to punish those 
who have “manifested their disposition to criminality.”424 A second justification is 
manifested in the theory that group criminality (even at the conspiratorial phase) poses 
a “special danger”.425 Cowling submits that conspiracy in terms of the RAA, just as the 
common purpose doctrine, showed a tendency to be applied to “political offences” 
which has been a hindrance in its subsequent judicial development.426  
3 4 2  Interaction with section 9 of POCA 
In S and Alexander and Others (“Alexander”)427 the Court stated the following: 
Where two or more persons have associated themselves in an organisation with the 
agreed purpose or object of committing an offence, they have in law formed a 
conspiracy to commit the contemplated offence. It follows that any person who joins 
such an organisation as a member, well knowing the object or purpose thereof or who 
remains a member after becoming aware of the purpose thereof, has signified by his 
conduct his agreement with the aims of the said organisation and has made himself 
guilty of a conspiracy to commit such offence.428 
The crime of conspiracy is comparable to section 9(1)(a) of POCA, which holds that 
gang members or active participants in a gang, shall be guilty of an offence if he or 
she “wilfully aids and abets any criminal activity committed for the benefit of, at the 
direction of, or in association with any criminal gang”.  
Snyman doubts the independent application or usefulness of section 9(1)(a) of 
POCA which regulates similar criminal behaviour.429 The author correctly submits that 
the aforementioned section of POCA does not require the commission of a crime but 
only that he or she “wilfully aids and abets any criminal activity committed for the 
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal gang” together with 
gang membership or active participation in that gang. There is no significant difference 
                                            
424 Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure vol I 550 referring to W LaFave Criminal Law 5 ed 
(2000) 567-568. 
425 See W LaFave & AW Scott Jr Handbook on Criminal Law (1972) 459. 
426 Cowling (1998) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 369.  
427 1965 (2) 1 All SA 81 (C).  
428 Alexander at 85. 
429 Snyman (1999) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 218-219.  
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between this offence and the formulation in Alexander. Snyman furthermore argues 
that the same conclusion can be reached when comparing subsections (b) and (c) to 
the crime of conspiracy.  
The only difference worth mentioning is probably sentencing – where crimes 
committed in terms of POCA would carry a lesser sentence than section 18(2)(b) of 
the RAA.430 A person who contravenes subsections 9(1)(a) or (b), shall be liable for a 
fine or imprisonment not exceeding six years.431 It will however be an aggravating 
circumstances for the purposes of sentencing if a crime in terms of subsections 9(1)(a) 
or (b) was committed on the premises or grounds of or within 500 meters of a (public 
or private) school or educational institution during school hours, school-related 
programmes or in circumstances where minors are using the school facilities.432 When 
a person is liable for conspiracy in terms of the RAA, he or she will be liable as if he 
or she has committed that offence, regardless of whether that offence was 
executed.433 Even though the provisions in POCA create quasi-conspiracy offences, 
they are still weaker. This could also probably be due to the fact that the accused 
would have been or will be punished for the underlying predicate crime and would lead 
to excessive punishment if the same approach as the RAA was followed.  
                                            
430 See Snyman Criminal Law 289 where the author contends that this should not be the case and there 
should be a lighter sentence in cases where the conspiracy did not lead to the commission of the 
proposed offence. This is due to the fact that the conspiracy does not bring about the same 
consequences as the commission of the actual offence.  
431 In terms of 10(1)(a) of POCA. 
432 In terms of 10(2) of POCA. 
433 In terms of section 18(2) of RAA. Blindly applying the sentence of the substantive offence however 
does not seem to be the correct approach. This has been criticised by the Western Cape High Court in 
S v Smith 2017 (1) SACR 520 (WCC). Rogers J (at para 101) held that the court a quo was incorrect in 
applying the mandatory minimum sentence for murder (in the case regarding conspiracy to do so) under 
the General Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. The Court the minimum sentence was certainly not the 
starting point and further that 
[t]he fact that the permissible sentencing range for conspiracy to commit a crime is determined 
by the permissible sentencing range for the crime itself does not mean that the starting point, 
in a case of conspiracy, is the sentence which would have been imposed if the crime had been 
successfully committed. 
Also see A van der Merwe “Recent Cases” (2017) 2 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 283 290. 
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Conspiracy is also a better alternative than the common purpose doctrine in cases 
of group criminality. The latter is, as mentioned above at 3 3 4, constitutionally and 
doctrinally problematic.434 If the common purpose doctrine were to become 
unworkable through fresh constitutional perspectives, then conspiracy would be a 
competent “back-up” in order to punish criminal agreements.435 In instances of criminal 
gang activities, conspiracy in terms of the RAA is also more flexible than the crimes 
enumerated in Chapter 4 of POCA. Section 18(2)(b) of the RAA is not circumscribed 
by the preliminary requirements set out in POCA. The State is, for example, not limited 
to situations involving a “criminal gang” as per section 1 of POCA.436  
Conspiracy is also one of the listed crimes in terms of Schedule 1 to POCA that 
may be used to form the requisite pattern of criminal gang activities. A gang member 
may thus, in addition to being convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime, be held liable 
in terms of POCA. 
3 5  Incitement 
3 5 1  Introduction and definition  
The crime of incitement has both a common law and statutory form. The rationale 
for the crime, as pointed out in R v Zeelie (“Zeelie”),437 is firstly to discourage those 
who try and convince others to commit unlawful acts and secondly to protect the 
recipients  of the incitement from being influenced by the criminal motives of others 
and consequently committing the incited act.438 Just as with the common purpose 
doctrine and conspiracy, it also addresses the societal distaste for group-based 
criminal activity.439 
                                            
434 Also see Kemp et al Criminal Law 267-269; Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure vol I 
550.  
435 Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure vol I 550. 
436 Also see 4 5 1 below.  
437 1952 (1) 400. 
438 Zeelie at 405. 
439 Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure vol I 541. 
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Incitement in terms of the common law is defined very widely. In S v Nkosiyana and 
another (“Nkosiyana”)440 it was held that “(…) an inciter is one who reaches and seeks 
to influence the mind of another to the commission of a crime”.441 
Incitement also has a statutory form in terms of the RAA. Section 18(2)(b) of the 
RAA holds that a person who 
incites, instigates, commands, or procures any other person to commit, any offence, 
whether at common law or against a statute or statutory regulation, shall be guilty of 
an offence and liable on conviction to the punishment to which a person convicted of 
actually committing that offence would be liable.  
Incitement is an independent offence that is separate from the crime that the accused 
is inciting the incitee to commit and no further steps have to be taken to actualise the 
crime.442  According to section 18(2)(b), the inciter shall be liable to face the same 
punishment as the incitee (the physical perpetrator), if the incitee were to convicted. 
This punishment applies whether or not the incitee was successful or not.  The equal 
punishment of the inciter does not seem to occur in practice as the inciter seems to 
receive more favourable or lenient punishment than the incitee.443 
3 5 2  Interaction with section 9 of POCA 
In order to form a pattern of criminal gang activities in terms of section 1 of POCA 
(read with Chapter 4), the accused must commit two or more of the offences listed in 
Schedule 1 of POCA. Item number 34 states that “any conspiracy, incitement or 
attempt to commit any offence” listed or referred to in Schedule 1 will also qualify as a 
predicate act. A person may be found guilty of a gang-related crime in terms of POCA, 
in addition to a conspiracy or incitement conviction. 
Section 9(2)(b) and (c) both create incitement-type crimes. 9(2)(b) makes it a crime 
to incite, instigate command, aid, advise, encourage or procure someone to participate 
in or perform in a pattern of criminal gang activities. This offence is substantially similar 
                                            
440 1966 (4) SA 655 (A).  
441 Nkosiyana 658. 
442 See R v Nhlovo 1921 AD 485; South African Criminal Law & Procedure vol I 541. 
443 Burchell Principles 539. See for example S v Boshoff 2013 JDR 2181 (ECG) where a person was 
sentenced to three years imprisonment for an incitement to commit fraud, obstruction of justice and 
committing corruption. 
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to offence in terms of the RAA. It is doubted whether this offence is of any particular 
use or when it would be preferred above section 18(2)(a) of the RAA. The State could 
more easily rely on the RAA because it is not restricted by the preliminary requirements 
in terms of section 1 of POCA444 such as the restriction to the items listed in the 
Schedule to POCA due to the fact that a pattern of criminal gang activity can only be 
brought about the items listed in the Schedule. “Traditional” incitement may be effected 
through any common law or statutory offence or regulation. 
Section 9(2)(c) criminalises gang recruitment, including incitement to join a gang. 
This is an odd provision because gang membership is not illegal. Liability only arises 
when gang membership is coupled with a pattern of criminal gang activities and the 
offences listed in Chapter 4. Although the motivation and intention behind this 
provision is most likely to curb gang recruitment and to protect individuals from violent 
or dangerous gang recruitment strategies, it must be questioned whether it is logical 
or even possible to punish the incitement to commit something that is not illegal. If the 
motivation behind incitement is the prevention of the instigation or promotion of crimes, 
as pointed out in Zeelie, then this a truly an odd crime. Even if this “incitement” to join 
a gang is successful, the incitee still has to participate in the gang’s activities before 
the conduct enters the sphere of unlawfulness. Criminalising the incitement of active 
participation (or even the participation in a pattern of criminal gang activities like in 
section 9(2)(b) of POCA) is a much more logical endeavour.  
Section 10(3) may also be used in conjunction with a charge of incitement.445 This 
aggravating factor may be attached to any other offence than those enumerated in 
Chapter 4 and shall be considered as an aggravating factor for purposes of 
sentencing, provided that the accused is a member of criminal gang. It is submitted 
that, due to the simplicity of this scheme, that this may be a popular application of 
POCA in the future.446 It is however still subject to the prerequisite conditions in terms 
of section 1 of POCA.  
                                            
444 It is however still an open question whether these preliminary requirements are peremptory or merely 
discretionary. See Chapters 4 5 1 and 5 3 2 below for a comprehensive discussion of the issue.  
445 See for example Thomas where the sixth charge against Accused number 1 was the alleged 
contravention of section 18(2)(b) of the RAA, read together with section 10(3) of POCA.  
446 See 4 5 3 3 below. The State’s reliance on section 10(3) was extremely successful compared to the 
substantive charges in terms of section 9 of POCA.  
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The State may almost always opt to charge a gang member with incitement under 
the common law than the incitement-type crimes under Chapter 4 of POCA because 
of the lower evidentiary burden in relation to incitement as well as a potential sentence 
equivalent to that of the incited crime.447 This may be, as mentioned above, due to the 
fact that an accused may have already been sentenced for the underlying predicate 
offence(s) and thus a heavy punishment for incitement-type crimes under POCA may 
be excessive.  
3 6  Public violence 
3 6 1  Introduction and definition 
There has been a dramatic increase of reported instances in public violence in 
South Africa and its commission has doubled from 2004 to 2015.448 This could be 
ascribed to the increase in protests in 2015 and several instances of gang activities 
especially in the Western Cape.449  
In S v Whitehead and Others (“Whitehead”)450 the Supreme Court of Appeal relied 
on Burchell’s definition for public violence, which holds that the crime of public violence 
is  
the unlawful and intentional commission by a number of people acting in concert of 
acts of sufficiently serious dimensions which are intended forcibly to disturb the public 
peace or security or to invade the rights of others.451 
The rationale for the crime is to protect public peace and tranquillity or security.452 
Public violence often overlaps with other crimes that may occur in the course of the 
action where it infringes personal rights such as bodily integrity or property rights. A 
group of persons may thus assault a person or damage property which may holistically 
                                            
447 Also see discussion at 4 5 2 5 below.  
448 See ISS “South Africa National Statistics” (29-09-2015) ISS <https://issafrica.org/crimehub/national-
statistics> (accessed 24-05-2016). There were 979 reported instances of public violence in 2004 to 
1993 reported instances in 2015.  
449 See for example South African Government News Agency “Heavy sentences for public violence 
convicts” (07-2014) SAnews.gov <http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/heavy-sentences-public-
violence-convicts> (accessed 24-05-2016).  
450 (1) SACR 431 (SCA).  
451 Whitehead para 38. 
452 See R v Salie & Others (1938) TPD 136 (“Salie”). Also see Snyman Criminal Law 312. 
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be viewed as an instance of public violence.453 The crime of public violence is however 
only committed when these actions reach “sufficiently serious dimensions”. These 
actions may however transcend “mere” public violence and overlap with the crimes of 
sedition and even high treason.454 
The definition of the crime is extremely wide and uncertain which may make it 
subject to prosecutorial misuse.455 The unlawfulness of public violence lies within the 
violence and infringement of rights associated with it and has to be distinguished from 
non-violent protesting.456 Public violence can only be committed by multiple persons 
(in other words, more than two).457 Other than this requirement, there is no fixed 
number of persons that are required to participate in the violence but they are required 
to act in concert and it must transcend mere private altercations.458 In R v Ngubane 
and Others (“Ngubane”)459 Shaw AJ took a holistic view of the facts and came to the 
conclusion that the matter at hand was rather that of assault than public violence and 
thus agreeing with the appellants.460 The Court considered the confined nature; limited 
duration and number of people involved in the altercation and stated that on the facts 
these factors were all indicative of assault than public violence.461 Acts of gang 
violence perpetrated in large groups would most likely fall under the sphere of public 
violence due to the number of persons acting in concert when committing violent acts.  
                                            
453 Snyman Criminal Law 312. 
454 Snyman Criminal Law 312. The author points out the right afforded in terms of section 17 of the 
Constitution with regards to assembly, demonstration, picket and petition. The internal qualifier to this 
right is that these actions be peaceful, and unarmed.   
455 See for example Salie where Solomon and Schreiner JJ both refer to the broad nature of the crime. 
Solomon J at 138 refers to the dissention in the authorities with regards to constructing a uniform 
definition of the crime. The learned judge goes at 139 further and in referring to the factors in 
differentiating instances of public violence from assault or private violence should be reduced in scope 
or “perverted from its original idea” in order to bring “quarrelsome natives” to justice. Schreiner J concurs 
at 140 with this sentiment and holds that it should not lightly be held that a given instance is that of 
public violence where there is doubt as to the matter, due to the “wide elastic” nature of the crime. Such 
wide and uncertain definitions of crimes potentially offend the principle of legality, especially ius certum. 
See 5 3 2 below for a discussion on the principle of legality.  
456 Burchell Principles 779. 
457 R v Cele and others 1958 (1) SA 144 (N) (“Cele”); R v Noxumalo and others 1960 (2) SA 442 (T).  
458 Burchell Principles 779-780. 
459 1947 (3) SA 217 (N).  
460 Ngubane 218-219. Shaw AJ relies on R v Mcunu and Others (1938) NPD 229 to support this view.  
461 Ngubane 218-219.  
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The phrase “acts of sufficiently serious dimensions which are intended forcibly to 
disturb the public peace” is a broad and enigmatic legal construction. This may require 
an act or threat of actual violence (the disturbance element) and that this must be 
differentiated from the use of force traditionally displayed during public protesting.462 
It is interesting to note that under this construction the threat of violence would qualify 
as the requisite act but not the use of force (which does not amount to violence).463 
The idea that actual violence does not have to occur stems from Van der Linden’s 
writings. The central point of contention in R v Segopotsi and Others (“Segopotsi”)464 
was whether an act of public violence had to have materialised in order for the accused 
parties to be held liable for the aforementioned crime. Claassen J held that the “acts 
of preparation” satisfied the requirements for public violence and that it was not the 
position in terms of South African law for these acts to have resulted in actual 
violence.465 Claassen J especially relies on Van der Linden in this regard.466 This 
disturbance must furthermore be of a “sufficiently serious dimension”. Schreiner J, in 
his separate, concurring opinion in R v Salie & Others (“Salie”)467 considered the 
determination of the “detentions of the fight” as “all-important” and suggested a holistic 
approach to the evaluation of this element, considering the particular factual scenario 
including the scale and reasons for the altercation.468 Solomon J suggested (and 
Schreiner J did so expressly)469 that the particular factual scenario is a borderline case 
                                            
462 Burchell Principles 780-781. See importantly Cele at 153 where the Court rejected the contention by 
the appellants that a threat of public violence does not constitute the crime of public violence and that 
the situation is indistinguishable from a threat of common assault in the sense that the threat of violence 
and personal harm also constitutes an assault.  
463 Burchell Principles 780-781 
464 1960 (2) SA 430 (T).  
465 Segopotsi at 433. The Court also refers to R v O’Brien (1914) TPD 287 at 289, where De Villiers JP 
also, upon analysis and with reference to Van der Lingen, does not find that it must “be specifically 
alleged or proved that persons have as a fact been terrorised” (own emphasis).  
466 See for example Segopotsi at 433 where Claassen J refers to a translation of Van der Linden’s text 
which stated that “all such acts as have for their object the unlawful disturbance of the peace and 
security or a forcible invasion of the rights of other people” (own emphasis) and "Behalven door het 
maken van oproer, wordt de misdaad van geweld gepleegd door alle die daaden welke eene 
wederregtelijke stooring der rust en veiligheid, of een gewelddadig indringen in de regten van andere 
menschen, ten doelwit hebben" at 436. 
467  (1938) TPD 136. 
468 Salie at 140. 
469 Salie at 140. 
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but noted that there was not a “public character” to the altercation and that the locality 
of the violence was private property of one of the involved families. There was also no 
attempt to assemble a group of persons to embark on a campaign of organised public 
violence and dimensionally the situation was on a small scale and “unworthy” to be 
characterised as public violence.470 
Schreiner J also points to the usefulness of the crime of public violence. The learned 
judge suggested that it would be preferred to charge an amorphous group of people 
with public violence if they did in fact take part in the criminal activities of the group 
and when it is of a considerable nature and individual prosecution might be 
impractical.471 This is preferred over dealing with the (alleged) individual role players 
because it is “very difficult to ascertain the relative parts played by the different persons 
and to fix the degrees of guilt”.472 This is to avoid the conflicting and unavoidably 
hearsay evidence all in the vein of “(…) X was there; Y had an axe; Z came later on 
(…)”.473  This justification is stronger here than in the case of common purpose. It 
seems that the common purpose doctrine would impute a harsher unlawful 
consequence where here it is imperative that the accused in fact participated in the 
public violence before a conviction would be secured.474 This would protect innocent 
parties to a degree who participated in a demonstration that took on a violent nature 
and where the identities of the actual perpetrators are unknown. The common purpose 
doctrine would probably be used (or used in conjunction with a charge of public 
                                            
470 Salie at 139. 
471 Salie at 140.  
472 Salie at 140. 
473 Salie at 140. 
474 See Cele at 153 (and also referring to the Court’s reasoning in Salie) that due to the “elastic nature” 
of the crime, that a conviction should not arise unless it can be proved that a particular accused was 
party to the acts of public violence. A conviction should not arise if acts of violence were perpetrated by 
certain members of the crowd of which the accused happened to be a part of. Also see Burchell 
Principles 781. 
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violence) because it is more advantagous from a prosecutorial standpoint due to the 
lower level of participation required to secure a conviction.475  
The abovementioned requirements must necessarily be linked to the requisite 
intention, specifically to “forcibly disturb the public peace or security or to invade the 
rights of others”.476 The accused must have the intention to engage in the activities of 
the group participating in public violence or at minimum foresee that that public 
violence will be the result of the organised gathering.477 The SCA in Le Roux stressed 
the importance of determining the individual liability of each appellant and rejected the 
court a quo’s contention that mere presence at the scene of the violence was sufficient 
to establish liability based on the conduct of other members.478 
 
3 6 2  Interaction with section 9 of POCA 
Item number 2 of the Schedule 1 specifically references public violence as one of 
the crimes that can form the requisite pattern of criminal gang activities. The State 
would secure a conviction under Chapter 4 of POCA if a criminal gang were to 
repeatedly commit acts of public violence over a period of time. This is due to the fact 
that the crime of public violence is so broadly defined that it also overlaps with the 
offences in section 9 of POCA, especially subsections 9(1)(b) (where it is offence to 
“[threaten]479 to commit, bring about or perform any act of violence or any criminal 
activity by a criminal gang or with the assistance of a criminal gang”) and 9(1)(c) 
(where it is an offence to “[threaten]480 any specific person or persons in general, with 
retaliation in any manner or by any means whatsoever, in response to any act or 
alleged act of violence”). 
                                            
475 Also see Salie at 139-140 where Solomon J points to the burden on the court being relieved of the 
task to determine to criminal liability of each of the participants severally when under the crime of public 
violence. It is thus sufficient that an accused did something with the group and associated with them 
somehow. The judge then went on to state that courts should not be “over ready to dispense with the 
need for ascertaining the individual misdeed of accused persons accurately” unless it is a genuine case 
of public violence.  
476 Whitehead para 38. 
477 Burchell Principles 782. 
478 See Le Roux para 19 where the SCA especially relies on the approach by the Appellate Division in 
Mgedezi.  
479 Own emphasis.  
480 Own emphasis. 
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These offences complement each other very well. The repeated commission of acts 
of public violence would secure a gang conviction. It does however raise the question 
what the novelty of (especially) sections 9(1)(b) and (c) is. This is once again just an 
instance of the common law rephrased into a statutory crime. The argument is not 
here that the section is not useful but rather that the Legislature should rather have 
focused on criminalising conduct in a novel way – not for the sake of novelty – but for 
it to be of actual use for the prosecution or regulate conduct which previously fell 
outside the ambit of criminal sanction.  By including the threats of the forbidden acts 
in subsections 9(1)(b) and (c), these crimes then fall squarely within the ambit of public 
violence as interpreted and developed in South African case law. Codifying public 
violence through the aforementioned provisions in section 9 of POCA (albeit 
unintentionally) addresses concerns regarding the possible violation of the principle of 
legality, especially ius certum and ius strictum.  
3 7  Final remarks 
A review of the South African common law and statutory law traditionally used to 
address group-based crimes has shown that there is no substantial difference 
between those modes of liability, common law and statutory crimes and the offences 
created in Chapter 4 of POCA. The latter crimes, after a brief comparison with existing 
common law and statutory crimes, appear to be largely superfluous and will find 
exclusive application in very limited factual scenarios. The next chapters of this 
dissertation will show that Chapter 4 of POCA would have benefited greatly from a 
broader investigation of foreign and international modes of criminalisation of gang 
activities.  
The most useful of the POCA Chapter 4 mechanisms appears to be section 10(3). 
Although it is simple to “attach” this provision to any gang-related offence other than 
those listed in Chapter 4, it is still subject to the prerequisite definitional requirements 
in Chapter 1. The reason for this popular application may be due to the fact that the 
crimes in Chapter 4 are so similar to more familiar common law offences, that the 
common law offences are preferred when applicable and carry heavier sentences. In 
cases such as murder which does not substantially overlap with the abovementioned 
common law crimes, Chapter 4 of POCA seems to be preferred.481 
                                            
481 See Thomas and the discussion below in Chapter 4. 
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Despite the constitutional and doctrinal issues with the common purpose doctrine, 
it remains the law of the land. South Africa is also not an outlier in this regard. As we 
have seen, joint criminal enterprise as a mode of liability still exists in some form or 
the other in comparative law (notably English law) and international criminal law 
(although, as was noted, the continued existence of the extended form of joint criminal 
enterprise beyond the jurisprudence of the ICTY remains doubtful).   
The common purpose doctrine serves to alleviate the prosecutorial burden of 
proving all of the elements of a crime and serves to deal with the “significant societal 
scourge” that is group criminality. Operating on the premise that the common purpose 
doctrine reflects the boundaries which courts are comfortable with when circumventing 
the basic tenets of individual criminal liability, further measures can then be suggested 
in order to fulfil the State’s policy considerations. These measures will be investigated 
especially in Chapter 6.   
All things considered, this author is cognizant that the common purpose doctrine is 
likely to stay. Statutory intervention is therefore strongly recommended in the absence 
of significant judicial interventions which could give definitive parameters for the 
application of the doctrine in the context of collectives, groups and complex cases 
involving organised criminality such as criminal gangs where there will always be the 
temptation to expand modes of liability in order to prosecute and convict as many as 
possible.  
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Chapter 4 
Statutory intervention: The Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act 121 of 1998 
4 1  Introduction  
This Chapter investigates core legislative interventions by the South African 
Government in the fight against organised crime in general and specifically criminal 
gang activities. The focus will be on the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 
1998 (“POCA”). A brief drafting history will be provided in order to determine the broad 
intent of the Legislature. 
The main focus of this Chapter is to construct the substantive offences listed in 
section 9 POCA, read with the definitions in section 1. A brief overview of the 
interaction between Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 of POCA will also be provided.  
Against this background, it will be evaluated whether the gang-related offences in 
POCA create criminal sanctions substantially different to the common law (which has 
also been discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation) and whether these sanctions are 
realising the original legislative intent. It will also be discussed which measures may 
be taken in order to more effectively realise this intent and better address the 
phenomenon of criminal gang activity.   
4 2  Legislative background of POCA 
The Prevention of Organised Crime Bill 118 of 1998 (“the Organised Crime Bill”) 
was introduced to Parliament in 1998. The Bill was drafted by a special task team 
which was commissioned by the then-Minister of Justice. The main purpose of the 
task team was to consider proposals that would lead to the implementation of 
legislation equipped to deal with organised crime and criminal gang activities.482 This 
was due to several reasons, especially the State’s inability to deal with the threat of 
organised crime (generally) and criminal gang activities.483 This legislative intent was 
                                            
482 Debates of the National Assembly of 1998: 14 September to 6 November vol 21 8042-8043. Also 
see Organised Crime Bill B118-98: The Memorandum on the Objects of the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Bill 1998 (para 1). 
483 A Standing Organised crime: A study from the Cape Flats (2005) 45 
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later confirmed and echoed in case law. Sachs J, in his separate, concurring opinion 
in Mohunram and Another v NDPP and Another (Law Review Project as Amicus 
Curiae) (“Mohunram”)484 elaborated on the motivation behind promulgating POCA and 
described it as a mechanism to mainly deal with two phenomena. It firstly aims to 
address organised crime, criminal gang activities, money laundering and racketeering 
which has become a problem globally and is posing a serious security threat within 
the South African borders.485 The learned justice held further that South Africa’s 
common law and statutory law had failed to keep up international standards in dealing 
with the aforementioned phenomena. In a previous judgment by the Constitutional 
Court in National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another v Mohamed NO and 
Others (“Mohamed”),486 Ackermann J relied on the long title and preamble of POCA 
to elucidate its purpose. The growth of organised crime, criminal gang activities,487 
racketeering and money laundering threatens the rights of the inhabitants of the 
Republic and furthermore endangers economic stability, safety and stability and the 
public order. The justice also refers to the ineffectual nature of the common law and 
statutory law and its being out of pace with measures enacted to deal with the 
aforementioned phenomena. The traditional measures under the common law and 
statutory law were furthermore ineffectual in dealing with the leaders of organised 
crime who distance themselves from the actual execution of crimes and furthermore 
could not be stripped of the unlawful proceeds of their crimes.488 
The Bill was formulated, based on three core proposals by the Minister. The first 
proposal was that the participation of organisations in a pattern of racketeering should 
be criminalised, using the US Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 
1970 (“RICO”) as the basis of this proposed criminalisation.489 The legislation should 
furthermore make provision for criminal and civil asset forfeiture directly against the 
assets (or actio in rem) rather against the accused party which was the status quo at 
                                            
484 2007 (2) SACR 145 (CC). 
485 Mohunram para 144. 
486 Mohamed para 14. 
487 The preamble specifically states that the “(…) pervasive presence of criminal gangs in many 
communities is harmful to the wellbeing of those communities, it is necessary to criminalise participation 
in or promotion of criminal gang activities”.  
488 Mohamed 14-15. 
489 Debates of the National Assembly of 1998: 14 September to 6 November vol 21 8043. Also see S v 
de Vries and Others 2012 (1) SACR 186 (SCA) (“de Vries”) para 43. 
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the time. Lastly and most relevant to this discussion, is the creation of crimes that 
criminalise the participation in criminal gang activities.490 The Minister indicated that 
the legislation was drafted after conducting a comparative study of foreign jurisdictions 
as well as measures taken in terms of international law.491 Other members of 
parliament alluded to the increasing “criminal culture” in South Africa and due to this 
decline in morality, which it has become increasingly simpler for criminals to hide within 
the masses. Organised crime furthermore also threatened the internal political stability 
and as well as that of the world and that it would not be farfetched to speculate that 
organised crime would result in a third world war – thus justifying the harsh legislative 
measures taken in POCA.492  
During the parliamentary debates regarding the Bill, Willie Hofmeyr referred to 
former President Nelson Mandela when he stated that the State was preparing to “fight 
fire with overwhelming fire” in their fight against crime. He furthermore specifically 
referred to measures relating to criminal gang activities and the “heavy prison 
sentences” for relatively minor offences.493 POCA also allows for the forfeiture and 
seizure of assets that are used in the commission of crime as well as the unlawful 
proceeds that flow from those activities.494 The former punishment for drug dealing, it 
was pointed out, was relatively minor before POCA but now with the racketeering 
offences, gang leaders could face substantial prison sentences and fines.495 The Act 
also addressed the problem of the “individualised nature” of South African criminal 
law.496 The common law at that time (bar the common purpose doctrine and to a lesser 
                                            
490 Debates of the National Assembly of 1998: 14 September to 6 November vol 21 8043. It was also 
stated that the scope of the original text was substantially broadened and there was also special 
mention of the sentence enhancing provisions for engaging in criminal gang activities close to 
educational institutions.  
491 The international law measures included the Palermo Convention and Council Framework Decision 
2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the Fight Aaginst Organised Crime, Official Journal of the 
European Union L 300/42 (adopted 24 October 2008, entered into force 24 October 2008). 
492 Debates of the National Assembly of 1998: 14 September to 6 November vol 21 8047-8048. 
493 Debates of the National Assembly of 1998: 14 September to 6 November vol 21 8051. 
494 Debates of the National Assembly of 1998: 14 September to 6 November vol 21 8052. 
495 Debates of the National Assembly of 1998: 14 September to 6 November vol 21 8052. 
496 See M Cowling “Fighting organised crime: comment on the Prevention of Organised Crime Bill 1998 
(1998) 11 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 350 368. 
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extent conspiracy and incitement) was not focused or developed to deal with 
organised criminality.497  
The product of the special task team was an amalgamation of American legislation, 
namely RICO (which formed the base of the racketeering offences in terms of Chapter 
2 of POCA) and the Californian Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act of 
1988 (“STEP”).498  
RICO was the US Federal Government’s reaction to combat the influx of unlawful 
proceeds entering into the legitimate economy and create criminal punishments as 
well as civil remedies.499 RICO has become infamous due to its far-reaching nature 
and severe penalties and has thus been subjected to harsh public and academic 
censure. This criticism includes the stigma of being labelled as a racketeer and this 
label may not be appropriate in many instances. Furthermore, due to the wide wording 
(and interpretation),500 many companies, even if they were factually innocent, plead 
guilty to alleged RICO offences out of fear for asset freezing and subsequent 
insolvency.501 
STEP was enacted in 1988 to address the crisis situation in California brought about 
by the nearly 600 violent street gangs operating in the state. These gangs were 
responsible for the individual and collective terrorisation of the citizens of California 
through their violent criminal acts. The Act specifically references the tremendous 80% 
                                            
497 See See above Chapter 2 (especially 2 2) for further discussions on the individualised nature of 
criminal law.  
498 Standing Cape Flats 45. Also see Cowling (1998) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 370. 
STEP is also partially based on RICO especially in terms of its structure and through the use of patterns 
to form the basis of liability. See SG Lebeya Defining organised crime: a comparative analysis LLD 
thesis UNISA (2012) 104; DC Van der Linde ŉ Patroon van kriminele bende-aktiwiteite: Die oplossing 
tot Suid Afrika se bendemisdaad of ŉ wit olifant? ŉ Kritiese, regsvergelykende en konstitusionele studie 
van Hoofstuk 4 van die Wet op die Voorkoming van Georganiseerde Misdaad 121 van 1998 
Unpublished LLM dissertation (2015) 9 fn 18. 
499 See Reves v. Ernst & Young 507 U.S. 170 (1993) (“Reves”) para 11; K Wooster “Validity, 
Construction, and Application of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1961 et seq.—Supreme Court Cases” American Law Reports Federal 1 15. 
500 See Reves generally on RICO’s so-called “liberal interpretation clause”. Locally, the SCA in S v 
Prinsloo 2016 (2) SACR 25 (SCA) (see para 57) has also adopted this broad and liberal approach to 
the construction of POCA and especially sections 2(e)-(f).  
501 H Abadinsky Organized Crime 6 ed (2000) 403. 
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increase in gang-related murders from 1986 to 1987.502 STEP was modelled in part 
on RICO and was considered pioneering legislation in the US anti-gang movement.503 
Even though STEP is the legislative inspiration for Chapter 4 of POCA, it  was originally 
envisaged to be an independent piece of legislation, namely the Gangsterism 
Prevention Act.504 This Act was planned to form part of an anti-gang strategy, which 
included the structuring of a gang database similar to the Californian equivalent, by 
the now-disbanded Visible Gang Unit.505 This proposed Act was however 
amalgamated with legislation that eventually became POCA.506  
It is surprising that the text and essence of STEP, for the most part, was transposed 
into Chapter 4 of POCA despite several constitutional reservations and potential 
controversies.507 
Standing posits that anti-gang legislation such as STEP and Chapter 4 of POCA is 
constructed on two central ideas: Firstly, that traditional criminal law has proven 
insufficient to curb the phenomenon of criminal gang activities508 and secondly that the 
State is justified in providing for more severe punishment for gang-related crimes. 
When anti-gang legislation is therefore enacted, it is pertinent to criminalise gang 
membership as well as gang recruitment.509 Gang membership is not criminalised in 
STEP nor in POCA as that would constitute a violation of the constitutionally-protected 
right to freedom of association.510 Only when gang membership (or active association) 
is coupled with the substantive offences, it becomes criminal conduct. It is submitted 
that neither STEP nor POCA functions on those central suppositions.      
                                            
502 § 186.21 of STEP. 
503 JF Sigal “Out of Step: When The California Street Terrorism Enforcement And Prevention Act 
Stumbles into Penal Code Limits” (2007) 38 GGULR 1 10. 
504 A Standing Organised Crime: A study from the Cape Flats (2005) 50; 267. 
505 Standing Cape Flats 50. 
506 Standing Cape Flats 50-51. 
507 See Chapters 4 and 5 for a discussion of these challenges. 
508 The alleged insufficiency of the common law is discussed in detail in Chapter 3 above. 
509 Standing Cape Flats 51. 
510 In terms of section 18 of the South African Constitution. The US Constitution, unlike the South African 
Constitution contains no express provision containing a right to the freedom of association. The US 
Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama 377 U.S. 288 (1964) held that this right forms part of the First 
Amendment (as part of the Freedom of Speech) of the US Constitution.  
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The Bill, in its final form, was eventually passed “with virtually unanimous support 
[from Parliament]”.511 POCA was however not free from controversy due to concerns 
about potential human rights infringements512 and limited research on the underlying 
gang phenomenon. The critics of POCA were however branded as being “soft on 
criminals” and it was said that the measures contained in POCA were necessary to 
combat the abovementioned crime types that posed a great threat to the young South 
African democracy.513 The perception was therefore that the government was 
promulgating a potentially unpopular legislative effort but that it was the only way in 
which the problem could be addressed.514  
There have been, broadly speaking, three waves in the South African criminal law 
that have dealt with organised criminality. The first wave is represented in the common 
law measures and modes of liability that, directly and indirectly, dealt with group-based 
or organised crime. These measures were mostly discussed in the Chapter 3 above. 
The common law also provided for other measures including the receipt of stolen 
property, fraud and defeating the administration of justice.515 The second wave is 
represented by various piecemeal legislative measures (mainly in the 1990s)516 to deal 
                                            
511 Standing Cape Flats 45.  
512 See I Kinnes “From urban street gangs to criminal empires” (2000) ISS 
<https://oldsite.issafrica.org/uploads/Mono48.pdf> (accessed 01-11-2015) where the author refers to 
human rights organisations which protested POCA based the belief that POCA would infringe the 
freedom of association (section 18 of the Constitution).   
513 Standing Cape Flats 46. 
514 Standing Cape Flats 46. 
515 See Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2016) 5 ed 891. 
516 Gastrow notes that only in 1991 did the South African Police force make any mention of “organised 
crime” and start to construct mechanisms to deal with this (“developing”) phenomenon. The author also 
suggests that this relatively late response to the problem is probably for the reason why, at that time 
(1998), relatively little research had been conducted on the topic, despite the existence of groups such 
as the “Boere Mafia” and Chinese Triads in the 1970s and 1980s respectively. See P Gastrow 
“Organised Crime in South Africa: An Assessment of its Nature and Origins” (08-1998) ISS 
<https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Mono28.pdf> (accessed 14-11-2016); P Gastrow 
Penetrating state and business: Organised crime in southern Africa vol 2 (2003) 73. 
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with the rise in the sophistication of organised crime in general.517 POCA came into 
force on the 21st of January 1999. The Act incorporated parts and also subsequently 
repealed518 the Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996519 and repealed substantial parts of 
the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992.520 It additionally amended the 
International Co-Operation in Criminal Matters Act 75 of 1996.521 POCA thus 
represents a third wave of measures dealing with organised criminality which is a 
holistic legislative approach to deal with the phenomenon. 
4 3  Interpretative tools assisting in the interpretation of Chapter 4  
Before endeavouring an interpretation of POCA, certain interpretive limitations must 
be stated. There is firstly a great lack of reported case law applying Chapter 4 of 
POCA. In fact, there is currently only one reported High Court judgment which has 
successfully employed Chapter 4.522 Apart from the textual and historical methods (the 
intent of the Legislature) alluded to above, there is a need for interpretation by analogy, 
which is done by comparing Chapter 4 of POCA with analogous legislation. The first 
pertinent example is an internal comparison with the language and structure of 
Chapter 2 of POCA. Chapter 2 is comprised of a similar structure and also makes use 
of an underlying pattern to form the basis of criminalisation. Chapter 4 is in fact a 
subspecies of Chapter 2, considering its legislative history as described above. 
Chapter 2 has a plethora of reported case law and has been subjected to constitutional 
                                            
517 Burchell points out the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (section 35(1)) contained measures to 
effect the forfeiture of items utilised during the commission of an offence; the Corruption Act 94 of 1992; 
the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 which repealed provisions of the 
former act; the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act and the Proceeds of Crime Act. See Burchell Principles 
889-891. 
518 Section 79(c) of POCA. 
519 Also see Burchell Principles (2016) 891.   
520 Section 79(b) of POCA. The extent of the amendment is described in Schedule 3 of POCA. Also see 
S Lottër & L Adendorff “Prevention of Organised Crime Act” in WA Joubert & JA Faris LAWSA 8 2 ed 
(2005) para 344 as well as van der Linde ŉ Patroon van kriminele bende-aktiwiteite (2015) 7.  
521 Section 79 of POCA. The extent of the amendment is described in Schedule 2 of POCA.  
522 S v Thomas 2015 JDR 1932 (WCC). There will be heavy reliance on this judgment in order to 
ascertain, to some extent, how courts apply Chapter 4 of POCA. Two unreported judgements are further 
available: S v Ceaser and Others unreported case, no SS29/2009 (“Ceaser”) which is of much less 
interpretive value and S v Jordaan and Others WCC 16-11-2017 case no CC20/2017 which provides 
important insights into the defintions in contained in Chapter 1 of POCA.  
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scrutiny several times and thus offers a ripe judicial basket of case law. The second 
pertinent example is POCA Chapter 4’s parent legislation, namely STEP of California. 
STEP, which was enacted in 1988, has even more apposite case law. The wording 
and structure is substantially similar, save for several technical and structural 
differences. Special care will be taken in the interpretation process due to these 
differences, as well as the patent and obvious differences in the two jurisdictions. 
STEP has also been subjected to several constitutional attacks. These attacks will 
however be discussed in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
A comparative analysis with international law is also required and this approach is 
affirmed by section 233 of the Constitution. Section 233 holds that courts must prefer 
a reasonable interpretation of legislation that is in conformity with international law 
above an interpretation that is inconsistent therewith. South Africa, further, is a party 
to the Palermo Convention, which imposes the obligation on member states to 
promulgate legislation to deal with, inter alia, the participation in an “organized criminal 
group”.523 It will be determined in this section whether Chapter 4 of POCA satisfies its 
minimum obligations in terms of the Palermo Convention.  
The joint action by the council of Europe, making it a criminal offence to participate 
in a criminal organisation in the Member States of the European Union,524 shall also 
be analysed and compared with the Palermo Convention. This analysis will provide 
definitional assistance as the Palermo Convention echoes the joint convention by 
creating similar group-based criminal offences.525  
There will also be reference to the South African common law due to the fact that 
several of the crimes listed in subsections 9(1) and 9(2) make use of well-established 
norms, terms, concepts and offences of criminal law.  
4 3 1  Californian Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act 
STEP provides important guidance on the interpretation of POCA Chapter 4 – which 
has not been subjected to much judicial scrutiny. It is thus imperative to provide an 
                                            
523 Article 5(1). 
524 Official Journal of the European Communities L 351/1. 
525 See GP Kemp “The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime: A milestone 
in international criminal law” (2001) 14 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 152 155-156. 
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overview of the most pertinent provisions of STEP.526 Relevant and comparable 
aspects will be discussed under the corresponding sections of POCA below.   
The main substantive offence is contained in section 186.22(a) of STEP and 
provides the following: 
Any person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that 
its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who 
wilfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of 
that gang, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a period not to exceed 
one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years. 
POCA is inspired by STEP as it also incorporates the scheme of predicate offences. 
A “pattern of criminal street gang activity” is defined under section 186.22(e) of STEP 
as  
(…) the commission of, attempted commission of, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation 
of, sustained juvenile petition for, or conviction of two or more of the following offenses, 
provided at least one of these offenses occurred after the effective date of this chapter 
and the last of those offenses occurred within three years after a prior offense, and the 
offenses were committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons (…) 
The full list of these offences is contained in Addendum A of this dissertation but 
includes crimes that are logically and traditionally associated with gangs. This includes 
assault with a deadly weapon,527 robbery,528 homicide and manslaughter;529 the sale 
(or possession with the intent to sell), manufacturing or transportation of certain 
“controlled substances”;530 rape531 and several firearm-related offences.532 
                                            
526 As also pointed out above, STEP is based on the US RICO statute. The SCA in de Vries at para 43 
(cf Prinsloo para 58) acknowledged the “considerable assistance” RICO jurisprudence provided in the 
interpretation of Chapter 2 of POCA. The SCA also noted its surprise that neither party to the case had 
relied on a body of case law. Despite this remark coming across as mostly obiter – the omission is 
nevertheless quite notable. It was also patent to note the complete lack of reliance on STEP in Thomas 
– especially considering that Thomas was a landmark judgement in the context of Chapter 4 of POCA.  
527 Section 186.22(e)(1). 
528 Section 186.22(e)(2). 
529 Section 186.22(e)(3). 
530 Section 186.22(e)(4). 
531 Section 186.22(e)(12). 
532 Section 186.22(e)(5)-(6); (22)-(23), (31)-(33). 
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STEP also provides for sentence enhancements. These enhancements shall be 
discussed below.533 Before we get to that, it is necessary to contextualise the 
comparative law with reference to applicable international law – specifically the 
Palermo Convention. This is done because South Africa adopted POCA shortly before 
it assented to the Palermo Convention. So the question is whether POCA was 
prompted by the imminent signing of the Palermo Convention, or the inspiration found 
in STEP, or both.  
4 3 2   The Palermo Convention  
The predominant international obligation of South Africa pertaining to organised 
crime, emanates from the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime534 (“the Palermo Convention”).535 South Africa assented to the treaty 
on the 14th of December 2000.536 POCA, the predominant means of giving effect to 
the goals stated in the Palermo Convention, came into force on the 21st of January 
1999. Article 1 of the Palermo Convention broadly states the purpose of the 
Convention, namely to “(…) promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational 
organized crime more effectively”. Thus, the purpose of the Convention is not merely 
to criminalise the acts relevant to organised crime but recognises their transnational 
nature by placing a strong focus on inter-country cooperation.537 Article 5(1)(a) 
(“legislative and other measures”) read with article 34(1) (“legislative and 
administrative measures”) places an obligation on states parties to implement their 
                                            
533 See 4 5 3 below.  
534 United Nations General Assembly Doc A/RES/55/25.  
535 See Parliamentary Monitoring Group “Revised Explanatory Memorandum: Ratification of The United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (The Convention) and Protocols Thereto” 
(2003) <http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/docs/2003/appendices/031024unmemo.htm> (accessed 05-08-2017).  
536 United Nations “12. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” United 
Nations (04-08-2017) <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
12&chapter=18&clang=_en> (accessed 05-08-2017).  
537 GP Kemp “The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime: A milestone in 
international criminal law” (2001) 14 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 152 153; S Betti “New 
prospects for inter-state co-operation in criminal matters: The Palermo Convention” (2003) 3 ICLR 
151 153. 
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obligations under the Palermo Convention in their domestic legislation.538 Common 
law crimes and modes of liability are probably not enough to satisfy this rather specific 
requirement. 
At the time of becoming party to the Convention, POCA was already in force. POCA 
was therefore not crafted in line with or giving effect to the Palermo Convention per 
se. Compliance with the Convention seems to be assumed539 but textual compliance 
with the requirements of the Convention is uncertain.  The text of POCA must therefore 
be scrutinised to determine whether it fulfils its obligations under the Palermo 
Convention.  
It is clear, despite this chronological technicality, that South Africa has in fact 
adopted “legislative and other measures” to establish criminal offences. The definition 
of a criminal gang in section 1 of POCA differs substantially from Article 2(a) of the 
Convention.  
Article 2(a) states that an organized criminal group 
shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time 
and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences 
established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, 
a financial or other material benefit [.] 
Article 2(a) implies a peremptory definition by using the word “shall mean” at the 
beginning of the definition. The group must also exist for a period of time thus 
excluding groups that have formed spontaneously. The benefit may also be other than 
financial and may extend to benefits that are not financial in nature by including “other 
material benefit” such as benefits of a sexual nature such as children obtained through 
                                            
538 Article 5(1)(a) pertains to participation in an organised criminal group where article 34 places a 
general obligation on states parties. Article 34 further states these measures must be in accordance 
with the domestic laws of each states party and that states may adopt “more strict or severe measures” 
than the ones provided in the Convention. The cumulative effect of not only these provisions but the 
others mentioned is that the Convention sets a minimum standard from which states may not deviate 
but seem free to set harsher conditions, within the bounds of the Convention. A state party may not, for 
example, set a stricter standard as mens rea, such as negligence.  
539 See United Nations on Drugs and Crime “Database of Legislation” (07-10-2016) UNODC 
<https://www.unodc.org/cld/legislation/zaf/prevention_of_organised_crime_act_121_of_1998/chapter_
4/section_9-11/chapter_4.html?lng=en> (accessed 20-10-2017).  
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human trafficking.540 “Serious crime” is defined in article 2(b) and means conduct that 
would attract imprisonment of a minimum of four years “or a more serious penalty”.  
South Africa is not bound by this definition, but as a signatory to the Convention, 
should satisfy the gist of the instrument.541 Section 233 of the Constitution also states 
that a “(…) court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is 
consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent 
with international law”.542 Certain discrepancies therefore warrant further discussion.  
Article 2(b) uses the standard of “serious crime” to indicate the types of crimes that 
should qualify as predicate offences and that those crimes must carry at least a 
potential four-year prison sentence. POCA makes use of a myriad of crimes that would 
render a gang a “criminal gang” in terms of section 1, read with Chapter 4 of the Act. 
The extremely broad list of 37 (“predicate”) offences listed in Schedule 1 of POCA 
covers a vast array of offences, which, for the most part, are associated with activities 
usually associated with criminal gangs. This includes offences such as murder, rape, 
public violence, robbery and sexual assault.543  
Items 21 and 26 of the Schedule 1 of POCA respectively list “offences relating to 
coinage” and “any offence relating to exchange control”.544 Section 34(1)(f) of the 
South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989 (“the Reserve Bank Act”), as amended, 
makes the act of soiling, damaging or attaching drawings to a coin which is legal tender 
an offence. The penalty for such an offence “a fine not exceeding R250”.545 This is 
                                            
540 See General Assembly of the United Nations Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of 
a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on the work of its first to eleventh sessions 
(Addendum) Interpretative notes for the official records (travaux préparatoires) of the negotiation of the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols thereto 
A/55/383/Add.1 2. 
541 See generally United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime “Legislative Guides for The Implementation 
of The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and The Protocol Thereto” 
(2004) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/legislative_guides/Legislative%20guides_Full%20version.pdf>. 
542 See generally J Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 4 ed (2011) 62-68; TW 
Bennett & J Strug Introduction to International Law (2013) 36. 
543 See Addendum A of this dissertation.  
544 The inclusion of these offences in Schedule 1 will also be discussed in Chapter 5 below in a 
constitutional context. Also see W Freedman “Recent cases” (2014) 3 South African Journal of Criminal 
Justice 466 473. 
545 Section 34(iv) of the Reserve Bank Act. 
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clearly out of touch with the type of offence envisaged in article 2(b) of the Convention.  
It is submitted that the seriousness of these offences is so infinitesimal, that they may 
even qualify as a basis for the defence of de minimis non curat lex.546 The 
appropriateness of such offences, amongst crimes such as rape, murder, arson and 
even offences in terms of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist 
and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004, is open to severe doubt and seems illogical.  
Article 2(c) defines a “[s]tructured group” as meaning a group that was not formed 
for the commission of specific offences. Structured groups may be organised both in 
a traditional sense with “formally defined roles” in a hierarchal fashion or those in a 
loose fashion with no defined roles or duties.547 There is also no need for a “continuity 
of membership” which is inevitable with gang members being in and out of prison, 
murdered or, to a far lesser extent, leave the gang. 
Article 5(1)(a) and (b) criminalises the participation in an organized crime group. 
States parties are required to “adopt legislative and other measures” criminalising the 
intentional participation in an organized criminal group. The suggested models must 
occur through: 
(a)  Either or both of the following as criminal offences distinct from those 
involving the attempt or completion of the criminal activity: 
(i)   Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious 
crime for a purpose relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining 
of a financial or other material benefit and, where required by 
domestic law, involving an act undertaken by one of the 
                                            
546 This maxim means that the law does not concern itself with trivialities. Practically, a court would 
consider the unlawful conduct of the accused to remain unpunished due to its trivial nature and the 
accused may raise it a defence although it is not a ground of justification in the strict sense. See Burchell 
Principles 245-247; G Kemp, S Walker, R Palmer, D Baqwa, C Gevers, B Leslie & A Steynberg Criminal 
Law in South Africa 2 ed (2015) 147-149. Kemp et al point to the Canadian case in Canadian Foundation 
for Children, Youth and The Law v Canada (Attorney-General) 2004 SCC 4 at para 204. Here, the 
Supreme Court of Canada that de minimis is founded mainly on three justifications. Firstly, the 
application of criminal law (and subsequent criminal sanction) to serious misconduct. Secondly, it 
protects an accused from severe criminal sanctions and for trivial conduct and additionally protects an 
accused from the stigma associated with such sanctions. It thirdly prohibits the criminal justice system 
from becoming swamped (which is equally true, probably even more so in South Africa).  
547 General Assembly of the United Nations Report of the Ad Hoc Committee 2 
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participants in furtherance of the agreement or involving an 
organized criminal group; 
(ii)  Conduct by a person who, with knowledge of either the aim and 
general criminal activity of an organized criminal group or its 
intention to commit the crimes in question, takes an active part 
in:  
a.  Criminal activities of the organized criminal group; 
b.  Other activities of the organized criminal group in the 
knowledge that his or her participation will contribute to 
the achievement of the above-described criminal aim; 
(b)  Organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counselling the 
commission of serious crime involving an organized criminal group. 
2.  The knowledge, intent, aim, purpose or agreement referred to in paragraph 1 
of this article may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.  
(…) 
The model most closely akin to South Africa’s model is article 5(1)(b). South Africa 
is obliged, as mentioned above, to enact legislative measures to deal with organised 
criminal groups. It is submitted that, on a literal reading of this obligation, common law 
measures, in particular the common purpose doctrine, will therefore not pass the 
muster of article 5(1). The article also prescribes that the criminal offences be 
committed intentionally. It does not specify which form of intention will suffice but 
negligence would be excluded. Intention in the form of dolus directus, dolus indirectus 
as well as dolus eventualis all seem to be appropriate forms of intent. Article 5(1) read 
with article 5(2) does not have a set standard of intent for the underlying offences. 
Intention is not required pertinently in each of the substantive crimes in POCA Chapter 
4 but can be construed as such. There are however problematic instances where the 
determination of the requisite dolus requires a strong reliance on inferences from the 
textual context.548 The intention standard in article 5(1)(a) at a minimum requires proof 
that the accused had joined the criminal organisation in pursuance of furthering or 
supporting the criminal conduct of the accused.549  It seems improbable that this 
                                            
548 See 4 5 2 ff. for a discussion on the requisite dolus for each of the enumerated crimes under Chapter 
4 of POCA. 
549 Kemp (2001) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 156.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 124 
 
standard, on the face of it, can be reconciled with POCA as the definition of criminal 
gang does not require such knowledge.  
It can equally as convincingly be argued that a formal gang member may share a 
common purpose with the rest of the gang to further that gang’s criminal conduct and 
the same can also most likely be said of a gang member who actively associates with 
that same gang. Someone who actively associates him- or herself with a gang, 
logically wants to further whatever criminal endeavour they are partaking in – possibly, 
in some instances, even more so. A member who actively associates themselves (and 
is not a formal member) is not bound by “formal” membership and selects activities he 
or she wants to partake in and may have more leeway than someone who is bound 
by formal gang membership. His or her mere conduct of actively associating with the 
gang provides evidence of the intention to further the gang’s operation. A formal gang 
member’s initial formal joining of the gang and participation in induction rituals,550 may 
serve as proof of serious intention to further the criminal activities of the gang. 
4 3 3  Council Framework Decision by the Council of the European Union 
The Council of Europe adopted a joint decision making it an offence to participate 
in an organised criminal group within the member states of the European Union.551 A 
subsequent Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the 
Fight Against Organised Crime (“Framework Decision”),552 repealed this joint decision 
in 2008.553 The joint action and subsequent Framework Decision is comparable to the 
Palermo Convention in in that it creates similar group-based criminal offences.554  The 
textual comparability with the Palermo Convention makes it relevant to look at the 
Council Decision, also from a South African perspective.  
Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision states that a criminal organisation   
                                            
550 See especially 4 5 2 6 below.  
551 Joint action of 21 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty 
on European Union, on making it a criminal offence to participate in a criminal organisation in the 
Member States of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Communities L 351/1 (adopted 
on 21 December 1998). 
552 Official Journal of the European Union L 300/42 (adopted 24 October 2008, entered into force 24 
October 2008). 
553 Paragraph 9 of the Decision Framework. 
554 See Kemp (2001) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 155-156. 
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means a structured association, established over a period of time, of more than two 
persons acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are punishable by 
deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more 
serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit  
The Decision Framework adopts a fixed albeit wide definition of criminal 
organisation. This type of definition stands in stark contrast to the definition of “criminal 
gang” under POCA which adopts a directory definition by employing the word 
“includes” at the beginning of the definition.555  Article 1(1) (“established over a period 
of time”) and 1(2) (“not randomly formed”) also explicitly excludes the inclusion of 
groups formed sporadically from the definitions, thereby also excluding criminal 
organisations that have formed for a specific mandate. Such sporadic or randomly 
formed groups are still possible under POCA due to the discretionary wording of the 
definition of criminal gang.  
Even though this definition is substantially similar to article 1 of the joint decision, it 
does not, for example, include the improper influencing of public official under the 
definition. The joint decision did also not include a further definition of “structured 
organisation”. Article 1(2) holds that a “structured organisation”  
means an association that is not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an 
offence, nor does it need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of 
its membership, or a developed structure.  
The adoption of a regional protocol may seem odd due the large number of EU 
countries that are also member states to the Palermo Protocol and due to the fact 
criminal organisations do not only operate within a regional context but transnationally 
as well.556 
4 3 4  The Canadian Criminal Code 
The Canadian Criminal Code (“the Code”) outlaws certain groups (or “criminal 
organizations”) through the prohibition of certain criminal acts in association with that 
organisation. The usefulness of the Canadian approach for South Africa is in certain 
                                            
555 See Chapter 5 for a comprehensive discussion on this issue. 
556 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Legislative Guides for the Implementation of the United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto (2004) 21 where 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also points out this fact.  
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textual aspects that may prove instructive or insightful for purposes of interpretation 
and potential legislative reform.  
A “criminal organization” is defined in section 467.1(1) of the Canadian Criminal 
Code and  
means a group, however organized, that (a) is composed of three or more persons in 
or outside Canada; and (b) has as one of its main purposes or main activities the 
facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences that, if committed, would 
likely result in the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a financial 
benefit, by the group or by any of the persons who constitute the group. 
Certain important observations are appropriate here. The Code also uses the word 
“means” at the beginning of the definition thus avoiding claims of vagueness – at least 
in this particular regard. Secondly, the main activities requirement calls for the 
commission of one or more serious offences under the Code “or any Act of 
Parliament”. Canada, unlike the US and South Africa, does not rely on a fixed list of 
predicate offences but relies on a broader category of “serious offences”.  
A “serious offence”  
means an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament for which the 
maximum punishment is imprisonment for five years or more, or another offence that 
is prescribed by regulation [.]557 
The Code also pertinently states that the “criminal organization” must have one of 
its main activities the facilitation and commission of these serious offences. POCA, in 
contrast, merely refers to “one of its activities”. This must be contrasted against the 
requirement under STEP which has developed more concrete case law on this 
point.558 
There will be consistent reference throughout this dissertation to the fact that 
Schedule 1 to POCA, which contains the relevant predicates acts, is so wide and 
varied in nature, possibly to the extent that it renders the list unconstitutionally vague 
and uncertain.559  
                                            
557 Section 467.1(1) of the Code.  
558 See 4 5 1 1 2 below.  
559 See especially 4 5 1 2 1as well as 5 3 2 2-5 3 2 4 below.   
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4 4  Chapter 2 of POCA: Racketeering offences 
4 4 1  Chapter 2 in the context of criminal gangs 
Chapter 2 of POCA attempts to address a previous lacuna in the law, namely 
effective means to hold those involved in the management and participation in criminal 
enterprises criminally responsible and to strip them of their unlawful proceeds of 
crime.560 Holding the masterminds of these enterprises criminally responsible has 
proved to be especially difficult under the common law due to the aforementioned 
masterminds distancing themselves from the actual commission of the crimes that 
generate the unlawful proceeds.561 This then creates a cloak of criminality shielding 
the participants of organised crime from prosecution.  
Kemp notes the importance of facilitating transnational cooperation when dealing 
with organised crime. The underlying crimes often spread over national borders and 
also are not inherently equipped to deal with the phenomenon.562 There are often 
several layers to organised criminality. Top tiers of so-called “supergangs”563 may start 
to manifest in something akin to an international crime syndicate.564  These gangs are 
“super” not only due to their size but also due to their stronghold over several 
territories. Pinnock describes how merchant gangs also have a hierarchal and 
business-like structure. Their top echelon is organised while the middle echelon is 
semi-structured. The lowest tier is “fluid and volatile”.565 The middle echelon often 
manages the illicit business interests and instructs the bottom tier.566 The top echelon 
yields exceptional influence and power and is, in fact, often linked to international 
syndicates through supply chains.567 The lowest echelon is the focus of this 
                                            
560 See the preamble to POCA; Debates of the National Assembly of 1998: 14 September to 6 
November vol 21 8044.  
561 See the preamble to POCA.  
562 Kemp et al Criminal Law 511. Also see P Gastrow Penetrating state and business: organised crime 
in Southern Africa (2003) 72. 
563 See Standing Cape Flats 103. These included gangs such as the Sexy Boys, Fancy Boys, the 
Americans and the Hard Livings.  
564 See D Pinnock Gang Town (2016) 98-100. 
565 Pinnock Gang Town 118.  
566 A Standing “Re-Conceptualising Organised Crime” (2003) 12(3) African Security Review 102 105. 
The persons at the middle tier are in certain contexts known as “area generals”.  
567 See Pinnock Gang Town 98; 118. 
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dissertation, as they are the part of the hierarchy that is responsible for violence 
terrorising communities, especially in the Western Cape. Standing notes that this level 
of the hierarchy usually does not benefit from the fruits of the illicit gains and are more 
often rather the consumers of the illicit products.568 This type of gang often supplies 
illicit goods (especially drugs) to so-called emerging gangs. Emerging gangs are not 
as strong in number or organisation and mostly operate in community context.569 This 
symbiotic relationship is therefore beneficial to both parties as the larger, merchant-
type gangs are enriched while the emerging gangs are also enriched and additionally 
receive protection form the larger gang as they promote their financial interests. 
Although gangs do vary in their organisational structure and hierarchy, it is clear from 
these observations of Pinnock that South African gangs can function in an extremely 
organised and hierarchal fashion.570 
There is often a conceptual separation between racketeering and money laundering 
offences on one side and gang activities on the other. This is also evident in the 
Legislature’s approach in criminalising these “categories” of crimes separately in 
POCA. So-called white-collar criminals are contrasted with street criminals.571 The 
separation can perhaps be justified based on the types of crimes the relevant chapters 
aims to punish; more specifically economic crimes on the one hand and violent crimes 
on the other. Criminal gangs however invest the fruits of their criminal labour in the 
legitimate economy for money laundering purposes.572 Criminal gangs, through the 
sale of drugs and alcohol, prostitution, human trafficking, robbery and theft, launder 
their money by investing in the legitimate economy through night clubs, shops and 
public transport, amongst other things.573 Criminal gangs moreover supplement the 
economy of disenfranchised communities by providing a source of income to those 
                                            
568 Standing (2010) African Security Review 105. 
569 Standing (2010) African Security Review 105-106. 
570 Pinnock Gang Town 104-106. 
571 See Pinnock Gang Town 99-100. The author also mentions this distinction and points towards the 
“worrying amnesia” when it comes to racketeering in international corporations while there is a focus 
on violent organised crime. 
572 M Wijnberg Exploration of Male Gang Members’ Perspectives of Gangs and Drugs” MA (Social 
Work) thesis University of Stellenbosch (2012) 28; Cowling (1998) South African Journal of Criminal 
Justice 368; Standing (2010) African Security Review 105. 
573 TR Samara Cape Town after Apartheid: Crime and Governance in the Divided City (2011) 97. 
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who otherwise feel that they cannot contribute through legitimate means.574 This in 
fact creates a paradoxical situation: Those terrorising a community often provide a 
source of income to members of the very same area.575 
Pinnock echoes these sentiments. He summarises the problem as follows: 
Even under POCA legislation it’s difficult for police to arrest gang leaders. They rule by 
word and not deed, avoid using drugs, keep organisationally ‘clean’ and enforce these 
rules of behaviour on men in their upper hierarchy. Excess money is laundered through 
legitimate businesses.576  
Thus the need for legislation enabling the state to target these illegal gains.577 This 
type of legislation inhibits a criminal gang’s ability to function properly and also serves 
as a disincentive for fellow gang members or those who want to engage in criminal 
gang activities.578  
4 4 2   An overview of sections 2(1)(e) and (f) 
Just as with Chapter 4 of POCA, Chapter 2 has certain key definitions. An 
“enterprise” for purposes of Chapter 2 of POCA 
includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other juristic person 
or legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact, although not a 
juristic person or legal entity [.]579 
The definition of this key term also (just as in Chapter 4) uses the word “includes” and 
it is submitted that this also creates a mere directory definition, just as with the 
definition of “criminal gang”. This definition would thus also be susceptible to 
constitutional attack.580 
                                            
574 See Samara Cape Town after Apartheid 99-100. 
575 See Samara Cape Town after Apartheid 100. The author also refers to research by Steve Kibble, 
indicating that gangs often also provide financial support (such as rent or grocery money), thereby 
making certain community members dependent on them.  
576 Pinnock Gang Town 110. 
577 See Standing Cape Flats 266. 
578 Standing Cape Flats 266. 
579 Own emphasis.  
580 See 5 3 2 2 below for a detailed discussion on the constitutionality of the term “criminal gang”.  
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The State must furthermore show that an accused has committed a pattern of 
racketeering activity. This 
means the planned, ongoing, continuous or repeated participation or involvement in 
any offence referred to in Schedule 1 and includes at least two offences referred to in 
Schedule 1, of which one of the offences occurred after the commencement of this Act 
and the last offence occurred within 10 years (excluding any period of imprisonment) 
after the commission of such prior offence referred to in Schedule 1 [.]581  
It is interesting to note that this definition very clearly uses the word “means” at the 
beginning of the definition. This creates a closed or peremptory definition which is not 
as susceptible to prosecutorial abuse or offending the ius strictum aspect of the 
principle of legality.  
For purposes of this discussion and the discussion of Chapter 4 offences, it is also 
important to note section 1(3), which states:  
For the purposes of this Act a person ought reasonably to have known or suspected a 
fact if the conclusions that he or she ought to have reached are those which would 
have been reached by a reasonably diligent and vigilant person having both 
(a) the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that may reasonably 
be expected of a person in his or her position; and 
(b) the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that he or she in fact 
has 
This section will only provide an overview of sections 2(1)(e) and (f) due to their 
application in gang-related decisions.  
Section 2(1)(f) creates the so-called management offence. This offence is 
contravened when a person 
manages the operation or activities of an enterprise and who knows or ought 
reasonably to have known that any person, whilst employed by or associated with that 
enterprise, conducts or participates in the conduct, directly or indirectly, of such 
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity [.]  
                                            
581 Own emphasis. 
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This offence requires actual participation in the racketeering enterprise.582 There is 
however a relatively low threshold of mens rea because it is sufficient for the State to 
prove that the accused was negligent in his or her conduct. The SCA in S v Prinsloo 
(“Prinsloo”),583 after an analysis of the relevant authority and legislative intent,584 
concluded that it was clear that culpa was sufficient to secure a conviction based on 
this section.585 
A definition for the term “manages”, just like the concept of membership in Chapter 
2, is also absent in the statute. Kemp et al suggest that the ordinary meaning of this 
term be attached and that some sort of de facto manager is required and formal 
employment should certainly not be required.586  
The definition also requires direct or indirect participation in the affairs of the 
enterprise. Although US jurisprudence indicates that this definition does not extend to 
people outside of the association, it has been submitted that the scope of the term 
“indirectly” is broad enough to include such categories of persons.587 The requisite 
pattern of racketeering activity can be fulfilled only by personal commission of the 
underlying predicate offences.588 This differs substantially from the position under 
Chapter 4, where personal commission of the predicate acts is not required. Members 
may individually or collectively contribute to the pattern. It is uncertain why such a 
distinction is made between the two statutes. Chapter 2 thus seems to be in line with 
the traditional concepts of criminal law, whereas Chapter 4, just like the common 
                                            
582 See generally Kemp et al Criminal Law 521; Standing Organised Crime (2013) 15-16. 
583 2016 (2) SACR 25 (SCA).  
584 See for example section 1(3) of POCA which states that 
For the purposes of this Act a person ought reasonably to have known or suspected a fact if 
the conclusions that he or she ought to have reached are those which would have been reached 
by a reasonably diligent and vigilant person having both─ 
(a) the general knowledge, skill, training, and experience that may reasonably be 
expected of a person in his or her position; and 
(b) the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that he or she in fact has. 
585 See Prinsloo paras 51-54. Kemp et al also posit that the wording of the statute would necessarily 
also exclude instances of “wilful blindness” or ignorance. See Kemp et al Criminal Law 520-521. 
586 Kemp et al Criminal Law 519.  
587 Kemp et al Criminal Law 519-520. 
588 See Kemp et al Criminal Law 520. 
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purpose doctrine, constitutes a substantial modification of the principle of personal 
guilt.589  
Another aspect that also differs from Chapter 4 of POCA, is that there has to be 
some kind of nexus (or “participatory link”) between the pattern of racketeering 
activities and the criminal enterprise and thus accidental, unrelated or coincidental 
commission of criminal offences would not be sufficient to sustain a conviction.590  This 
does not appear to be the position under Chapter 4 of POCA, where the participation 
in the enterprise does not have to be “through”591 the predicate acts. The underlying 
predicate acts under Chapter 4 do not appear to have the same requirement: only the 
substantive offences require there to be some connection (or benefit in some 
instances).   
Section 2(1)(e), on the other hand, states: 
whilst managing or employed by or associated with any enterprise, conducts or 
participates in the conduct, directly or indirectly, of such enterprise's affairs through a 
pattern of racketeering activity [.] 
This offence contains largely the same essential elements as subsection (f). A 
significant difference is, however, that there is no mention of the requisite mens rea 
here. In the absence of a direct reference to the requisite form of mens rea, there is a 
presumption that statutory crimes require dolus in one of its three forms.592 The SCA 
in Prinsloo held that the mere commission of the underlying predicate offences would 
satisfy the elements of subsection (e) and that the State would consequently not have 
to prove anything beyond that.593 This position differs substantially from what is 
required under Chapter 4. Each of the section 9 offences (under Chapter 4) requires 
specific and separate conduct from the underlying predicate offences. The 
                                            
589 See Chapter 2 for a discussion on the concept of personal guilt. Kemp et al refer to obiter remarks 
by the Gauteng South Division of the High Court in Boekhout v S (unreported case, no SS134/06) where 
the Court held that personal commission of the predicate offences was not required – mere involvement 
in the commission of those offences would suffice. The author also points out that this position is 
inconsistent with RICO jurisprudence. See Kemp et al Criminal Law 520 fn 42.  
590 See Savoi I para 111; Eyssen II para 8. Also see See Kemp et al Criminal Law 520.  
591 See Kemp et al Criminal Law 521.  
592 See Burchell Principles 900. 
593 Prinsloo at para 64. Also see Burchell Principles 900 fn 11.  
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commission of the predicate offences, thus, has to be followed by the commission of 
a predicate offence with its own accompanying actus reus.  
Burchell points out that the position held in Prinsloo is not congruent with the 
position held by the KwaZulu-Natal division of the High Court in Savoi I and that intent 
is an “inescapable” element with regards to all racketeering offences.594  
4 4 3  Case studies: S v Eyssen and S v Thomas 
4 4 3 1 S v Eyssen  
The SCA in S v Eyssen (“Eyssen II”)595 heard an appeal relating to two counts of 
racketeering in terms of sections 2(1)(e) and (f) of POCA.596 The State argued that the 
requisite “enterprise” was that of the Fancy Boys gang and that the business of that 
gang was mainly the robbery of homes.597 The Court considered the available (albeit 
limited) evidence on the aforementioned gang which all pointed towards the fact that 
the so-called enterprise was factually non-existent. There was a lack of hierarchical 
structure and the “members” were not necessarily members of the gang due to their 
crimes being for personal gain and not that of the alleged enterprise. Due to this, the 
SCA rejected the State’s submission that the Fancy Boys constituted an enterprise for 
the purposes of Chapter 2 of POCA.598 This additionally illustrates the difficulty in trying 
to criminalise gang activity on the assumption that the gang members function as a 
cohesive unit and underlines the fact that “gangs” may engage in venture-specific 
activities and dissolve immediately thereafter.599 The SCA furthermore rejected the 
State’s contentions that the underlying predicate offences (consisting of three common 
law offences) which formed the pattern of racketeering activity formed part of the 
activities of the gang. All of the offences involved multiple persons and only in one 
instance gang membership was established and with the other instances (where the 
accused parties were apprehended), no established gang members were involved.600 
                                            
594 Burchell Principles 900-901. 
595 2009 (1) SACR 406 (SCA). 
596 See Eyssen II paras 1-3. 
597 See Eyssen II para 13. 
598 See Eyssen II para 13. 
599 See 4 5 1 1 below and P Gastrow “Organised Crime in South Africa – An Assessment of its Nature 
and Origins” ISS. 
600 See See Eyssen II para 14. 
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Submissions that the appellant managed the affairs of the Fancy Boys gang were 
similarly rejected by the Court.  
4 4 3 2 S v Thomas  
The Western Cape Division of the High Court in S v Thomas (“Thomas”)601 found 
that Accused 1 was guilty of the charged racketeering offences. The Thomas case is 
the most significant gang-related case involving Chapters 2 and 4 of POCA. The State 
had originally charged nineteen people with 166 gang-related crimes – not only under 
POCA – but also with common law crimes such as murder, assault, conspiracy, 
incitement as well as various gun-related charges under the Firearms Control Act 60 
of 2000 and offences under the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992. 
The State argued that Accused 1 managed the affairs of the 28s criminal gang (the 
criminal enterprise) in terms of section 2(1)(f) of POCA. It was furthermore alleged that 
he knew that several of his co-accused were in service of this criminal enterprise which 
(directly or indirectly) contributed to a pattern of racketeering activities.602 The 
evidence revealed that the accused was a high-ranking (or even highest-ranking) 
member of the gang and that various crimes were executed on his instruction.603 The 
Court consequently found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Accused 1 was in control 
(thus “managed”) the affairs of the enterprise (the 28s gang) since he became a 
member of the gang.604 This was despite the accused’s unsuccessful attempt to argue 
that his position within the gang did not place him in such a managerial position. The 
Court also noted that it was in any case not relevant which rank the accused held. The 
relevant question was whether he was in a de facto position to give orders and whether 
he had in fact given such orders.605  
The Court additionally found Accused 1 guilty of contravening subsection (e) due to 
his direct as well as indirect participation in four murders.606 The accused’s 
                                            
601 2015 JDR 1932 (WCC). 
602 Thomas at 480-482. 
603 Thomas at 480-483. The evidence showed that the accused went by several aliases which included 
“Ndoda” and “Die Ou” which indicated his leadership position. Also see Ceaser at 16. 
604 Thomas at at 512.  
605 See Thomas 511-512. 
606 Thomas at 515. The SCA in Prinsloo recently confirmed that this it was possible to hold someone 
liable both in terms of subsections (e) and (f) after an unsuccessful challenge by one of the accused 
parties. See Prinsloo paras 56-60.  
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responsibility was unusual in the sense that he, as a gang leader, also committed 
crimes on “street level”.607  
The other accused parties were not convicted so easily.608 This was mainly due to 
a lack of evidence to form the requisite pattern of racketeering activities.609 There were 
however some convictions. Accused 16 was, notably, convicted despite the fact that 
membership (or “employment”) of the 28s gang was not proven but membership to 
another gang (the 26s) was proved. The Court accepted the State’s evidence that he 
contributed to the enterprise of the 28s gang. This position is correct and is in line with 
the clear and ordinary meaning of subsection (f) which requires either direct or indirect 
(as with Accused 16) participation in the enterprise.610  
Why was the Court in Thomas able to find the accused guilty of racketeering 
offences and not the Court in Eyssen? The main difference is that there was 
substantial evidence indicating the accused’s position of authority in Thomas, thus 
satisfying the managerial element in the offence. There was also, unlike in Eyssen, 
sufficient evidence that the activities of the 28s constituted the requisite “enterprise”. 
4 4 4  Section 2(2) 
Section 2(2) of POCA importantly provides that  
 [t]he court may hear evidence, including evidence with regard to hearsay, similar facts 
or previous convictions, relating to offences contemplated in subsection (1), 
notwithstanding that such evidence might otherwise be inadmissible, provided that 
such evidence would not render a trial unfair. 
This is a crucial provision in POCA. The section however resorts under Chapter 2 and 
not to gang-related related matters. Nowhere in the Act is it explicitly stated that a court 
has the same liberties in relation to gang-related matters as with racketeering under 
Chapter 2, despite the fact that Chapter 4 is almost wholly founded on the concept of 
utilising a pattern of criminal gang activity, which is, in turn, founded on previous 
                                            
607 See Thomas at 481. 
608 In terms of subsection (e).  
609 See Thomas 515-520. With regards to Accused 6, on the other hand, the Court was not satisfied 
that the State proved that the relevant crimes were executed at the direction of Accused 1. In other 
words, it was not shown that the crimes were committed for the enterprise through the pattern of 
racketeering activities. 
610 See Kemp et al Criminal Law 520 and the discussion above. 
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convictions. Although this oversight is somewhat of an anomaly, it does not appear if 
it is an impediment to the utilisation of Chapter 4. Section 211 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (“the CPA”) also provides general authorisation for the proof 
of previous convictions in criminal trials.611 In order to avoid future challenges to 
Chapter 4, a provision similar to section 2(2) should be added to Chapter 4.612  
4 4 5  Evaluation 
It is clear that the business of gangs is inextricably linked to criminal gang activities. 
A conceptual separation of the “types” of criminals who perpetrate either racketeering 
or gang-related activities is not justified.  In order to effectively battle organised crime, 
in all its permutations, the State needs to strip an organised criminal group of its illicit 
gains; punish the participation in illicit business activities and thirdly attempt to 
dismantle the organised structure.  
4 5  Chapter 4 of POCA: Gang-related offences  
4 5 1  The preliminary requirements in terms of Chapter 1 
Certain preliminary requirements must be proven before a conviction under Chapter 4 
of POCA may be secured. A court must firstly be satisfied that the individuals 
concerned are members of or active participants in a criminal gang.613 There must 
secondly be proof that these alleged members individually or collectively contributed 
                                            
611 Section 211 reads that  
[e]xcept where otherwise expressly provided by this Act or the Child Justice Act, 2008, or except 
where the fact of a previous conviction is an element of any offence with which an accused is 
charged, evidence shall not be admissible at criminal proceedings in respect of any offence to 
prove that an accused at such proceedings had previously been convicted of any offence, 
whether in the Republic or elsewhere, and no accused, if called as a witness, shall be asked 
whether he or she has been so convicted. 
It can therefore be argued that the “pattern of criminal gang activity” is an element of the offences under 
Chapter 4 of POCA. Section 197(d) further permits the State to question the accused regarding his or 
her previous convictions if it can prove that “he [or she] has committed or has been convicted of such 
other offence is admissible evidence to show that he is guilty of the offence with which he [or she] is 
charged”.  
612 See 7 2 below. 
613 It is however submitted that active participation will often constitute de facto gang membership even 
if there is no formal gang membership. 
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to a pattern of criminal gang activities. Chapter 1 (section 1) of POCA defines these 
concepts.  
4 5 1 1 “Criminal gang”  
A brief overview of leading conceptualisations of the concept of a criminal gang was 
provided in the introductory chapter of this dissertation.614 The focus of this dissertation 
and the function of Chapter 4 of POCA is reliant on the definition of a “criminal gang” 
in POCA. Chapter 1 of POCA defines a criminal gang as follows:  
includes any formal or informal ongoing organisation, association, or group of three or 
more persons, which has as one of its activities the commission of one or more criminal 
offences, which has an identifiable name or identifying sign or symbol, and whose 
members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal 
gang activity [.]615 
This definition makes use of the word “includes” before the description of a criminal 
gang. The use of this word tends to indicate that a definition is merely of a directory 
and not peremptory nature. This creates great legal uncertainty as well as 
constitutional issues which will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
Snyman has argued that a court would be able to make use of a “general, 
nontechnical meaning” of the concept of a criminal gang.616 This would include the 
broader (non-legal) definitions as described above.617 Kruger however is not so willing 
to accept this interpretation. The author argues that there will have to be “clear 
evidence” that a criminal gang is devoid of the very detailed indicia provided for in the 
definition.618 It is submitted that Snyman’s interpretation appears to be more in line 
with what is expected of a definition that incorporates the word “includes” at the 
beginning of the definition. This is also more in line with the general legislative intent 
of POCA as confirmed in case law.619 The SCA has also held that this legislative intent 
                                            
614 See 1 3 1 above especially. 
615 Own emphasis.  
616 CR Snyman “Die nuwe statutêre misdaad van deelname aan 'n kriminele bende” (1999) 12 South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 213 215. 
617 See 1 3 1 above.  
618 A Kruger Organised Crime and Proceeds of Crime Law in South Africa 2 ed (2013) 72.  
619 See Mohunram para 144; Mohamed para 14 and discussion at 4 2 above. 
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calls for a liberal interpretation of the various Chapters in POCA.620 It is however 
submitted that Kruger’s interpretation is the preferred interpretation because it avoids 
conflict with the principle of legality and should thus be followed by courts.621 
It must furthermore be read in conjunction with section 11 (“Interpretation of a 
criminal gang”) which lists several factors which a court may consider in deciding 
whether someone is a member of a criminal gang. These factors are, when an accused 
(a) admits to criminal gang membership; 
(b) is identified as a member of a criminal gang by a parent or guardian; 
(c) resides in or frequents a particular criminal gang's area and adopts their style of 
dress, their use of hand signs, language or their tattoos, and associates with known 
members of a criminal gang; 
(d) has been arrested more than once in the company of identified members of a 
criminal gang for offences which are consistent with usual criminal gang activities; 
(e) is identified as a member of a criminal gang by physical evidence such as 
photographs or other documentation. 
Here, just like in STEP, there is no exact definition for a criminal gang. The Court in 
Thomas did not explicitly rely on section 11 in determining gang membership but did 
consider aspects relating to the individual style of dress, tattoos and language as 
supporting a finding of gang membership.622 
 In terms of STEP, a “criminal street gang”  
(…) means any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, 
whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of 
one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (25), inclusive, or 
(31) to (33), inclusive, of subdivision (e), having a common name or common 
                                            
620 Prinsloo para 57. The SCA held that this liberal construction especially applies to sections 2(1)(e)-
(f).  
621 See 5 3 2 2 below. Kruger’s interpretation would therefore avoid legality issues but amendment to 
the text is recommended to bolster this approach. See 7 2 below for suggested amendments to the text 
of POCA.   
622 These factors are specifically listed in section 11(c). See Thomas 481-482 especially. Ceaser at 16 
where there is brief testimony of the tattoos of the Americans gang. See further discussion at 4 5 1 1 3 
below.  
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identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in 
or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.623 
It is notable that the Californian Legislature opted for a peremptory definition instead 
of the directory definition of the South African legislature. Except for that, the definition 
is almost identical to the definition of a criminal gang under POCA. Therefore, it is 
submitted that there must have been a conscious legislative reason for changing the 
wording followed under STEP and not just due to “careless drafting”.624  
Californian courts have interpreted three core requirements for proving the legal 
existence of a criminal street gang. The group must, firstly, be an ongoing association 
consisting at least of three persons. That association must furthermore have an 
identifying symbol or name. Then, secondly, the group must have as one of their main 
activities the commission of one or more of the listed (predicate) offences. The 
members of the group, finally, must have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity 
– either in the past or presently.625  
STEP also excludes certain predicate offences from consideration for purposes of 
establishing that one of its primary activities is the commission of the listed offences. 
The offences that are explicitly excluded mostly relates to theft626 or fraudulent use627 
involving bank cards or account information. 
Trade unions are explicitly excluded under STEP628 but not POCA. The reason for 
this difference is unknown. Trade unions in South Africa have been known to engage 
in violent activities.629 The most prominent example in recent history is undoubtedly 
                                            
623 §186.22(f) of STEP (own emphasis).  
624 Kruger Organised Crime 72. Here, the author indicates that there might have been some 
carelessness in the drafting of POCA. See 5 3 1 3 3 below for a more comprehensive discussion on the 
issue of careless drafting casus omissus. 
625 People v. Lara 9 Cal.App.5th 296 (2017) at 332; People v. Sengpadychith 27 P.3d 739 (2001) at 
744; People v. Loeun P.2d 1313 (1997) at 1316. 
626 Paragraph (26) of STEP read with Section 484e of the Californian Criminal Code.  
627 Paragraph (27) of STEP 484g of the Californian Criminal Code. 
628 In terms of § 186(23), which states that  
[t]his chapter does not apply to employees engaged in concerted activities for their mutual aid 
and protection, or the activities of labor organizations or their members or agents. 
629 See generally M Tenza “An investigation into the causes of violent strikes in South Africa: Some 
lessons from foreign law and possible solutions” (2015) 19 Law, Democracy and Development 211.  
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the tragedy at the Marikana Mines following an unprotected strike.630 Although striking 
workers might not fall under the traditional conception of a “criminal gang”, they may 
satisfy the definitional requirements of a gang (either in terms of the statutory text or 
in terms of the ordinary meaning of the word) and thus fall within the ambit of POCA. 
Any trade union consists of three or more persons; is an ongoing formal organisation; 
more often than not have an identifiable name or symbol. If a series of offences were 
committed during an industrial action, the trade union will have satisfied the 
requirement of having one of its activities the commission of one or more criminal 
offences. This goes hand-in-hand with the members having individually or collectively 
engaging in a pattern of criminal gang activity. It is suggested that a similar provision 
to section 186(23) be included in POCA to avoid a scenario where persons involved 
in industrial action be charged for gang-related offences. Such a prosecutorial decision 
would cause significant societal outcry – just as when the Marikana workers were 
charged under the common purpose doctrine.631 At any rate, the criminalisation of 
industrial action and trade union activities via an overzealous prosecutorial 
interpretation and application of POCA would undoubtedly fall outside the legislative 
intent.  
4 5 1 1 1 Formal or informal ongoing association or group of three or more  
persons 
The gang must consist out of some sort of structure and the Legislature, over and 
above opting to give a directory definition, defines this part of the definition extremely 
liberally. This structure may firstly be an association of persons of either a formal or 
informal nature. This means that the association or group may have some kind of 
legitimate structure (or guise) such as a club or business. It equally denotes that the 
structure may be of an informal nature where such a structure is absent. The qualifier 
to both these terms is that the structure be ongoing. This word will necessarily exclude 
structures that have formed spontaneously and such structures would fall more within 
the ambit of the common purpose doctrine in its active association form.632 The 
structure may furthermore consist of three or more persons and this should not be a 
                                            
630 See 3 3 2 above for a brief overview of the incident.  
631 See 3 3 2. 
632 See 3 3 3.  
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problematic requirement for the State to prove.  Smaller (emerging) gangs constitute 
relatively small numbers. In other instances, gangs may constitute supergangs as 
described above. This can also be contrasted to niche gangs that develop to cater to 
a certain market or only operate in a small geographical area and may form and come 
to an end rather sporadically.633 Gang sizes vary and may range from ten members 
with smaller gangs to between (an estimated) 5 000 and 10 000 members for 
supergangs such as the “Americans”.634 
A strict and peremptory definition is preferred especially in instances where it has 
to be determined whether someone was a member of a criminal gang. Many persons 
may form part of the gang sphere including established and “hard-core” members as 
well as members on the fringe of the gang who merely admire the actual members or 
who aspire to join the gang.635 The latter group should not fall within the ambit of this 
definition. 
The problematic aspect of this part of the definition may be the requirement that the 
structure be of an ongoing nature. As pointed out above, gangs, especially smaller 
gangs, may form and die out sporadically. Such gangs should not be considered as 
“ongoing” and not fall within the ambit of POCA. It is suggested that this part of the 
definition is aimed at specially excluding groups that have formed sporadically at the 
scene of a crime or for the execution of a specific crime. This would constitute a factual 
matrix that would fall under the scope of the common purpose doctrine.  
4 5 1 1 2 One of its activities is the commission of criminal offences 
This phrase indicates that the criminal gang may have other activities other than 
their illicit activities – as long as it is a “main” activity. This also means that criminal 
gangs may use legitimate organisations as guises for their criminal gang activities.  
POCA does not require that these main activities be one of the listed activities in 
Schedule 1. It merely requires there to be the commission of criminal offences. This is 
                                            
633 Standing Cape Flats 103. 
634 Standing Cape Flats 104. Pinnock estimates the combined membership of the Americans and Hard 
Livings to have been between 3 000 and 10 000 in 1994 – see Pinnock Gang Town 97.  
635 See Standing Cape Flats (2005) 104.  
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in contrast with STEP,636 which requires that the “primary activities”637 be one of the 
enumerated criminal acts. 
Californian courts were previously inconsistent with their interpretation of this part 
of the definition.638 While some courts indicated that the current offences before the 
court were sufficient to prove the “primary activities” requirement,639 others indicated 
that crimes other than the ones the accused was currently charged with were 
required.640 In other words, the debate was whether a “primary activity” could be 
discerned by merely looking at the single incidences before the court or whether a 
more holistic or historical view had to be taken. Witkin indicates that this issue was 
resolved in People v. Sengpadychith (“Sengpadychith”).641 Here the Supreme Court 
of California held that both past and present activities were acceptable in determining 
an alleged gang’s primary activity as both categories “have some tendency in reason 
to show the group's primary activity” and therefore also falls within the scope of the 
general rules of admissibility.642 The Court further postulates that this would 
necessarily exclude occasional commission of the relevant crimes – such as a police 
department or environmental organisation committing the listed crimes.643 The 
commission of the listed crimes, in such instances, would not be the primary activity 
of the organisation. 
This part of the definition may prove problematic when exercising otherwise 
constitutionally protected activities, especially the right to protest644 and strike.645 
Certain factions of the #FeesMustFall movement serve as example. Some protests by 
this movement have become extremely violent and do in fact satisfy the elements of 
                                            
636 In terms of §186.22(f). 
637 STEP uses the term “primary activities” in contrast to POCA which uses main activities. These terms 
are semantically identical.  
638 See BE Witkin, NL Epstein & members of the Witkin Legal Institute Witkin California Criminal Law 4 
ed vol 7 (2012) para 33; People v. Sengpadychith 27 P.3d 739 (2001) at 856. 
639 See People v. Galvan 68 C.A.4th 1135 (1998). 
640  See In re Elodio O. 56 C.A.4th 1175 (1997).  
641 See fn 637 above.  
642 Sengpadychith at 857. 
643 Sengpadychith at 857 referring to People v. Gardeley 14 Cal. 4th 605 (1996) (“Gardeley”). 
644 In terms of section 17 of the Constitution.  
645 In terms of section 23(2)(c) of the Constitution.  
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the definition of criminal gang in terms of section 1.646  As illustrated with trade unions 
above, #FeesMustFall is an ongoing formal (or informal) association of three or more 
persons with an identifiable name. One of the activities in which certain of its members 
participated, was the commission of one or more activities listed in Schedule 1 of 
POCA – in which members individually or collectively engaged. It is argued here that 
although #FeesMustFall is not a criminal gang in the strict sense, members of this 
organisation or similar bodies may fall under the broad wording of the Act. There is 
further no doubt that their activities would qualify if a court were to consider the 
definition under section 1 as directory. Again, prosecutorial abuse of POCA to 
suppress otherwise democratic practices of concerned or even angry citizens would 
arguably fall foul of the legislative intent of POCA, not to mention the ethos of the 
Constitution which certainly envisages an open and free society with a robust 
democratic culture. The point here is merely that the structure and wording of POCA 
Chapter 4 is such that movements, sometimes engaging in criminal activities (or 
associated with criminal activities) could potentially fall under the rubric of POCA 
Chapter 4.  
4 5 1 1 3 Identifiable name or symbol  
The definition requires that the gang have an identifiable name or symbol. The 
function of this requirement is potentially to differentiate criminal gangs from non-
ongoing associations that may have participated in illegal activities but do not 
constitute a gang or persons who are fringe members that are neither active 
participants nor members. As mentioned above, POCA aims to only punish ongoing 
structures.  
Section 11 of POCA, provides guiding factors a court may take into consideration 
in determining whether an accused is a member of a criminal gang. Section 11(c) 
specifically mentions clothing style; the use of hand signs; language and tattoos as 
                                            
646 See for example Hotz and Others v University of Cape Town 2017 (7) BCLR 815 (CC) para 1; 
Concerned Association of Parents and Others for Tertiary Education at Universities v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University and Another ECC 10-11-2016 case no. 4976/2016; J Duncan “Opinion: Why 
Student Protests in SA Have Turned Violent (30-09-2016) EWN 
<http://ewn.co.za/2016/09/30/OPINION-Why-student-protests-in-South-Africa-have-turned-violent> 
(accessed 01-12-2017). Chapter 5 of this dissertation will investigate whether Chapter 4 of POCA in 
fact infringes on associational freedoms in the broad sense. 
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factors that may indicate that someone is a member of a criminal gang. Gangs typically 
have their own and distinct fashion, colours, tattoos and slang (or “sabela” as used by 
the 28s gang).647 This is both to show kinship, facilitate intra-gang cohesion as well as 
an expression of their dissent from the mainstream from which they often have been 
ostracised from.648 Wijnberg points out how the Americans gang, for example, has 
appropriated symbols of American culture and government to symbolise the gang. The 
American way of life appeals to them because of pop culture depictions of the country 
as one of lavish lifestyles they aspire to.649 Members of the 28s gang are associated 
with various insignia, such as tattoos of the number 28, a setting sun, and thumb, index 
finger and middle finger tattooed with the Afrikaans word “Sonaf” (sunset).650 
Membership is often confirmed upon the receipt of such a tattoo.651 Their sabela slang 
is used to communicate covertly with fellow gang members about criminal operations 
as well as their wellbeing in general.652 
These factors however do not constitute presumptions with regards to gang 
membership, which would constitute a violation of an accused’s presumption of 
innocence.653 The Organised Crime Bill provided for a statutory presumption that 
someone was a gang member if two or more of the listed factors in section 1(iv)654 
                                            
647 See Wijnberg Exploration (2012) 30. Sabela is an amalgamation of English, Afrikaans and Zulu and 
refers to gang language in general. Also see Thomas at 482 where a witness refers to gang members 
kneeling before and addressing the gang leader (accused number 1) in this language while in prison; 
suggesting an authoritative relationship over these members. The 26s and 27s speak shalombom while 
the 28s speak ndyaza – see Pinnock Gang Town 101. 
648 See Wijnberg Exploration (2012) 30; Standing (2010) African Security Review 105. 
649 See Wijnberg Exploration (2012) 30. 
650 See Thomas at 481 where the Court considered this information, together with other factors, to 
determine the role of the main accused in the 28s gang. 
651 See D Pinnock Gang Town 83; 89. 
652 Thomas 179-180. 
653 In terms of section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution. Also see Snyman (1999) South African Journal of 
Criminal Justice 216-217. 
654 “criminal gang member” is a person who is a member of a criminal gang and in considering whether 
a person is a member of a gang the court may, when applicable, take into account two or more of the 
following factors, namely that such person— 
(a) admits to criminal gang membership;  
(b) is identified as a criminal gang member by a parent or guardian; 
(c) is identified as a criminal gang member by a documented reliable informant; 
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were present. This provision possibly infringed the freedom of association655 but was 
subsequently omitted from the final text of POCA. The sole discretion in determining 
whether someone is a gang member is now up to the court in terms of section 11 of 
POCA. The contents of section 11 are merely factors. This may prove to be more 
problematic than the position under the Organised Crime Bill because there is no 
definition of a gang member in POCA (despite the word being used several times 
throughout the statute) which may constitute an infringement of the ius certum rule. 
It may be questioned whether it is imperative for a criminal gang to have an 
identifiable name and symbol. Gangs may even develop in order to circumvent this 
requirement and no longer brand their members with such names and symbols.656 It 
is also quite possible for members of the community to assimilate the gang lifestyle – 
purely out of admiration or to not fall victim of gang attacks.657 Fringe members trying 
to impress gang leaders may then fall under the scope of POCA when they are not in 
actual fact gang members but “merely” active participants. 
The definition of “criminal street gang” also requires the existence of a “common 
name or common identifying sign or symbol”.658 STEP case law indicates that when a 
gang is known by two names (for instance “Tongan Family” or simply “the Family”), 
the existence and use of at least one of these names by the members will satisfy this 
requirement.659  
                                            
(d) resides in or frequents a particular criminal gang’s area and adopts their style of dress, their 
use of hand signs, language or their tattoos, and associates with known criminal gang 
members;  
(e) is identified as a criminal gang member by an informant of previously untested reliability and 
such identification is corroborated by independent information;  
(f) has been arrested more than once in the company of identified criminal gang members for 
offences which are consistent with usual criminal gang activity;” 
(g) is identified as a criminal gang member by physical evidence such as photographs or other 
documentation [.]  
655 In terms of section 18 of the Constitution. Also see Cowling (1998) South African Journal of Criminal 
Justice 372. 
656 See Burchell Principles 910.  
657 Pinnock Gang Town 92. 
658 §186.22(f) of STEP.  
659 In re Nathaniel C. 228 Cal.App.3d 990 (1991) at 1001. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 146 
 
4 5 1 1 4 Members individually or collectively engage in a pattern of  
criminal gang activity 
This element makes it possible for only certain members at a time to engage in a 
pattern of criminal gang activities and not necessarily the entire gang at once. Although 
members can individually contribute to the pattern, it does not mean that the other 
members are automatically liable for an offence. An accused would have to, in his or 
her own capacity, commit an offence in terms of section 9 of POCA.  
The State may rely on the predicate acts of any of the members of the criminal gang 
to establish the requisite pattern.660 It is somewhat more contentious when the State 
wants to rely on the accused party’s own previous convictions. This is due to the fact 
that proof of an accused’s previous convictions is considered as similar fact evidence 
and excluded on the basis that it is irrelevant or immaterial. The equivalent provision 
in Chapter 2 of POCA has already been (unsuccessfully) constitutionally challenged 
in Savoi I and II. A comprehensive discussion of this aspect of the POCA will ensue in 
Chapter 5 of this dissertation.  
It is uncertain why there is a difference between the Chapter 2 and 4 in this regard. 
Chapter 2 requires personal commission of the requisite predicate acts. This is not the 
case under Chapter 4 as members may personally or collectively engage in the pattern 
to constitute such a pattern. This harks back, once again, to the common purpose 
doctrine where personal guilt (in the full sense) is not required to secure a conviction 
and guilt by association (or more specifically imputation) would suffice.  
4 5 1 1 5 Active participation or gang membership 
This requirement only appears later in section 9(1)(a)-(c) but will be discussed here 
for purposes of convenience. An accused may only be criminally liable in terms of 
these subsections when he or she is a gang member or is an active participant in a 
gang.  
POCA, just like its Californian counterpart, STEP, does not contain a definition of 
the term or concept “gang membership”. The closest is section 11 which provides 
courts with factors to assist in the interpretation of a criminal gang.  
                                            
660 This is also the situation under STEP. See for example Gardeley 624-625. 
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There are certain requirements that have to be satisfied for a gang member to be 
considered an active participant under STEP. A court must be satisfied that an 
accused was more than a nominal member of the gang.661 The accused must, 
secondly, have knowledge of the gang’s present or past participation in a pattern of 
criminal gang activity. The accused must then finally have had the requisite intent by 
furthering, promoting or assisting in the felonious conduct of the gang.662  
The interpretation of the concepts of membership and active participation have 
proven to be a contentious matter in STEP case law and has been subjected to several 
constitutional challenges.663 The authoritative position, for almost a decade, under 
People v. Green (“Green”),664 was that “member” or “membership” required a criminal 
association that was not merely superficial and thus “(…) not accidental, artificial or 
unconsciously in appearance only”.665 It was also found that the terms membership 
and “active participation” had the same meaning and that the latter required conduct 
that was not merely “nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical” and that the 
defendant must devote all or a substantial part of his or her time to the gang’s 
activities.666 The Californian Legislature was however not in favour of this 
interpretation and inserted a subsection overruling this interpretation.667 The California 
Supreme Court then subsequently also held that active participation required conduct 
that is “more than nominal or passive” and thus creating a wider criminal net as per 
Green.668  
                                            
661 People v. Castenada 23 Cal.4th 743 (2000); People v. Lamas 42 Cal. 4th 516 (2007) at 524. 
662 Lamas at 524. 
663 See Chapter 5 below for a discussion on the constitutional challenges.  
664 278 Cal.Rptr. 140 (1991).  
665 Green 145. 
666 Green 146. 
667 Section 186.22(i) states that:  
In order to secure a conviction or sustain a juvenile petition, pursuant to subdivision (a) it is not 
necessary for the prosecution to prove that the person devotes all, or a substantial part, of his 
or her time or efforts to the criminal street gang, nor is it necessary to prove that the person is 
a member of the criminal street gang. Active participation in the criminal street gang is all that 
is required. 
Also see A Schloenhardt Palermo on the Pacific Rim: Organised Crime Offences in The Asia Pacific 
Region (2009) 256. 
668 Castenada 745-753.  
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It is alarming that these decisions and legislative history were available to the 
legislature during the drafting of POCA, yet no attempt was made to insert a similar or 
equivalent provision as the Californian legislature or merely define this concept in any 
form.  
What is required under the POCA scheme, is that the gang (either by individual 
members or collectively) commit more than one offence to give rise to the pattern.669 
This appears to be an imputation of conduct which is, once again, reminiscent of the 
common purpose doctrine.  
4 5 1 2  A “pattern of criminal gang activity”  
A pattern of criminal gang activity   
includes the commission of two or more criminal offences referred to in Schedule 1: 
Provided that at least one of those offences occurred after the date of commencement 
of Chapter 4 and the last of those offences occurred within three years after a prior 
offence and the offences were committed  
(a) on separate occasions;  
                                            
669 See S v Eyssen (unreported case, no CC31/06, CPD) (“Eyssen I”). Veldhuizen J found that it will 
suffice for the State to show that (...) two or more criminal offences have been committed by the gang 
no matter that any one member may only have committed one crime.” Kruger submits that it is not 
necessary for State to prove that the accused had committed two or more predicate acts due to the 
directory wording of the definition – see Kruger Organised Crime (2013) 72. This statement is 
contentious. It must firstly be agreed that definition is directory in nature. The issue is not necessarily 
whether an individual accused has committed these predicate offences but whether the criminal gang 
(as a whole) has. Burchell states that Kruger “missed the point” with the interpretation of this part of the 
statute – see JM Burchell “Organised crime and proceeds of crime law in South Africa” (2010) 23 South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 177 179. The former author also points out that the commission of a 
single offence (in the absence of other offences by either an individual gang member or the criminal 
gang as a whole) would be contradictory to the word “pattern”. Burchell’s comments are in relation to 
Kruger’s first edition of this publication (A Kruger Organised crime and Proceeds of Crime Law in South 
Africa (2008)). In the original version Kruger relied on the Eyssen I judgement as authority for his 
interpretation (at 56). In the second edition, however, there is no reference to Eyssen I as authority for 
this view but merely reference to the directory nature. Kruger’s original interpretation might have been 
based on a slight misreading of the judgement but is not incorrect. A strict adherence to the directory 
nature will indeed lend itself to absurdities such as not requiring more than one predicate act to 
constitute the requisite pattern. It is however unfathomable that court would come to such a conclusion.  
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(b) on the same occasion, by two or more persons who are members of, or 
belong to, the same criminal gang [.]670 
This definition in section 1 once again utilises the word “includes” at the beginning 
of the definition, indicating a definition of a directory nature. Binns-Ward J in S v 
Jordaan and Others WCC 16-11-2017 case no CC20/2017 (“Jordaan”) admitted to 
being uncertain about the application of this definition (both as a definition and further 
use of the term in the text of section 9(2)(a)) and whether courts were to follow the 
comprehensive statutory definition or “whether it also bore the meaning denoted by 
the words making it up used in their ordinary sense.”671 The learned judge however 
did not make a pronouncement on this issue but does seem to accept  a “pattern of 
criminal gang activity” in the ordinary sense of the word as a legitimate option.672  
 Circumventing some of the essential elements in this definition (due to the directory 
nature) will however lead to some absurdities. Satisfying the pattern requirement with 
only one criminal act, for example, would “defy the ordinary meaning of the word 
'pattern'”.673 The SCA in S v Eyssen II also affirmed this by referring to the inherent 
plural and repetitive nature of the term “pattern”.674 
POCA creates several deviations from the traditional rules of the law of evidence 
and will also be discussed in detail below in Chapter 5. Two distinct technical or 
procedural issues were raised in S v de Vries and Others (“de Vries”)675 in relation to 
the racketeering offences in terms of Chapter 2 of POCA. Section 2(2), specifically, 
enables the State to adduce evidence that would have been otherwise inadmissible, 
on the condition that that evidence does not render the trial unfair. The appellant 
contented by hearing the substantive offences in Chapter 2 in conjunction with the 
underlying predicate offences, on the same charge sheet, renders an accused’s trial 
unfair. The SCA considered this to be an academic enquiry due to the appellant’s legal 
team not putting a substantive argument forward as to exactly how, in that specific 
case, it rendered the trial unfair. Leach JA held that this conceptual separation occurs 
                                            
670 Own emphasis.  
671 Jordaan para 136. The learned judge also referred to a prior judgement of his (S v Peters and 
Another WCC 04-11-2013 case no SS17/2013) discussing this particular point. 
672 See Jordaan para 136 and 4 5 2 4 below 
673 Burchell (2010) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 179. 
674 See Eyssen II paras 8-9.  
675 2012 (1) SCR 186 (SCA).  
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daily and suggested that “trained judicial mind[s]” are sufficiently equipped to deal with 
such problems not only in the current type of scenario but similar instances (such as 
trials-within-trials) as well.676 
Leach JA similarly rejected the argument that racketeering offences under POCA 
constituted an improper splitting of charges and/or duplication of convictions. It was 
further held that these provisions do not give rise to the pleas of either autrefois acquit 
or autrefois convict.  
The plea677 of autrefois acquit in South African law can be raised when a competent 
court has previously acquitted an accused of the same crime of which he is currently 
charged.678 Similarly, the plea679 of autrefois convict may be raised when an accused 
has already been convicted of the current charge.680 These pleadings have also been 
enshrined in the Constitution.681 The duplication of convictions occurs when multiple 
punishments are imposed on an accused for the same criminal conduct.682 It was 
                                            
676 See Eyssen II paras 50-53. 
677 In terms of section 106(1)(d) of the Criminal Procedure Act.  
678 JP Swanepoel “Arraignment and plea of an accused” in JJ Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure 
Handbook 12 ed (2017) 271 299-306. Also see A Kruger Hiemstra’s Criminal Procedure (2016) 15-13. 
679 In terms of section 106(1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
680 Joubert et al Handbook 299-306.  
681 In terms of section 35(3)(m).  
682 See de Vries para 44. The SCA dealt with this matter again in Prinsloo. For purposes of this 
discussion, emphasis shall only be placed on the question whether convicting Accused 1 in Prinsloo on 
both sections 2(1)(e) and 2(1)(f) of POCA constituted a duplication of convictions (see paras 55-60 and 
Brand JA’s separate dissenting judgement at paras 395-399). The majority judgement by Fourie and 
Eksteen AJJA does not analyse whether this constitutes a duplication of conviction (or splitting of 
charges) but rather addresses the contention by Accused 1 that someone who participates in a 
racketeering scheme (section 2(1)(e)) cannot also be held liable as managing said scheme (section 
2(1)(f)). The majority found that this is in fact possible and refers to its previous judgement in de Vries 
(although the Court incorrectly refers to the a quo judgement in S v de Vries and Others case no 67/2005 
(20 April 2006)) and states that a liberal construction of POCA should be followed, especially in 
reference to the vexed subsections. This would then also be in line with the intention of the Legislature 
to curb organised crime. A finding to the contrary, it was submitted, would lead to absurdities. Brand 
JA, on the other hand, found that this was an improper duplication of convictions. The learned judge 
relies on the dictum in R v Van der Merwe 1921 TPD 1, where it was held that  
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consequently held, based on RICO jurisprudence683 that the so-called “umbrella” or 
POCA offence constitutes a separate and distinct crime from the underlying predicate 
offence and that neither of the three pleas or defences cannot be raised to shield an 
accused from prosecution.684 Relying on the Court’s previous judgment in S v Dos 
Santos and Another (“Dos Santos”),685 the SCA acknowledged that there will often be 
an overlap in evidence in POCA cases but this does not result in a duplication of 
convictions or splitting of charges.686  
This issue was also disposed with by Californian courts, based on alleged violations 
of the rule against double jeopardy. Courts have found that underlying predicate 
crimes had “a separate intent and objective”687 and, with reference to mens rea, that 
an accused has “two independent, even if simultaneous, objectives”.688 
The Court in Thomas dealt with the pattern requirement in a pragmatic fashion. The 
State submitted that several of the accused (including Accused 1 to 12, 15, 17 and 19) 
formed part of the 28s gang. There were no submissions, save perhaps in relation to 
Accused 1, that they were members or active participants of that gang. The charges 
against these accused were listed and it was further submitted that those charges 
                                            
(…) if the evidence necessary to prove one criminal act necessarily involves evidence of 
another criminal act, those two are to be considered as one transaction. But if the evidence 
necessary to establish one criminal act is complete without the other criminal act being brought 
in at all then the two are separate crimes [Brand JA’s emphasis]. 
He acknowledges that there might be certain instances (such as the scenario described by the majority 
at para 59) where the manager participated in certain activities of the enterprise but in others not – 
where he or she only had knowledge of said activities. Duplication of convictions however take place 
where “(…) the knowledge proved for purposes of (f) derives from the very participation which founded 
the conviction in (e)” (para 399). This is a convincing argument.  See generally M Basdeo, MG Karels 
& JP Swanepoel “Indictments and charge sheets” in JJ Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 12 
ed (2017) 237 249-254. 
683 Mainly United States v Crosby 305 U.S.App.D.C. 290 (1994). There the Court looked at the 
legislative intent behind RICO and that the legislature promulgated it to create new laws – thus distinct 
from the existing laws – rendering an argument based on double jeopardy (based on the Fifth 
Amendment of the US Constitution) invalid.  
684 See de Vries especially paras 44-48.  
685 2010 (2) SACR 382 (SCA).  
686 Dos Santos para 43.  
687 In re Jose P. 106 Cal.App.4th 458 (2003) at 471. Also see 5 3 1 4 1 below. 
688 People v. Herrera 70 Cal.App.4th 1456 (1999) at 1466. Also see 5 3 1 4 1 below.  
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(specifically charges 6 to 167) constituted the requisite pattern of criminal gang 
activity.689 The Court never pertinently analysed whether the offences constituted a 
pattern as required in the definition in section 1 of POCA. Constituting a pattern was 
however not problematic. The number of charged offences was so vast, it easily 
constituted the requisite pattern.690 The problem lies with the approach by the court. 
Another court could interpret this approach to mean that the mere presence of a large 
number of charged offences would ipso facto constitute a pattern of criminal gang 
activity when those offences do not qualify as such under either subsections (a) or (b). 
In S v Ceaser WCC 29-11-2010 case no SS29/2009 (“Ceaser”) six out of the seven 
accused were charged with a myriad of crimes including a contravention of 
subsections 9(1)(a) and (b) of POCA. The Court held that there was a “strong 
suspicion” that the activities of the relevant accused were gang-related, but, without 
providing reasons why, the State’s evidence failed to prove so beyond a reasonable 
doubt.691 All six of the relevant accused were consequently held to not be guilty of 
subsections (a) and (b). In Jordaan, the Court held that the State successfully adduced 
the requisite pattern (as pointed out above) either in terms of the definition or in a 
nontechnical sense.692 This at least indicates the Court’s cognizance of the definition 
as an essential element to the structure of POCA. 
Nothing prohibits a court from using the common purpose doctrine to establish the 
pattern. Where there is insufficient evidence to establish that the conduct of the 
particular individual accused has made out a pattern, his participation in a joint criminal 
                                            
689 Thomas 14.  
690 This in seems to have been the approach by the SCA in Prinsloo as well. Fourie and Eksteen AJJA 
at para 48 held that  
[t]he first accused also did not seriously dispute the finding of the court a quo that a ‘pattern of 
racketeering activities’ as defined in s 1 of POCA, had taken place in conducting the business 
of the scheme. As will become clear in due course, a multitude of offences referred to in 
Schedule 1 of POCA had been committed by the accused in conducting the scheme through 
its various entities, which offences had occurred prior to and after the commencement of POCA 
and within a ten year period as prescribed by POCA [own emphasis]. 
The SCA however did endeavour somewhat more than the WCC in Thomas in discussing the elements 
of the pattern requirement by referencing the ten-year period and the commencement date of POCA.  
691 Ceaser at 56. 
692 Jordaan para 136. 
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scheme may be utilised. The court in S v Miller and Others WCC 04-09-2017 case no 
SS13/2012 (“Miller”) confirmed this as a possibility in relation to racketeering activity 
under Chapter 2 of POCA. The Court emphasised the importance of first establishing 
the existence of a predicate offence before a finding is made on the substantive 
offences under section 2. Gamble J was alert of this and firstly remarks the following: 
However, we had difficulty in concluding that [Van Rensburg] can be said to have 
committed two predicate offences and we requested the State to address us on the 
point.  Ms Heeramun, in reply, fairly conceded that the State could not point directly 
thereto, but she went on to argue that Van Rensburg’s criminal liability can be inferred 
through the application of the doctrine of common purpose.693 
And in conclusion: 
In my view there can be no principial [sic] objection to applying the doctrine of common 
purpose to establish liability under a predicate offence.   One need only think of the 
type of gang-related activities which are routinely prosecuted under POCA, for 
example, murder, rape and robbery, in which it could hardly be claimed that the 
doctrine of common purpose could not be used to establish the liability of an individual 
gang member in relation to crimes committed by the collective.  The offences to which 
I have just referred are, of course, consequence crimes, but as I have already said 
there can be no objection to apply the doctrine to statutory crimes, committed by such 
a collective.  The court must simply be cautious that it does not circumvent proof of the 
predicate offences and, if it relies on common purpose to do so, that all the elements 
of the doctrine are found to exist.694 
Three points must be noted here. The common purpose doctrine can, firstly, be used 
in conjunction with POCA as an anti-gang measure, as illustrated in Chapter 3 
above,695 and secondly that it may be used in order to prove the requisite pattern as 
described in Miller. Courts must, thirdly, take care in establishing the pattern and not 
be blinded by the volume of (presumed) offences or impression of criminality.  
The elements of the definition of a pattern of criminal gang activity will be discussed 
below.  
                                            
693 Miller para 284. 
694 Miller para 290. 
695 See 3 3 5 above (Interaction between POCA and the common purpose doctrine).  
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4 5 1 2 1 The commission of two or more offences in Schedule 1 
Schedule 1 lists no less than 37 offences. This list forms the list of so-called 
predicate offences that an accused must commit to form the required pattern of 
criminal gang activity. At least two offences must have been committed to form the 
requisite pattern. If a court had to follow a directory interpretation of this definition, then 
this requirement may be ignored and would lead to absurdities and an unconstitutional 
approach.696  
Although this appears to be a closed list of offences, the mere scope of the conduct 
listed would cover, it is submitted, the most common criminal offences by criminal 
gangs and that it would be hard for conduct not to fall within that ambit. Item 33 also 
includes offences with the punishment not exceeding one year imprisonment without 
the option of a fine and Item 34 includes the incitement, attempt or conspiracy to 
commit any of the other offences listed in the Schedule.  
4 5 1 2 2  Offences committed prior and/or after the commencement of  
Chapter 4 and within three years of each other 
POCA requires at least one of the predicate offences to have been committed after 
its commencement date – which was the 21st of January 1999. The similar wording of 
Chapter 2 of the Act was subject to constitutional challenge in Savoi I and Savoi II 
because of alleged retrospective (or ex post facto) functioning.697 This is due to the 
acts prior to the operation of POCA becoming an element to a new crime after the 
commencement date of POCA. The Constitutional Court in Savoi II found that this did 
not constitute retrospective punishment and that POCA still provided sufficient 
forewarning to citizens in order for them to adjust their conduct and avoid punishment. 
A comprehensive review of this aspect of the judgment will follow in Chapter 5 below. 
4 5 1 2 3  Offences committed on separate occasions or on the same  
occasion  
The Act provides for two different scenarios. The acts constituting a pattern of 
criminal gang activity, per subsection (a), may firstly be perpetrated on separate 
occasions. The second scenario is where the acts occur on the same occasion (in 
                                            
696 See Chapter 5 3 2 2 below.  
697 See Chapter 5 3 1 3 3 especially for a comprehensive discussion on the constitutional challenge.  
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other words, several criminal acts may be perpetrated during one criminal endeavour). 
The second scenario has the added proviso that during that same occasion, the acts 
be perpetrated by two or more persons who are members of or “belong”698 to the same 
criminal gang.   
Subsection (b) is reminiscent of the common purpose doctrine. Where criminal acts 
are committed by two or more persons during the same criminal endeavour, all those 
acts committed during that criminal endeavour will qualify as predicate crimes, 
provided that the parties to the criminal endeavour are members of or belong to the 
same criminal gang. There would thus be a de facto imputation of liability to satisfy the 
pattern requirement. The following scenario serves as an example. A and B walk down 
the street. C and D (who are both members of the Cool Cats gang) decide to rob them. 
C robs A of her cellphone and D assaults B (who is trying to protect A). Both C’s and 
D’s crimes could be used as predicate crimes to form the requisite pattern. For 
purposes of a prosecution under Chapter 4 of POCA, it will be as if A and B both 
committed robbery and assault. This is however not the situation under the 
comparable racketeering offence because that definition requires the predicate crimes 
to be “planned, ongoing, continuous or repeated participation or involvement” and not 
merely a single, sporadic instance.699  The broader wording with respect to the gang-
related offences casts a potentially much wider net of criminalisation.  
It is unfortunately not clear what subsection (a) specifically requires. POCA simply 
states that the acts may be committed on separate occasions. There is no indication 
as to whether it can be effectuated by one person on separate occasions or may (or 
even must) also be done by multiple gang members on separate occasions. 
Uncertainty also exists whether individual parties contributing to the pattern on 
separate occasions must be of the same gang. Could a single member (Mr A) of the 
26 gang contribute to a pattern of criminal gang activity of the 28 gang and could Mr 
A’s offences then be used against members of the 28s? The Court in Thomas 
accepted that Accused 16 contributed to the criminal enterprise of the 28s gang 
despite him being a member of different gang, the 26s, and he was convicted under 
                                            
698 POCA never defines the term “belong” anywhere in the Act. In fact, it is never used again. This may 
be another example of “careless drafting” but it nonetheless frustrates a meaningful interpretation of the 
text of the Act.  
699 See Kruger Organised Crime 25. Also see Thomas at 460. In Eyssen II at paras 8-9 the SCA 
emphasised the repeated nature required to form the pattern.  
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Chapter 2 of POCA.700 The gang membership of Accused 16 was not mentioned in 
the context of Chapter 4 where membership is much more relevant. 
Subsection (b) quite pertinently points out that the criminal acts must be carried out 
by two or more persons belonging to, or who are members of, the same criminal gang. 
The most logical conclusion would be that more than one person may contribute to the 
pattern if the acts are committed on separate occasions under subsection (a). Since 
POCA is attempting to prohibit gang activity, it is difficult to imagine that the Legislature 
meant that only one person at a time may commit a crime on separate occasions.  
A proper construction of subsections (a) and (b) is also absent in Thomas. The 
approach by the State was to enumerate the charged offences of the individual 
accused and then, by proof of those offences, a pattern would be constituted.701 
Although this is not an incorrect approach in itself, the Court failed to interact with the 
individual requirements under subsections (a) and (b). Charge 147, for example, 
stated Accused 1, 16 and 19, inter alia, conspired to commit murder.702 No mention is 
made here that Accused 16 was a member of a different gang, the 26s.703 If only two 
persons, say Accused 16 and 19, had participated in this murder conspiracy, it would 
not have qualified as a predicate offence which could contribute the pattern because 
Accused 16 and 19, participating in a crime on the same occasion, were not members 
of the same gang. 
US case law however indicates that it is not necessary for there to be both proof of 
a commission of offences on different occasions as well as that it be effectuated by 
different persons, but the prosecution may do so.704 In other words, the predicate 
offence of a single person may be used to satisfy a pattern of criminal gang activities 
of another when the crimes are committed on different occasions.705 Such an 
approach, if it were to be followed in South Africa, basically renders the distinction 
superfluous because under either subsection (a) or (b), the crime(s) would be able to 
be imputed to any other person who is a member of or active participant in the gang if 
he or she is charged with a Chapter 4 offence. This would seem to be the approach in 
                                            
700 Thomas at 481.  
701 The judgement in Thomas is indicative. See 4 5 1 2 above. 
702 Thomas at 128. 
703 See Thomas at 481. 
704 People v. Loeun 947 P.2d 1313 (1997) at 1317. Also see People v. Tran 51 C.4th 1040 (2011). 
705 See Fellows v. Dexter 551 F.Supp.2d 969.  
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any case under the Thomas judgmentjudgment. As already pointed out, no effort is 
made to truly interact with the requirements for a pattern of criminal gang activity. 
There was also, naturally, no attempt made in determining whether each act fell under 
subsection (a) or (b). All that seems to be required, is that the offence was committed 
by a gang member or an active participant in the gang.  
An alternative view (and simple answer) to this issue may be that the distinction is 
that the Legislature merely intended to show that the predicate offences could be 
effectuated either on separate occasions or on the same occasion and that there was 
no intention to distinguish these two subsections by adding further requirements under 
subsection (b). The counterpoint to that would be that by enumerating subsections (a) 
and (b) is verbose and unnecessary and could have been worded more simply. The 
second counterpoint pertains to the Afrikaans text of POCA. The Afrikaans text makes 
use of the word “of” (which means “or” in English). Despite the Afrikaans text not being 
the signed text, it does seem to indicate that these are clear and separate 
manifestations. The final counterpoint points towards the formatting of the definition. 
Subsection (5) of the definition of unlawful activity in POCA reads as follows: 
Nothing in this Act or in any other law, shall be construed so as to exclude the 
application of any provision of Chapter 5 or 6 on account of the fact that  
(a) any offence or unlawful activity concerned occurred; or 
(b) any proceeds of unlawful activities were derived, received or retained, 
before the commencement of this Act. 
The phrase “before the commencement of this Act” is clearly formatted in such a way 
to indicate that it pertains to both subsections (a) and (b) and not just the latter. This 
is not the case with the definition of a pattern of criminal gang activity.  
Determining whether subsections (a) and (b) are alternatives with different 
requirements is not merely a semantic exercise. Concluding that subsection (b) has 
separate or additional requirements, leads to the further conclusion that subsection (a) 
does not demand these requirements. Therefore, certain important inferences may be 
made based on this. Firstly, anyone may contribute to a specific gang pattern of 
criminal gang activities if it is done on separate occasions – thus – alone and without 
the assistance of gang members. In other words, members of the general public or 
fringe gang members may contribute to the pattern. Secondly, two or more persons 
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are not required to act on separate occasions. One person, individually, may also 
contribute to the pattern.  
4 5 2  The substantive offences in section 9 
Several gang-related offences are created in section 9 of POCA.  
(1) Any person who actively participates in or is a member of a criminal gang and who  
(a) wilfully aids and abets any criminal activity committed for the benefit of, at 
the direction of, or in association with any criminal gang;  
(b) threatens to commit, bring about or perform any act of violence or any 
criminal activity by a criminal gang or with the assistance of a criminal gang; or  
(c) threatens any specific person or persons in general, with retaliation in any 
manner or by any means whatsoever, in response to any act or alleged act of 
violence,  
shall be guilty of an offence.  
(2) Any person who 
(a) performs any act which is aimed at causing, bringing about, promoting or 
contributing towards a pattern of criminal gang activity; 
(b) incites, instigates, commands, aids, advises, encourages or procures any 
other person to commit, bring about, perform or participate in a pattern of 
criminal gang activity; or 
(c) intentionally causes, encourages, recruits, incites, instigates, commands, 
aids or advises another person to join a criminal gang, 
shall be guilty of an offence. 
Each of these crimes will be constructed below with reference to the objective (actus 
reus) and subjective elements (mens rea). 
4 5 2 1 Section 9(1)(a): aiding and abetting a criminal gang 
The core elements of this crime are:  
(i) intentionally; 
(ii) providing assistance;  
(iii) by acting in association; or at the direction of; or by benefitting a criminal 
gang; 
(iv) through a criminal activity and 
(v) gang membership or active participation in a criminal gang 
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4 5 2 1 1 The crime in general 
The crime contemplated in this section, at first glance, seems to require some act 
of assistance amounting to accomplice liability.  This alludes to the commission of 
some “criminal activity” by someone other than the accused. Accessorial liability arises 
when someone provides some form of intentional assistance or furtherance of a crime. 
His or her contribution does not satisfy the definitional requirements of the crime and 
is thus not a co-perpetrator but does further or assist the crime in some fashion.706 It 
does however appear that such a strict interpretation of the subsection is not followed 
in practice.707 The Court in Thomas relied on a myriad of offences which did not 
constitute accessorial liability and mainly included charges of murder which satisfied 
the conduct element. Any criminal activity which furthers gang-related matters seems 
to constitute “aiding and abetting” in terms of this subsection.  
In Jordaan, Binns-Ward J considered the meaning of “aids and abets” under this 
subsection and held that “[t]he expression (…) means to assist in or facilitate the doing 
of something or to give counsel or encouragement in respect of its doing”.708 Binns-
Ward J also refers to the Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases709 which states that  
[i]f a person assists in or facilitates the commission of a crime, if he gives counsel or 
encouragement, if, in short, there is any co-operation between him and the criminal, 
then he “aids” the latter to commit the crime (…)710 
The Court therefore, correctly, comes to the conclusion that a principal actor cannot 
be held responsible under this provision – only those who are not the principals to a 
crime can be said to “aid and abet” in a crime.711 Such a person facilitates the 
commission of a crime but does not personally satisfy the definitional elements of a 
                                            
706 S v Williams en 'n Ander 1980 (1) SA 60 (A). See Kemp et al Criminal Law (2015) 273-275. Also see 
Burchell Principles 505-512 where the author highlights the theoretical and practical complexities 
relating to accomplice liability. 
707 See S v Thomas 2015 JDR 1932 (WCC).  
708 Jordaan at 134. 
709 RD Claassen Legal Words and Phrases (1997).  
710 Jordaan para 134; see Claassen Legal Words and Phrases s.v. “Aid and abet” where the judgement 
of R v Van Niekerk 1944 EDL 202 is referred to under this definition.   
711 Jordaan para 134. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 160 
 
crime and his or her contribution is therefore accessorial in nature.712 A person 
charged with the offence can therefore never be the principal perpetrator. He or she, 
for example, can never be the murderer or the assaulter (either personally or through 
the common purpose doctrine).  
 Section 9(1)(a) does not require the crime that the accused is assisting in to be one 
of the listed crimes in Schedule 1 of POCA. There is only mention of aiding and 
abetting “any criminal activity” which means that the accused can assist in any 
statutory or common law crime to satisfy this requirement. Snyman puts forward 
certain examples of how this might manifest, including where the accused acts as 
accountant or messenger for the criminal gang or makes his house available for the 
gang to use for a meeting.713 Criminal activity implies unlawful or illegal activity. The 
examples the author provides, although not patently unlawful or illegal, are linked to 
underlying criminal activities. Where someone acts as the accountant for the criminal 
gang, he may be facilitating money laundering or racketeering. If the person provides 
his house for a meeting, that meeting may be used to conspire about future criminal 
endeavours and where the members of the criminal gang are incited to commit these 
criminal endeavours. The same holds for when the accused acts as a messenger. He 
or she might be acting as the messenger for the communication of an instruction to 
commit murder.  
Merely assisting in a noncriminal fashion will not constitute a contravention of the 
offence if one additionally considers the requisite form of intention. The accused must 
wilfully benefit; act at the direction of or in association with the criminal gang in any 
criminal activity. The accused must thus know he or she is committing an offence while 
aiding and abetting (for example murder). 
In Jordaan, it was found that the State failed to prove that the four relevant accused 
had aided and abetted in the commission of the offences. The Court in particular 
pointed out that the mere presence of the accused at murder scene is insufficient to 
“constitute assistance, facilitation or co-operation”.714  
                                            
712 See Chapter 1 1 above; Kemp et al 247; see also DC van der Linde ŉ Patroon van kriminele bende-
aktiwiteite: Die oplossing tot Suid Afrika se bendemisdaad of ŉ wit olifant? ŉ Kritiese, regsvergelykende 
en konstitusionele studie van Hoofstuk 4 van die Wet op die Voorkoming van Georganiseerde Misdaad 
121 van 1998 LLM dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2015) 21.  
713 Snyman (1999) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 218.  
714 Jordaan para 134. 
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STEP, by comparison, is not as broadly worded as the aiding and abetting provision 
under POCA. The related provision requires that the person promoting, furthering or 
assisting in any criminal conduct to be convicted “of that felony”715 and thus requires 
the act of assistance to amount to a crime of a more serious nature.716 Examples from 
STEP case law shows similar instances of where the subsection will be contravened 
and includes the sale of illicit drugs for the gang’s benefit717 or assisting in an 
attempted robbery.718 
4 5 2 1 2 Benefit, association or direction/instruction 
Gang members or active participants in a gang will contravene this subsection when 
they aid and abet in criminal activity which is either for the benefit of the gang; at the 
direction of that gang or in association with that gang. The disjunctive “or” between the 
last two terms seems to indicate three alternative ways to contravene the subsection 
and are not required to be all present in one factual scenario. It is difficult to envisage 
scenarios where aiding and abetting a gang, either at the direction or in association 
with a gang, would not also benefit that gang. The only scenario where the benefit 
alternate will come into play, is where a gang member or active participant in a gang 
acts alone. Where a gang member acts alone (thus not at the direction or in 
association with a gang), his or her assistance must benefit the gang. When a gang 
member acts alone in a criminal endeavour, which does not benefit the gang, that 
action cannot be construed as aiding and abetting a criminal gang.   
Aiding and abetting a criminal gang which is not at the direction of, in association 
with or for the benefit of the gang, cannot be construed as a contravention of section 
9(1)(a). This was in fact the case in Thomas where Accused number 6 was acquitted 
of the charge of contravening section 9(1)(a) due to a murder being carried out based 
on a personal vendetta between the deceased and the accused.719 He was thus not 
aiding and abetting the gang. The murder of future witnesses in a criminal trial against 
                                            
715 Own emphasis.  
716 § 186.22(b)(1). 
717 See People v. Ferraez 112 C.A.4th 925 (2003); BE Witkin, NL Epstein & members of the Witkin 
Legal Institute Witkin California Criminal Law 4 ed para 37. 
718 See People v. Rodriguez 55 C.4th 1125 (2012); BE Witkin, NL Epstein & members of the Witkin 
Legal Institute Witkin California Criminal Law 4 ed para 37. 
719 See Thomas at 525. 
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gang members;720 the murder of competition in the drug trade,721 as well as the murder 
of members from a rival gang722 were all found to contravene the subsection. Fortuin 
J did not elaborate much as to which alternate each of these contravened but in those 
scenarios they could easily fall under any of the alternatives. These examples however 
do have a common theme: competition. As with any other business, a gang functions 
to make profit, eliminate the competition and strive towards having a monopoly in the 
market.723    
4 5 2 1 3 Intention  
Section 9(1)(a), as mentioned above, makes use of the word “wilfully” at the 
beginning of the definition. The use of this word indicates some form of dolus 
(including, possibly, dolus eventualis). Burchell submits that the use of “wilfully” could 
point to dolus directus as the requisite form of intent.724 An accused would have to 
direct his mind at achieving two things. He must firstly aim to aid and abet in a criminal 
gang. Secondly, this wilful act of aiding and abetting must be directed at benefiting the 
criminal gang; directed at associating with the gang or acting wilfully at their direction.  
Burchell’s construction is preferred and would necessarily exclude instances of 
personal vendettas satisfying the definitional requirements, for example where an 
accused foresees a possibility that the murder of his personal nemesis would benefit 
his gang. In that scenario the mind of the accused was not directly aimed at benefitting 
the gang. If Burchell’s construction is not followed, then a court could easily infer that 
the accused possessed dolus eventualis during the commission of the crime and 
foresaw the possibility that the murder could benefit the gang. The benefit alternate, 
as mentioned above, would mostly come into play if the accused neither acted at the 
                                            
720 See for example Thomas at 525-526. This appears to be the Court’s inference from the evidence. 
This inference is however not properly formulated or elucidated. The Court reasoned that the deceased 
was murdered on instruction from someone within the gang and that the accused parties carried out 
this instruction due to his membership. It is mentioned by one of the accused parties that he had no 
motive to kill the particular deceased, but the Court refers to the fact that two other victims were 
murdered in order to prevent them from testifying against gang members and thus suggesting that this 
particular deceased was killed based on the same motive.  
721 Thomas at 526 with regards to Accused number 9. 
722 Thomas at 526 with regards to Accused numbers 10, 11, 13 and 14. 
723 See further Pinnock Gang Town 96 and 2 2-2 3; 4 5 2 3 above. 
724 Burchell Principles 910. 
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direction of, nor in association with, a criminal gang. If the possible benefit only 
becomes patent after the commission of the crime, then the benefit requirement would 
also not be satisfied. This would not even constitute dolus eventualis and is merely an 
incidental or collateral benefit. For example: a gang member, Z, aids in the murder of 
Y (with non-gang members) because Y had an affair with Z’s wife. It later turns out 
that Y was going to testify against Z and his fellow gang members. This factual 
scenario should not satisfy the elements under this particular subsection725 because 
Z was not wilfully aiding and abetting, or benefitting the criminal gang but his will was 
aimed at a personal benefit.   
The sentence enhancement of STEP refers to “(…) specific intent to promote, 
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members (…)”726 which is 
semantically identical to the POCA text. The “specific intent” requirement under STEP 
is congruent with Burchell’s submission of dolus directus and then further bolsters 
such an interpretation. This sentence enhancement will be discussed in greater detail 
below.727  
4 5 2 2 Section 9(1)(b): Threatens to commit, bring about or perform any  
act of violence or any criminal activity   
The core elements of this crime are:  
(i) intentionally and unlawfully;  
(ii) threatening violence or criminal activity;  
(iii) gang membership or active participation in a gang 
4 5 2 2 1 The crime in general 
The scope of this crime seems to be substantially similar to the common law crime 
of assault as well as offences under the Intimidation Act 72 of 1982 (“the Intimidation 
Act”).728 It is useful to analyse common law assault and the offences under the 
Intimidation Act in order to construct the corresponding offence under POCA. 
                                            
725 It will also not satisfy the requirement that the crime be committed in association or at the direction 
of a criminal gang.  
726 § 186.22(b)(1).  
727 See 4 5 3 as well as 5 4 below.  
728 See Snyman (1999) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 219.  
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Subsection 9(1)(b) of POCA specifically makes reference to threats of violence and 
not actual or completed acts of violence. Kemp et al defines common law assault (or 
“common assault”) as  
the unlawful and intentional application of force to the complainant, or inspiring the 
belief of imminent use of force against the complainant.729 
The wrongful application of force or the threat thereof were both considered as iniuriae 
under Roman-Dutch law.730 The South African law relating to assault has however 
primarily been influenced by English law which differentiated between the distinct 
crimes of battery and assault. While the crime of battery aimed to prevent retaliation 
of a physically harmed person by providing the victim with compensation, the crime of 
assault aimed to protect the dignity of the victim by compensating inflictions of harm 
on the victim’s psychological well-being. Thus, by inspiring the subjective belief in the 
victim that he might suffer physical harm, it will be enough to constitute this harm 
without the infliction of actual physical harm.731  South African law amalgamated the 
English concepts of assault and battery into the single concept of assault.732 The 
Legislature also adopted this position in section 152 of the Transkei Penal Code of 
1886.733 
4 5 2 2 2  Interpretation of section 9(1)(b) through the common law 
The offence under POCA overlaps specifically with the second part of the definition 
of common assault: the inspiration of the belief of force. A court must assess the three 
additional requirements (over and above unlawfulness and intention) for an assault 
                                            
729 Kemp et al Criminal Law (2015) 308. Also see Burchell Principles 591. 
730 Digesta 47.10.15.1 as well as Voet 41.10.7. Also see R v Jolly and Other Appellants (1923) AD 176 
at 179. 
731 Burchell Principles 592. 
732 Burchell Principles 592-593. See for instance Jolly at 179 where the Appellate Division pointed 
towards the amalgamation of concepts in legal practice and accordingly accepted it as the law. 
733 Section 152 stated that: 
An assault is the act of intentionally applying force to the person of another, directly or indirectly, 
or attempting or threatening, by any act or gesture to apply such force to the person of another, 
if the person making the threat has or causes the other to believe on reasonable grounds that 
he has the present ability to effect his purpose. 
See also Burchell Principles 578. 
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without physical impact through an objective lens.734 There must firstly be a threat 
imminent or immediate harm; it must secondly be reasonable for the victim to believe 
this threat and lastly that the accused is capable of carrying out this threat.735  
There is no mention of actual or realised violence and such conduct should fall 
within the scope of sections 9(1)(a) and 9(2)(a). Under common law, an accused in an 
assault case merely has to create the subjective belief in the mind of the accuser that 
there will be some use of force against him or her. This belief can be evoked not only 
through the conduct by the accused, but also words and gestures.736 This subjective 
belief of the threat does not necessarily mean that the victim must experience fear due 
to such a threat. That is irrelevant to the court’s consideration.737 He or she must 
merely believe that the conduct of the accused will cause bodily contact with the 
victim.738 If the victim however does not experience this subjective belief of immediate 
harm, then the conduct of the accused would not constitute an assault, even if that 
was his direct intention.739 
The requirement of imminent harm will only be satisfied when the threat is present 
and not a future or conditional threat of assault.740 In Thomas, however, it was 
accepted that a future/conditional threat of non-imminent/remote harm constituted the 
relevant crime in terms of section 9(1)(b). The murder of Strydom, a State witness, by 
Accused 4 and 5, constituted a future threat of murder towards other potential 
witnesses against the gang.741 This conclusion seems to be a stretch of the clear 
statutory language, considering that there was no direct communication towards the 
other potential witnesses or evidence that the other witnesses subjectively 
experienced this murder as a threat directed towards them. There was only evidence 
                                            
734 Kemp et al Criminal Law 310. 
735 R v Sibanyone (1940) JS 40 (T). These requirements were approvingly referred to in S v Miya and 
Others (1966) 4 SA 287 at 289. Also see Kemp et al Criminal Law 310. 
736 Kemp et al Criminal Law 308. The author points out that it was previously the position under English 
law that criminal liability would only flow from overt acts or gestures, which was based on the decision 
in R v Meade and Belt (1823) 1 Lew CC 184. This traditionally was originally followed by South African 
courts but the law later evolved to also allow for words to constitute an assault.  
737 Kemp et al Criminal Law 310. 
738 Kemp et al Criminal Law 310. 
739 Burchell Principles 593. 
740 See especially Miya 289. 
741 Thomas at 531. 
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that witnesses to Strydom’s own murder were scared.742 At most, the murder of 
Strydom could be considered a future/conditional threat that other State witnesses 
could face the same fate if they became State witnesses. This would also therefore 
constitute future, non-imminent harm. 
Accused number 9, without the Court providing much details, was found guilty of 
contravening section 9(1)(b) through relying on his previous convictions of murder as 
well as carrying out robberies pertaining to threats towards his competition in the drug 
trade.743 The Court however did not illustrate how the accused possessed the requisite 
intention for those murders and robberies to be received or perceived as threats or 
who the victims or class of this specific charge were.  
These threats (by the furthest stretch of the word) are future (as well as 
conditional)744 in nature. The Court furthermore failed to establish a single victim with 
regard to each of these charges – merely that the unlawful actions could be construed 
as threatening to a potential, theoretical or identifiable victim.   Such an interpretation 
of section 9(1)(b) can therefore not be supported.  
Section 9(1)(b) is therefore rendered superfluous if it cannot be stretched beyond 
the traditional understanding of threats of assault or violence through the inspiration 
of fear. This nevertheless does not justify stretching the words of the statute beyond 
its clear statutory meaning and resulting in the absurdity of making threats directed at 
(and experienced by) no one. 
The second requirement of the objective test is the reasonable apprehension of 
harm by the alleged victim. There appears to be two schools of thought with regards 
to the reasonableness of the apprehension. The first school submits that an 
unreasonable apprehension would not constitute an assault.745 The second school 
holds that requiring such an objective evaluation of a vulnerable or anxious individual 
is absurd and that the action by the accused remains reprehensible despite the fact 
                                            
742 Thomas at 531. 
743 Thomas at 533. 
744 Kemp et al point out that there was previously uncertainty and controversy in the law of whether a 
conditional threat can constitute an assault. This dispute was however resolved in Miya. See Kemp et 
al Criminal Law 310-311; also see Burchell Principles 598.   
745 See Kemp et al Criminal Law 311. 
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that the victim’s apprehension was unreasonable.746 The decision in Thomas also 
does not appear to take cognizance of this analogous requirement under the common 
law with regard to threats of assault or violence. There was no mention of the 
apprehension of the alleged victims of the offence. In fact, the specific victims were 
not identified by the State (or the Court) but rather a hypothetical category or class of 
people. From this it does appear as if there is less focus on the victim’s identification 
and more on the unlawful act of making a threat to a potential class of victims. It must 
however be questioned whether something can be construed as a threat if there is no 
direct (and identified) victim to experience it as such.747 There appeared to be no 
evidence before the Court that the alleged intended victims experienced the actions 
of the relevant accused parties as a threat or even that the accused intended for it to 
be a threat. The conclusions reached by the Court appear to be its own speculation. 
It is submitted that merely having an identifiable class of victims is not sufficient. There 
must also be sufficient evidence that this class of victims experienced the relevant 
actions as a threat. The construction of this crime under Thomas seems to imply that 
it is not a consequence crime, as the mere making of the threat without any cognisable 
consequence is sufficient to secure a conviction.  
The last objective requirement is that the accused must have the capability to 
effectuate the assault. There appear to be two legs to this enquiry. The accused must 
firstly have the present capability to carry out the threat. Where an assault is 
impossible to carry out, the conduct is undeserving of criminal sanction. The subjective 
                                            
746 See Burchell Principles 599. Burchell also submits that if someone intentionally induces an 
unreasonable apprehension that this would “clearly” constitute an assault. Also see Kemp et al Criminal 
Law 311.  
747 This paradox is reminiscent of the philosophical question of whether a falling tree can make sound 
when there is no one to perceive the sound. This conundrum was apparently originally posited (albeit a 
slightly different manifestation) by Irish philosopher George Berkley in his book A Treatise Concerning 
the Principles of Human Knowledge. He questions whether trees in a park, books in a closet or chairs 
in a parlour can exist if there when no one is there to perceive them. He seemingly answers this 
conundrum by stating that “[t]he objects of sense exist only when perceived”. Something such as a 
criminal threat must be directed at and perceived by someone. The threats envisaged here do not exist 
independently; in a vacuum where perception or experience of them need not be experienced. See G 
Berkeley & C Porterfield Krauth A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1874) 202; 
214.  
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fear of the victim is not the sole consideration in South African law.748 The fear would 
additionally be unreasonable if it was clear to the victim that the threat could not be 
carried out.749 In addition to having the capability, the second leg of the enquiry, relates 
to the state of mind of the victim and whether he or she believed that the accused was 
going to realise the threat.750 Once again, if courts had to follow the interpretation in 
Thomas, it becomes unnecessary to show a victim’s apprehension of the ability of the 
accused to effectuate the threat. The ability of the accused also becomes somewhat 
of an ex post facto conjecture by the court. The threats in Thomas were separated in 
time and space from the category of alleged future victims. An evaluation (by the 
victims) as to whether the accused would be able to carry out the threat and whether 
the category of victims believed that he was capable, was impossible.  
Reconciling the traditional concept of a criminal threat of violence with the offence 
contained in section 9(1)(b) of POCA, seems impossible. With the limited information 
available from Thomas, it seems that it is sufficient for the State to show that there 
was conduct by the accused which could be construed as a threat towards an 
identifiable class of persons and that threatening conduct can be separated in time 
and space.  If we however consider the overarching reasons for the enactment of 
POCA, namely to supplement the ineffectual common law, then an offence that 
transcends and expands the common law crime of assault becomes legislatively 
understandable (even if it cannot be fully supported here) The interpretation of the 
offence in Thomas has led to seemingly absurd consequences. Such absurdities could 
be avoided if there is some form of evidence to the subjective state of mind of the 
victim.   
The second part of the offence in section 9(1)(b) relates to the threat of “any criminal 
activity”. A strict adherence to the language of the statute would lead to a conclusion 
that a threat of any criminal activity would satisfy the requirement. If A, a gang member, 
were to threaten B, a rival gang member, with extortion by his gang, he could be liable 
under this offence. When A, in association with several gang members, threatens to 
                                            
748 See Kemp et al Criminal Law 311. The author here relies on the English authority of Stephens v 
Meyers (1830) 4 CAR & P 350 where it was held that the accused must at all relevant times have had 
the ability to carry out the relevant threat.  
749 Kemp et al Criminal Law 311. 
750 See Snyman Criminal Law 6 ed (2014) 450; Miya at 277. See also R v Gondo 1970 (2) 306 (R) at 
307. 
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kill B’s dog,751 this too would seemingly be a sufficient threat due to it being a criminal 
activity. The threat must merely be executed by the criminal gang or with the 
assistance of the gang. 
4 5 2 2 3 Interpretation of section 9(1)(b) through the Intimidation Act 72 of  
1982 
There are certain parallels between section 9(1)(b) of POCA and section 1(b)(i) of 
the Intimidation Act. Section 1(b)(i) states that  
(1) Any person who- (…) 
(b) acts or conducts himself in such a manner or utters or publishes such words that it 
has or they have the effect, or that it might reasonably be expected that the natural and 
probable consequences thereof would be, that a person perceiving the act, conduct, 
utterance or publication  
(i) fears for his own safety or the safety of his property or the security of his 
livelihood, or for the safety of any other person or the safety of the property of 
any other person or the security of the livelihood of any other person (…) 
 shall be guilty of an offence (…) 
This offence creates a substantially broad offence especially in terms of the very low 
threshold of intention. Dolus eventualis in its broadest and most liberal manifestation 
is present by proscribing conduct that may have the effect of inducing fear in someone 
who may consequently fear their safety; that of their property or that of another.  
There is once again a subjective inquiry into the victim or a potential victim’s state 
of mind. The accused must have at least foreseen that his or her conduct evoked fear 
in the victim. The commonality between threats of violence under the common law and 
under the Intimidation Act is the evocation of a sense of fear or at very least having 
the intention to evoke such fear. 
Burchell notes that the legislature and the judiciary have refrained from relying on 
this broad form of intention (“natural and probable consequences” of an act) and rather 
opted to proscribe behaviour in terms of dolus eventualis, at least.752 By proscribing 
behaviour based on natural and probable consequences, the accused stands the risk 
to be held liable for consequences he or she did not intend or at least foresee to 
                                            
751 Which is an offence under the Animals Protection Act 71 of 1962.  
752 Burchell Principles 355-356; 593.  
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happen.753 The phrase “natural and probable consequences” is as far-reaching and 
uncertain as the Court’s approach in Thomas. But even this phrase is limited by the 
qualification that there must be “a person perceiving the act, conduct, utterance or 
publication”.754 The scope of this offence under POCA is therefore also not congruent 
with the Intimidation Act. The Intimidation Act further affirms the importance of the 
victim’s subjective appreciation of the threat that is being made.  
Burchell further submits that the type of threats the Intimidation Act is attempting to 
prohibit are, inter alia, threatening witnesses from testifying in court and furthermore 
posits that that type of conduct requires subjective intent.755 Witness intimidation is 
exactly the type of intimidation that the Court in Thomas found Accused numbers 4 
and 5 guilty of. There was however a complete disregard of the subjective states of 
mind of the two accused. There was no evidence as to whether they had intended for 
the murder of the State witness to serve as a threat for other potential witnesses.  
4 5 2 2 4  Intention  
The intention, it appears from the discussion above, differs greatly from criminal 
threats of violence under the common law or the Intimidation Act. There appears to be 
no need for a subjective victim-based approach under this provision if Thomas is taken 
as binding authority.756 The requisite intention is more closely related to that required 
in terms of section 1(b)(i) of the Intimidation Act which provides for a very liberal 
manifestation of dolus eventualis. But as mentioned above, even the Intimidation Act 
requires there to be a victim to appreciate the threat.  
Dolus eventualis thus seems to be a sufficient form of fault. The dolus specifically 
relates to having the intention to bring about an act that could objectively be construed 
as a threat of violence or criminal activity. There is apparently no need for there to be 
an actual victim of these threats; the mere making of the threat is sufficient. Evoking 
an apprehension of harm is therefore not required.757 An accused would therefore not 
                                            
753 Burchell Principles 355-356.  
754 Section 1(b)(i) of the Intimidation Act (own emphasis).  
755 Burchell Principles 593. The author rejects Snyman’s interpretation that negligence would be a 
sufficient form of fault here. See Snyman Criminal Law 6 ed (2014) 457.  
756 In the Western Cape, at least. As of the time of the submission of this dissertation, no other reported 
judgement on Chapter 4 of POCA by another division of High Court could be identified.  
757 See Burchell Principles 599. See also Snyman Criminal Law 452-453. 
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be able to submit to this charge under POCA that the threat was made in jest758 or that 
they were unaware of the fear experienced by the potential victims.759 
It is submitted that the Court’s interpretation in Thomas is incorrect and strains the 
meaning of the statutory text and is incongruent with the established principles of 
criminal threats under the common law and the Intimidation Act. The approach in 
Thomas shows a complete disregard of the state of mind of the accused.  
Courts should at very least enquire as to the intention of the accused – even though 
there is very little guidance in the statutory text – the phrase “threatens to bring about 
or perform” indicates that the accused is in some fashion directing his or her will to 
cause “any act of violence or any criminal activity by a criminal gang or with the 
assistance of a criminal gang”.    
4 5 2 2 5  Policy and constitutional considerations 
The Organised Crime Bill,760 which preceded POCA, had an explicit provision 
prohibiting a contravention of one of the gang-related offences if it was based on 
“speech alone”.761 There was however a three-pronged proviso. Speech alone would 
constitute a gang-related crime (in conjunction with one of the gang-related offences 
in terms of section 42(1)) if the violence was threatened against a specific person; the 
accused had the apparent ability to effectuate the threat and physical harm was likely 
occur. This proviso constituted a codification of the common law requirements for the 
inspiration of the belief of imminent harm.  
                                            
758 See S v Mtimunye 1994 (2) SACR 482 (T) at 458, Botha J held that a serious murder threat which 
is taken as a joke by the victim, does not constitute a crime. Conversely, if a murderous joke is made, 
and that joke is taken seriously by the complainant to the extent that it evokes an apprehension of fear, 
the accused may be liable for assault. Also see Snyman Criminal Law 452.  
759 See Snyman Criminal Law 452.  
760 See discussion above at 4 2.  
761 Section 42(2) stipulated that:  
No person shall be convicted of a contravention of subsection (1) based upon speech alone, 
except where it is shown that the speech itself threatened violence against a specific person, 
that the accused person had the apparent ability to carry out the threat, and that physical harm 
was eminently likely to occur. 
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The inclusion of this clause in the Bill appeared to safeguard otherwise 
constitutionally protected activities, such as the freedom of expression,762 from 
prosecution under POCA.763  
The final text of POCA excluded this clause in favour of section 9(1)(b) and (c) which 
are crimes that can be committed by “speech alone” (albeit a broad interpretation of 
“speech”).764 The exclusion of the provision and its exceptions has led to absurdities. 
The first exception, for example, requiring that the speech be directed to a specific 
person would have prohibited the truly puzzling conclusion by the Court in Thomas. 
This subsection is therefore potentially sweeping in its application. For this reason, the 
wording contained in the Bill is favoured. This approach incorporated the common law 
requirements for the inspiration of the belief of imminent harm and limited potentially 
overbroad (and absurd) interpretations such as in Thomas. 
4 5 2 3 Section 9(1)(c): Threats of retaliation  
The core elements of the crime are: 
(i) intentionally and unlawfully 
(ii) threatening a specified person or persons in general 
(iii) in response to acts or alleged acts of violence; 
(iv) gang membership or active participation  
This offence is merely a subspecies of the previous offence and is reminiscent of 
section 1A of the Intimidation Act.765 The offence is however much more specific in 
nature and specifically targets threats of retaliation. These acts of retaliation must be 
in response to acts of violence or alleged violence. The offence appears to attempt to 
curb violence perpetrated between rival gangs.766 This type of violence is commonly 
associated with conflicts over gang territory over the sale of illicit goods, especially 
                                            
762 In terms of section 14 of the Constitution.  
763 Cowling (1998) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 371.  
764 Cowling also suggested a broad interpretation of speech and refers to the US Supreme Court 
decision in Texas v Johnson 491 US 397 (1989), where the Court found that the burning of the American 
flag constituted speech and was consequently deserved constitutional protection. See Cowling (1998) 
South African Journal of Criminal Justice 372 (and fn 118).  
765 The heading for this section reads “Intimidation of general public, particular section of population or 
inhabitants of particular area”.  
766 See generally I Kinnes “Gangs, drugs and policing in the Cape Flats” (2014) Acta Criminologica 14. 
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drugs but also includes prostitution and robbery.767 It has also been reported that the 
majority of gang violence in the Western Cape is due to conflicts surrounding the 
expansion or control of drug territories held by rival gangs.768 Local communities, 
especially communities in the Western Cape, fall victim to this type of violence which 
is often associated with the use of weapons and loss of life of associated 
bystanders.769 The offence is in theory a laudable move by the legislature, due to 
ongoing violence between gang members which often claims innocent lives.770 
The phrase “in any means or manner whatsoever” creates a substantially broad 
offence which is ripe for prosecutorial abuse or overbroad judicial interpretation. The 
provision does not require the act of retaliation to have a violent or criminal nature, 
despite these acts of retaliation mainly manifesting as acts of violence. This wording 
could lead to absurdities qualifying as acts of retaliation due to noncriminal behaviour 
also qualifying as the requisite acts of retaliation. Would a personal insult, such as 
having an affair with a rival gang member’s wife, be construed as retaliation “in any 
manner or by any means whatsoever”? Reading the statutory text as is, the answer 
could be in the affirmative.  
The requisite intention, just as with the preceding crime described above, is quite 
vague. Dolus eventualis would seem to be sufficient. 
This offence, despite its broad wording, was surprisingly not used in Thomas.   
                                            
767 See, for example, the facts in Ceaser at 5. There was a violent outbreak after apparent faction 
fighting within the Americans gang itself. Also see Thomas 494 where a witness, Shafiek Staggie, 
testified to the fact of gangs operating within certain territories. He submitted that a member of the 28s 
could “request” a certain territory of the 26s. Should such a “request” however be refused, then such 
refusal shall result in death. 
768 South African Police Service Annual Crime Report 2015/2016: Addendum to the SAPS Annual 
Report (2016) 80.  
769 A Standing “The threat of gangs and anti-gangs policy: Policy discussion paper” (2005) Paper 116 
Institute for Security Studies 1 2. 
770 See L Issacs & S Fisher “Weekend Gang Violence Claims 8 Lives in Manenberg” (11-04-16) Eye 
Witness News < http://ewn.co.za/2016/04/11/Weekend-gang-violence-claims-8-lives-in-Manenberg> 
(accessed 10-09-2016) where it was reported that there were “gun battles” and hostage situations 
between four rival gangs in Manenberg. Also see M Mortlock “Gangsterism Must Fall: Residents in 
Gang Violence-Stricken Areas Live in Fear” (07-02-2016) Eye Witness News 
<http://ewn.co.za/2016/02/07/WC-victims-of-gang-violence-speak-out-about-terrifying-daily-routines> 
(accessed 10-09-2016).  
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4 5 2 4 Section 9(2)(a): Bringing about a pattern of criminal gang activity 
The core elements of this crime are:  
(i) intentionally and unlawfully; 
(ii) bringing about a pattern of criminal gang activity 
4 5 2 4 1 The crime in general  
The conduct and intention elements contemplated in section 9(2)(a) are not readily 
susceptible to clear and unambiguous interpretation. Just as with the other offences 
in subsection (2), this subsection does not require the accused to be a member of a 
criminal gang or even an active participant. When someone who is not a member of a 
gang commits several offences that bring about, causes or contributes towards a 
pattern of criminal gang activity, that scenario would fall within the proscribed conduct. 
A “pattern of criminal gang activity” is defined in POCA and has been discussed 
above.771 The same uncertainty as to whether courts should strictly follow the statutory 
definition or “whether it also bore the meaning denoted by the words making it up used 
in their ordinary sense”772 thus also applies here. Binns-Ward J in Jordaan however 
made the following finding in relation of a charge of contravening section 9(2)(a): 
In my judgment the state failed to adduce evidence to prove a relevant ‘pattern of 
criminal gang activity’, whether in the defined sense of the term or the ordinary meaning 
of those words, to which the actions of the accused could be related for the purposes 
of s 9(2)(a).773 
This provides judicial authority that the term “pattern of criminal gang activity” could 
possibly be used not only as defined in section 1 but also in the ordinary or 
nontechnical sense.  
The conduct of the accused must result in a “pattern of criminal gang activity” as 
defined in Chapter 1.  If the statutory definition is followed strictly, then this pattern 
may only consist of two or more offences listed in Schedule 1 of POCA. The accused 
is therefore limited to a fixed, albeit broad, array of crimes in which the conduct of the 
accused may result.  
                                            
771 See 4 5 1 2 above. 
772 Jordaan para 136.  
773 Jordaan para 136. 
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Snyman argues that the ambit of this offence is so broad that it, unlike many of the 
offences in Chapter 4, goes beyond the ambit of existing common law and statutory 
crimes.774 The offence transcends co-perpetration, accessorial or anticipatory liability 
because those forms of liability require the actual commission of an offence.775 It is 
submitted that this interpretation is incorrect. The accused’s conduct must result in a 
“pattern of criminal gang activity”. The definition of this term starts with the phrase 
“includes the commission of two or more criminal offences referred to in Schedule 1 
(…)”. Section 9(2)(a) comes into operation if the accused “performs any act which is 
aimed at causing, bringing about, promoting or contributing towards” such a pattern. 
Although 9(2)(a) uses the term “any act” – such an act will necessarily be accessorial 
in nature as it must bring about, promote or contribute to this pattern which consists of 
criminal offences. 
4 5 2 4 2 Intention  
The objective of the accused is to bring about a pattern of criminal gang activity. 
Whether the pattern does eventually manifest in fact is not of importance because the 
State only has to show that it was the accused’s objective to bring about this pattern. 
This is evident from the words “aimed at causing, bringing about or promoting or 
contributing towards (…)”776 which does not require a materialisation of such a pattern. 
Dolus directus might be the requisite form of intention here. The word “aimed” is used 
at the beginning of the definition, suggesting that the actions of the accused must be 
directly aimed at bringing about the proscribed conduct. As pointed out in Jordaan, 
there has to be “a relevant connection between the acts of the accused and a pattern 
of criminal gang activity.”777 The pattern therefore cannot be brought about 
unknowingly, accidentally or coincidentally. 
A “pattern of criminal gang activity” is a defined legal term. Whether the conduct of 
the accused must be aimed to promote a pattern of criminal gang activity in the legal-
technical sense, is uncertain. When a person encourages a gang member to commit 
an assault, not knowing whether that person would commit a Schedule 1 offence 
                                            
774 See Snyman (1999) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 220-221. 
775 See Snyman (1999) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 220. 
776 Own emphasis.  
777 Jordaan para 135. 
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again, could that act of encouragement qualify in terms of section 9(2)(a)? His or her 
(direct) intention was never to contribute or to further the pattern but only to promote 
the singular criminal offence. The question to this answer is likely to be answered in 
the negative. It is doubted that courts would take such a formalistic view to the 
interpretation of this subsection. The remarks by Binns-Ward J may serve as evidence 
of the willingness by the judiciary to accept the definition in less strict terms. It is 
submitted that courts should follow a stricter approach in applying this section (and 
section 9(2)(b)) as their intention relates to causing a pattern. This section should be 
used against leadership figures in a criminal gang as it is likely their intention to cause 
the requisite pattern. Where there is evidence of the intent to participate in criminal 
plot involving two or more offences in Schedule 1, then that would constitute sufficient 
intent to commit this offence.    
4 5 2 5 Section 9(2)(b): Inducement to contribute to gang activities 
The core elements of this crime are:  
(i) intentionally and unlawfully 
(ii) inducing another 
(iii) to bring about or contribute to a pattern of criminal gang activity. 
This subsection appears to be a subspecies of section 9(b)(a). Section 9(2)(b) 
seems to be targeted at leadership figures within gang structures since it punishes 
certain criminal orders or instructions. These leadership figures are especially difficult 
to prosecute in general due to the fact that they tend to distance themselves from the 
actual perpetration of crimes.778 This section however does not require the person 
performing these acts to be a member of a criminal gang or even be an active 
participant in such a gang. This is paradoxical because these categories of persons 
are most likely to be members of a criminal gang or at the very least active participants. 
Unassociated members of the public are not usually associated with giving instructions 
to gang members but now they are also susceptible to be included within the long 
reach of POCA. A scenario where unassociated members of the public are instructing 
gang members is not impossible, but would in any case be included within the ambit 
of incitement or conspiracy. 
                                            
778 See Standing Cape Flats 51 as well as the foreword to POCA. 
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The offence lists several types of unlawful conduct that cannot be easily categorised 
under one heading. Inciting, commanding and advising are three distinct types of 
conduct. Aiding someone to perform or bring about a pattern of criminal gang activity 
differs greatly from advising them to do the same. The common thread, save for the 
word “aiding”, however, seems to be an act of incitement. As described in Chapter 3 
above, incitement is committed when someone attempts to provoke, procure or 
instigate another to commit an offence.779 Stating “aiding” as an alternate in this 
subsection seems misplaced; it would seem to be a repeat of the conduct proscribed 
in subsections 9(1)(a) and 9(2)(a) and inappropriate to the common theme of 
incitement or inducement.  
Aiding requires active participation in the proposed crime while the other 
alternatives merely require some form of inducement to commit the crime but no actual 
participation.780 It may be easier for the State to secure a conviction under this 
provision by not requiring gang membership or active participation as a prerequisite 
for accountability. The State may face severe difficulties in proving this crime due to a 
potential lack of evidence proving the instructions.  
Accused 1 in Thomas was found guilty under this provision. Fortuin J found that he 
was the leader of the 28s gang during the relevant times based on testimony by 
several witnesses781 and was thus empowered to give orders and subsequently 
ordered his subordinates to execute dozens of acts of criminal gang activities.782 The 
Court also found that there was sufficient evidence identifying Accused 1 as the 
instruction-giver of the relevant offences.783 It was however unnecessary, but not 
incorrect, for the Court to first find that the accused was the leader of the criminal gang. 
The section clearly refers to “[a]ny person” at the beginning of the definition and would 
thus, as mentioned above, include non-gang members. An accused under this section 
also does not have to be in a position of authority over the persons he or she is 
instructing, as held by the Court in Thomas. A gang member, equal or lower in rank to 
another, could just as easily be held responsible for giving orders to his peer. In fact, 
                                            
779 JM Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure vol I 541. 
780 S Hoctor, JRL Milton & MG Cowling South African Criminal Law and Procedure Volume III: Statutory 
Offences (RS 17 2007) B4-51. 
781 See Thomas at 481-483.  
782 See Thomas 521-522. 
783 Thomas at 522. 
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Accused 1, even though he was the leader of the gang, in contrast to the practice of 
other gangs, participated in the execution of crimes on “street level”.784  
4 5 2 6 Section 9(2)(c): Gang recruitment  
The core elements of the crime are: 
(i) intentionally  
(ii) inducing a member of the public to join a criminal gang  
This offence is aimed at punishing gang recruitment. A large gang membership is 
required to expand the criminal network and manifest and expand strongholds in gang 
territories.785 These strongholds are then utilised and expanded for the sale of illicit 
goods, typically drugs such as marijuana (or “dagga”) and mandrax.786 Young 
members of communities often fall victim to gang recruiters. They are lured through 
promises of gifts or drugs as remuneration and also the prospect of gangster wealth.787 
Recently released prisoners may also fall victim to the gang lifestyle by being promised 
a safe haven after a stint in prison. They may have been ostracised from their 
communities and gangs undertake to provide for them upon their release.788 Gang 
leaders then lure them into the gang lifestyle by tasking them with small errands and 
remunerate them with drugs, accommodation and camaraderie.789 Newly recruited 
gang members may be subjected to harsh and violent initiation rituals including the 
murder of members from other gangs, rape or even murder of their own relatives.790 
Initiates in prison gangs may be required to assault a fellow prisoner or guard. If they 
are however punished for the aforementioned crimes, they may not show any sign of 
emotion or expression of pain.791 
We find some authority in international and regional human rights law in the flip-
side of freedom of association, namely the freedom not to be coerced into joining 
groups or associations. Thus, for instance, Article 10(2) of the African Charter on 
                                            
784 Thomas 481-482.  
785 See generally Standing (2005) ISS 2. 
786 Standing (2005) ISS 2. 
787 Standing (2005) ISS 2; Wijnberg Exploration (2012) 37.  
788 Pinnock Gang Town 89. 
789 Pinnock Gang Town 89. 
790 Standing (2005) ISS 2; See Standing Cape Flats 115. 
791 Wijnberg Exploration (2012) 27. 
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Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACHPR”)792  prohibits compelling another to join an 
association.793 Coercing a person to join a criminal gang is therefore also in violation 
of a person’s liberties under international law. It is however important to note that the 
ACHPR does not, unlike our Constitution, provide for a general or broad right to 
freedom of association. Article 10(1) clearly states that an individual has a “(…) right 
to free association provided that he abides by the law”. Members of ostensibly criminal 
organisations could argue that they have protection under Article 10(1) as long as 
those members abide by the law.794 
The fact that gang membership in itself is not a criminal offence but to recruit gang 
members is, seems to be an odd construction. There may be a constitutional rationale 
for this oddity. Gang membership only traverses the line between non-criminal to 
criminal behaviour when it is coupled with the offences listed in section 9. This stance 
is arguably to avoid violations of the right of freedom of association.795 Burchell further 
posits that an offence of mere membership would constitute “the worst excesses of 
guilt by association”, and reminiscent of the decision in S v Nzo.796 So the odd 
construction under POCA s 9(2)(c) seem to have some basis in policy and 
constitutional consideration. But it is not at all clear that the crime under s 9(2)(c) 
makes sense from a criminalisation point of view. 
The underlying rationale is probably that the recruiter (A) is recruiting someone (B) 
to eventually participate in gang-related crimes. The crime may also be viewed from a 
paternalistic point of view as the State has a duty to protect all its inhabitants, even 
those who may be involved in gang activity. Certain recruitment activities, as described 
above, are violent and gruesome in nature.  
                                            
792 (adopted 27 June 1981 entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217. 
793 This forms part of the broader right of freedom of association under article 10(1) of the ACHPR. 
Article 10(2) is however limited by Article 29 which imposes certain duties on individuals. For example: 
Article 29(2) states that an individual may be obliged “[t]o serve his national community by placing his 
physical and intellectual abilities at its service” and Article 29(6) states that an individual must “(…) work 
to the best of his abilities and competence, and to pay taxes imposed by law in the interest of the 
society”.  
794 Freedom of association shall be discussed in more detail in below – see especially 5 4.  
795 In terms of section 18 of the Constitution.  
796 Burchell Principles 909; S v Nzo 1990 (3) SA 1 (A). See Chapter 3 below for a critical discussion on 
Nzo.  
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This recruitment seems to emulate the crime of incitement. The inciter is replaced 
by a gang-recruiter and the incitee is replaced by the potential gang member. As with 
section 9(2)(b), subsection (c) does not require the gang recruiter to be a member of 
a criminal gang him- or herself.  
This is however where the comparisons with incitement stop. The crime of 
incitement requires the inciter to influence the mind of the incitee in order to commit a 
crime. In terms of section 9(2)(c), the inciter is merely inciting gang membership, which 
is not a crime in itself. Whether the potential gang member eventually does join the 
gang and commits gang-related crimes is up to him or her and falls outside of the 
ambit of this offence. It must thus be questioned, when relying on the traditional 
principles of criminal law and specifically incitement, whether someone can be held 
criminally liable for this quasi-incitement to do something which is not illegal. Snyman 
posits that this section constitutes incitement to commit conspiracy.797 
The effectiveness of the provision is also doubted as there would usually be very 
little evidence of encouraging someone to join a gang. There were no convictions 
based on section 9(2)(c) in Thomas.  
4 5 3  Sentencing  
4 5 3 1 Sections 10(1)(a) and (b) of POCA 
The penalties for gang-related offences are set out in section 10 of POCA. A person 
who is found in contravention of any offence under section 9(1) (thus aiding and 
abetting a criminal gang; threatening to commit, bring about or perform any act of 
violence or any criminal activity and threats of retaliation) and section 9(2)(a) (bringing 
about a pattern of criminal gang activity) will be liable either for a fine or imprisonment 
for a maximum of six years.798   
Persons who contravene sections 9(2)(b) (inducement to contribute to gang 
activities) or (c) (gang recruitment) will face either a fine or a sentence not exceeding 
three years.799 This is an extremely weak sanction, especially compared to certain 
sentences under Chapter 2. Where someone is found guilty of the management 
                                            
797 Snyman (1999) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 219. 
798 Section 10(1)(a) of POCA. 
799 Section 10(1)(b) of POCA. 
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offence800 (probably the most comparable provision to section 9(2)(b)), he or she shall 
be liable to a fine of R1 000 million or life imprisonment.801  
4 5 3 2  Sections 10(1)(c) and (d) read with section 10(2) of POCA 
The penalties for a contravention of the offences under sections 9(1), the offence 
under section 9(2)(a),802  the offence under section 9(2)(b) as well as section 9(2)(b)803 
must be read with section 10(2). An accused will face a sentence enhancement in 
terms of section 10(2) if he or she is liable in terms of section 9(1) or 9(2)(b) of POCA 
and that offence is committed at or within 500 metres of a school or educational 
institution.804 The Western Cape Government has identified the prominent gang 
influence and violence on the schools of the province, thus providing a public interest 
rationale for such a provision.805 School grounds are often a market for the sale of 
drugs and young female learners may also fall victim and be used in human 
trafficking.806  Section 10(2), unlike its sister provision below, does not operate 
independently to Chapter 4 and requires the commission of a Section 9 offence to 
enhance the sentence of that accused. Section 10(2) also differs from section 10(3) 
by using the word “committed” instead of “convicted”. This difference in wording is 
however not important because the use of a sentence enhancement requires a 
conviction before it can be employed. Merely committing an act in the factual sense 
                                            
800 Section 2(1)(f) of POCA.  
801 Section 3(1) of POCA.  
802 Section 10(1)(c) of POCA. 
803 Section 10(1)(d) of POCA. 
804 With the proviso that the facility is currently open for classes or school-related programmes or when 
minors are using aforementioned facilities. It would thus appear if the offence is not applicable if the 
school is in use by persons who have reached majority but would be if it was in use by both minor 
persons and persons who have reached the age of majority. It would furthermore seem to be applicable 
if the crime(s) were committed on or near a university because the term “academic institution” would 
naturally include universities. This is an unnecessary distinction albeit from a noble intention to protect 
minors.  
805 Western Cape Government Integrated Provincial Violence Prevention Policy Framework (2013) 12. 
The Framework indicated that 61,6% of (22) schools in at-risk areas have been affected by robbery and 
violence by gangs. Also see Chapter 2 above for a broader discussion on the influence of gangs on 
children in general. 
806 Standing (2005) ISS 1 3. 
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(without a legal conviction) is thus irrelevant in this context. Section 10(2) is 
comparable to STEP which also aggravates a sentence in these circumstances.807  
4 5 3 3  Section 10(3) of POCA 
An accused may receive a sentence enhancement in terms of section 10(3) of 
POCA if he or she is guilty of an offence other than those contained in Chapter 4 and 
it also requires the accused to have been a member of a criminal gang at the time of 
the commission of the crime. The State may rely on this provision in combination with 
any statutory or common law crime including any other offence in POCA. It is 
furthermore free from the complexities under sections 9 and 1 (save for the 
requirement of gang membership) and is easily attached to aforementioned crimes. 
The definition only mentions gang members and thus would seem to exclude persons 
who are “merely” active participants in a criminal gang.  
The provision proved to be extremely useful to the Prosecution in Thomas and was 
used several times in combination with an enormous amount of offences. It was used, 
for example, in combination with charges of murder, incitement,808 and several 
charges in terms of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000.809 
There is a substantial difference, however, between the wording of the Californian 
and South African sentence enhancements. Section 186.22(b)(1) of STEP holds that 
where someone  
(…) is convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 
association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or 
assist in any criminal conduct by gang members (…) 
that person shall receive a sentence enhancement (as it is colloquially referred to). 
These enhancements shall vary depending on the underlying felony that the person 
                                            
807 186.22(b)(2) holds that  
[i]f the underlying felony described in paragraph (1) is committed on the grounds of, or within 
1,000 feet of, a public or private elementary, vocational, junior high, or high school, during hours 
in which the facility is open for classes or school-related programs or when minors are using 
the facility, that fact shall be a circumstance in aggravation of the crime in imposing a term 
under paragraph (1). 
808 See Thomas 20-21. 
809 See Thomas 23-24 et seq.  
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has committed.810 Two requirements therefore arise from the text of section 
186.22(b)(1) and this has been confirmed through case law.811 The first requirement 
is the crime must have been committed for the “benefit of, at the direction of, or in 
association with any criminal street gang”. This wording is therefore substantially 
similar to section 9(1)(a) of POCA. It would seem that that the South African 
Legislature opted to convert this sentence enhancement into a substantive offence; 
take the sentence enhancement and strip it of its constitutional protections that would 
prevent punishment of mere association. 
The wording in section 186.22(b)(1) STEP is clear and uncontroversial. All that is 
required, is that the crime have some relation to gang activity812 and not be for a 
personal purpose – which also relates to the second requirement. The accused must 
secondly also possess specific intent to either “promote, further, or assist” in any 
criminal conduct of the criminal street gang members. The Supreme Court of California 
                                            
810 The enhancement shall be between two and four years as per the court’s discretion (in terms of 
section 186.22(b)(1)(A)). This shall however not apply if the felony for which the person is convicted is 
a serious felony. Serious felonies, in terms of section 1192.7(c) of the Californian Penal Code, include 
crimes such as murder or voluntary manslaughter, arson and several forms of assault with a deadly 
weapon.  In those circumstances, he or she “shall be punished” by a further five years. In instances of 
violent felonies, the person shall be sentenced for an additional ten years in terms of section 
186.22(b)(1)(B). Violent felonies mostly include similar crimes but are restrained to contact crimes and 
does not include reference to crimes such as arson.  
811 See generally BE Witkin, NL Epstein & members of the Witkin Legal Institute Witkin California 
Criminal Law 4 ed par 40. 
812 Both the wording of section 186.22(b)(1) and case law clearly indicate that a gang member may act 
alone or in concert with other gang members. In People v. Galvez 195 Cal.App.4th 1253 (2011) 
(“Galvez”) at 1261-1262 the Californian Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the State that an 
assault by a gang member of someone who was attempting to call 911 to report a gang-related crime 
satisfies the requirement of acting “in association with” a gang. This crime was furthermore committed 
in public and would send a clear warning message. An expert witness, Detective Corbett, stated that 
this public assault “promotes fear, which, in essence, promotes their gang and their brutality to the 
community in which they live.” He further stated that “[i]f you have a group of individuals ... that attack 
somebody and they're together and they are with [a] gang, they are absolutely promoting fear in the 
furtherance of that gang in that community”. In People v. Albillar 51 C.4th 47 (2010) at 68 the Supreme 
Court of California held that there was substantial evidence for the jury to infer that the defendant had 
acted in concert with and assisted other gang members to commit several acts of rape.  
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made it clear in People v. Albillar813 that gang membership is not required. There must 
rather just be the specific intent to promote, further or assist the criminal street gang.814  
It will immediately be noted that the STEP enhancement differs from that contained 
in section 10(3) of POCA in that it does not enhance a sentence based merely on 
association or membership and that there are further objective requirements (the crime 
must be in association, at the direction or for the benefit of the gang) and subjective 
requirements (specific intent to further, assist or promote the gang’s criminal conduct).   
Section 10(3), conversely, does not require any of these elements and allows an 
individual convicted of any offence to be punished more severely solely based on gang 
membership. This type of scheme of punishment is constitutionally suspect and is 
punishing mere gang membership without any reference or connection to any type of 
gang activity. This shall be discussed in detail below.815 
4 5 3 4 The possible role of restorative justice in gang-related cases  
The National Anti-Gang Strategy (“the Strategy”) recognises restorative justice 
under its fourth pillar (the criminal justice process). This facilitates the rehabilitation of 
gang-offenders and the reintegration of these persons into their communities. 
Restorative justice in these cases can therefore  potentially improve social cohesion 
between victims and offenders.816 A restorative justice process should therefore be 
considered as an alternative or additional sentence in gang-related cases, even 
though it is not explicitly recognised in POCA. 
Restorative justice processes usually stand in stark contrast to the usual functioning 
of the criminal justice system. The criminal justice system essentially revolves around 
                                            
813 See fn 811 above. 
814 See Albillar 67-68. In People v. Ramirez 244 C.A.4th 800 (2016) at 819 the Court found that there 
was not sufficient evidence to hold that the accused had committed the attempted murder knowing that 
the persons that he had acted in concert with were gang members. He therefore could not have specific 
intent to further their activities. Also see BE Witkin, NL Epstein & members of the Witkin Legal Institute 
Witkin California Criminal Law 4 ed par 40. 
815 See 5 4 below.  
816 Western Cape Department of Community Safety “Implementing the National Anti-Gangsterism 
Strategy” (02-12-2017) <https://www.westerncape.gov.za/assets/departments/community-
safety/presentation_nags_workshop_gang_strategy.pdf> Western Cape Government (accessed 01-
10-2017). 
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the accused and places the victim of the crime at the background; often invisible or 
passive throughout the process.817 Roach states that 
[d]iscursively, both punitive and non-punitive models of victims' rights promise to 
control crime and respect victims, but the punitive model focuses all of its energy on 
the criminal justice system and the administration of punishment while the non-punitive 
model branches out into other areas of social development and integration.818  
Christie states it even more profoundly:  
So, in a modern criminal trial, two important things have happened. First, the parties 
are being represented. Secondly, the one party that is represented by the state, namely 
the victim, is so thoroughly represented that she or he for most of the proceedings is 
pushed completely out of the arena, reduced to the triggerer-off of the whole thing. She 
or he is a sort of double loser; first, vis-à-vis the offender, but secondly and often in a 
more crippling manner by being denied rights to full participation in what might have 
been one of the more important ritual encounters in life. The victim has lost the case 
to the state.819 
Roach and Christie therefore make it clear that the modern criminal justice process 
has further victimised the victims of crime. The professionalisation of (legal) conflict 
has essentially dehumanised this process with the conflict becoming the “property” of 
legal professionals and the State.820 Restorative justice allows victims to reclaim 
ownership of the justice process.   
Although the definition of restorative justice has not always been readily susceptible 
to crystallisation,821 certain widely-accepted principles and definitions have emerged. 
                                            
817 See Department of Justice and Constitutional Development “Restorative justice: the road to healing” 
(2011) the doj & cd <http://www.justice.gov.za/rj/2011rj-booklet-a5-eng.pdf> (accessed 20-09-2017).   
818 K Roach “Four Models of the Criminal Process” (1999) 89(2) Journal of Law and Criminology 
671 673. Also see SE van der Merwe “A basic introduction to criminal procedure” in JJ Joubert (ed) 
Criminal Procedure Handbook 12 ed (2017) 3 12-14. 
819 N Christie “Conflicts as Property” (1977) 17(1) British Journal of Criminology 1 3 (original emphasis). 
820 See Christie (1977) British Journal of Criminology 4; M Zernova Restorative Justice: Ideals and 
Realities (2007) 48.  
821 See A Skelton & M Batley “Restorative justice: a contemporary South African review” (2008) 21(3) 
AC 37 38 where the authors hold that there is “widespread agreement” on the definition of restorative 
justice and criticise Bezuidenhout’s view that there is no consensus regarding the definition and scope 
of restorative justice. See C Bezuidenhout “Restorative justice with an explicit rehabilitative ethos: is 
this the resolve to change criminality?” (2007) 20(2) Acta Criminologica 43 43-60. 
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The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in 
Criminal Justice Matters (“UN Basic Principles”),822 which holds that a “restorative 
process”  
means any process in which the victim, the offender and/or any other individuals or 
community members affected by a crime actively participate together in the resolution 
of matters arising from the crime, often with the help of a fair and impartial third party. 
Examples of restorative process include mediation, conferencing and sentencing 
circles.823 
The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development expands on these ideas 
and specifies “victims, offenders, families, concerned and community members” all as 
stakeholders in the restorative process with the focus on repairing the harm that was 
inflicted upon the victim and not merely on retributive justice as the focus has been 
traditionally.824  
Restorative justice may be invoked at several stages of the criminal process.825 It 
may be done before the crime has been reported and is dealt with by the affected 
parties before the matter is escalated to the formal justice process. This may be more 
appropriate for petty crimes of a non-violent nature.826  
The process may furthermore take place during the pre-trial stage (thus after a 
charge has been laid but before the formal court process) and the most prominent 
example is diversion under the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 (“CJA”).  
Skelton and Batley outline the process for the invocation of restorative justice during 
the pre-trial stage: A prosecutor identifies a case which has the potential for diversion 
whereupon the accused and the victim are informed of the process. The matter is kept 
on the court roll and postponed while the matter is referred to a “service provider” such 
as the Department of Social Development or a nongovernmental organisation for 
                                            
822 ECOSOC Res. 2000/14 (21 July 1999) UN Doc No E/2000/INF/2/Add.2.  
823 UN Basic Principles Annex II par 1(3).  
824 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development “Restorative justice: the road to healing” the 
doj & cd. 
825 See Department of Justice and Constitutional Development “Restorative justice: the road to healing” 
the doj & cd. 
826 This seems to be the most popular application of the process (outside of diversion of youth offenders 
in terms of the CJA) – see H Hargovan “Knocking and entering: restorative justice arrives at the courts” 
(2008) 21(1) Acta Criminologica:  Special Edition 24 26. 
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assessment. If the service provider agrees that the matter is appropriate for a 
restorative process, such processes may be initiated. Upon the postponed court date, 
the responsible prosecutor would submit a report to the court outlining the process.827  
Restorative processes may also take place during the pre-sentencing (where 
certain conditions are set as part of suspended or postponed sentences) or post-
sentencing stages (such as correctional programmes).828 A convicted person who is 
considered for community correction,829 may be required to partake in mediation 
between him/her and the victim or family group conferencing.830 Family group 
conferencing831 and victim-offender mediation832 are diversion options in terms of the 
CJA. The rationale for victim-offender mediation under the latter Act is stated as a 
consensual process833 which brings the alleged child-offender together with the victim 
of his or her alleged crime. These parties shall then, mutually, formulate a plan which 
aims to redress the impact and effects of the offence.834 
The appropriateness of restorative justice in redressing all types of crimes may 
however be criticised. The SCA in S v Thabethe (“Thabethe”)835 cautioned against the 
indiscriminate use of restorative processes. Bosielo JA further warned against its 
application in relation to serious offences as this might “evoke profound feelings of 
outrage and revulsion amongst law-abiding and right-thinking members of society”.836 
Inappropriately resorting to restorative processes may discredit the entire criminal 
justice system. A sentence must always, as a general point of departure, represent 
                                            
827 Skelton & Batley (2008) AC 43. 
828 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development “Restorative justice: the road to healing” the 
doj & cd. 
829 In terms of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 (“CSA”), “community correction”  
means all non-custodial measures and forms of supervision applicable to persons who are 
subject to such measures and supervision in the community and who are under the control of 
the Department [.] 
830 Section 52(1)(g) of the CSA.  
831 Section 61 of the CJA.  
832 Section 62 of the CJA.  
833 Section 62(1)(b) of the CJA.  
834 Section 62(1)(a) of the CJA.  
835 2011 (2) SACR 567 (SCA).  
836 Thabethe para 20. 
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some sort of equilibrium between the “seriousness of the offence and the natural 
indignation and outrage of the public”.837 
Certain common themes arise from this brief overview. Restorative justice, at its 
core, is a consensual process which aims to involve all the stakeholders affected by a 
crime. The aim of the process is usually to redress harms caused, heal or restore 
relationships and identify the underlying rationale for the criminal behaviour.838 
Restorative justice must furthermore take place within the general framework of 
sentencing and always be cognizant of the seriousness of the offence and whether 
such a process is “appropriate” given the nature of the crime. 
The influence of criminal gangs extends beyond the individual and affects 
communities at large as well, especially in communities like the Cape Flats. This has 
been illustrated in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Community involvement in 
readdressing the harm caused by gang members could thus be extremely apposite in 
healing a community, especially a community plagued by gang activity. The gravity 
and seriousness of gang-related crime must however be borne in mind. They range 
from harmful initiation processes that remove a young boy from his home to that boy 
being used in murders for the gang.839 Disruption of public services such as clinics, 
schools,  and transport affect Cape Flats communities on a large scale. Streets in 
these areas are often the battleground for turf wars; claiming the lives of innocent 
children who are hit by stray bullets.  
It would thus be advantageous, in the appropriate circumstances, to invoke 
restorative processes in order to heal victims of gang violence as well as communities 
at large. The Constitutional Court considered the appropriateness of restorative 
processes in a defamation case in Dikoko v Mokhatla.840 Perhaps, as guiding 
principles in gang cases, reference can be made to Sachs J’s separate judgment in 
                                            
837 Thabethe para 20. Also see S Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 3 ed (2016) par 
11.6 where the author seems to doubt the potential widespread application of restorative justice unless 
there is an overhaul of the criminal justice system; accompanied by a shift from the “fixation” of the 
legislature on retributive justice.  
838 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development “Restorative justice: the road to healing” the 
doj & cd. 
839 See for example S Swingler “The Cape’s youth gangs: Bigger, deeper, more dangerous” (26-05-
2014) Daily Maverick <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-05-26-the-capes-youth-gangs-
bigger-deeper-more-dangerous/#.Wg_mJ0qWaUm> (accessed 01-11-2017).  
840 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC). 
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which he references Skelton,841 who identifies four principles or elements of restorative 
justice. These principles are: encounter (dialogue or interaction addressing the harm 
caused and potential future resolution), participation (informal interaction between the 
victim and offender and other possible stakeholders close to the core parties), 
reintegration (back into the community in which the offender caused harm) and 
reparation (the goal being healing rather than retribution).   
4 6  Evaluation   
From the preceding analysis in the sections above, it becomes apparent that the 
offences enumerated in POCA are statutory offences with nuanced differences 
compared to their common law counterparts. As mentioned above in Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation, the only difference in some instances between the corresponding 
common law crime and the POCA offence, is the fact that the penalty in terms of POCA 
would be less severe than in terms of the common law. The offences under POCA 
seem to add an additional layer of punishment to conduct which is patently covered 
by existing common and statutory laws. This could have also been achieved by a 
sentence enhancement similar to those contained in POCA section 10. Considering 
the main reason for the promulgation of POCA was to supplement the existing 
common and statutory law, it becomes concerning that the Chapter 4 crimes created 
by POCA do not, in fact, create anything meaningful. What POCA does “create”, are 
modified common law offences cloaked in statutory language. If POCA was 
promulgated due to the insufficient common law, then logically we must conclude that 
the POCA-offences are equally as ineffectual as their common law counterparts. 
Sections 9(1)(b) and (c) are especially problematic; being statutory manifestations 
of common law offences. Section 9(1)(b) has qualities of common law assault as well 
as intimidation under the Intimidation Act. The only case law interpreting this offence 
however seems to disregard these parallels and abuses the broad statutory wording. 
The Court consequently resorts to the furthest extremes of inferential reasoning in 
order to attribute the requisite intention to the accused.  
                                            
841 A Skelton The Influence of the Theory and Practice of Restorative Justice in South Africa, with 
Special Reference to Child Justice Unpublished LLD thesis Pretoria University (2006) 18-21. 
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Several of the provisions are also subject to certain interpretive issues while 
sections 9(1)(b) and 10(3) are constitutionally problematic. Judicial or legislative 
intervention is required to remedy the situation.  
Gang convictions are at a shocking low rate. It has been reported that there have 
been only 61 gang convictions over the course of five years which translates into a 
conviction rate of approximately 3%.842 During the period between the 1st of April 2016 
and the 31st of July 2017, only 42 persons were convicted under POCA in the Western 
Cape from 3 892 gang-related arrests.843 This translates into a 1,08% conviction rate 
over a sixteen-month period.  
The underutilisation of POCA Chapter 4 may be ascribed to certain key factors. 
Firstly, prosecutors may choose to rely on familiar common law and statutory crimes 
when charging alleged gang members.844 The technical complexities in securing a 
Chapter 4 conviction may be too laborious in contrast to familiar common law crimes. 
Secondly, the lack of evidence inherent in gang-related crimes (due to their 
clandestine nature) frustrates the prosecution thereof – either through the common 
law or statute.845 These conviction rates are not solely attributable to POCA. 
Understaffed police stations846 as well as the general backlog of the criminal justice 
system play a role.  
The National Prosecuting Authority (“NPA”) should also promote education for 
prosecutors relating to the crimes enumerated under Chapter 4 of POCA. From a 
                                            
842 S Sesant “Gang guilty verdicts at 3%” (28-03-2017) IOL <http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-
courts/gang-guilty-verdicts-at-3-8378062> (date accessed 24-06-2017). 
843 Portfolio Committee on Police “Briefing by the Management of SAPS on the Anti-gang Strategy: 
Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Eastern Cape” Parliamentary Monitoring Group (23-08-2017) 
<http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/170823Anti-Gangsterism.pdf> (accessed 
01-09-2017). Also see Portfolio Committee on Police “Hawks Illegal Firearms Unit; SAPS Anti-Gang 
Strategy; Quarter 1 performance; Vetting Senior Management” Parliamentary Monitoring Group (23-
08-2017) <https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/24881/> (accessed 01-09-2017). Also see Chapter 1 
1 above.  
844 No data was provided on exactly how many gang members (or persons who actively associate with 
a gang) were convicted under the common law or other statutory offences. The tables provided only 
indicate certain anecdotal incidences – which total twelve convictions. See Portfolio Committee on 
Police “Briefing by the Management of SAPS on the Anti-gang Strategy: Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal 
and Eastern Cape” Parliamentary Monitoring Group 22-23  
845 See generally South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 92 (2000) 25. 
846 See Chapter 2 2 above. 
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review of the case law, the perception is that the NPA is only preoccupied with 
implementing POCA to deal with “white collar criminals”. The NPA however does offer 
an advanced training programme on organised crime, which, inter alia, deals the 
following aspects are dealt with: “[e]lements of Gang related [sic] Offences as 
identified in court judgments: the existence of a gang; Pattern of criminal gang activity; 
accused; the actus reus; mens rea”.847 This however seems to be an optional course. 
It would be highly advantageous if this course were to be compulsory for prosecutors 
who work in areas with a high incidence of gang-related crimes.  
It is at this point that one must consider the strategies by other jurisdictions 
employed in their fight against criminal gangs. The current statutory scheme, although 
a commendable project, has not had a substantial impact on the South African fight 
against criminal gang activities. The most significant case example has been the 
judgment in Thomas which has even garnered international accolades for the 
prosecutors.848 This author is convinced that the same result would have been 
achieved (save for the convictions based on POCA Chapter 2) through the use of 
common law offences. Stated otherwise: Chapter 4 did not create legislative 
innovations which enabled the State to prosecute conduct that the State could 
previously not.849 This preliminary verdict on the usefulness of POCA Chapter 4 begs 
the question: Should the focus not be on general principles – especially modes of 
liability, in order to more effectively prosecute those responsible for group-based 
criminal activities (such as criminal gang activities)? And, is POCA not ripe for 
                                            
847 Justice College “Legal & Quasi-Judicial Learning Faculty: Prosecutorial Programmes” 
<http://www.justice.gov.za/juscol/f-lqj-05.html#06> Justice College (accessed 05-08-2017); Own 
italisation. Also see Parliamentary Monitoring Group “Question to the Minister of Justice and 
Correctional Services” (14-11-2016) Parliamentary Monitoring Group (accessed 05-08-2017).  
848 M de Wee “SA aanklaers wen prys met Geweld-saak” Die Burger (2016-09-16) 5. Also see D Plato 
“George “Geweld” Thomas and co-accused’s sentencing welcomed” 
<https://www.westerncape.gov.za/news/george-%E2%80%9Cgeweld%E2%80%9D-thomas-and-co-
accused%E2%80%99s-sentencing-welcomed> (03-06-2015) Western Cape Government (accessed 
09-09-2016) where the Western Cape Minister of Community Safety, Dan Plato, hailed the judgement 
and stated that it was “a victory for the communities plagued by gangs and drugs in the province”. 
849 Burchell also critiques the criminalisation of gang activities in general. The author asserts that anti-
gang legislation presupposes that gangs share certain universal characteristics and suggests that the 
common law, especially the inherently flexible common purpose doctrine, might be more apposite to 
deal with the phenomenon. This might not be an issue so much with POCA as it would appear the 
definitions are broad and discretionary. See Burchell Principles 909-910. 
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legislative reform, given the rather negative evaluation apparent from this chapter? 
What is clear is that POCA as it currently stands does not seem to add a significant 
value in terms of the fight against criminal gangs in South Africa. Subsequent chapters 
will further explore the possibilities for law reform, not only in terms of the analyses 
thus far, but also in terms of certain constitutional imperatives. 
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Chapter 5 
Constitutional aspects relating to Chapters 1 and 4 
of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 
1998 
5 1  Introduction 
In a constitutional democracy like South Africa, it is imperative to evaluate a statute 
such as POCA through the lens of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (“the Constitution”). This Chapter considers of three individual yet interrelated 
components. The first component is the constitutional duty on the State to protect its 
inhabitants, which stands in a dichotomous relationship to the other components: the 
fair trial rights of the accused in terms of section 35(5) of the Constitution (which is 
largely the focus of the Chapter) and their freedom of association in terms of section 
18 of the Constitution. 
Before a constitutional analysis can be done, a basic normative constitutional 
framework must be established. Section 1 of the Constitution establishes South Africa 
as a sovereign and democratic state founded on several values, including the rule of 
law. The principle of legality, which is encompassed by the rule of law, is a core 
principle of criminal justice and thus naturally important to this study. Chapters 1 and 
4 of POCA are also subject to section 2 of the Constitution which establishes the 
Constitution as the supreme law of the country and that “law or conduct inconsistent 
with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled”. The Bill of Rights 
moreover reaffirms “the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom”.850 
It will be shown below that these underlying values recur throughout the constitutional 
analysis in the formation and development of certain evidentiary and criminal law rules 
and that it is of paramount importance that they be protected and promoted. 
 South Africa has several obligations in terms of and relating to international law as 
well as regional instruments. These obligations must be contextualised through our 
Constitutional framework. The Constitution compels all courts, tribunals and forums to 
                                            
850 Sections 1 and 7 of the Constitution.   
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consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.851 This obligation does 
not extend to foreign law as any court “may” consider foreign law852 and to the text 
does not refer the word “must” as with international law. Section 39(2) furthermore 
instructs courts, in the interpretation of legislation as well as the development of the 
common law and customary law, to promote “the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights”.  
The Constitutional Court (under the Interim Constitution, 1993) in S v Makwanyane 
and Another (“Makwanyane”)853 however noted that although there is a duty to 
consider international law, a court is not obliged to follow it.854 Similarly, section 233 
of the Constitution, 1996 states that courts must favour a reasonable interpretation of 
legislation to be consistent with international law rather than alternative inconsistent 
interpretations. This section, prima facie, does not apply to the common law and 
appears to only apply to the interpretation of legislation.  
Dugard highlights the willingness of South African courts to rely on international 
human rights law and refers to reliance on treaties as an interpretative tool as well as 
“to support an interpretation in favour of the unconstitutionality of a statute”.855 This 
position is strongly affirmed by Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others (“Glenister”).856 The Constitutional Court held that  
(…) section 233 (…) demands any reasonable interpretation that is consistent with 
international law when legislation is interpreted. There is, thus, no escape from the 
manifest constitutional injunction to integrate, in a way the Constitution permits, 
international law obligations into our domestic law. We do so willingly and in 
compliance with our constitutional duty.857 
The peremptory language of section 233 is therefore bolstered by the resolute 
interpretive instruction by the Constitutional Court.  
Further, section 198(c) of the Constitution states that national security must be 
perused with regard to international law. It is submitted here that matters such as 
                                            
851 Section 39(1)(b). 
852 Section 39(1)(c). 
853 1995 (3) SA 391. 
854 Makwanyane at 415. 
855 J Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 4 ed (2012) 63-64. 
856 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC). 
857 Glenister para 202. 
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criminal gang activity must indeed be treated as a matter of national security, as 
criminal gang activity has been repeatedly identified as threatening the security of the 
Republic and has undergone a transmutation to having, in certain instances, being 
linked to (and having the structure of) international syndicates. In his study on the 
influence of serious crime as a national security threat since 1994, Pienaar found that 
serious crime in fact posed a significant threat to the national security of the state.858 
This is due to a matrix of factors, especially the governmental failure to prevent 
transnational organised crime (which was also a rationale for the promulgation of 
POCA);859 the proliferation of corruption as well as high instances of physical 
violence.860 The author also found that, despite the State’s acknowledgement and 
attempts to address these issues, there was ineffectual mitigation of the threats – 
especially due to a lack of policy implementation.861  
Section 231 of the Constitution provides rules for the domestication and 
implementation of international agreements. Section 231(2) importantly states that an 
agreement is only binding on the Republic where such an agreement has been 
approved by the National Assembly as well as the National Council of Provinces (save 
for instances in section 231(3)). An agreement however only becomes law when it has 
been enacted through national legislation.862 The Implementation of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 (“ICC Act”), for example, gives effect 
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“the Rome Statute”).863 POCA, 
amongst other pieces of national legislation, gives effect to the United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (“the Palermo Convention”).864  
It has been noted above and will be noted again below that POCA in fact predates 
the Palermo Convention. Therefore, it is somewhat of a misnomer to state that POCA 
is a classic act of incorporation or transformation of an international instrument. 
                                            
858 LE Pienaar Serious Crime as a National Security Threat in South Africa since 1994 DPhil thesis 
(Political Science) University of Pretoria (2014) 205-210. 
859 See Chapter 1 (generally) as well as Chapter 4 2 above. 
860 Pienaar National Security Threat 206. 
861 Pienaar National Security Threat 211-212. 
862 In terms of section 231(4). This section also states that a self-executing provision of an international 
agreement does not have to be enacted through legislation but only requires Parliamentary approval, 
unless that provision is inconsistent with the Constitution.   
863 Adopted 17 July 1998 (entered into force 1July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90. 
864 Adopted 14 December 2000, (entered into force 20 February 2004) 40 ILM 335.   
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However, given the purport and subject matter of POCA, it is still the case that POCA 
“gives effect to” the stated aims of the Palermo Convention. POCA overwhelmingly 
fulfil its obligations pertaining to the “[c]riminalization of participation in an organized 
criminal group”.865 On the other hand, a deviation from the Palermo Convention can 
be noted with regard to the definition of “serious crime” as per article 2(b) of POCA.866 
It is submitted that this deviation does not in any fundamental way undermine POCA’s 
broad compliance with the spirit and aims of the Palermo Convention.  
A constitutional dichotomy arises in order to realise these constitutional and 
international law obligations imposed on the State. In pursuance of the obligation to 
protect the freedom and security of all of the inhabitants of the state, the liberty and 
dignity of those committing crimes necessarily have to be limited (as will be shown 
below) to both punish crime and protect the general populace in the future. Sachs J 
observed the following in S v Coetzee (“Coetzee”)867  
There is a paradox at the heart of all criminal procedure, in that the more serious the 
crime and the greater the public interest in securing convictions of the guilty, the more 
important do constitutional protections of the accused become. The starting point of 
any balancing enquiry where constitutional rights are concerned must be that the public 
interest in ensuring that innocent people are not convicted and subjected to ignominy 
and heavy sentences, massively outweighs the public interest in ensuring that a 
particular criminal is brought to book. Hence the presumption of innocence, which 
serves not only to protect a particular individual on trial, but to maintain public 
confidence in the enduring integrity and security of the legal system.868 
Before the aforementioned liberties are (justifiably) infringed upon, an accused has 
to be found guilty of a crime through a trial. As alluded to above, that trial has to be 
fair. The State, legislature and courts are in a position of authority over an accused 
and necessarily certain principles have developed in order to limit the powers of the 
three branches of government in order to protect inhabitants from arbitrary and unfair 
law enforcement.  
                                            
865 Article 5 of the Palermo Convention. 
866 See the discussion at 4 3 2 above.  
867 1997 (3) SA 527. 
868 Coetzee para 220 (footnotes omitted). 
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The constitutional challenges to the relevant pieces of foreign legislation will be 
analysed as a comparative tool. It is essential to analyse the parent legislation of 
POCA Chapter 4, the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act of 1988 
(“STEP”). The US state of Tennessee will also be referred to in the discussion of 
freedom of association. The Canadian Criminal Code RSC 1985, c C-46 (“the Code”) 
further serves as an important analytical tool, considering the similarities between our 
constitutional texts and the Constitutional Court’s frequent reliance on Canadian 
jurisprudence. Comparable international instruments, lastly, shall also be referenced 
throughout the Chapter.  
5 2 The constitutional duty of the State to protect its inhabitants  
The Preamble to POCA illuminates the State’s motivation for promulgating the Act. 
It explicitly cites the infringement on the rights of the inhabitants and communities of 
South Africa through organised crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities 
as one of the main motivations for the promulgation of the Act.869 Section 12(1)(c) is 
especially relevant when one reads the next two paragraphs of the Preamble, which 
states that870  
(...) it is the right of every person to be protected from fear, intimidation and physical 
harm caused by the criminal activities of violent gangs and individuals (…)  
and further that  
(…) organised crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities, both individually 
and collectively, present a danger to public order and safety and economic stability, 
and have the potential to inflict social damage [.] 
An ambitious promise is made in section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution, stating that 
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the 
right to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources”. This 
                                            
869 See National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another v Mohamed NO and Others 2002 (4) SA 
843 (CC) at paras 14-15; Mohunram and Another v NDPP and Another (Law Review Project as Amicus 
Curiae 2007 (2) SACR 145 (CC) at para 144 as well as Chapter 1 above. 
870   Also see Cowling (1998) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 355.   
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creates both a positive as well as a negative duty on the State.871 This duty, in its 
negative form, requires the State to refrain from all forms of violence and tyranny 
against its inhabitants. In its positive form, however, the State is required to act 
proactively and implement measures to prevent violence against its inhabitants and 
thus protect them.872 Although the State seems to be upholding the negative form of 
this constitutional duty, it is lacking in the positive form. It is clear from the contextual 
background provided in Chapter 1 that South Africa and especially the Western Cape 
are still terrorised by criminal gang activities, which have even increased since the 
inception of the Constitution and POCA before the turn of the millennium. 873 
As mentioned above, section 12(1)(c) provides an ambitious and broad 
constitutional promise. There have been several seminal cases that have interpreted 
this right. In Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education (“Christian 
Education”)874 the Constitutional Court emphasised the State’s role and responsibility 
in promoting the right to safety and security of its inhabitants. Sachs J noted that 
section 12 must be read in conjunction with section 7 of the Constitution, which places 
an obligation on the State to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil” the rights contained 
in the Bill of Rights.875 Section 7 thus reinforces the notion of a positive obligation. This 
however still does not provide an answer as to how exactly the State is supposed to 
fulfil this obligation. This issue was more pertinently addressed in Carmichele v 
Minister of Safety and Security (“Carmichele”).876 Here, the Constitutional Court 
considered the scope and content of the positive obligation. Ackerman and Goldstone 
JJ refer to section 8(1) of the Constitution which states that the Bill of Rights is 
applicable to all law as well as all three branches of government and organs of State.877 
                                            
871 I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 281. Also see GP Kemp, S Walker, R 
Palmer, D Baqwa, C Gevers, A Steynberg Criminal Law in South Africa 2 ed (2015) 10. Here, the 
authors argue that modern societies expect more from a state than the mere maintenance of law and 
order. Rights described here (amongst many others), such as safety and security, should actively be 
pursued and promoted through the State and its various organs.  
872 Currie & De Waal Handbook 281-282.   
873 See Chapter 1 1 above.  
874 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC).  
875 Christian Education 47. 
876 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC).  
877 Carmichele 44. The justices also refer to section 7(1) of the Interim Constitution which provided for 
a similar but narrower constitutional order. The original section (oddly) did not bind the judiciary to the 
Bill of Rights and did not explicitly state that it was applicable to all law.  
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The justices further state that this constitutional order prohibits the aforementioned 
organs and branches of government from infringing on the rights of its citizens and in 
some instances also creates a positive duty to “provide appropriate protection to 
everyone through laws and structures designed to afford such protection”.878 This 
notion is also bolstered by article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”)879 that aims to bind its signatories to protect the right to life 
of their inhabitants and that that right must be protected through law and the 
inhabitants shall also not be arbitrarily be deprived of it.880 In a comparative analysis, 
the Court points out that article 2(1)881 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”)882 corresponds with the right to life883 contained in the South African 
Constitution. Furthermore, the Court applies the dictum of a European Court of Human 
Rights judgment in Osman v United Kingdom (“Osman”).884 This judgment supports 
the notion that the right to life is not a “bare” or freestanding right. There must also be 
“machinery” in order to enforce that right: 
It is common ground that the State's obligation in this respect extends beyond its 
primary duty to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal law 
provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person backed up by law 
enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches 
of such provisions. It is thus accepted by those appearing before the Court that art 2 
of the Convention may also imply in certain well defined circumstances a positive 
                                            
878 Carmichele 44.  
879 Adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
880 Article 6(2) does however limit this right by acknowledging that states, that have not abolished the 
death penalty, may implement it as a criminal sanction. 
881 Article 2(1) reads that  
[e]veryone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime 
for which this penalty is provided by law. 
882 (adopted 4 November 1950 entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221.  
883 In terms of section 11 of the Constitution.  
884 29 EHHR 245.  
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obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an 
individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual.885 
One can therefore posit that the right to freedom and security of the person is the 
machinery or mechanism through which our right to life is realised and protected. And 
most importantly, it is the duty of the State to take action to protect its citizens, or at 
least provide mechanisms to do so. As noted in Osman, this can be achieved by 
effective criminal law sanctions (in order to deter violence and criminal activities) and 
action by the necessary law enforcement agencies.  
Chapter 4 of POCA does not appear to be effective machinery to protect people 
from criminal gang activities. It is not submitted here that the State could eradicate all 
criminal gang activities, but currently there is an increase in this type of crime – 
implying a failure by the State in fulfilling its constitutional duty.  
On the other side of the constitutional spectrum are the rights of the accused – 
which is the focus of this chapter. POCA has created harsh punishments for gang 
members. In addition to the original sentences for their underlying predicate crimes, 
criminal gang members or those who actively participate in criminal gang activities can 
be punished even further when these crimes constitute a pattern of criminal gang 
activities and commit one or more of the offences listed in Chapter 4. Persons may be 
liable in terms of Chapter 4 even if they did not commit a gang-related offence. In 
terms of section 10(3), a court may use the fact that the accused is a gang member 
as an aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes. The fact that a section 9 
offence has been committed 500 metres from a public or private school or other 
educational institution (during their operating hours), will constitute an aggravating 
circumstance.886 These extreme measures are arguably justified due to the 
extraordinary gang presence in especially the Western Cape.887 These extreme 
measures have to be balanced against the fair trial rights of accused persons in terms 
                                            
885 Osman 115. The Constitutional Court also contrasted this position of the EU with the USA. In De 
Shaney v Winnebago County Department of Social Services 489 US 189 (1988) the Supreme Court of 
the United States refused to impose liability (based on a due process argument in terms of the 14th 
Amendment) on a governmental official due to the fact that there was a so-called “inaction” on the part 
of the official, in thus failing to prevent harm. See Carmichele para 45. 
886 Section 10(3) of POCA. 
887 A Standing Organised crime: a study from the Cape Flats (2006) 5. 
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of section 35(3) of the Constitution as well as section 12(1)(a), which protects citizens 
against arbitrary deprivation of freedom. 
5 3  Fair trial rights under section 35(3) of the Constitution 
Considerable attention has been paid to the rights of accused, arrested and 
detained persons since the advent of South Africa’s constitutional democracy. This is 
evident from the introduction of several constitutional rights afforded to this class of 
persons in terms of section 35 of the Constitution. Section 35(3) specifically grants 
every accused person several fair trial rights due to the “’punitive’ or ‘criminal’ nature 
of the proceedings”888 and the potential deprivation of freedoms. Tulkins accurately 
states that it is in fact “[t]he primary, traditional role of human rights (…) to afford 
protection from the criminal law”.889 It reflects and expands upon the rights contained 
in international instruments such as the ICCPR,890 the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (“ACHPR”)891 as well as the ECHR.892 The listed rights in section 35(3) 
do not form a numerus clausus of fair trial rights but extend into the sphere of a broader 
residual right893 and attempt to promote the “abstract notions of fairness and 
justice”.894 This is a stark departure from and rejection of the draconian position under 
the apartheid regime. The Appellate Division in S v Rudman; S v Mthwana 
(“Rudman”)895 held that it  
                                            
888 JM Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 5 ed (2016) 3. 
889 F Tulkens “The Paradoxical Relationship between Criminal Law and Human Rights” (2011) 9 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 577 579. 
890 Article 14. 
891 (adopted 27 June 1981 entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217. See Article 7., 
892 Article 6.  
893 See S v Zuma 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC) para 16. The Constitutional Court analysed the equivalent 
right under the Interim Constitution. The Constitutional Court in S v Dzukuda and Others; S v Tshilo 
2000 (2) SACR 443 (CC) (“Dzukuda”) at para 9 also states that instances listed in section 35(3) are 
merely that – instances – and that the right to a fair trial only becomes illuminated through adjudication 
and determination on a case-by-case basis. Also see generally SE van der Merwe & PJ Schwikkard 
Principles of Evidence (2016) 241-242 on trial fairness.  
894 S v Ramuongiwa 1997 (2) BCLR 268 (V). See F Snyckers & J Le Roux “Criminal Procedure: Rights 
of Arrested, Detained and Accused Persons” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law 
of South Africa 2 ed (OS 07-06) 51-100. 
895 (1992) 3 All SA 806 (AD).  
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(…) does not enquire whether the trial was fair in accordance with 'notions of basic 
fairness and justice', or with 'the ideas underlying . . . the concept of justice which are 
the basis of all civilised systems of criminal administration'. The enquiry is whether 
there has been an irregularity or illegality, that is a departure from the formalities, rules 
and principles of procedure according to which our law requires a criminal trial to be 
initiated or conducted.896 
And further: 
What an accused person is entitled to is a trial initiated and conducted in accordance 
with those formalities, rules and principles of procedure which the law requires. He is 
not entitled to a trial which is fair when tested against abstract notions of fairness and 
justice.897 
Several constitutionally suspect issues arise from Chapters 1 and 4 of POCA and 
can be divided into two broad categories. The first contentious issue is whether the 
use of prior convictions as predicate crimes violates any fair trial rights and secondly 
whether the scope of certain core definitions in Chapter 1 are, in the light of the 
constitutionally-enshrined principle of legality, offensive in terms of the aforementioned 
rights.  
5 3 1  The use of prior convictions  
POCA, both in Chapters 2 and 4, make use of previous convictions in constructing 
the elements of a pattern of racketeering activity and a pattern of criminal gang activity 
respectively. These patterns form the basis for the substantive crimes. This practice is 
constitutionally suspect and stands in stark contrast with contemporary South African 
criminal law as well as the law of evidence. The relevant provisions of the anti-
racketeering law have already been subjected to constitutional challenge.898 The 
following sections will provide a comprehensive exposition of the background and 
current position relating to treatment of evidence of prior convictions and investigate 
whether it can be constitutionally and doctrinally justified.  
                                            
896 Rudman at 811. 
897 Rudman at 823. 
898 See Savoi and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another [2013] 3 All SA 548 
(KZP) (“Savoi I”) and Savoi and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another 2014 (5) 
SA 317 (CC) (“Savoi II”). 
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In terms of the South African law of evidence, under the common law, proof of an 
accused person’s previous convictions is usually considered irrelevant and 
consequently inadmissible at the trial stage. It is however relevant and may be taken 
into account at the sentencing stage after an accused has been convicted899 as well 
as when considering an application for bail.900 The Criminal Procedure Act (“the CPA”) 
furthermore creates certain exceptions to the aforementioned common law rule and 
enables the prosecution to rely on previous convictions as elements of a separate 
offence and in other limited statutory instances. In 1998, POCA also substantially 
broadened the ambit of the CPA with regards to the rules relating to previous 
convictions and other traditionally inadmissible categories of evidence.901 The 
admission of otherwise prior convictions, falling under the broad category of similar 
fact evidence, must however be assessed in order to determine whether it is fair to an 
accused to be subjected to the use of previous convictions where other accused 
persons would, to a certain extent, be shielded against their use.  
The following section will firstly analyse the motivation behind the rule against the 
use of prior convictions in criminal trials and secondly analyse the various exceptions 
to this rule. It will be determined whether this rationale has evolved over time and 
whether it still deserves a place in our law and if the underlying rationale is applicable 
to the situations under POCA.902 It will then be discussed as to whether the inclusion 
of this exception is contrary to the fair trial rights of an accused, especially in the light 
of Chapter 4 of POCA.   
                                            
899 In terms of section 271 (as well as sections 272 and 273) of the CPA.  
900 An application for bail is not considered a “criminal proceeding” in terms of the CPA. Howard J in S 
v Hlongwa 1979 (4) SA 112 (D) at 114-115 came to the conclusion that it was the clear intent of the 
Legislature to not include the bail applications under the scope of criminal proceedings because the 
Legislature had drawn a clear distinction between normal criminal proceedings under the CPA and bail 
applications in terms of sections 67 and 68. In fact, sections 60(11B)(a) and (b) compels an accused 
and their legal adviser to inform the court of prior convictions; to inform the court of any charges pending 
against the accused and whether the accused has been released on bail in with regards to those 
charges. 
901 Especially in terms of section 2(2).  
902 It must be borne in mind that the aim of this section is not to provide a comprehensive study of similar 
fact evidence or to suggest how this category of evidence should be dealt with regards to Chapter 4 of 
POCA.  
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The text of section 2(2) of POCA, which empowers the use of prior convictions in 
racketeering cases, reads as follow 
The court may hear evidence, including evidence with regard to hearsay, similar facts 
or previous convictions, relating to offences contemplated in subsection (1), 
notwithstanding that such evidence might otherwise be inadmissible, provided that 
such evidence would not render a trial unfair. 
It is somewhat odd (and puzzling) that a similar provision to section 2(2) is not 
incorporated in reference to criminal gang activities. Section 2(2) exclusively applies 
racketeering offences. This may potentially only be an oversight, but it seems to be 
assumed that the same proviso would apply to Chapter 4.903 
5 3 1 1 Rationale for the rule 
Evidence of previous convictions is legally irrelevant for the purposes of criminal 
proceedings. The rationale behind this rule is the fact that admission of previous 
convictions has the potential to create a negative impact on the character of the 
accused.904 The Court in R v Dominic905 came to the conclusion that admitting the 
previous convictions of the accused into evidence prejudiced the trial court against the 
accused. The Court pointed out that the admission of such evidence undermines the 
objectivity of judicial officers by unfairly influencing their opinion of the accused through 
the lens of their prior convictions.906 The exclusion of previous convictions thus 
facilitates judicial objectivity.  It has to be determined if this underlying rationale may, 
constitutionally, prohibit the functioning of POCA Chapter 4. 
5 3 1 2  Origins of the rule: The position under the common law  
The origins of the similar fact rule can be found in English common law. It appears 
that there was no general principle against the use of an accused’s previous 
convictions during a trial until the late 19th century.907 There was only a piecemeal 
                                            
903 See 4 4 4, 5 1 3 3 below as well as 7 2.  
904 Savoi I 117 
905 (1913) TPD 582. 
906 Dominic 584.  
907 J Stone “The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England” (1933) 46(6) Harvard Law Review 
954 960-961. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 205 
 
recognition of certain types of cases before then which acknowledged the fact that the 
evidence of previous misconduct of an accused should not be allowed in a separate, 
unrelated trial.908 Julius Stone refers to what seems to be the first manifestation of the 
rule (already mentioned in the 18th century)909 in treason trials but this “rule” was still 
misinterpreted by courts.910 The rationale for this rule was the perceived unfairness for 
accused in defending prior acts that he or she was not indicted for in the present case 
and thus not prepared to defend at trial.911 Foster, also speaking of a rule, asserted 
that the foundation for disallowing all evidence “foreign to the point in issue” is founded 
in “sound sense and common justice”.912 This broad rule appeared to only exclude 
unrelated evidence which was “foreign to the point in issue” and evidence of relevant 
prior conduct would still be admissible.913  
The first case to mention a general rule against the use of similar fact evidence914 
in all criminal proceedings appears to be The King v John Carey Cole (“Cole”).915 This 
case concerns a man that was charged with the crime of sodomy. The accused was 
confronted with a confession to other acts of sodomy where he stated that these acts 
were his “natural inclination”.916 Although Cole was charged on three separate 
indictments of sodomy, this confession, relating to the third instance, was used to 
                                            
908 Stone (1933) Harvard Law Review 958. 
909 By Foster in 1762. 
910 Stone (1933) Harvard Law Review 958. 
911 M Foster A Report of Some Proceedings on the Commission for the Trial of the Rebels in the Year 
1746 in the County of Surrey and of Other Crown Cases: To which are Added Discourses Upon a Few 
Branches of the Crown Law (1809) (commonly referred to as “Foster’s Law”) 244-246. The author 
elucidates the rule to mean that  
[t]he sense of this clause I take to be, that no overt act amounting to a distinct independent 
charge, though falling under the same head of treason, shall be given in evidence, unless it be 
expresly laid in the indictment; but still, if it amounteth - to a direct proof of any of the overt acts 
which are laid, it may be given in evidence of such overt acts. 
912 Foster’s Law 246. 
913 Stone (1933) Harvard Law Review 959. This is also clear from the examples that Foster gave of 
evidence that was allowed in treason cases that were still relevant according the courts.  
914 It must be noted that the broader category of similar fact evidence encompasses the category of 
prior convictions and the latter may be led as evidence under the exceptions pertaining to the former.  
915 (1810) Judges' Notebooks on Crown Cases, Vol. 3. 
916 DJ Field A Statutory Formula for The Admission of Similar Fact Evidence against a Criminal Accused 
DPhil thesis (Law) Bond University (2013) 39 fn 118. 
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convict him on two of these indictments. His conviction was nevertheless overturned 
on appeal because it was not permissible for the Crown to show that “prisoner has a 
general disposition to commit the same kind of offense as that charged against him”.917 
This account of Cole only surfaced in 1814 when Phillips used it as authority for a rule 
prohibiting inclusion of evidence of previous similar facts or evidence that the accused 
had a tendency to commit a particular type of crime.918 Other legal scholars however 
made no reference to such a rule – even as late as 1824.919 Although the Court in Cole 
confidently expressed this rule prohibiting the reference to prior convictions due to its 
inherent unfairness, there was no widespread application of this rule.920 The Cole 
judgment appeared to apply only in scenarios where the similar fact evidence would 
only serve as to prove that the accused had a particular propensity to commit a 
particular type of crime.921  
This rationale, although not universally adopted, came to prominence in the 
infamous judgment of Makin v Attorney General for New South Wales (“Makin”).922 
The Makin judgment provided some clarity with regards to the inclusion of similar fact 
evidence during a separate criminal trial. The facts of the case deserve brief 
mention.923 A married couple were in the business of so-called baby farming – a 
practice where they received payment to take care of babies of others who were not 
capable of doing so. The specific child in question had been found buried and 
decomposed in the backyard of the spouses.924 They were then charged with the 
murder of that child. Upon further investigation, it was discovered that the bodies of 
twelve other children were buried in the backyard of the accused couple and this 
                                            
917 Field A Statutory Formula (2013) 39 fn 118. 
918 Stone (1933) Harvard Law Review 959, referring to SM Phillips Treatise on the Law of Evidence 1 
ed (1814) 69-70. Stone mentions that Phillips also refers to Rex v Whiley 2 Leach C. C. 983 (1804). In 
that case however, evidence of prior instances of forgery was used against the accused. 
919 Stone (1933) Harvard Law Review 960. 
920 Stone (1933) Harvard Law Review 961. 
921 Stone (1933) Harvard Law Review 965-966.  
922 1894 AC 57 (PC).  
923 The facts of the case appear from the court a quo judgement of R v Makin and Wife 1893 (1) 11 
N.S.W. L.R. 218 (“Makin and Wife”). 
924 Makin and Wife 1. 
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evidence was used in the criminal trial against them.925 This judgment gave rise to the 
oft-quoted dictum of Lord Herschel: 
It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence tending to shew 
that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the 
indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person 
likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the offence for which 
he is being tried.  On the other hand, the mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to 
shew the commission of other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant if 
it bears upon the question whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in 
the indictment were designed or accidental, or to rebut a defence which would 
otherwise be open to the accused. 
Paizes posits that there are two “distinct propositions” to be derived from Lord 
Herschel’s dictum.926 Similar fact evidence may firstly not be used as the foundation 
of proving the guilt of the accused by showing that he or she has the propensity to 
commit certain types of crimes.927 This first proposition is however qualified by the 
second: similar fact evidence may be adduced if its foundation is something other than 
to prove propensity.928  The first proposition alludes to the original rationale to the rule, 
whereby it would be contrary to natural justice to expect the accused to answer to all 
of the misdeeds that he or she has done in his or life instead only responding to the 
                                            
925 Makin and Wife 1. 
926 Paizes “Evidence” in E Du Toit & SE Van der Merwe Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 
vol 2 (RS 53 2014) 24-22D. Also see PJ Schwikkard & SE Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 4 ed 
(2016) 78. 
927 Paizes “Evidence” in E Du Toit & SE Van der Merwe Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 
vol 2 (RS 53 2014) 24-22D. 
928 Paizes “Evidence” in E Du Toit & SE Van der Merwe Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 
vol 2 (RS 53 2014) 24-22D. DT Zeffertt “Similar-Fact Evidence in Criminal Proceedings” (1977) 94 
South African Law Journal 399 402 points out that the evidence in Makin was not admitted because the 
accused was a “bad man” but rather that the similar fact evidence pointed towards the “strong statistical 
likelihood” that the buried babies had been murdered and that they had been murdered by the Makins. 
The author also refers to two other cases where the evidence rather pointed towards the statistical 
likelihood that the accused person had been the perpetrator. In R v Smith (1915) 84 LJKB 2153 (“Smith”) 
the accused had been charged with the murder of his “wife”. It was discovered that his previous two 
“wives” had also died in a similar fashion – in the bath. In R v Geering (1849) 18 LJMC 215 (“Geering”) 
the accused had been the common factor in deaths in her family resulting from food poisoned by arsenic 
in a short period of time. 
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relevant crimes charged and it also prohibits evidence that only shows that the 
accused is a “bad man”.929 Van der Merwe and Schwikkard however point out that this 
formulation and rationale cannot justify the exclusion of propensity evidence in all 
circumstances. To illustrate this point, the authors refer to the judgment in S v Straffen 
(“Straffen”)930 where evidence of the idiosyncratic propensity of the accused was 
allowed on the synthetic basis that it was relevant to the identity of the perpetrator (and 
not on the basis of propensity).931 The Makin decision was understood to delineate 
certain categories of instances when similar fact evidence would be admissible 
evidence.932 The conclusion that flows from that reasoning is that evidence outside of 
these categories is impermissible.933 Categories include identity, design or system, 
intent and proving the actus reus.934 
In DPP v Boardman (“Boardman”)935 the principle underlying Makin was understood 
to mean that only similar fact evidence where the probative value outweighed the 
prejudicial effect may be admitted.936 The Court in Boardman also required a “striking 
similarity” between the facts in question and the similar fact evidence.937 This 
requirement was however rejected by the Court in DPP v P.938 In DPP v P, the Court 
held that the inclusion of similar fact evidence cannot be restricted to instances of 
“striking similarity” but must be broadened to instances where the probative force 
outweighs the prejudicial impact and that may certainly include cases of striking 
similarity.939 
It can be summarised that similar fact evidence, under the English common law, 
may not be admitted as a weapon of character assault against the accused but may 
be admitted in a circumspect fashion and in exceptional circumstances where there is 
                                            
929 DT Zeffertt “Similar-Fact Evidence in Criminal Proceedings” (1977) 94 South African Law Journal 
399 401. 
930 1952 2 QB 911. 
931 PJ Schwikkard & SE Van der Merwe Principles 79-80. 
932 See Van der Merwe & Schwikkard Principles 81.  
933  Zeffertt (1977) South African Law Journal 401. 
934 See DT Zeffertt & AP Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 3 ed (2017) 298-314 for a 
comprehensive discussion on the main categories as elucidated by case law.  
935 [1975] AC 421. 
936 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 81-82 (referring to Boardman at 442, 451, 456 and 457).  
937 Boardman 444.  
938 [1991] 2 AC 447. 
939 DPP v P at 460-461. The Court also refers to Straffen and Smith here. 
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a “strong degree of probative force”940 and has “material bearing on the issue to be 
decided”.941 The courts, according to Zeffertt and Paizes, have identified that the 
overriding interest to be protected when allowing similar fact evidence and 
consequently evidence of prior convictions, is that it does not render the trial unfair.942 
5 3 1 3 Statutory exceptions to the rule 
The common law position relating to similar fact evidence and consequently 
evidence of prior convictions is entrenched in the South African law of evidence.943 
The evidence must be of material interest to the issue before the court or it must serve 
as proof or rebuttal of matter in dispute. Evidence of previous convictions of an 
accused is classified as similar fact evidence and is excluded because of the 
prejudicial effect of the evidence will exceed the probative value thereof. Proof of 
previous convictions must thus have an additional evidentiary value than to expose 
the bad character of the accused. There are however certain express statutory 
exceptions to the rule against similar fact evidence, which will be explored below. 
5 3 1 3 1  The Criminal Procedure Act  
In terms of section 89 of the CPA, no charge may contain an allegation that an 
accused possesses a prior conviction unless it is an element of the charged offence.944 
The State is additionally embargoed from questioning an accused concerning his or 
her prior convictions. The State may however deviate from the embargo against 
questioning in certain circumstances.  Section 197(d) of the CPA empowers the State 
to question an accused about prior convictions if the questioning can prove that the 
                                            
940 See DP van der Merwe & WH Schmidt and DT Zeffertt “Evidence” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) 
LAWSA 18 3 ed (2016) para para 126. 
941 Harris v DPP (1952) AC 694 (HL) at 710 (“Harris”). 
942 Zeffertt & AP Paizes The Law of Evidence 295. See further 296 for their summary for the preferred 
modern approach to the admission of similar fact evidence. 
943 Zeffertt & Paizes advance that this common law rule presumably “expressly” became a part of the 
South African common law of evidence in terms of section 252 of the CPA which states that English 
law of evidence still in force on the 30th of October 1961 shall apply if not expressly provided for in terms 
of the CPA or any other law. See Zeffertt & AP Paizes The Law of Evidence 260. 
944 Section 89 of the CPA.  
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accused has committed the offence that he or she is currently charged with. .945  
Section 211 of the CPA additionally states the following; supplementing section 89: 
Except where otherwise expressly provided by this Act or the Child Justice Act, 2008, 
or except where the fact of a previous conviction is an element of any offence with 
which an accused is charged, evidence shall not be admissible at criminal proceedings 
in respect of any offence to prove that an accused at such proceedings had previously 
been convicted of any offence, whether in the Republic or elsewhere, and no accused, 
if called as a witness, shall be asked whether he or she has been so convicted.  
The crux is therefore that a charge may reference a previous conviction and an 
accused may potentially be questioned about these convictions if the aforementioned 
conviction is an element of the crime that he is currently being accused of. 946 These 
convictions may consequently be proven via section 211. The most patent example 
may be escaping from prison – the fact that the person was imprisoned for a crime is 
an underlying fact and element to the subsequent crime of escaping prison.947 Kruger 
notes that there is a disharmony between sections 197(d) and 211. Section 211 only 
shields against the proof of previous convictions and not in situations where an 
accused had in fact previously committed a crime but did not result in a charge against 
them or in situations where a person was accused of a crime but was not found guilty. 
Section 197(d) however does shield an accused against this line of questioning.948  
A review of the South African case law interpreting section 211 echoes the rationale 
for the general rule excluding similar fact evidence. In S v Mthembu and others 
(“Mthembu”),949 Smalberger JA, delivering judgment for the Appellate Division, stated 
that the motivation behind sections 197 and 211 was to protect the accused from 
undue prejudice and that questioning an accused about prior convictions would 
amount to a prima facie irregularity.950 The learned judge went further and stated that 
                                            
945 See also Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 69; A Kruger “Previous Convictions in Hiemstra’s 
Criminal Procedure 10 ed (RS 2017) 27-3. 
946 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 47; 67-68; 76-77. Also see A Kruger Organised Crime and 
Proceeds of Crime Law in South Africa 2 ed (2013) 36. 
947 In terms of section 117 of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. See S v Mthembu and others 
[1988] 3 All SA 561 (AD) at 571, where Smalberger J uses this example. 
948 A Kruger Hiemstra: Suid-Afrikaanse Strafproses 7 ed (2010) 570. 
949 [1988] 3 All SA 561 (AD). 
950 Mthembu at 564. 
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instances where similar fact evidence is expressly allowed (such as with sections 197 
and 211) cross-examination of this vexed category of evidence must be limited to 
extract information relevant to the issues before a court, even in instances where the 
accused himself has revealed this information.951 Smalberger JA was thus cautious of 
the use of similar fact evidence, even in instances where it is statutorily permissible 
and probably envisioned the danger of misuse by the prosecution in an attempt to 
attack the character of an accused. The conclusion in this case, regarding the issue 
of cross-examination pertaining to a prior conviction, was that fairness and justice 
prohibited that line of questioning.952  
Another issue that arose in Mthembu was the effect of prisoners appearing in their 
prison garb during an unrelated trial. The Court was of the opinion that the only time 
when such an appearance would be appropriate, is where the accused had committed 
a crime in prison or when an accused is being prosecuted for a crime relating to his 
imprisonment, such as escaping from custody.953 Subsequent cases have 
investigated this practice in the light of the Constitution. In S v Phiri (“Phiri”),954 the 
Transvaal Provincial Division came to the conclusion that the accused appearing in 
prison garb would not ipso facto constitute an irregularity but each case would have to 
be analysed on its merits.955 Van der Westhuizen and Webster JJ also stated that the 
appearance of a prisoner in prison garb would amount to an inadmissible evidence of 
a previous conviction of the accused.956 Furthermore, such an appearance would 
violate an accused’s right to a fair trial, more specifically section 35(3)(h) of the 
Constitution, which protects the presumption of innocence of an accused.957 The 
justices then submit that the subsections to section 35(3) do not amount to a closed 
list of protections but go further and broader to protect the rights of the accused.958 
                                            
951 Mthembu at 565. Also see Paizes “Evidence” in E Du Toit & SE Van der Merwe Commentary on the 
Criminal Procedure Act vol 2 (RS 53 2014) 24-22Q. 
952 Mthembu at 565. 
953 Mthembu at 571. Also see Paizes “Evidence” Commentary 24-22Q. 
954 2005 (2) SACR 476. 
955 Phiri at 15 
956 Phiri at 4. 
957 Phiri at 4. 
958 Phiri at 4 where the Court refers to Zuma (see 5 3 above). 
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The constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom are fundamental values of 
the Constitution and are intrinsic to the fair trial rights.959 
It is clear that section 211 is still there to protect the accused from prejudices first 
voiced in Cole and subsequent judgments such as Makin. There is however no 
authority on how to deal with prior convictions as an element of a separate offence 
which is the relevant issue here. Paizes relies on Mthembu to suggest that the fact of 
an accused’s previous convictions may suffice and not the details thereof.960  
It is submitted that, in order to ensure that the subsequent trial of the accused 
remains fair, it must be ensured that the mind of the judicial officer is kept as objective 
as possible. Details surrounding previous convictions (the predicate crimes) must not, 
as far as possible and in line with the traditional approach, be allowed during a hearing 
for criminal gang activities. A failure to do so would result in an unjust assault on the 
character of the accused. This is furthermore unfair because in other instances the 
admittance of prior convictions would only occur in extraordinary cases, but it is the 
norm when convicting an accused in terms of Chapter 4 of POCA. Thus, everything 
must be done to neutralise the prejudicial effect of admitting evidence of prior 
convictions.  
5 3 1 3 2  The Child Justice Act 75 of 2008961 
Children often fall victim to gangs, either as victims or when they are forced to join 
as a survival mechanism.962 Children may, in circumstances, be diverted from the 
formal criminal justice system and rather diverted in terms of the Child Justice Act 75 
of 2008 (“the CJA”). 
The CJA makes several references to the existence of prior convictions. This is to, 
inter alia, assess whether it is in the interests of justice to release a child to the care 
of a parent or guardian,963 whether to further detain a child in prison964 and as a factor 
                                            
959 Phiri at 4. The Court here refers to Dzukuda at 9. 
960 Paizes “Evidence” Commentary 23-32; Mthembu 561. 
961 The CJA has also been discussed in Chapter 4 as a part of the sentencing of gang offences – see 
4 5 3 above.  
962 See 2 2 above.  
963 Section 24(3)(b) of the CJA. 
964 Section 30(3)(c) and 30(5)(a) of the CJA. 
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in the assessment of an alleged child offender.965 A prior conviction must be placed 
before the magistrate in terms of a section 47 preliminary inquiry.966 A diversion order 
in terms of the CJA also does not constitute a “previous conviction” in terms of the 
CPA967 and would thus not receive the protection of section 211 of the CPA but would 
be shielded through sections 210 and 197(d).968 Offences that were diverted in terms 
of the CJA will therefore not qualify as predicate offences under POCA.  
In circumstances where a child older than fourteen years has been found guilty of 
a Schedule 1 offence (in terms of the CPA) the court may impose a sentence of 
imprisonment if the child offender has a record of relevant convictions and substantial 
and compelling reasons exist for such a sentence.969 These offences therefore qualify 
as predicate offences under POCA and a child may potentially face prosecution under 
POCA.  
5 3 1 3 3   The Prevention of Organised Crime Act  
The enactment of POCA brought about several departures from the traditional 
framework of the South African law of evidence. The most important provision is 
section 2(2), which provides a relaxed approach to the admissibility of evidence and 
states that 
[t]he court may hear evidence, including evidence with regard to hearsay, similar facts 
or previous convictions, relating to offences contemplated in subsection (1), 
notwithstanding that such evidence might otherwise be inadmissible, provided that 
such evidence would not render a trial unfair. 
As already mentioned above (and acknowledged in section 2(2) of POCA itself), 
similar fact evidence and consequently prior convictions, are generally inadmissible. 
POCA deviates from this rule and allows a court to hear such evidence in relation to 
offences involving racketeering activities in terms of subsection 2(1). Kruger notes that 
similar fact evidence will otherwise not be admissible if it does not relate to subsection 
                                            
965 Section 35(c) of the CJA.  
966 Section 47(3)(c) of the CJA.  
967 Section 59(1)(b) of the CJA. 
968 See 5 3 1 3 1 above. In terms of section 87 of the CJA, however, child offender convictions will be 
expunged under certain circumstances and after certain time periods have elapsed.  
969 Section 77(3)(c).  
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2(1) but in the same breath warns against the dangers of admitting such prejudicial 
evidence.970  It is important to note that Chapter 4 of POCA does not contain a similar 
provision for allowing previous convictions. It may merely be “careless drafting”971 that 
an equivalent provision was not included in Chapter 4. This lacuna (or, casus omissus) 
is probably remedied, at least at face value, by section 211 of the CPA.972 A court 
would further not be empowered to hear evidence relating to hearsay relating to 
Chapter 4 of POCA and would have to rely on the exceptions under the General Law 
Amendment (“GLAA”) Act 45 of 1988.973 The Court in Thomas relied exclusively on 
the GLAA in considering the admissibility of hearsay.974  
The Free State Division of the High Court in S v Frederiksen (“Frederiksen”)975 was 
not forgiving in its finding relating to the ostensible casus omissus by the Legislature. 
The case concerned charges under the National Health Act 61 of 2003 (“the Health 
Act”) which related to the removal of human tissue without written consent. The 
relevant provisions of the Health Act976 however did not create offences for this 
unlawful act despite the fact that the act which it replaced, the Human Tissue Act 65 
of 1983, did so. Daffue J refers on constitutional principles,977 the sentencing powers 
of the courts, principles of statutory interpretation enunciated in Cool Ideas v 
                                            
970 A Kruger Organised Crime 36. 
971 See Kruger Organised Crime 72 where the author, albeit in a different context, alluded to the fact 
that there may have been careless drafting involved when the Legislature crafted Chapter 4. 
972 See 4 4 4 above for a comprehensive discussion on the practical implications of this casus omissus. 
973 See sections 3(1)(a) and (c) of the GLAA. See further Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 
Chapter 13 and Zeffertt & Paizes The Law of Evidence Chapter 13. 
974 See, for example, Thomas paras 20-26. 
975 2018 (1) SACR 29 (FB).  
976 Sections 55 and 58 of the Health Act.  
977 For example, the principle of legality (specifically nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege) 
as well as sections 35(3)(l) and (n) which form part of the accused’s fair trial rights. Section 35(3)(l) is 
essentially the constitutional codification of nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege. Section 
35(3)(n), on the other hand, states that the accused has the “benefit of the least severe of the prescribed 
punishments if the prescribed punishment for the offence has been changed between the time that the 
offence was committed and the time of sentencing”. These principles function in favour an accused and 
essentially function to protect an accused from the arbitrary deprivation of freedom. See 5 3 2 below for 
a comprehensive discussion on the principle of legality. 
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Hubbard,978 “the clear and unambiguous language of the legislature,” the context of 
the Health Act and background circumstances. The Court was resolute in finding that 
it could not venture into creating offences “(…) merely because it might be of the view 
that a casus omissus has occurred”.979  
The approach in Frederiksen has to be compared to the controversial judgment in 
R v Forlee (“Forlee”).980 The Court in Forlee found that it was within the powers of the 
courts to punish conduct, even though there was no indication that the conduct (the 
sale of opium other than a pharmacist) was a crime or that it was punishable. It was 
held that “an inference of an intention to criminalise the prohibited conduct” could be 
made, considering the statutory language.981 De Villiers JP and Mason J found that 
“the act in question was expressly prohibited in the public interest and with the evident 
intention of constituting an offence, it is punishable under our law”.982 This approach 
cannot be supported as it could potentially constitute a violation of the principle of 
legality.983 
The same logic in Frederiksen would apply here in allowing similar fact evidence 
and hearsay under Chapter 4 of POCA and in the context of expanding the dragnet of 
criminalisation. Considerations of legality are at stake.  
A court, in light of the judgment in Frederiksen, would therefore have to take 
extreme care in the consideration of hearsay evidence under Chapter 4 of POCA and 
only allow it as per the GLAA and similarly only allow similar fact evidence under the 
provisions of the CPA. Where an accused faces charges under both Chapters 2 and 
                                            
978 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC). The Constitutional Court at para 28 confirmed that a statute “must be given 
their ordinary grammatical meaning” but there are three “interrelated riders” qualifying this general 
principle, specifically  
(a)  that statutory provisions should always be interpreted purposively; 
(b)  the relevant statutory provision must be properly contextualised and 
(c)  all statutes must be construed consistently with the Constitution, that is, where 
reasonably possible, legislative provisions ought to be interpreted to preserve their 
constitutional validity. This proviso to the general principle is closely related to the 
purposive approach referred to in (a) [footnotes omitted]. 
979 Frederiksen para 16. 
980 1917 TPD 52. 
981 Forlee at 56; Frederiksen para 16. 
982 Forlee at 56. 
983 See 5 3 2 below. 
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4 of POCA, a court should only follow the relaxed approach for hearsay and/or similar 
fact evidence for the charges under Chapter 2. If hearsay evidence and/or similar fact 
evidence pertains to the charges under POCA Chapter 4, then the evidence must only 
be allowed by the court in terms of the empowering provisions under the GLAA or the 
CPA. The answer is not quite as obvious where a single criminal endeavour gives rise 
to charges under both Chapters 2 and 4. This author submits that it would be 
impermissible to use hearsay evidence admitted under Chapter 2, for charges under 
Chapter 4 – even where it relates to the same criminal endeavour. Section 2(2) clearly 
states that “[t]he court may hear evidence, including evidence with regard to hearsay, 
similar facts or previous convictions, relating to offences contemplated in subsection 
(1) (…)”. Subsection (1) refers to section 2(1) – racketeering offences. A strict and 
proper interpretation of the statute would therefore not allow this evidence to be 
admissible for charges under Chapter 4 of POCA. That would lead to the anomaly that 
the State would have to argue for the same hearsay or similar fact evidence to be 
admitted under the respective statutes, despite it being admitted as evidence already. 
This is admittedly a strict approach but the only proper interpretation of the statute in 
light of the ostensible casus omissus. 
Some of these evidentiary issues as well as various other constitutional challenges 
were addressed in the High Court judgment of Savoi and Others v National Director 
of Public Prosecutions and Another (“Savoi I”)984 and the subsequent Constitutional 
Court judgment in Savoi and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Another (“Savoi II”).985 
The applicants in Savoi I argued that the admission of the previous convictions of 
the accused in terms of POCA subsection 2(2) violated his right to a fair trial in terms 
of section 35(3) of the Constitution.986 It was further argued that the relevant provisions 
of POCA were broad in scope and “irrational meaningless and unconstitutional” 
because the Act contains no guidelines for the admission of these types of 
evidence.987 The respondents replied by arguing that these expansions to the 
traditional rules of the law of evidence were necessary in order to combat sophisticated 
                                            
984 [2013] 3 All SA 548 (KZP).  
985 2014 (5) SA 317 (CC).  
986 Savoi I 114.  
987 Savoi I 115.  
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organised crime. Consequently, a more flexible approach to the traditional evidentiary 
rules must be followed. This flexible approach, so the respondents alleged, did not 
interfere with the criminal onus of proof and that the admission of evidence remains in 
the sphere of the judicial officer’s discretion.988 
Madondo J confirmed that it is the duty of the judicial officer to guard against 
inadmissible evidence. He referred to S v Aimes (“Aimes”)989 and stated that the 
standard for admitting such evidence (in terms of the discretion of the judicial officer) 
is found in this case. It was decided in Aimes that evidence may only be allowed when 
the admission of that evidence does not result in an unfair trial or is otherwise 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.990  
The Court in Savoi I identified two exceptions to the prohibition against the proof of 
prior convictions: Firstly, when the probative value surpasses the prejudicial effect of 
the inadmissible evidence and secondly when a prior conviction is an element of a 
separate offence in terms of section 211 of the CPA. Madondo J was of the opinion 
that subsection 2(2) of POCA upholds the constitutional standard in terms of section 
35(5) of the Constitution. Evidence of prior convictions shall consequently be rejected 
if it renders the trial unfair or is otherwise detrimental to the administration of justice.991 
Consequently, according to Madondo J, considering the fact that subsection 2(2) of 
POCA incorporates the constitutional guidelines for admissible evidence, it becomes 
unnecessary to lay down additional guidelines, as alleged by the applicants.992  This 
reasoning is somewhat odd. Section 35(5) lays down guidelines as to when to exclude 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence and does not provide guidelines as to how and 
when exactly evidence should be included. Guidelines pertaining to the inclusion of 
evidence in the context of racketeering would for example be by requiring the predicate 
offences to be separated by a maximum of ten years. This sets a standard for inclusion 
by qualifying categories of evidence.  
This approach by Madondo J is probably incorrect. It is submitted that the reliance 
on section 35(5) was incorrect because the vexed issue was never improperly or 
illegally obtained evidence. Section 2(2) of POCA is reminiscent of section 35(5), and 
                                            
988 Savoi I 115. 
989 1998 (1) SACR 343 (C).  
990 Aimes 350. 
991 Savoi I 121; S v Mfene and another 1998 (9) BCLR 1157 (N) at 1167C and 1168B‐D.  
992 Savoi I 121. 
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case law pertaining to trial fairness might be instructive. The relevant constitutional 
right was the right to a fair trial in terms of section 35(3). The issue was whether this 
traditionally impermissible category of evidence, excluded due to its prejudicial effects, 
renders a trial unfair.  
The Constitutional Court in Savoi II addressed the same issues as discussed in the 
High Court judgment in Savoi I but followed a different approach. The applicants 
argued this time that the inclusion of otherwise inadmissible evidence in terms of 
section 2(2) of POCA would automatically constitute an unfair trial.993 Madlanga J, in 
a unanimous judgment by the Constitutional Court, came to the conclusion that the 
inclusion of prior convictions, in terms of sections 211 of the CPA and 2(2) of POCA, 
did not offend section 35(3) of the Constitution.994 The Court then further approached 
the challenge to admission of prior convictions mainly through the lens of similar fact 
evidence.995 The Court correctly pointed out that the law pertaining to similar fact 
evidence has been surrounded by confusion, possibly due to the “vast morass of 
authority”.996 Madlanga J additionally mentions that the so-called category approach 
as developed after Makin is still the law of the land in South Africa. The Court doubted 
why evidence pertaining to the proclivity of a certain accused is not relevant to the 
issue before a court. There was however no undertaking to suggest how the law 
relating to similar fact evidence should be developed but is in favour of a less restrictive 
approach.997 It was however firm in its stance in asserting that similar fact evidence 
and evidence of prior convictions is, under certain circumstances, an acceptable 
category of evidence and does not automatically render a trial unfair.998 
                                            
993 Savoi II at 36. Also see IM Rautenbach “Overview of Constitutional Court Judgments on The Bill of 
Rights – 2014” (2015) 2 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 379 391. 
994 Savoi II para 60 
995 Savoi II para 62.  
996 See Savoi II 50 and fn 75, where Madlanga J refers to an article by Zeffertt – see DT Zeffertt “Similar-
fact Evidence in Criminal Proceedings” (1977) 94 South African Law Journal 399 399. 
997 Savoi II para 58. 
998 Savoi II para 59. 
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5 3 1 4 Foreign law 
5 3 1 4 1 USA 
Constitutional challenges to STEP have not addressed the use of prior convictions 
as elements of a separate crime. There have, however, been concerns about the use 
of prior convictions constituting double jeopardy. In In re Jose P. (“Jose P.”),999 the 
appellant argued that the underlying “objective and intent as to both crimes had to be 
the same” thus constituting double punishment for the same act. The Court did not 
agree with this reasoning and stated that section 186(22) required “a separate intent 
and objective from the underlying felony committed on behalf of the gang”.1000 Premo 
J relied on People v. Herrera (“Herrera”)1001 where the court in a similar situation came 
to the conclusion that the accused had “two independent, even if simultaneous, 
objectives”.1002 
5 3 1 4 2 Canada 
 The Court in R v Terezakis (“Terezakis”)1003 addressed the use of prior convictions 
as predicate elements. The respondent argued that his right to a fair trial would be 
infringed upon due to the reliance on evidence of his bad character which would 
otherwise be inadmissible.1004  Although the Court conceded that there is a risk of 
unfair prejudice, especially in the context of jury trials, the probative value of evidence 
of general propensity and bad character outweigh such prejudice. A trial judge 
furthermore retains his or her residual discretion to exclude evidence if the prejudicial 
effect outweighs the probative value.1005 
                                            
999 106 Cal.App.4th 458 (2003). 
1000 Jose P. 471.  
1001 (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456. 
1002 Herrera 1467-1468. 
1003 2007 BCCA 384. Appealing from the Supreme Court of British Columbia in R. v. Accused No. 1 et 
al., 2005 BCSC 1727 (“Accused”). 
1004 Terezakis paras 46. 
1005 Terezakis paras 46-47. 
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5 3 1 5 Evaluation  
The South African common law, as influenced by English law and developed by 
case law and the subsequent statutory developments, makes it clear that under certain 
circumstances a court may hear evidence of an accused’s prior convictions. Statutory 
exceptions, such as those contained in POCA and empowered by the CPA, have 
created scenarios that were never envisioned by Lord Herschel and others who 
developed the rule as it applies in South Africa today. It thus becomes difficult to 
reconcile the “morass of authority” with modern considerations. The inclusion of prior 
convictions can be readily justified if one considers that the predicate offences have 
“material bearing on the issue to be decided”1006 and are not used to show that the 
accused has the propensity to commit a certain type of crime. One could possibly 
argue that the accused is convicted because he has committed a certain type of crime 
(those listed in Schedule 1 to POCA) repeatedly. 
It is best to view the relevant sections of POCA strictly for what they are: a separate 
crimes relying on past events as their elements and therefore having material bearing 
on the issue before the court. All that has to be proved (and should be proved) is the 
fact that the accused had committed the predicate offences.1007 Categorising predicate 
crimes as similar fact evidence, as the Constitutional Court in Savoi II has done, might 
also be somewhat of a misnomer because the actus reus of crimes listed in Chapters 
2 and 4 will often substantially differ from the underlying predicate acts.  
The South African Law Reform Commission’s report entitled Review of the Law of 
Evidence (“Project 126”) 1008 made no recommendations regarding the use of prior 
convictions in terms of section 211 of the CPA but it was mentioned in its Report on 
Sexual Offences (“Project 107”).1009 Project 126 succinctly reflects the position in our 
law by stating that similar fact evidence may be used if its function is other than 
evidence of character. Although this is a somewhat rudimentary view of the matter, it 
can once again be seen that evidence of prior convictions is an accepted and 
admissible category of evidence. The main qualifier is that it should not be used as a 
                                            
1006 See Harris at 710. 
1007 See 5 3 1 1 3 above. 
1008 South African Law Reform Commission Review of the Law of Evidence (Issue Paper 26): Project 
126 (2008).  
1009 South African Law Commission Report on Sexual Offences: Project 107 (2002). 
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weapon against the character of the accused. If so, the judicial officer still has a 
residual discretion not to allow the evidence where that is its only function and is not 
being used as an element to prove the crimes under Chapters 2 and 4. The inclusion 
of prior convictions under Chapters 2 and 4 of POCA thus does not violate the right of 
an accused to a fair trial.  
5 3 2 The principle of legality  
5 3 2 1 Introduction 
It is necessary to analyse Chapters 1 and 4 of POCA in light of the principle of 
legality. The principle of legality is a foundational principle of our constitutional 
democracy1010 and functions to constrain the powers of the judicial, executive and 
legislative branches of the government and also to prevent misuse of their powers – 
therefore protecting the persons that are subjected to these powers.1011  
The content of the principle manifests in the Latin maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena 
sine lege or, no crime, no punishment without law,1012 coined by Paul von 
Feuerbach.1013 Von Feuerbach’s formulation calls for two categories. Firstly, it requires 
that 
                                            
1010 Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape v Prins and Others 2012 (2) SACR 183 (SCA) 
(“Prins”) at para 6. 
1011 Prins at para 6. Also see L Jordaan “Die legaliteitsbeginsel en die toelaatbaarheid van regterlike 
aktivisme by die ontwikkeling van die substantiewe strafreg (deel 1)” (2014) 2 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 264 264 fn 2 where the author refers to Prins. See further CR Snyman Criminal Law 
(2008) 36; CR Snyman Strafreg (2012) 37. L Mnguni & J Muller “The principle of legality in constitutional 
matters with reference to Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC)” 
(2009) 13 LDD 112 113 as well as DC van der Linde ŉ Patroon van kriminele bende-aktiwiteite: Die 
oplossing tot Suid Afrika se bendemisdaad of ŉ wit olifant? ŉ Kritiese, regsvergelykende en 
konstitusionele studie van Hoofstuk 4 van die Wet op die Voorkoming van Georganiseerde Misdaad 
121 van 1998 Unpublished LLM dissertation (2015) 50. Also, see Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and 
Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) at 
especially paras 53-58 where the Constitutional Court discussed the control of public power under the 
greater umbrella of the rule of law. The exercise of public power, which was subject to the rule of rule 
in the pre-constitutional era, is now subject entrenched in the Constitution – especially section 1(c).  
1012 See generally R Ramosa “The limits of judicial law-making in the development of common-law 
crimes: Revisiting the Masiya decisions” (2009) 3 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 353 358.  
1013 IL Fraser “The Foundations of Criminal Law and the Nullum Crimen Principle” (2007) 5 JICL 1005 
1008. For the original text, see PJA von Feuerbach Lehrbuch des gemeinen in Deutschland gültigen 
peinlichen Rechts 11 ed (1832) 18-19. 
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(I) [a]ny infliction of punishment presupposes a penal law. (Nulla poena sine lege.) For 
only the threat of evil by law constitutes the foundation of the notion, as well as the 
legal possibility, of punishment. 
And furthermore that an 
(II) [i]nfliction of punishment is conditional upon the existence of the action subject to 
the threat. (Nulla poena sine crimine) For the law links the threatened punishment to 
the act as a legally necessary precondition of punishment.1014 
Courts are confined to the definition of that crime and may not extend that crime or 
create new crimes to punish the conduct of the accused.1015 The rationale behind this 
principle is that it protects the members of the public from arbitrary punishment, 
deprivation of freedom and protects human dignity.1016 The common law principle of 
legality, now manifested in section 35(3) of the Constitution, facilitates the protection 
of especially two constitutional rights of accused persons, specifically the right not to 
be detained without just cause (section 12(1)(a)) and dignity (section 10).1017 
There was insurgency in Europe against the forces in power during the Age of the 
Enlightenment. This was the era of inception for the principle of legality1018 and during 
that time two texts spoke of aspects reminiscent of the modern principle of legality. 
The Italian criminologist and jurist Cesare Beccaria1019 made several references to the 
restriction of public power and the deprivation of civil liberties in his seminal treatise 
Dei delitti e delle pene in 1764. Beccaria was firm on the function of judicial officers 
and for example stated that 
                                            
1014 Fraser (2007) JICL 1008; von Feuerbach Lehrbuch 12-19.  
1015 LAWSA par 22. In S v Ndebele and Others 2012 (1) SACR 245 (GSJ) (“Ndebele”), however, the 
South Gauteng High Court division of the High Court extended the definition of theft to include electricity 
theft, based on the fact that even though electricity is invisible it does take on a physical manifestation. 
See Ndebele, especially 254-256.  
1016 JM Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure – Volume I: General Principles of Criminal law 
(2011) 35. 
1017 Also see F Snyckers & J Le Roux “Criminal Procedure: Rights of Arrested, Detained and Accused 
Persons” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 07-06) 
51-2, as well as Ramosa (2009) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 385.  
1018 Snyman Criminal Law 39; Prins para 7. 
1019 The classical formulation of the principle of legality is said to originate from Beccaria and Paul von 
Feuerbach. See EM Wise “Criminal Law” in Clark & Ansay (eds) Introduction to the Law of the United 
States (2002) 139 140-141.  
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[t]he laws only can determine the punishment of crimes; and the authority of making 
penal laws can only reside with the legislator, who represents the whole society united 
by the social compact. No magistrate then, (as he is one of the society,) can, with 
justice, inflict on any other member of the same society punishment that is not ordained 
by the laws. But as a punishment, increased beyond the degree fixed by the law, is the 
just punishment with the addition of another, it follows that no magistrate, even under 
a pretence of zeal, or the public good, should increase the punishment already 
determined by the laws.1020 
Later, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (“the French 
Declaration”) in 1789 declared in articles 7 and 8: 
(7)  No man may be accused, arrested or detained except in the cases determined 
by the Law, and following the procedure that it has prescribed. Those who 
solicit, expedite, carry out, or cause to be carried out arbitrary orders must be 
punished; but any citizen summoned or apprehended by virtue of the Law, must 
give instant obedience; resistance makes him guilty. 
(8)  The Law must prescribe only the punishments that are strictly and evidently 
necessary; and no one may be punished except by virtue of a Law drawn up 
and promulgated before the offense is committed, and legally applied.1021  
In its substantive application under South African law, statutes or crimes under the 
common law that violate the principle could be challenged and may be declared 
unconstitutional or voided by a court.1022 This ancient principle, which has been 
judicially developed and entrenched in the Constitution, finds expression in five distinct 
yet sometimes overlapping facets. Firstly, there is the ius acceptum principle which 
requires an offence must be recognised under the common law or statute for an 
accused to be found guilty of that crime. Secondly, ius praevium requires the offence 
to have existed at the time of the commission of the crime. The ius strictum principle 
thirdly requires courts to interpret statutes or the common law in a strict fashion and 
fourthly ius certum requires crimes to be expressed in a clear and certain terms, and 
                                            
1020 See C Beccaria On Crimes and Punishment (1764) (original text); See PH Nicklin An Essay on 
Crimes and Punishments (1819) 20 (translated text).. 
1021 Translated from the original French text.  
1022 Savoi I at 104; LAWSA par 22.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 224 
 
finally, the prescribed punishment must also comply with the aforementioned 
principles.1023  
5 3 2 2 The principle of legality in constitutional perspective 
It is submitted that the definitions in section 1 of POCA potentially violate the 
principle of legality by utilising dubiously wide descriptions. These definitions make 
use of the word “includes” at the beginning of the definitions thus rendering the 
definitions merely directory, as well as vague and thus possibly unconstitutional. 
The definition of “criminal gang” in terms of section 1 reads as follows:  
‘[C]riminal gang' includes any formal or informal ongoing organisation, association, or 
group of three or more persons, which has as one of its activities the commission of 
one or more criminal offences, which has an identifiable name or identifying sign or 
symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in 
a pattern of criminal gang activity.1024 
The other problematic definition relates to a “pattern of criminal gang activity”. It 
provides that a pattern of criminal gang activity  
includes the commission of two or more criminal offences referred to in Schedule 1: 
Provided that at least one of those offences occurred after the date of commencement 
of Chapter 4 and the last of those offences occurred within three years after a prior 
offence and the offences were committed 
(a) on separate occasions; 
(b) on the same occasion, by two or more persons who are members of, or belong 
to, the same criminal gang1025  
These constitutionally suspect provisions will now be evaluated through the three 
relevant facets of the principle of legality.  
5 3 2 2 1 Ius certum 
Ius certum requires legislation to be drafted or phrased in certain and clear terms. 
This principle does not necessitate absolute certainty but must at least be capable to 
                                            
1023 JM Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure – Volume I: General Principles of Criminal law 
(2011) 35-37.  
1024 Own emphasis.  
1025 Own emphasis.  
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reasonable interpretation and application.1026 Section 35(3)(a) of the Constitution 
entrenches this principle and states that the accused “to be informed of the charge 
with sufficient detail to answer it” because, as Burchell points out, criminal laws that 
are drafted in vague terms impair an accused person’s right to a fair trial.1027 If a statute 
is drafted vaguely, an accused cannot know how to adjust his or her conduct in order 
to avoid traversing the line between legal and illegal conduct,1028 or know how to 
adequately respond to a charge against them. The (partially) uncodified criminal law 
system of South Africa also poses an additional danger to the ius certum principle due 
to conflicting and sometimes inaccessible judgments which do not promote legal 
certainty.1029 The law can however not remain static. This creates a tension with the 
duty on courts to “promote the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights” when 
interpreting legislation or developing the common law in terms of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution and there have been examples in case law where judicial development 
or extension of definitions by analogy have been appropriate in order to address 
modern or evolved circumstances that the common law or legislation did not 
address.1030 Phelps, in response to Snyman’s critique against the controversial 
Constitutional Court judgment in Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria 
and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies and Another, Amici Curiae) 
(“Masiya”)1031, correctly pointed out that  
[i]f the Constitutional Court is prohibited from intervening in order to bring the law in 
line with the rights contained in the Bill of Rights, the concept of constitutional 
supremacy is robbed of substance.1032 
                                            
1026 See Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC) 
paras 108-109. 
1027 JM Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure – Volume I: General Principles of Criminal law 
(2011) 35. 
1028 J Grant “Defences under the protection of State Information Bill: Justifications and the demands of 
certainty” (2012) 28 South African Journal of Human Rights 328 343. 
1029 Snyman Strafreg 40-41. 
1030 K Phelps “A Dangerous Precedent Indeed—A Response To CR Snyman’s Note on Masiya” (2008) 
128(4) South African Law Journal 648 658. 
1031 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC).  
1032 Phelps (2008) South African Law Journal 658. 
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Ius certum has often manifested itself as the doctrine of vagueness in case law and 
has been the focus of various disputes since the advent of the Constitution. The 
principle provides suitable criteria against which to measure the constitutionally 
suspect provisions of POCA. The Constitutional Court in Savoi II has addressed the 
issue of vagueness of certain provisions in Chapters 1 and 2 of POCA. The applicants 
in Savoi II argued that the definition of “pattern of racketeering activity” was 
unconstitutionally vague and thus void. Furthermore, the applicants argued that the 
definition of “enterprise” was overbroad and unconstitutional.1033  
In addressing these assertions, Madlanga J refers to the Constitutional Court’s 
previous judgmentjudgment in Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of 
Health and Others (“Affordable Medicines”)1034 where the Court considered the 
meaning of the vagueness doctrine. There, Ngcobo J stated that the principle of 
legality requires that legislation must be constructed in a “clear and accessible 
manner”.1035 The doctrine does however not require “perfect lucidity” but only 
“reasonable certainty”.1036 It appears if Ngcobo J formulated the test for vagueness in 
South African law to be whether those affected by the statute can, with reasonable 
certainty, ascertain what is required of them.1037  
The Court in Affordable Medicines also refers to R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical 
Society (“Nova Scotia”)1038 where the Canadian Supreme Court investigated the 
vagueness doctrine in light of judgments by the European Court of Justice. The Court 
in Nova Scotia makes several important observations. A legislature might have to 
phrase legislation in broad terms in order to achieve its objectives. Drafting legislation 
in such broad terms is necessary because public policy evolves over time and its effect 
on legislation and the application in specific cases, over time, will vary.1039 Legislation 
drafted in strict terms furthermore obstructs the state from achieving its legislative 
goals. This might well be the case with these definitions. One of the points of criticism 
                                            
1033 Savoi II 15. 
1034 2006 (3) SA 247 (CC).  
1035 Affordable Medicines para 108 where the Constitutional Court is referring to R v Pretoria Timber Co 
(Pty) Ltd and Another 1950 (3) SA 163 (A).  
1036 Affordable Medicines para 108, referring to the judgement in R v Jopp and Another 1949 (4) SA 11 
(N).  
1037 Affordable Medicines para 109. 
1038 1992 CanLII 72 (SCC).  
1039 Nova Scotia  
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against criminalising gang activity in terms of a statute, is that such a statute 
presupposes that gangs share certain universal characteristics.1040 A balance between 
the state’s so-called “social interests” and the rights of an accused is consequently 
required. Lastly, Madlanga J observes that legislation drafted in general terms might 
be more accommodating towards the fundamental rights of an accused and might not 
require invalidation, as with the case under a strictly defined statute.1041  
Madlanga J came to the conclusion that the impugned provisions in POCA were in 
fact not unconstitutionally vague. This was mainly due to two reasons. Although the 
applicants contended that the requirements in establishing the pattern of racketeering 
is so “numerous and varied” that it rendered its entire definition vague, the Court stated 
that there must be a planned, ongoing, continuous or repeated participation in these 
offences.1042 The Court additionally pointed out that the crimes listed in the Schedule 
go beyond what traditionally constitutes organised crime and that due to the 
interconnected, varied and orchestrated nature of organised crime, it is necessary to 
target a varied field of criminal activities that criminal syndicates may engage in.1043 
The second argument, namely the contention that the offences listed in Schedule 1 of 
POCA were vague, especially those relating to coinage and exchange control,1044 was 
also rejected.1045 While offences may appear obscure in nature and may on the face 
of it not have anything to do with organised crime, the Court correctly pointed out that 
organised crime has an interconnected and far-reaching nature, requiring a wide 
criminal net to be cast,1046 thus echoing the sentiments in Nova Scotia. This 
nevertheless did not render the entire Schedule unconstitutionally vague.1047 
Madlanga J stated that most people would certainly be aware of the existence of such 
                                            
1040 Burchell Principles 909-910. 
1041 Nova Scotia 641.  
1042 Savoi II para 18.  
1043 Paras 22-27. 
1044 Respectively items 21 and 26 of Schedule 1. 
1045 Savoi II [20]. 
1046 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice in R v Lindsay 2004 (2004) 182 C.C.C. (3d) 301 (“Lindsay 
2004”) made a similar statement and also rejected claims that the relevant sections of the Code, which 
allowed for a myriad of seemingly random predicate crimes to be used, were impermissibly overbroad. 
It conceded that the nature of organised crime did not lend itself to a closed list of crimes. See Lindsay 
2004 para 44. 
1047 Savoi II [20]. 
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offences in broad terms, even though they may not know the exact content of the 
prohibitions.1048 This statement is made in reference to the Appellate Division 
judgment in S v De Blom (“De Blom”)1049 where it was stated that it is not necessary 
for the accused to know the precise terms of the legislation that he or she is 
contravening but only that the act is unlawful or for the accused to foresee the 
possibility of it being unlawful.1050  
This approach has not been without criticism. Freedman argues that the 
methodology and approach shows the Constitutional Court’s reluctance to follow a 
strict application of the vagueness doctrine.1051 This is due to the wide and obscure 
range of offences in terms of Items 21 and 26 of Schedule 1, with reference to the 
South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989 (“Reserve Bank Act”) and Prevention of 
Counterfeiting of Currency Act 16 of 1965 (“Counterfeiting Act”), as well as the 
Exchange Control Regulations (promulgated in GN R111).1052 Section 34(1)(f) of the 
Reserve Bank Act, for example, criminalises the act of defacing, soiling, damaging or 
attaching drawings to any coin which is legal tender. If a group of vandals make it their 
objective to repeatedly deface South African coins, they could potentially be held 
criminally liable for several of the offences listed in Chapter 4 of POCA. Whether the 
general public knows of the existence of such an offence and that committing it various 
times, with a group of people, could result in a gang conviction, is open for debate but 
is strongly doubted. Freedman does however concede the fact that the attack in Savoi 
II was brought in the abstract and not based on specific factual matrix and the Court 
only had to show that items 21 and 26 were not prima facie vague.1053  
This problem is not limited to South Africa. Schloenhardt, in his comprehensive 
review of organised crime legislation, pointed out countries employing a model utilising 
a list of predicate offences often struggled to achieve a sufficiently expansive list 
(without it being unconstitutionally broad and uncertain) whilst focusing on crimes that 
                                            
1048 Savoi II [21], relying on S v De Blom 1977 (3) SA 513 (A). 
1049 1977 (3) SA 513 (A).  
1050 De Blom 530. See Savoi II 20. 
1051 W Freedman “Recent cases” (2014) 3 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 466 473.  
1052 W Freedman “Recent cases” (2014) 3 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 473. 
1053 W Freedman “Recent cases” (2014) 3 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 473.  
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are traditionally associated with organised crime as well as keeping it up to date with 
emerging criminal trends.1054  
If the Affordable Medicines test1055 has to be applied to the definitions in Chapter 1 
of POCA, they would probably not survive constitutional scrutiny. It could still be 
argued that people could avoid participating in gangs “in the general sense” but 
considering the extremely technical nature of “pattern of criminal gang activities” and 
the plethora of meanings that it could encompass, it would be hard for those affected 
by the legislation to, with reasonable certainty, ascertain what is expected of them in 
order to avoid prosecution if a court is free to interpret that provision as directory in its 
current form. Also, considering the wide and varied nature of Schedule 1 which 
incorporates various crimes contained in different statutes, it could hardly be argued 
that the crimes are clear, certain and reasonably ascertainable by the general public. 
The Court in S v Jordaan and Others WCC 16-11-2017 case no CC20/2017 
(“Jordaan”) admitted to the ambiguity regarding the definition of a “pattern of criminal 
gang activity”. This judgment will be discussed in the following section. 
5 3 2 2 2 Ius strictum  
The aforementioned problems link and somewhat overlap with the second facet, 
which is the ius strictum principle. This principle requires courts not to strain or stretch 
the words and definitions within a statute in order to bring the conduct of the accused 
within the ambit of those words and definitions1056 or extend the scope of crimes by 
way of analogy. Courts must avoid crossing the “tenuous line between interpretation 
and innovation”.1057 In the divisive Masiya judgment the Constitutional Court stated 
that:  
                                            
1054 A Schloenhardt Palermo on the Pacific Rim: Organised Crime Offences in The Asia Pacific Region 
(2009) 270. It appears (as at November 2017) Schedule 1 of POCA has been amended a total of six 
times over the course of nineteen years. This, inter allia, includes the addition of Item 33A which makes 
offences under Chapter 2 of the Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act 7 of 2013 
predicate offences for purposes of Schedule 1 of POCA.  
1055 See Affordable Medicines 108-109 especially.  
1056 Snyman Criminal Law 44; Burchell Criminal Law & Procedure 37; R Ramosa “The limits of judicial 
law-making in the development of common-law crimes: Revisiting the Masiya decisions” (2009) 3 South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 353 360-361. 
1057 Ackermann J in S v Von Molendorff and Another 1987 (1) SA 135 (T) at 169 referring to Burchell 
and Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure vol I (General Principles) 47-55.  
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Courts must be astute to avoid the appropriation of the Legislature's role in law reform 
when developing the common law. The greater power given to the Courts to test 
legislation against the Constitution should not encourage them to adopt a method of 
common-law development which is closer to codification than incremental, fact-driven 
development.1058  
This salient principle of criminal justice can also be found in international law,1059 such 
as in article 22(2) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“the Rome 
Statute”):1060  
The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by 
analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person 
being investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 
An underlying value of this principle is that courts should rather elect a (strict) 
interpretation of a statute that favours the liberty of an accused and avoid a definition 
that would deprive the accused of his or her liberty.1061  
These principles can be employed to save the definitions of “pattern of criminal 
activity” and “criminal gang” from possible unconstitutionality or legislative 
intervention. Courts must rather strictly adhere to the definitions in Chapter 1 than elect 
to interpret the definitions as merely being directory. In its current form, a court can 
interpret these definitions to be of a “nontechnical” or “general nature” as Snyman 
                                            
1058 Masiya para 31. 
1059 See also generally G Werle & F Jessberger Principles of International Criminal Law 3 ed (2014) 39-
41. 
1060 Adopted 17 July 1998 (entered into force 1July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90. Article 28(a) of the Statute of 
Rome was considered in light of article 22(2). The Trial Chamber in The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo ICC-01/05-01/08 (15 June 2009) para 423 stated that it was bound by “the principle of 
strict interpretation (…) mirrored in [article 22(2)) (…) as a part of the principle nullum crimen sine lege”. 
The Trial Chamber seems to have read in a requirement of causality between a superior’s failure to 
exercise proper control in the resultant crimes that were committed due to this ineffectual control.  
1061 Otherwise known as in favoram libertas; see JM Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure 
– Volume I: General Principles of Criminal law (2011) 37. See S v Von Molendorff and Another 1987 
(1) SA 135 (T) at 170, where Ackermann J states that “(…) if there is doubt as to whether particular acts 
are covered by the definition of a common law crime, the accused ought to be given the benefit of the 
doubt”. This principle is also reflected in article 22(2) of the Statute of Rome.  
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claims.1062 Kruger supports this interpretation by stating that it is not necessary for a 
“pattern of criminal gang activity” to consist of two or more criminal offences due to the 
directory nature of the definition.1063 This is in itself illogical because a pattern 
inherently has multiple instances. In S v Eyssen (“Eyssen II”),1064 in the context of the 
definition of “pattern of racketeering activity” with reference to offences relating to 
racketeering activity in Chapter 2, the Supreme Court of Appeal relied on the definition 
of “pattern” in the Oxford English Dictionary and stated that it was “’an order or form 
discernible in things, actions, ideas, situations, etc. Frequently with [“]of[”] as pattern 
of behaviour = behaviour pattern’”.1065 It is clear that reference is made to these 
aspects in the plural form. This interpretation was relied on with approval by the 
Constitutional Court in Savoi II.1066 These two “pattern definitions” are however not 
completely analogous. A “pattern of racketeering activity” in terms of section 1 of 
POCA   
means the planned, ongoing, continuous or repeated participation or involvement in 
any offence referred to in Schedule 1 and includes at least two offences referred to in 
Schedule 1, of which one of the offences occurred after the commencement of this Act 
and the last offence occurred within 10 years (excluding any period of imprisonment) 
after the commission of such prior offence referred to in Schedule 1[.]1067  
Firstly, the Legislature opted to make use of the word “means” at the beginning of the 
aforementioned definition, in contrast with the “pattern of criminal gang activity” that 
uses the word “includes” at the beginning of the definition. Secondly, the word 
“repeated” is used expressly as a manner to describe the required participation in 
racketeering activity. Kruger posits that the differences may merely be due to careless 
                                            
1062 CR Snyman “Die nuwe statutêre misdaad van deelname aan 'n kriminele bende” (1999) 12 South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 213 215.  
1063 It appears that Kruger originally did not agree with this interpretation, stating that it may merely be 
careless drafting by the legislature and the text of the POCA should still be followed by the courts – see 
A Kruger Organised Crime and Proceeds of Crime Law in South Africa (2008) 56. This opinion seems 
to have been abandoned in the second edition – see A Kruger Organised Crime and Proceeds of Crime 
Law in South Africa (2013) 2 ed 72. In the second edition the author states that even if it was merely 
careless drafting, only one predicate crime is required to form a “pattern of criminal gang activity”.  
1064 2009 (1) SACR 406 (SCA). 
1065 Eyssen II at para 8 (Court’s emphasis). 
1066 Savoi II para 19.  
1067 Own emphasis.  
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drafting by the Legislature but this does still not constitute a sufficient reason to require 
at least two predicate acts with regards to a pattern of racketeering activity but only 
one would suffice to form a pattern of criminal gang activity.1068 It is suggested here 
that it is highly unlikely for this to merely be careless drafting but rather the intention 
of the Legislature to create such wide definitions – especially when one considers that 
these directory definitions are used twice in definitions relating to the offences in POCA 
Chapter 4.  
As discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, Binns-Ward J in Jordaan admitted to 
the confusion caused by the definition of “pattern of criminal gang activity” and 
appeared to accept that both an ordinary as well as a strict statutory definition would 
be acceptable. The learned judge held that:  
I have had occasion previously, in S v Peters and Another (unreported judgment 
delivered on 4 November 2013 in case no. SS 17/2013), to remark on the difficulties 
inherent in the definition of ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’, which is used only in s 
9(2)(a) of the Act and in the definition in s 1 of ‘criminal gang’. It was found unnecessary 
in that case to resolve the difficulties; more particularly, whether the import of the term 
was comprehensively determined by the statutory definition, or whether it also bore 
the meaning denoted by the words making it up used in their ordinary sense. The same 
situation applies in this case. In my judgment the state failed to adduce evidence to 
prove a relevant ‘pattern of criminal gang activity’, whether in the defined sense of the 
term or the ordinary meaning of those words (…)1069 
Binns-Ward J did not explicitly make a finding and left the question open to other courts 
to interpret and resolve but did not reject the possibility of the definition also including 
“the meaning denoted by the words making it up used in their ordinary sense”. Such 
an approach is dangerous and could lead to great legal uncertainty.  
These definitions in their current form endanger individual liberty by casting the 
criminal net too wide in that they make persons who do not strictly meet the definitional 
requirements susceptible to prosecution. Problems arise when these provisions do not 
meet the standards of either ius certum or ius strictum. The problems are furthermore 
not limited to the amount of predicate crimes required to form a pattern. If the 
aforementioned definitions are merely directory, then reference to Schedule 1 is 
                                            
1068 Kruger Organised Crime 72.  
1069  Jordaan para 136 (own emphasis). 
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superfluous. Consequently, any common law or statutory crime may be used as a 
predicate crime. The requirement that these crimes be committed “within three years 
after a prior offence” would also not be necessary; and the requirement that the earliest 
offence must have occurred within ten years after a prior offence1070 could also be 
considered to be an optional demarcation. Additional dangers arise when interpreting 
“criminal gang” through a directory lens. A criminal gang must be either a formal or 
informal ongoing structure. The words formal and informal are used to describe the 
phrase ongoing structure. If the structure is no longer required to be ongoing, it may 
form spontaneously or sporadically and then encroaches on the territory covered by 
the common purpose doctrine and thus rendering a substantial part of POCA Chapter 
4 redundant. It would also be unnecessary to prove that this structure has an 
identifiable name or symbol. Requiring the criminal gang to form some type of 
structure, in other words, requiring some level of organisation, would also not be 
necessary. This is an untenable situation and implies an overbroad reach of POCA 
Chapters 1 and 4 which flagrantly offends the principle of legality.  
5 3 2 2 3 Ius praevium 
Ius praevium dictates that an accused may only be found guilty of a crime if the 
conduct was criminalised at the time that the criminal act was executed1071 and this 
principle has been enshrined in section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution.1072 Courts may 
thus not punish an act which has not previously been recognised as criminal 
conduct1073 or find that an accused act that did not satisfy the definitional requirements 
of a crime, declare that a morally repugnant or “shocking” act to now be a crime.1074 
                                            
1070 This raises yet another, separate legality issue – see below. 
1071 JM Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure – Volume I: General Principles of Criminal law 
(2011) 35. 
1072 Section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution states that every accused has the right to “not to be convicted 
for an act or omission that was not an offence under either national or international law at the time it 
was committed or omitted”. Also see JM Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure – Volume I: 
General Principles of Criminal law (2011) 35.  
1073 JM Burchell South African Criminal Law & Procedure – Volume I: General Principles of Criminal law 
(2011) 35.  
1074 See for example in S v Von Molendorff and Another 1987 (1) SA 135 (T) Ackermann J at 169 quotes 
the judgement in R v M 1915 CPD 334 (at 340), where Kotze J stated that: 
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The underlying rationale behind this principle is once again based in fairness and to 
allow the public to not traverse the line between legal and illegal conduct by providing 
them with appropriate forewarning as to what constitutes criminal behaviour.1075  
One of the earliest forms of the prohibition against retrospectivity can be found in 
the Corpus Iuris Civilis and the Digest. The Digest expressed it as “[n]emo potest 
mutare consilium suum in alterius iniuriam”1076 which means that “[n]obody can 
change his argument to the detriment of another”.1077 More importantly, the Corups 
Iuris Civilis stated the following:  
Leges et constitutiones futuris certum est dare fornam negotiis, non ad facta praeterita 
revocari, nisi nominatim etiam de praeterito tempore adhuc pendentibus negotiis 
cautum sit.1078 
  
                                            
Courts of law certainly discountenance anything immoral, but there are some acts of an immoral 
nature which they cannot reach and punish.... We do not possess the power of creating 
offences, upon the ground that, in our opinion, they are contrary to good morals. 
Also see GP Kemp “Nullum crimen sine lege: ‘Hoe staan dit nou in ons reg?’” in Du Plessis & Lubbe 
(eds) Man of Principle – The life and legacy of JC de Wet (2013) 376 386-392 where the author refers 
to Snyman’s criticism of the Masiya judgement. Snyman argues that the Constitutional Court based 
their finding, at least partially, on emotional considerations of the “shocking facts”. See CR Snyman 
“Extending the Scope of Rape – A Dangerous Precedent” (2007) 124 South African Law Journal 
677 680. 
1075 See Savoi II at paras 75-76 where Madlanga refers to comments made Blackstone in the 18th 
century regarding the unfairness and even cruelty of retrospective criminal provisions. 
1076 D 50.17.75. 
1077 A Fellmeth & M Horwit “Nullus commodum capere (potest) de sua iniuria propria” (2009) Guide to 
Latin in International Law 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com.nwulib.nwu.ac.za/view/10.1093/acref/9780195369380.001.0001/acr
ef-9780195369380-e-150> (accessed 20-08-2018). 
1078 C 1.14.7. 
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This translates to: 
It is clear that laws and constitutions create a rule for future cases and cannot be 
applied retroactively to past acts, unless provision has expressly been made 
concerning the past for acts that are still pending.1079  
This sets out the principle that laws should only have future operation and do not have 
application to past events unless explicitly stated.1080 Article 11(2) of Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 stated that 
[n]o one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time 
when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was 
applicable at the time the penal offence was committed. 
                                            
1079 BW Frier & FH Blume The Codex of Justinian 3 Volume Hardback Set: A New Annotated 
Translation, with Parallel Latin and Greek Text (2016) 261. Also see FH Blume “Book I. Title XIV: 
Concerning statutes, imperial constitutions and edicts” UW Digital Libraries 
<http://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-justinian/ajc-edition-2/books/book1/book%201-14rev.pdf> 
(accessed 29-10-2018).  
1080 See EE Smead “The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence” 
(1935-1936) 20 Minnesota Law Review 775 775-776. 
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Section 22(1) of the Rome Statute of the ICC, the International Covenant on 
ICCPR,1081, and national jurisdictions such as Germany1082 are further examples of 
how the principle against retrospectivity finds expression. 
Ius praevium has been expressed in case law as the prohibition against 
retrospective punishment. One must also distinguish between a statute that operates 
retrospectively and one that operates retroactively. The nuanced categories are 
distinguished as follows:  
A retroactive statute is one that operates as of a time prior to its enactment. A 
retrospective statute is one that operates for the future only. It is prospective, but it 
imposes new results in respect of a past event. A retroactive statute operates 
backwards. A retrospective statute operates forwards, but it looks backwards in that it 
attaches new consequences for the future to an event that took place before the statute 
                                            
1081 Article 15(1) holds that 
[n]o one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did 
not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was 
committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time 
when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, 
provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit 
thereby. 
Article 15(1) further reads that  
[n]othing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or 
omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general 
principles of law recognized by the community of nations. 
This text is therefore substantially similar to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Prosecutor 
v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić, Mazim Delić, Esad Landžo IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) para 352 
for reference to Article 15. 
1082 Article 1 of the German Criminal Code. I will be relying on an English translation of the StGB, see 
M Bohlander “German Criminal Code” (10-10-2013) Bundesministerium der Justiz und für 
Verbraucherschutz <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0143> 
(accessed 28-08-2017). The German text reads as follow: “Eine Tat kann nur bestraft werden, wenn 
die Strafbarkeit gesetzlich bestimmt war, bevor die Tat begangen wurde.” 
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was enacted. A retroactive statute changes the law from what it was; a retrospective 
[sic?] changes the law from what it otherwise would be with respect to a prior event.1083 
POCA has already been subjected to constitutional attacks based on its apparent 
retrospectivity, but once again in the context of POCA Chapter 2. In National Director 
of Public Prosecutions v Carolus and Others (“Carolus”),1084 Farlam AJA referred to 
the explicit retrospective nature of various chapters in POCA, including Chapter 4,1085 
thus removing any uncertainty regarding the matter. In the same case, the justice 
refers to the presumption against retrospectivity. This presumption dictates that the 
Legislature did not intend for a statute to function retrospectively, unless it is expressly 
rebutted or through clear interpretation.1086 The Court refers to R v Sillas1087 which 
highlights a mitigating practice in cases where a more severe punishment has been 
prescribed since the commission of the crime. This principle is now a constitutional 
right in terms of section 35(3)(n) of the Constitution.1088  
This issue was more pertinently dealt with in the Savoi II where the Constitutional 
Court considered the matter of retrospectivity of Chapter 2 of POCA. The crux of this 
challenge was that one of the predicate racketeering offences could have been 
committed before the enactment of POCA and whether that renders Chapter 2 of 
POCA retrospective and thus unconstitutional.1089 The Constitutional Court reaffirmed 
previous judgments on retrospectivity such as Basson and Carolus1090 and Madlanga 
J even posited that a violation of the rule against retrospectivity would not only infringe 
on section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution but also the rights to freedom and security of the 
                                            
1083 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Carolus and Others 1999 (2) SACR 607 (SCA) para 34, 
where the Court relies on Canadian authority – see EA Driedger “Statutes: Retroactive Retrospective 
Reflections” (1978) 56(3) Canadian Bar Review 264 268-269. Farlam AJA at para 35 states that 
retroactivity is used to describe retrospectivity in the “strong” sense and retrospectivity is used for 
retrospectivity in the “weak” sense. 
1084 1999 (2) SACR 607 (SCA).  
1085 Carolus para [53].  
1086 Carolus para [31].  
1087 1959 (4) SA 305 (A).  
1088 “Every accused has the right to a fair trial [including] (...) the benefit of the least severe of the 
prescribed punishments if the prescribed punishment for the offence has been changed between the 
time that the offence was committed and the time of sentencing [.]” 
1089 Savoi II [42].  
1090 See paras [74]-[76].  
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person contained in sections 12(1)(a)-(e).1091 The justice importantly highlights the 
core of the rule against retrospectivity – that no criminal sanction must flow from acts 
that predate the enactment of a statute – and that was not the case in POCA Chapter 
2.1092  
Applying the definition and principles of retrospectivity to the definitions in POCA 
Chapter 1, it becomes clear that Chapter 4 operates retrospectively. If Mr X commits 
and is found guilty of several criminal acts listed in Schedule 1 of POCA since 1990, 
more criminal consequences are attached to his prior criminal acts committed since 
1990 after the enactment of POCA than before it. In 1998, for example, his act of 
robbery (whether or not as a member of or in association with a criminal gang) was 
just an act of robbery but after 21 January 1999,1093 it would also constitute a predicate 
act in terms of POCA. The only qualifier is that that the last offence committed by the 
accused must occur within three years after a prior offence as required by section 1. 
This problem is intensified if one takes the abovementioned definitional lacunae into 
consideration. The State could rely on criminal acts stretching far beyond the 
maximum of three years between predicate acts if the definitions in section 1 are only 
directory. There is also no requirement that the underlying pattern of criminal gang 
activity be executed with the mens rea to benefit the gang. 
But, if one follows the reasoning in Savoi II, this prima facie retrospectivity is 
remedied because a predicate act in itself does not give rise to the requisite pattern or 
criminal sanctions. Thus, it would seem, that although POCA Chapters 1 and 4 attach 
novel consequences to already-existing criminal acts, that something additional still 
has to be done before criminal sanctions arises and that sufficient forewarning has 
been given to allow citizens to adjust their conduct accordingly in order to avoid 
prosecution. 
5 3 2 3 Evaluation  
There is a clear and underlying principle throughout the discussion of the various 
facets of the principle of legality: there must be a proactive protection of the accused’s 
                                            
1091 The learned justice does not, however, expand on the assertion but it seems that only subsection 
(a) would be relevant where everyone has the right “not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without 
just cause”. 
1092 Savoi II [80].  
1093 The date of commencement of POCA.  
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liberty when drafting statutes in order to provide fair warning and avoid arbitrary 
punishment. This conclusion is clear from the discussion above that Chapter 4, read 
with Chapter 1 of POCA, offends the ius certum and ius praevium facets of the 
principle of legality. POCA has a retrospective operation by potentially relying on acts 
that took place before the enactment of POCA in 1999. The danger of this still 
occurring almost twenty years after the enactment of POCA is small but not impossible 
if one considers the broad interpretations of the definitions of “pattern of criminal gang 
activity” and “criminal gang” in Chapter 1. If it is accepted by courts that these 
definitions are merely directory, and thus in violation of the ius strictum facet, then the 
State could rely on historic criminal acts separated further in time despite section 1 
requiring that “last of those [predicate] offences occurred within three years after a 
prior offence (…)”. Prescription under section 18 of the Criminal Procedure Act would 
then be the only restricting factor preventing the reliance on certain historic predicate 
acts outside the scope of the wording of the definition in POCA Chapter 1.1094   
                                            
1094 Section 18 of the CPA states that 
The right to institute a prosecution for any offence, other than the offences of 
(a) murder; 
(b) treason committed when the Republic is in a state of war; 
(c) robbery, if aggravating circumstances were present; 
(d) kidnapping; 
(e) childstealing; 
(f) rape or compelled rape as contemplated in section 3 or 4 of the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007, respectively; 
(g) genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, as contemplated in section 4 of 
the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act, 2002; 
(h) any contravention of section 4, 5 or 7 and involvement in these offences as provided 
for in section 10 of the Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act, 2013 
(Act 7 of 2013); 
(hA) trafficking in persons for sexual purposes by a person as contemplated in section 
71 (1) or (2) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment 
Act, 2007; 
(i) using a child or person who is mentally disabled for pornographic purposes as 
contemplated in sections 20 (1) and 26 (1) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007; or 
(j) torture as contemplated in section 4 (1) and (2) of the Prevention and Combating of 
Torture of Persons Act, 2013 (Act 13 of 2013),  
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It is difficult to speculate in the abstract whether the courts will adopt a directory and 
thus more flexible approach to the definitions in POCA section 1. If courts do indeed 
adopt such an approach, that approach will be a flagrant disregard for the ius strictum 
facet and not afford citizens appropriate forewarning or knowledge of the possible 
criminal sanctions. Ius strictum, as mentioned above, is the saving grace of the 
definitions in Chapter 1. A strict interpretation of these definitions would not violate 
these fundamental constitutional values. 
5 3 2 4 Foreign law 
5 3 2 4 1 USA 
The Californian Court of Appeals has ruled on several constitutional challenges to 
STEP. It is necessary to analyse these challenges in the light of the fact that STEP is 
the main legislative inspiration for Chapter 4 of POCA.  
The constitutional challenges to STEP were mainly based on due process 
considerations in that the wording of the statute had a vague and/or overbroad 
application. Due process challenges are based on the Fifth Amendment1095 (binding 
                                            
shall, unless some other period is expressly provided for by law, lapse after the expiration of a period 
of 20 years from the time when the offence was committed. 
Therefore, most predicate crimes listed in Schedule 1 (see Addendum A of this dissertation) would 
prescribe after twenty years even if the definitions were considered to be directory. Note that at the time 
of the submission of this dissertation, the Constitutional Court in Levenstein and Others v Estate of the 
Late Sidney Lewis Frankel and Others (CCT170/17) [2018] ZACC 16 (14 June 2018) held that section 
18 of the CPA was irritational, arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional due to the fact that it limited the 
scope of sexual offences that were subject to prescription. The order of constitutional invalidity was 
suspended for 24 months – giving the Legislature to amend the CPA in accordance with the judgement. 
During the remedial time provided to the Legislature, the words “and all other sexual offences whether 
in terms of common law or statute” should be read into section 18(f) after the words “the Criminal Law 
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007, respectively” (para 89). 
1095 The Fifth Amendment states that 
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the federal government) and Fourteenth Amendment1096 (applicable to individual 
states) to the United States Constitution.1097 These amendments function to protect 
individual liberty and require that the spheres of government to act within their 
conferred powers and provide just and fair procedures.1098   
In In re Alberto R. (“Alberto”)1099 the Court stated that the requirements for a 
vagueness challenge founded in due process are twofold. The statute must firstly “be 
sufficiently defined to provide adequate notice of the conduct proscribed” and must 
secondly provide “sufficiently definite guidelines (…) to prevent arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement”.1100 The first requirement violates due process rights 
when persons with normal intelligence have to guess the meaning of a prohibition 
                                            
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
1096 Section 1 holds that  
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
1097 Due process challenges differ from legality challenges in terms of South African law but these 
doctrines do appear to share common legal ancestry (see above) as well as substantive similarities. 
Features of the principle of legality are found in US law as a general, underlying principle of criminal 
law and does not appear to be as richly and independently developed as in South Africa. Wise notes 
that states have recently opted to incorporate facets of ius acceptum and ius praevium in their state 
constitutions. The ius strictum facet, especially where judicial creation is prohibited, does not form part 
of the US constitutional doctrine but would still not be possible due to the restriction of the power vested 
in them by Congress, and state courts would thus be limited by due process considerations. See EM 
Wise “Criminal Law” in Clark & Ansay (eds) Introduction to the Law of the United States (2002) 139 140-
141. 
1098 P Strauss “Due Process” Wex Legal Library <https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process> 
(accessed 03-11-2015).  
1099 235 Cal.App.3d 1309 (1991).  
1100 Alberto 1316. 
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proscribed in a statute.1101 There is also an underlying argument based on personal 
autonomy: statutes have to be drafted in clear terms so that citizens may freely choose 
whether to obey or disregard them.1102 If not drafted clearly, if takes away this 
autonomy and may “trap the innocent”.1103 Vague and overbroad statutes may 
conversely also cause law abiding citizens to refrain from exercising their 
constitutionally protected freedoms in order to avoid prosecution.1104 The second 
consideration prevents the application of arbitrary and subjective punishment by the 
State and juries.1105  
With regards to broadness, the Court observed that the broadness and vagueness 
doctrines were “logically related”.1106 The prohibition on overbroad statutes is based 
on similar considerations as the vagueness doctrine whereby, in terms of NAACP v. 
Alabama,1107 a statute is so overbroad that it substantially1108 invades the sphere of 
protected individual liberties. The Court relied on United States v. Petrillo1109 and 
states that the constitutional standard requires that the relevant conduct be proscribed 
in a fashion that gives adequate warning to those affected by it “when measured by 
common understanding and practices”.1110 Bjerregaard notes that courts should apply 
heightened scrutiny when applying the vagueness doctrine to situations where 
constitutionally protected behaviour may be limited, such as freedom of association 
when criminalising gang activity.1111  
The most efficient way to illustrate the development of the constitutional 
jurisprudence relating to the development of STEP is to provide a review of the most 
seminal judgments.  
                                            
1101 Alberto 1316.  
1102 Alberto 1316.  
1103 Alberto 1316.  
1104 NAACP v. Button 371 U.S. 415 (1963) 433. Also see B Bjerregaard “The Constitutionality of Anti-
Gang Legislation” (1998) 21(1) Campbell Law Review 31 33. 
1105 Alberto 1316.  
1106 Alberto 1316 referring to Kolender v. Lawson 461 U.S. at p. 359, 103 S.Ct. at p. 1859, fn. 8.).  
1107  377 U.S. 288 (1964), as referred to in Alberto 1316.  
1108 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma 413 US 601 (1973). 
1109 (1947) 332 U.S. 
1110 United States v. Petrillo (1947) 332 U.S.; Alberto 1317.  
1111 Bjerregaard (1998) Campbell Law Review 33.  
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5 3 2 4 1 1 Vagueness and overbreadth: Application in case law  
STEP has been subjected to several constitutional challenges based on the alleged 
vagueness of certain key definitions. The appellant in Alberto R. challenged the 
relevant provisions in STEP on several grounds. It was argued that the sentence 
enhancing provisions in section 186.22(b) were unconstitutionally vague; were 
overbroad in his case and consequently violated his due process rights by not 
providing fair notice of the criminalised conduct, equal protection and freedom of 
association rights.1112  
This attack was directed at numerous phrases of the relevant provisions. The Court 
rejected the contention that the term “benefit of” was ambiguous because it would 
include instances of non-monetary benefit while the legislature could only have 
intended it to include monetary benefits.1113 Huffman J accurately pointed out that the 
legislature had used terms such as “profits” and “proceeds” in the same text to indicate 
monetary benefits and would have done the same if it was applicable to the impugned 
instance. Furthermore, words and phrases must be interpreted with reference to their 
qualifying language which contextualises it and limits its scope.1114 Vagueness and 
overbreadth are avoided in this instance due to the qualifying words “with the specific 
intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members (…)”.1115 
The appellant’s additional contention that an accused would be subjected to arbitrary 
enforcement based on the decision of whether the gang’s “primary activity” is social 
or criminal as required by STEP, was also addressed by the Court.1116 It responded 
by stating that the Act clearly lists which conduct is prohibited and the State 
furthermore has to provide evidence that the primary activity of the group falls within 
the prohibited conduct as per STEP.1117 It could also be phrased that the Act provides 
adequate warning to members of the public which equips them with adequate 
knowledge in order to avoid prosecution. The additional claim that the phrase “active 
participation in criminal gang activity” was overbroad, was also dismissed by the Court. 
                                            
1112 Alberto 1315. 
1113 Alberto 1322. 
1114 Alberto 1322. 
1115 Alberto 1322. 
1116 Alberto 1322. 
1117 Alberto 1322. 
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The requirements in STEP limit the application thereof to situations where alleged 
gang members intentionally further the objectives of the gang and to gang members 
that in fact know of the criminal conduct.1118 Only those persons would face 
prosecution. The Court ultimately rejected all of the contentions made by the appellant 
and furthermore asserted that the language used by the legislature protected his right 
to freedom of association and that the subsection did not offend the doctrines against 
overbreadth and vagueness.1119 
The appellant in People v. Green (“Green”),1120 argued that section 186.22 of STEP 
was so vague that it did not provide the public with adequate notice of the prohibited 
conduct and as a result led to arbitrary enforcement.1121 It was argued that the 
vagueness of the subsection and resultant uncertainty also created the danger that 
legitimate and protected activities fell within the ambit of the statute which caused it to 
be impermissibly overbroad and thus unconstitutional in its application.1122 The 
appellant attacked the terms “active participation” and “members” for being 
constitutionally uncertain. The Court firstly dismissed the challenge to “member” (or 
“membership”) because it is a word with ordinary meaning under the common law and 
has also been judicially interpreted to be “a relationship to an organization that is not 
accidental, artificial or unconsciously in appearance only”.1123 Case law has also 
shown that that a member must actively contribute to the activities of the (criminal) 
organisation by contributing all or a substantial part of his time to it – and not merely 
be a technical, nominal or passive member.1124 Stein AJ pointed out that the 
Californian Legislature had opted to use terminology similar to the approach under the 
common law through the use of the phrase “active participation”. It was further posited 
that this terminology is analogous to “active membership” under the common law and 
thus fringe members would not fall within the ambit of the subsection. Thus, relying on 
the common law requirements for active membership, the Court concluded that the 
members of the public would not be the victim of arbitrary law enforcement or that the 
                                            
1118 Alberto 1324. 
1119 Alberto 1324.  
1120 278 Cal.Rptr. 140 (1991).  
1121 Green 694. 
1122 Green 694. 
1123 Green 699 referring to Galvan v. Press 347 U.S. 522 (1954).  
1124 Green 699-700 referring to Scales v. United States 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
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law would similarly afford insufficient notice to them.1125 The Californian Legislature 
then intervened and inserted a provision overruling this provision.1126  The California 
Supreme Court however overruled this “substantial time” interpretation in People v. 
Castenada (“Castenada”)1127 by stating that all that has to be proved is that the 
defendant’s active participation has been “more than nominal or passive”.1128 
The Court similarly rejected the claims of the appellants against the term 
“membership” stating that although it may not be precisely defined or definable, 
absolute certainty of its meaning is not required. The contention that fringe members 
will be subjected to prosecution was rejected by Stein AJ because these members 
were not in danger of being prosecuted. More than mere membership is required 
under section 186.22.1129 Section 186.22 also withstood an attack on the required 
knowledge of a pattern of criminal gang activity. The Court was not convinced by the 
contention that an accused could be convicted based on gossip of his alleged 
knowledge that the impugned group was involved in a pattern of criminal gang activity. 
Knowledge means “awareness of the particular facts proscribed in criminal 
statutes”1130 and this awareness must relate to the listed crimes under subsection 
186.22(e).1131 This line of reasoning is bolstered with reference to RICO case law 
where a court in United States v. Campanale1132 held that the term “pattern of 
racketeering activity” would be “unmanageable” were it not for the definition and closed 
list of crimes relating to it.1133  
The additional attack to the term “criminal street gang” was considered as meritless 
by the Court. The appellant’s reliance on a New Jersey State Supreme Court decision 
in Lanzetta v. New Jersey1134 was not adequate considering the differences between 
                                            
1125 Green 700.  
1126 Section 186.22(i). Also see See Schloenhardt Organised Crime Offences (2009) 256.  
1127 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 906 (2000). See M Baker “Stuck in the Thicket: Struggling with Interpretation and 
Application of California’s Anti-Gang Step Act” (2006) 11 Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law101 109. 
1128 See Castenada 910-913. 
1129 Green 700. Some additional act of furtherance, promotion, assistance is required.  
1130 Stein AJ referring here to People v. Lopez (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 592. 
1131 Green 702-703. 
1132 (9th Cir.1975) 518 F.2d 352.  
1133 Green 702. 
1134 306 U.S. 456.  
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the two statutes.1135 The Court rather relied on previous judgments based on the RICO 
statute and asserted that the term “enterprize” in terms of RICO was similar to that of 
“gang” under STEP and that the Courts have not had difficulty interpreting the former 
term.1136  
5 3 2 4 2  Canada  
The definition of “criminal organization”1137 and the provision relating to the 
commission of offences by a criminal organization1138 in the Code have also been 
subjected to constitutional scrutiny. Vagueness was once again central to these 
challenges. The leading authority for the application of the vagueness doctrine in terms 
of Canadian constitutional law can be found in the Nova Scotia judgment.1139 The 
Supreme Court of Canada highlighted that a vagueness challenge can be raised both 
under sections 7 and 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“the 
Charter”). A statute may firstly be challenged under section 7 as a matter of 
fundamental justice which requires laws to not be impermissibly vague. A challenge 
may additionally be raised under section 1 in limine. The basis for this challenge is, in 
order for Charter rights to be limited, the limitation has to be prescribed law – but in 
cases of vagueness the limiting instrument is so vague, that it does not meet the 
requirement of it being prescribed law.1140 The doctrine, like in South African and US 
law, is based in the rule of law requiring fair notice be provided to citizens. According 
to Gonthier J in Nova Scotia, a court will have to consider a trilogy of factors in its 
determination of whether a law is impermissibly vague: firstly, the need for flexible 
legislation which can adapt to various factual scenarios and cognisance for the 
interpretative function of the courts, next the fact that absolute certainty cannot be 
achieved but, in its place, “a standard of intelligibility” is favoured, lastly the Court also 
recognised that various judicial interpretations can and may exist and coexist, which 
                                            
1135 See Green 702. 
1136 Stein AJ in Green 702 relied on U.S. v. Perholtz (D.C.Cir.1988) 842 F.2d 343 and United States v. 
Turkette (1981) 452 U.S. 576. Section 186.22, to substantiate this assertion.  
1137 Section 467.1(1) of the Code. 
1138 Section 467.1(12) of the Code. 
1139 And has approvingly been relied on in South African constitutional jurisprudence (see 7 3 1 1). 
1140 Nova Scotia 626. 
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does not necessarily lead to a conclusion of vagueness.1141 The fundamental test for 
vagueness under Nova Scotia is whether a law is so vague that it does not produce 
an adequate basis for legal debate. In other words, one cannot elucidate the meaning 
of the law through the application of reasoned analysis of legal criteria.1142 It does not 
provide fair notice to citizens or curb enforcement discretion by law enforcement 
agencies by delineating the area of risk a statute is proscribing.1143 Although the 
aforementioned test may sound abstract, the analysis must also be contextualised 
through the subject matter, boni mores, the related legislative provisions and former 
judicial interpretation.1144  
Overbreadth is separate and distinct from the vagueness doctrine under Canadian 
law.1145 As stated in R v Zundel (“Zundell”):1146 
Vagueness and overbreadth are two concepts. They can be applied separately, or they 
may be closely interrelated. They intended effect of a statute may be perfectly clear 
and thus not vague, and yet its application may be overly broad. Alternatively, as an 
example of two concepts being closely interrelated, the wording of a statute may be so 
vague that its effect is considered to be overbroad.1147 
The Court in Nova Scotia was however clear in that overbreadth had no independent 
existence in Canadian constitutional law and was merely an “analytical tool”.1148 This 
notion has however been challenged in subsequent decisions applying overbreadth 
                                            
1141 Nova Scotia 627. 
1142 Nova Scotia 639-640. 
1143 Nova Scotia 639.  
1144 R. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031 (“Pacific”) para. 47, referred to by Mackenzie J in 
Terezakis para 23. 
1145 The Court in Nova Scotia emphasised the fact that the doctrine of vagueness and overbreadth are 
to distinct, yet sometimes overlapping doctrines. The Court also pointed out that these doctrines seem 
to intertwine in American constitutional litigation. 
1146 (1987) 58 O.R. (2d).  
1147 Zundell 129 157-158; approvingly relied on by Nova Scotia at 130. 
1148 Nova Scotia 632. This is also the case in South African constitutional law. In Savoi II 31 the 
Constitutional Court said that: 
In our constitutional jurisprudence overbreadth is not a self-standing ground of statutory 
constitutional invalidity. It comes into the equation of general application has been found to limit 
a right in the Bill of Rights in the justification analysis in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution 
once a law of general application has been found to limit a right in the Bill of Rights.  
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as an independent doctrine under section 7 of the Charter and, and where it was stated 
that it involves balance between state interest and individual liberty.1149 The test for 
overbreadth is whether the specific means employed (such as legislation) are 
necessary and consequently do not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve 
the desired state interest.1150  
The relevant provisions of the Code were also unsuccessfully attacked on the 
grounds that they violated the fair trial rights in terms of sections 7 and 11(d) of the 
Charter, as well as rights of freedom of association in terms of section 2(d). 
5 3 2 4 2 1  Application in case law 
In Lindsay 2004 Fuerst J had to address a three-pronged constitutional challenge 
to subsections 467(1) and 467(12) of the Code based on contentions that the 
provisions were vague, broad and/or did not meet the constitutional standard for the 
requisite minimum level of mens rea.1151 It was additionally alleged that section 
467(14) constituted cruel and unusual punishment, thus violating section 12 of the 
Charter by imposing a mandatory consecutive sentence and removing the judicial 
discretion of setting an appropriate sentence.1152 In dealing with the overbreadth 
challenge to the definition of “serious crime”, the Court pointed out that legislators 
cannot envisage every scenario that the legislation may have to address,1153 thus 
requiring it to be drafted in broad terms. The Court held that the definition of “serious 
offence” did not constitute overbroad drafting. This definition, based on the wording in 
the Palermo Convention,1154 is sufficiently defined in the Code and does not punish 
non-criminal or recreational group conduct. The tentacles of organised crime 
structures furthermore require a myriad of predicate activities to be criminalised – even 
                                            
1149 The Court in Lindsay 2004 admitted to the doctrines being distinct but stated, in contrast to Nova 
Scotia, that both vagueness and overbreadth could form the basis for a section 7 Charter challenge. 
See Lindsay 2004 at para 35. 
1150 Lindsay 2004 para 37. 
1151 See Lindsay 2004 paras 11-14.  
1152 Lindsay 2004 para 66. This challenged was not analysed by the Court. Fuerst J found that the 
matter was not ripe to be addressed by the Court yet. See Lindsay 2004 para 66-68. 
1153 Lindsay 2004 para 41. 
1154 Article 2(b) of the Palermo Convention.  
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those that are not prima facie associated with organised crime such as hazardous 
waste disposal – thus rendering a closed list of offences impracticable.1155  
The Court also did not agree with the allegations of vagueness, specifically with 
regard to the definitions of “criminal organization” and the term “in association with”. 
Fuerst J conceded, as stated with overbreadth above, that legislators are necessitated 
to draft legislation in wider and consequently vaguer terms due to the impossibility of 
legislating every factual scenario. The task of clarifying and interpreting that 
necessarily vague legislation is the task of the courts but this does not translate to it 
being unconstitutionally vague.1156 The components of the “criminal organization” 
definition1157 all had accepted definitions and had been interpreted by case law, thus 
avoiding the alleged vagueness and uncertainty.1158 
Addressing the mens rea challenge, it was stated that moral blameworthiness as 
an element of criminal liability was a constitutional requirement under section 7 of the 
Charter.1159 The Court acknowledged that some form of subjective mens rea is the 
preferred form of liability especially for crimes that carry a significant amount of stigma 
or severe punishment, although there are statutory instances where faultless liability 
can occur.1160 Analysing section 467(12), the Court found that subjective mens rea is 
required for several aspects before the Crown can secure a conviction. It has to prove 
mens rea for the predicate offence(s) and that the accused acted for “benefit of, at the 
direction of, or in association with a criminal organization”. The Court approved the 
Crown’s assertion that there was an implied requirement to be read into the definition: 
the accused must commit a predicate offence with the intent to benefit, at the direction 
of, or in association with a group, knowing that the group was a criminal organization. 
It is however not required that the accused know the identities of the members of the 
organization.1161 
                                            
1155 Lindsay 2004 para 44. See 5 3 2 2 1 above where similar observations were made with regard to 
POCA.  
1156 Lindsay 2004 para 55. 
1157 The Court focussed on the terms “common objective”, “commission”, “facilitate”, and “material 
benefit”. 
1158 Lindsay 2004 paras 56-60. 
1159 Lindsay 2004 para 61, relying on R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, 153 C.C.C. (3d) 1. 
1160 Lindsay 2004 paras 62-63. 
1161 Lindsay 2004 para 64.  
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In Terezakis”1162 the Court of Appeal for British Columbia addressed a previous 
finding that the instructing offence in terms of section 467(13) of the (read with the 
definition of “criminal organization” in subsection 467(1)) was unconstitutionally vague 
and overbroad.1163 The phrase “group, however organized”, according to the court a 
quo, was “so vague as to constitute no meaningful guidance"1164 or alternatively that 
it almost boundlessly overbroad.1165 The concerns of the judge of the court a quo, 
where the risk of prosecuting persons that do not share the same criminal objective as 
those who do, were reasoned away by Mackenzie J. Only members of an organisation 
who share and execute the common criminal activity will face prosecution and not 
those who are part of the organisation but only form part of an innocent purpose of 
said organisation. The reasoning of the trial court was consequently rejected where it 
was posited that even persons that are aware of the criminal activities and purpose, 
but do not participate, would be liable for prosecution.1166 Mackenzie J pointed out that 
a wide legislative net had to be cast in order to prosecute participants in a criminal 
organisation. This is due to the fact these groups do not conform to formal or traditional 
legal structures but the wording of the provisions do not endanger non-participants in 
the criminal organisations.1167 Subsections 467(11)-(12) do not require the accused to 
be part of the criminal organisation. The so-called “participation offence” (section 
467(11)) only requires the participation “in activities that enhance the ability of the 
organization to commit or facilitate an indictable offence” coupled with the requisite 
mens rea.1168 The “commission offence” (section 467(12)) requires that there be a link 
between the criminal organisation and indictable offence.1169  
An issue that was not addressed by the court a quo, was the alleged violation of the 
freedom of association by sections 467(11)-(13) of the Code. The respondent based 
this attack on the wording “has as one of its main purposes or main activities the 
facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences” because under the 
                                            
1162 2007 BCCA 384. Appealing- from the Supreme Court of British Columbia in R. v. Accused No. 1 et 
al., 2005 BCSC 1727 (“Accused”). 
1163 Terezakis para 1. 
1164 Accused at 130; Terezakis at 16. 
1165 Accused at 130; Terezakis at 16. 
1166 Terezakis para 32. 
1167 Terezakis para 34. 
1168 Terezakis para 35. 
1169 Terezakis para 35. 
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definition, not all parties to the organisation have to share the criminal purpose or 
engage in the criminal activity to be subjected to prosecution.1170 For similar reasons 
as outlined above, the Court also rejected this attack. The instructing offence under 
section 467(13) requires that the alleged criminal leader to have the requisite 
knowledge of the main criminal activities or purpose of the organisation for the 
instruction to fall within the scope of the offence. In a similar vein, subsections 467(11) 
and (12) require that the actors possess knowledge of a relationship between the 
criminal activity and criminal organisation. Merely associating with the organisation is 
not illegal in itself.1171 It was additionally submitted by the Crown that the trial judge 
erred in asserting that there is a risk of including fringe members of the criminal 
organisation. Mackenzie J agreed and stated that this strains the plain meaning of the 
text.1172 Furthermore, the scope of the instruction offence is limited by the required 
mens rea of the instructor. The instructor must know that they are part of the criminal 
organisation and that the instruction is connected to said organisation; consequently 
limiting the scope of subsection 467(13) and rescuing it from unconstitutional 
vagueness or overbreadth. Due to this mens rea requirement, unconnected persons 
to the organisation are not at risk of prosecution as well.1173 
5 3 2 5 Evaluation  
Many of the themes present in the constitutional litigation against Chapter 2 POCA 
are present in the cases brought against the US and Canadian statutes.  
The Californian Legislature has gone to great lengths to protect anti-gang legislation 
from constitutional scrutiny. It is however undeniable that there is a tension between 
the interest of the state and community and the rights of (potentially) accused persons. 
The state, on the one hand, wants to cast a wide criminal net in order to capture 
undeniably far-reaching criminal networks. This necessitates drafting statutes in 
(somewhat) vague terms. This wide criminal net, however, potentially infringes upon 
the constitutional rights of accused persons or the very least persons whom the 
legislation might affect.  
                                            
1170 Terezakis para 44. 
1171 Terezakis para 44. 
1172 Terezakis paras 38-39. 
1173 Terezakis paras 42-43.  
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Bjerregaard highlights the difficulties of drafting this type of legislation in such a way 
as not to infringe on the constitutionally protected freedoms of the accused, and states 
that there are three main strategies that have been employed to avoid said 
vagueness.1174 Freedom of association violations are avoided by requiring active 
participation and not mere membership as well as requiring knowledge of the criminal 
street gang’s criminal activities.1175 This requirement (mostly) excludes fringe 
members and one-time or unknowing participants from being prosecuted. STEP also 
sets a strict intent requirement by necessitating that the accused have the intent to 
ʻʻpromote, further or assist the criminal conduct of the gang”. The final strategy is the 
Californian legislature’s narrow definitions of certain key terms.1176 This is certainly 
true if one considers the case law above. The Californian courts have gone to great 
lengths to limit the scope of the definitions of STEP and, as far as possible, leave very 
little room for vagueness, ambiguous interpretation or overbreadth. This was 
apparently not the approach of the South African legislature when it opted to draft 
open-ended language for Chapter 4 of POCA. 
Baker also points out that STEP has no definition for “gang member” even though 
there are several references to the term throughout STEP. There is no uniform 
interpretation of this term by the courts and law enforcement agencies and the author 
argues that uncertainty regarding this term renders the entire statute vague and 
unconstitutional but can be saved by legislative intervention.1177 This lacuna has been 
carried over into the wording of STEP and creates the same danger, especially 
considering the problems pointed out in 5 3 2 2 2 and 5 3 2 2 3. 
The Canadian Code offers its own set of problems because of its unique “instruction 
offence” aimed at the leaders of criminal organisations and by not requiring formal 
membership in order to be convicted of the offences, which is usually the case with 
organised criminal group statutes. This is however remedied by the various mens rea 
requirements. The leader must possess knowledge of the main criminal activities or 
the purpose of the organisation; that they are part of the “organization” (and not 
necessarily a member) and that the instruction is connected to the organisation.     
                                            
1174 B Bjerregaard “The Constitutionality of Anti-Gang Legislation” (1998) 21(1) Campbell Law Review 
31 34. 
1175 Bjerregaard (1998) Campbell Law Review 34. 
1176 Bjerregaard (1998) Campbell Law Review 34. 
1177 See Baker (2006) Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law109-112. 
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Something that is apparent, especially in the Canadian constitutional litigation, is 
that the tentacles of organised crime groups are far-reaching and require more 
flexibility than other statutes. Non-conformation with traditional or formal legal 
structures further complicates matters – thus requiring dynamic legislation which can 
be applied to a myriad of different factual scenarios. Similar sentiments were 
expressed by the South African Constitutional Court in Savoi II.1178 This then justifies 
broader and vaguer definitions which still adhere to constitutional standards. Burchell’s 
critique against statutorily criminalising criminal gang activities becomes very relevant 
here.1179  
5 4  The freedom of association 
Legislation criminalising the participation in certain associations should necessarily 
involve a constitutional analysis, as the freedom of association is protected by section 
18 of the Constitution. There has been repeated reference throughout this dissertation 
that the Legislature and the Judiciary should be vigilant with respect to the potential 
impact of the constitutional freedom of association.1180 The ensuing section will 
analyse the South African and US positions regarding the freedom of association in 
the context of anti-gang legislation.  
5 4 1  South African perspective  
 POCA Section 10(3) might violate an accused person’s freedom of association by 
using the mere fact of gang membership as an aggravating circumstance for purposes 
of sentencing for offences that might not even be gang-related. The section states 
that:  
If a court, after having convicted an accused of any offence, other than an offence 
contemplated in this Chapter, finds that the accused was a member of a criminal gang 
at the time of the commission of the offence, such finding shall be regarded as an 
aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes.  
Anti-gang legislation avoids freedom of association challenges by requiring gang-
related offences to be coupled with a mens rea requirement or by requiring active 
                                            
1178 See paras 22-24. 
1179 See Burchell Principles 909-910, as well as 1 3 1, 3 1, 5 3 2 1 1 as well as 5 4 1 fn above. 
1180 See for example 1 6, 3 3 5, 4 2, 4 5 1-2, 5 1 as well as the preceding sections above.  
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participation in a criminal gang.1181 Here, in terms of section 10(3), a Court may 
consider a person’s gang membership as an aggravating circumstance even when 
sentencing an unrelated offence that he or she has committed in their personal 
capacity. In these circumstances, mens rea is completely absent.  
Section 18 of the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of association and 
simply and broadly states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of association”.1182 
Article 10(1) of the ACHPR is more restrictive in its wording by stating that an individual 
has a “(…) right to free association provided that he abides by the law”. The members 
of a criminal organisation are therefore, in principle, protected as long as they do not 
actively participate in the conduct of the criminal gang.  
The ECHR is more expansive in its delineation of the freedom of association (which 
is amalgamated with the freedom of assembly).1183 Article 11(2) however prohibits 
restrictions on the exercise of these rights  
(...) other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.1184 
This conditional right is congruent with article 9(2) of the Basic Law of Germany 
(Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland) 1949 (“Grundgesetz”).1185 Article 
9(2) however goes further and holds that  
                                            
1181 See Bjerregaard (1998) Campbell Law Review 34 and discussion above.  
1182 This is similar to section 2 the Canadian Charter which merely states that “[e]veryone has the 
following fundamental freedoms (…)” and includes freedom of association fourth on the list in section 
2. 
1183 Article 11(1) states that  
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with 
others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
1184 Article 11(2) further states that it “shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the 
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the 
State”. 
1185 See Tomuschat C, Currie DP & Kommers DP “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany” 
(23-12-2014) Deutscher Bundestag <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf> (accessed 
27-11-2017) for an official translation.  
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[a]ssociations whose aims or activities contravene the criminal laws, or that are 
directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding, 
shall be prohibited. 
There is a slight textual but ultimately significant difference between these two texts. 
The ECHR limits the exercise of right if the limitation is required “for the prevention of 
disorder or crime”. A criminal group would then not be deserving of the right to freely 
associate.  Article 9(2) of the Grundgesetz however places a blanket prohibition on 
associations aimed at criminal activities or violation of the constitutional order. Merely 
having this criminal aim is therefore sufficient to warrant constitutional exclusion.  
The ACHPR, ECHR and the Grundgesetz provide some illustration as to the content 
of associational protections considering that section 18 of the South African 
Constitution is considerably vague in its wording. Only the ACHPR has persuasive or 
binding value as South Africa is a party to it. The ACHPR is congruent with the ECHR 
and Grundgesetz albeit not as strict as the latter.  
A paradox may arise when interpreting whether section 10(3) complies with the 
ACHPR. Individuals, under the ACHPR, have the right to free association on the 
condition that they “abide by the law”. The only logical conclusion would be that a 
person would not receive associational protection if, in the exercise of their 
associational freedoms, he or she contravened the law; then such a person would not 
deserve protection. A person who is subject to a sentence increase under section 
10(3) did contravene the law – but they did not contravene the law for or with their 
association. Their increased sentence is therefore irrational and arbitrary as there is 
no link between increased punishment merely because someone is a gang member – 
without the crime being linked to gang activities. This was the exactly the case in the 
state of Tennessee in the USA, which abolished a similarly-worded statute. The 
judgment will be discussed in the subsequent section. 
Woolman has contemplated whether criminal organisations are deserving of 
constitutional protection under section 18. The author seemingly does not agree – and 
argues that the outlawing of criminal associations would be uncontroversial.1186 He 
submits, firstly, that criminal organisations do not normally seek to enhance “civil 
society or any of the macrosocial ends” which are characteristic of legitimate, 
                                            
1186 S Woolman “Freedom of Association” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2 ed (OS 06-08) 44.3-2 
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noncriminal associations.1187 Woolman submits, next, that one has to ask whether a 
criminal law is an impediment to the right to freely associate and then provides 
responses to this dilemma if the answer is in the affirmative. Associations whose sole 
purpose is to subvert should not deserve protection unless the association is 
challenging a criminal law and therefore advocating for change.1188 Further,  
organisations are deserving of constitutional protection, when they are “intimately 
linked to the exercise of other fundamental rights” such as the  freedom to assemble, 
demonstrate, picket and petition;1189 facilitate labour relations – 1190 to name only a 
few.1191 A final saving grace would be to exclude criminal associations on a case-by-
case basis and let them potentially be saved by section 36 of the Constitution.  
Despite the views of Woolman, which are largely supported by Cheadle et al,1192 it 
is submitted that the increased sentence of a gang member merely due to his 
                                            
1187 Woolman “Freedom of Association” in CLOSA 44.3-2. 
1188 Woolman “Freedom of Association” in CLOSA 44.2-2. 
1189 Section 17 of the Constitution. 
1190 Section 23 of the Constitution, which, inter alia, provides for the right to strike in terms of section 
23(2)(c). See generally Woolman “Freedom of Association” in CLOSA 44.2-1-44.2-12.  
1191 Other rights include dignity (section 10); privacy (section 14); religion or belief (section 15); freedom 
of expression (section 16); language and cultural rights (section 30 and 31) – MH Cheadle, DM Davis 
& NRL Haysom in South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (SI 23 2017) 13-3. 
1192 See Cheadle et al Bill of Rights 13-7 especially. The authors do however criticise Woolman’s “loose 
concept” of criminal associations. They are uncertain whether the organisation’s objectives must be 
criminal in nature or the character of the individuals concerned. It is unclear to this author what Cheadle 
et al mean by “criminal character” – does it potentially refer to the fact that someone is a habitual 
criminal? Someone’s “criminal character” is procedurally and constitutionally problematic – with 
reference to the evidentiary rules providing for the exclusion of character evidence as well as evidence 
pertaining to previous convictions and similar fact evidence. The topic of the use of previous convictions 
and similar fact evidence was discussed in depth in this Chapter.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 257 
 
association with a gang and not because of his actual participation or personal guilt in 
gang-related activity is untenable. There is an absence of an additional requirement 
linking the crime that the accused has committed to the gang membership and 
therefore renders this offence indefensible in light of section 18 of the Constitution. 
Over and above violating free association, section 10(3) also violates one of most 
basic tenets of criminal law – the principle of individual criminal responsibility.1193  
The following section shall investigate how US and Canadian courts have dealt with 
possible free association violations posed by anti-gang legislation. The discussion, 
over and above reference to STEP, will however include a particularly instructive 
judgment made in the US state of Tennessee which struck down a statute with similar 
wording to section 10(3) of POCA.  
5 4 2  USA  
The issue of freedom of association was addressed in People v. Rodriguez 
(“Rodriguez”)1194 in considering the constitutionality of section 186.22(a) (the 
substantive provision) of STEP. The Californian Supreme Court here relied heavily on 
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. The latter court in Scales v. United 
States (“Scales”)1195 addressed the constitutionality of a provision of the Alien 
Registration Act 367 18 U.S.C. (commonly known as “the Smith Act”)1196 which 
                                            
Also in question is whether, based on this loose concept, an outlawed criminal association accused 
of relatively trivial crimes (such as persons who have defaulted on their municipal rates or hawkers 
accused of illegally trading) would also be denied their right to assemble to challenge their criminal 
status. The authors submit that the focus of their inquiry would be rather in terms of the limitations 
clause, rather than limiting the content of the right itself. Further, they refer to the availability of common 
law measures such as conspiracy or common purpose to prosecute them. Woolman responds to this 
by stating (amongst other things) that the one must be circumspect in relegating the entire enquiry as 
to the potential unlawfulness of an association to the limitation phase. The author also disagrees with 
Cheadle et al’s characterisation of his concept of a criminal organisation as “loose” and correctly holds 
that the purpose of the associations mentioned are different: the unlawful hawkers or defaulters are a 
criminal association and acts where they engage in or plan these activities may fall under common law 
measures such as common purpose and conspiracy. See Woolman “Freedom of Association” in 
CLOSA 44.2-3 fn 12. 
1193 See also 3 2 and 3 3 6 2 3 above.  
1194 55 Cal.4th 1125 (2012).  
1195 367 U.S. 203 (1961).  
1196 § 2385. 
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criminalised membership of organisations “advocating the overthrow of the 
government by force or violence”.1197 There, Harlan J stressed the importance of the 
principle of personal guilt affirmed in US jurisprudence, in line with the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.1198 Criminal sanction will only be 
justifiable when there is a “sufficiently substantial” connection between the status of a 
person (as a member of an organisation) and their conduct and other criminal 
conduct.1199 The provision of the Smith Act ultimately survived the attack under the 
Fifth Amendment because the Supreme Court held that the statute only targeted active 
members, accompanied by the requisite “guilty knowledge and intent” of the members 
of the vexed organisation and not members who may only be sympathetic to the cause 
of an alleged criminal organisation.1200  
The Californian Supreme Court also referenced its previous judgment in People v. 
Mesa (“Mesa”)1201 where the careful phrasing of the Californian Legislature was 
highlighted. Mesa held that the Legislature intended that only active participation, 
together with knowledge about the activities of the criminal organisation and with the 
intent to further that the criminal activities of that organisation; or instances where there 
is wilful promotion, furtherance or assistance in those criminal activities, would incur 
criminal liability.1202 
From this jurisprudence, it appears that a statute such as STEP (or the now-
repealed Smith Act), shall pass constitutional muster if it (a) does not punish mere 
membership or association, (b) the accused must actively (c) carry out some (criminal) 
act in furtherance of the criminal conduct of the vexed group and (d) do so with guilty 
intent as well knowledge of the group’s conduct.  
                                            
1197 Rodriguez 1149. 
1198 Scales 224. 
1199 Scales 224-225; Rodriguez 1149 relying on Scales.  
1200 Scales 228; Rodriguez 1149. 
1201 54 Cal.4th 191 (2012). 
1202 Mesa 196-197. Also see People v. Gardeley 14 Cal.4th 605 (1996) at 624-625 where the Californian 
Supreme Court held that STEP 
does not criminalize mere gang membership; rather, it imposes increased criminal penalties 
only when the criminal conduct is felonious and committed not only "for the benefit of, at the 
direction of, or in association with" a group that meets the specific statutory conditions of a 
‘criminal street gang,’ but also with the ‘specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any 
criminal conduct by gang members.’” 
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The Californian enhancement, as illustrated above,1203 differs substantially from the 
enhancement under section 10(3) of POCA. Californian courts have repeatedly 
interpreted this enhancement to have distinct requirements that have to be fulfilled 
before the enhancement may be applied.  
A more apt comparison is the Tennessee Code (2012) section 40-35-121. The 
structure and text of the code is substantially similar to POCA and employs enhanced 
sentencing in certain circumstances. This provision was challenged in 2015 and 
considered by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals in State of Tennessee v. 
Devonte Bonds, Thomas Bishop, Jason Sullivan, and Brianna Robinson (“Bonds et 
al”).1204 Section 40-35-121(b) was challenged on the basis that it violated the 
defendant’s substantive due process rights.1205 This section stated that  
[a] criminal gang offense committed by a defendant who was a criminal gang member 
at the time of the offense shall be punished one (1) classification higher than the 
classification established by the specific statute creating the offense committed. 
This provision is therefore identical in substance to section 10(3) of POCA which 
enhances a sentence based on mere gang membership.  
The arguments relating to the sentence enhancement can be summarised as 
follows: the sentence enhancement would apply irrespective of knowledge, control or 
consent to the activities of the other members of the criminal gang. Unlike the 
enhancement provision in STEP, the State did not have to prove “that the offenses 
committed by others w[ere] committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 
association with any criminal street gang”.1206 There was furthermore no requirement 
that the crimes that were committed by gang members were gang-related – only that 
the crimes were committed by gang members. Thus, the defendants correctly 
submitted that a person would receive enhanced punishment for being a gang member 
without in fact having contributed to that gang in any fashion. He or she could therefore 
be punished merely because of the criminal acts of other members of the gang in 
                                            
1203 See 4 5 3 above. 
1204 Tenn. Crim. App. (2016). The defendants raised several substantive and procedural issues but the 
issue that will be discussed here is the sentence enhancements as per section n 40-35-121 of the 
Tennessee Code.  
1205 Bonds et al 40. 
1206 Bonds et al 40.  
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instances where the underlying crime is not of a gang-related nature and therefore 
based on mere association.1207  
The defendants relied on a similar case decided by the Florida Supreme Court in 
State v. O.C. (“O.C.”).1208 There, the Court held that the sentence enhancement in 
terms of section 874.07 of the Florida Statute (1996) was unconstitutional. The 
Supreme Court of Florida held that the Statute was punishing mere association 
because an accused could face increased punishment, even in instances where the 
membership (or association) with the gang had nothing to do with the underlying crime 
that was being enhanced due to gang membership.1209 The Court found that the effect 
of section 847.04 was irrational on several grounds. It was held that it lacked a nexus 
between the criminal acts of the accused and his or her gang membership and 
furthermore that there was no rational relationship between the sentence 
enhancement and the (legitimate) legislative goal of curbing gang violence. This 
consequently fell short of the constitutional standard of a “(…) ’reasonable and 
substantial’ relation to a permissible legislative objective”.1210 
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, after careful consideration of the above 
authority and an analysis of other US states utilising sentence enhancements for gang-
related offences,1211 concluded that the omission of a nexus between gang-related 
                                            
1207 Bonds et al 40. 
1208 748 So.2d 945 (1999).  
1209 O.C. 950; Bonds et al 42. 
1210 O.C. 950; Bonds et al 42. The Court in O.C. is quoting a previous judgement of the Florida Supreme 
Court in State v. Saiez 489 So. 2d 1125 (1986) (“Saiez”) holding that due process must have a 
“reasonable and substantial relation” to the object of the statute and said statute must furthermore also 
not be “unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious”. See Saiez 1128. 
1211 The Court referred to statutes of Georgia, Ohio, Indiana and California. These sentence enhancing 
statutes were all challenged on constitutional grounds but each survived their respective challenges. 
The common theme amongst these statutes was a nexus between the enhancement and personal 
involvement in the activities of a criminal gang. In Rodriguez v. State 284 Ga. 803 (2009) at 810, for 
example, the Supreme Court of Georgia held, quoting State v. Walker 506 N.W.2d 430 (1993) at 433, 
that 
[t]o support a conviction, the accused must be shown to have conducted or participated in 
criminal street gang activity through the commission of "an actual criminal act. Mere association 
is insufficient."  
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activity (the legitimate governmental purpose) and the sentence enhancement was 
“constitutionally fatal” as it did not fulfil the intended governmental purpose at all.1212 
The only objective that was achieved, was the “harsher treatment of criminal offenders 
who also happen to be members of a criminal gang.”1213 
Considering this body of foreign law finding a substantially similar statute to be 
unconstitutional, the next step is to evaluate whether the relevant provisions of POCA 
are justifiable under section 36 of the Constitution.  
5 4 3  Limitations clause: Section 36 of the Constitution  
An analysis under the limitations clause was conducted in Chapter 3 where the 
constitutionality of the common purpose doctrine was considered.1214  The enquiry 
here turns to the statutory context.  
The first factor is the importance and purpose of the limitation. The limitation must 
serve some sort of (governmental) purpose.1215 It was illustrated above that the 
common purpose doctrine aims to address the “significant societal scourge” of group 
criminality by relieving the evidentiary burden of the State from having to prove the 
causation element. Whether one agrees with the manner in which this goal is achieved 
or not, one cannot argue that the goal is illegitimate. The ostensible goal of section 
10(3) is enhancing the sentences of gang members for, one would hope, gang-related 
crimes. This then serves as a deterrent and possibly also prevention (albeit only while 
the gang member is incarcerated) of a gang member from re-offending soon after 
conviction. A final goal may then also be unadulterated retribution against someone 
                                            
In State v. Williams 773 N.E.2d 1107 (2002) (at 1012), the Ohio Court of Appeals held that the statute 
requires active membership as well as guilty knowledge by said members. These requirements 
preclude guilt by mere association.  
1212 Bonds et al 44.  
1213 Bonds et al 44. 
1214 See 3 3 7 above. 
1215 See Currie & De Waal Handbook 166. 
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for being a gang member or associating with gang members. Such unadulterated 
retribution also does not “promote the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights”.1216  
The following factor, namely the relationship between the limitation and the 
purpose,1217 goes hand-in-hand with the prior factor. As we have seen above, the 
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals found that there was no relationship between 
the legitimate governmental purpose in curbing gang-related crimes and the sentence 
enhancement. There was no “reasonable and substantial” relation between the 
enhanced punishment and committing a crime that had nothing to do with a person’s 
gang involvement. The Tennessean statute, just like section 10(3) of POCA, would 
apply regardless of whether there was any type of knowledge, control or consent by 
the other members of the gang. The crime is completely unrelated to the conduct of 
the gang. Burchell described this type of punishment, albeit in a different context,1218 
as “the worst excesses of guilt by association”.1219 This is exactly what it is: a mere 
association with a gang, without some evidence of being a formal gang member, 
makes one liable for increased punishment.  
Deterrence or prevention is further not attained when the crime in question does 
not have to be gang-related. This author fails to see how, as ridiculous as the example 
might be, the governmental objectives would be attained by increasing the sentence 
of a gang member who has violated, for instance, the National Road Traffic Act 93 of 
1996. The person may not even be a gang member by choice. It was pointed out in 
Chapter 2 that (especially younger) people often have to join gangs in order to survive 
or are forced or manipulated to do so.1220 Section 10(3) is therefore not only legally 
                                            
1216 Section 39(2) of the Constitution. Also see 5 1 above. See for example Chaskalson J’s comments 
in Makwanyane (para 129) on the retribution as a reason for the death penalty. The learned justice 
questions strong reliance thereon in a constitutional era and stated that it carried less weight than 
deterrence. Earlier in the judgement, he also quotes the following passage from S v J 1989 (1) SA 669 
(A) (para 682):  
Generally speaking, however, retribution has tended to yield ground to the aspects of correction 
and prevention, and it is deterrence (including prevention) which has been described as the 
'essential', 'all important', 'paramount' and 'universally admitted' object of punishment. 
1217 Section 36(1)(d) of the Constitution. 
1218 In the context of the common purpose doctrine. 
1219 Burchell Principles 909. 
1220 See 2 2. 
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but morally indefensible and should not survive constitutional scrutiny – even under 
section 36. 
The US approach is preferred where actual knowledge and intent to further the 
gang’s objectives is required. 
5 5  Chapter overview 
The preceding sections show a troubling trend of statutory uncertainty and 
overbroad application. Although it can be argued that the constitutional scale may be 
tipped in favour of the protection of the inhabitants of the State, it should not eviscerate 
constitutional protections of the accused. Amendments to the text of POCA is required 
to bring it in line with the principle of legality as well as the freedom of association are 
required.1221   
                                            
1221 See 7 2 for the proposed amendments.  
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Chapter 6 
Considering alternative measures addressing gang 
activity:  
Foreign and international law perspectives 
6 1  Constitutional framework and introduction  
It was illustrated in Chapter 5 that the Constitution places certain interpretative 
instructions or imperatives on courts, tribunals and forums (simply referred to as 
forums) when interpreting the Bill of Rights. The overarching interpretive instruction is 
that these forums “must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”.1222 These forums must then 
also consider international law;1223 while they may consider foreign law.1224 Section 
39(2) furthermore places a duty on courts to “promote the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights” when interpreting legislation or developing the common law. The 
last important interpretative imperative is “the democratic values of human dignity, 
equality and freedom”.1225 
This Chapter will investigate foreign and international mechanisms in dealing both 
with organised crime as well as holding leadership figures in hierarchal criminal 
structures responsible for their contributions to the unlawful actions of their 
subordinates. The purpose of this analysis is firstly to consider possible alternatives or 
supplementary measures to South Africa’s current legislative regime in dealing with 
criminal gang activities. The preceding chapters have outlined several institutional, 
substantive and constitutional problems in dealing with criminal gang activities. 
Foreign models and their implementation will be analysed but importantly also whether 
they are appropriate in our jurisdiction as they give rise to other institutional, 
substantive and constitutional concerns.  
                                            
1222 Section 39(1)(a) (own emphasis).  
1223 Section 39(1)(b) (own emphasis).  
1224 Section 39(1)(c) (own emphasis).  
1225 Sections 1 and 7 of the Constitution.   
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6 2 Considering the rationale for punishment of leaders in hierarchal  
structures 
What exactly is the rationale and benefit of investigating additional or alternative 
models for the punishment of gang leaders? POCA Chapter 4 has no express 
provision pertaining to gang leaders. The closest provision is section 9(2)(b) which 
criminalises the inducement to contribute to a pattern of criminal gang activity.1226 This 
provision has an extremely weak maximum sentence of three years (or a fine)1227 for 
this crime. The sentence is aggravated to a maximum of five years if committed within 
500 metres of a school or educational institution.1228 Section 2(1)(f) criminalises the 
management of an “enterprise” within the meaning of section 1 of POCA. Securing a 
conviction for this offence may prove to be evidentially complex as certain elements 
have to be proven.1229 
Liability for leaders or criminal masterminds under the common law is also 
problematic because liability can only ensue where the accused’s active and/or direct 
involvement (as a leader-cum-instigator, leader-cum-conspirator or party to a criminal 
endeavour under the common purpose doctrine) can be proven.1230 The liability under 
these forms is harsher because the punishment is usually equal to physical or actual 
perpetration.1231 But this may be justifiable as will be illustrated below. The scheme 
under POCA similarly requires an active and/or direct contribution to be proven by the 
State.  
The problem in holding leaders of criminal organisations or criminal gangs liable 
lies mostly in proving their direct involvement with the crimes committed by 
subordinates lower in the hierarchal chain of command or even in the absence of such 
a “formal” chain of command. The leader is too far removed from the actual 
perpetration of the crime. Neha points to this problem under international criminal law 
and the difficulties faced by tribunals. The problem is in fact two-fold: holding an 
individual responsible for crimes committed as “part of a collective criminal project” 
                                            
1226 See 4 5 2 5 above.  
1227 Section 10(1)(b) of POCA. See 4 5 3 1 above.  
1228 Section 10(1)(b) read with sections 10(1)(d) and 10(2). See 4 5 3 1-4 5 3 2 above.  
1229 See above at 4 4 for a more comprehensive discussion on these provisions. 
1230 See the discussion at 3 3-3 5 above.  
1231 See Chapter 3 above.  
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and furthermore, justifying labelling that person as a perpetrator despite the fact that 
he or she did not carry out any part of the wrongful act.1232 These are the identical 
problems the State and the courts face in holding gang leaders responsible for their 
crimes. In order to circumvent this issue, several doctrines under international law as 
well as in foreign jurisdictions1233 have developed to hold the commanders or superiors 
in a military relationship or leaders of criminal organisations responsible for the crimes 
committed by their subordinates. Again, it is noted here that it is not this author’s 
contention that the doctrines of international criminal law are directly applicable to any 
of the crimes under POCA as they are presently constructed. The aim here is to see 
how modes of liability and justifications for punishment of leadership crimes under 
international criminal law and selected foreign law can help us to better understand 
possible weaknesses in and potential ways to reform South African criminal law. 
There are strong justifications for holding gang leaders responsible for the actions 
of their subordinates. While it is clear that leaders of criminal gangs should be held 
responsible for their role in ordering, instructing or masterminding criminal 
endeavours, there is also motivation for further, additional or harsher punitive 
sanctions for their role in a criminal gang. Commentators have argued that leaders of 
criminal organisations cannot be treated as regular instigators because subordinates 
cannot “substantially deviate” from the instructions of the leader.1234 A harsher 
punishment should therefore be imposed due to this power the leader wields over the 
subordinate.  
Moral blameworthiness also plays a significant role. Eldar points to an apparent 
legal intuition by holding that the conduct of the leader is undoubtedly more 
reprehensible.1235 The author refers to the trial of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi official. There 
it was posited that criminal responsibility in fact increases further away from the actual 
                                            
1232 J Neha "The Control Theory of Perpetration in International Criminal Law" (2011) 12(1) Chicago 
Journal of International Law 159 161-162. 
1233 Such as Germany and Canada. 
1234 See T Weigend “Perpetration through an Organization: The Unexpected Career of a German Legal 
Concept” (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 91 102-103.  
1235 H Silving Constituent elements of crime (1967) 147; S Eldar “Punishing Organized Crime Leaders 
for the Crimes of their Subordinates” (2010) 4 Criminal Law and Philosophy 183 183-184.  
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perpetrator and higher up the organisational ladder to the so-called masterminds.1236 
This intuition may be founded in the retribution theory of punishment. This theory 
requires that an offender be punished for their acts and thus receives their just deserts 
for acting outside of the law.1237 Although this theory still enjoys widespread public 
favour, it has become fallen out of favour in academic and criminological spheres due 
to the appropriate move towards movements such as restorative justice.1238 Incidental 
to this retributionist argument, is that the contribution of leaders of organisations 
should not be relegated to that of a mere accessorial or conspiratorial nature.1239 
A lack of capacity and coercion is a further justification for punishing the leaders of 
criminal organisations more severely than the actual perpetrators. In relationships 
where there is a power imbalance imbalance and where there is a presence of 
coercion to execute certain criminal orders, the subordinate may lack the capacity to 
act autonomously and freely.1240 South African law has recognised that coercion 
through an imbalanced relationship of power may have an influence on the capacity 
of a perpetrator.1241 Other authorities however argue the counterpoint: that criminal 
                                            
1236 Eldar (2010) Criminal Law and Philosophy 184 referring to Attorney General v. Eichmann (1961) 
Criminal Case No. 40/61 (“Eichman”) at 197. Also see The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui ICC-01/04-01/07 (30 September 2008) (“Katanga & Chui”) (at para 503) referring to the 
Eichmann case. 
1237 WR LafFave & AW Scott Jr Handbook on Criminal Law (1972) 24. Also see CR Snyman Criminal 
Law 6 ed (2015) 11-20 for a review of the theories of punishment. 
1238 Kemp et al Criminal Law 22. Also see Snyman Criminal Law 11-15 and discussion above at 4 5 3 
4. 
1239 See F Muñoz-Conde & H Olasolo “The Application of the Notion of Indirect Perpetration through 
Organized Structures of Power in Latin America and Spain” (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 113 115; 134.  
1240 Eldar (2010) Criminal Law and Philosophy 185. See also Katanga & Chui at para 495; See G Werle 
& F Jessberger Principles of International Criminal Law 3 ed (2014) 239-244 for the grounds under 
international criminal law for excluding criminal law.  
1241 Kemp et al Criminal Law 182-183. The author refers here to the presumption of coercion applying 
in favour of a child offender. The State will consequently have to prove that the child had the ability to 
resist the compulsion or coercion of the older person exercising his or her influence over the child. This 
must of course be understood in the context of the criminal capacity of a child, especially in light of the 
Child Justice Act 75 of 2008. In the context of gangs, the court in S v Bradbury 1967 (1) SA 387 (A) 
however (at 404) held that 
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organisations often operate on the basis of positive, rather than negative, 
reinforcement and thus act akin to legitimate organisations.1242 Japanese triads such 
as the Yakuza act within a paradigm of extreme cohesion. In eighteenth-century 
Japan, the unique relationship between Yakuza leaders and subordinates, known as 
oyabun-kobun (which translates literally into “father-role/child-role”) was common and 
continues to exist.1243 Standing refers to the internal contradiction within criminal 
                                            
[a]s a general proposition a man who voluntarily and deliberately becomes a member of a 
criminal gang with knowledge of its disciplinary code of vengeance cannot rely on compulsion 
as a defence or fear as an extenuation. But each case must be judged on its own facts. 
Although the Appellate Court did admit here to the fact that each case must be judged on its own facts, 
the general rule holds that an accused cannot escape liability or claim extenuating circumstances when 
he or she “voluntarily and deliberately becomes a member of a criminal gang” knowing the murderous 
practices or policies of that gang. The locus classicus for compulsion in South African law is however 
S v Goliath 1972 (3) SA 1 (A) (“Goliath”). The crux of the judgement, for purposes of this dissertation, 
is that compulsion can be used as a complete defence, even in relation to a charge of murder. The facts 
of each case will however have to be judged on its own merits. Human beings cannot be held to the 
highest ethical standards or ideals and favour the life of one above that of another. The Court pointed 
out that it is accepted that the average person will consider their own lives as more important and are 
not expected to act like heroes. (Goliath especially at 21 and 25-26). See further Burchell Principles 
(2016) 174-178; JRL Milton “Recent cases” (1967) 84 South African Law Journal 121 145-148. 
The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007, albeit in a 
different context, recognises a power imbalance as a factor that would exclude sexual consent. Section 
1(3)(b) states that 
Circumstances in subsection (2) in respect of which a person ('B') (the complainant) does not 
voluntarily or without coercion agree to an act of sexual penetration, as contemplated in 
sections 3 and 4, or an act of sexual violation as contemplated in sections 5 (1), 6 and 7 or any 
other act as contemplated in sections 8 (1), 8 (2), 8 (3), 9, 10, 12, 17 (1), 17 (2), 17 (3) (a), 19, 
20 (1), 21 (1), 21 (2), 21 (3) and 22 include, but are not limited to, the following: 
 (…) 
where there is an abuse of power or authority by A to the extent that B is inhibited from 
indicating his or her unwillingness or resistance to the sexual act, or unwillingness to 
participate in such a sexual act [.] 
1242 Eldar (2010) Criminal Law and Philosophy 185. Also see DC Smith “Organized crime and 
entrepreneurship” (1978) 6 International Journal of Criminology and Penology 161.  
1243 DE Kaplan & A Dubro Yakuza: the explosive account of Japan's criminal underworld (1987) 18-19. 
Also see Eldar (2010) Criminal Law and Philosophy 185-186. 
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gangs because they often try to function both as a family as well as a business.1244 
The author furthermore points to Paoli who submitted that gangs sometimes fall within 
the “clan model” which operates like a family with an emphasis on loyalty.1245  
Claus Roxin’s theory of indirect perpetration through a criminal organisation,1246 
seems to have found favour at the ICC and compliments the aforementioned “lack-of-
autonomy doctrine”. The central idea of the theory is that a subordinate is merely a 
cog in the criminal machinery of the leader and is the “intellectual author alongside the 
perpetrator at the heart of the events”.1247 The subordinate in this scheme is thus 
almost dehumanised and the leader is placed central in the sequence of criminal 
events. One can also view this to mean that the only actor of relevance is the leader 
and that the interchangeable, replaceable or even “fungible” subordinates of the 
criminal organisation are of no significance in the context of criminal sanction. The 
implementation of the criminal plan will therefore not be foiled by the failure of one 
subordinate to execute that plan.1248  
There is a strong legal as well as moral basis (founded in public opinion) for the 
more severe punishment of leaders in a criminal gang. The section below will 
investigate the models and protocols particularly employed under international law as 
a possible solution to the doctrinally problematic solutions under POCA and the 
                                            
1244 A Standing Organised crime: A study from the Cape Flats (2005) 70. Also see Levitt S & Venkatesh 
SA "Are we a family or a business?" History and disjuncture in the urban American street gang” (2000) 
29 Theory and Society 427 427-462. The authors at 428 refers to a meeting of members of the Black 
Kings Nation gang. A member posited the question, "Are we a family or a business?". Levitt & 
Venkatesh then point towards the differences in the institutional approaches of these units. A family 
would focus more on cohesion and have a disdain for interfamilial competition among the members. On 
the other hand, if they consider them to be (more of) a business, than these relationships would be of 
secondary importance and competitiveness is promoted such as with certain leaders encouraging and 
incentivising higher drug sales by subordinate gang members. Also see 6 4 2 4 2 below for a discussion 
of the power dynamics and familial structure of gangs.  
1245 Standing Cape Flats 74; L Paoli “Criminal Fraternities or Criminal Enterprises?” in P Williams P & 
D Vlassis (eds) Combating Transnational Crime. Concepts, Activities and Responses (2001) 88-108.  
1246 See C Roxin Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft 8 ed (2006).  
1247 Roxin Täterschaft (2016) 245; quoted in Katanga & Chui para at para 515. See Eldar (2010) Criminal 
Law and Philosophy 186. The author here is not in favour of this theory because it is posited that it does 
not withstand scrutiny due to a lack of empirical data supporting it. See also F Jessberger & J Geneuss 
“On the Application of a Theory of Indirect Perpetration in Al Bashir: German Doctrine at The Hague?” 
(2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 853 860. 
1248 See Katanga & Chui para 516. 
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common law as well as the unsatisfactory punishment scheme – especially under 
POCA.  
6 3 Overview of regional and international instruments addressing organised 
and transnational crime 
Before specific models are analysed, relevant regional and international 
instruments which provide the theoretical basis for the proposed alternative models, 
will be discussed. 
6 3 1  The Malabo Protocol 
The Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights (“Malabo Protocol”) was adopted1249 in Malabo, Equatorial 
Guinea, at the African Union’s Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 
2014.1250 The criminal jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human and 
People’s Rights (“ACJHPR”) (“the African Court”) proposes a broad range of crimes 
enumerated in article 28A. The jurisdiction is substantially broader than the core 
crimes of the ICC which hears matters of crimes against humanity, crimes of 
aggression, war crimes and genocide.1251 As of August 2018, eleven states have 
signed the Protocol. South Africa has not signed the Protocol and there are no 
ratifications yet. The Protocol has not yet come into force.1252  
While the ICC is mainly focused on the most serious crimes under international law, 
namely genocide, crimes against humanity, the crime of aggression and war crimes, 
the proposed African Court will also deal with transnational economic crimes (such as 
money laundering, drug trafficking and corruption) as well as crimes such as the illicit 
exploitation of natural resources, trafficking in persons as well as trafficking in 
                                            
1249 Decision on The Draft Legal Instruments Doc. Assembly/AU/8(XXIII). 
1250 See Amnesty International Malabo Protocol: Legal and Institutional Implications of The Merged and 
Expanded African Court (2016); A Abass “Historical and Political Background to the Malabo Protocol” 
in Werle & Vormbaum (eds) Malabo Protocol (2017) 11 11-13. 
1251 Article 5(1) of the Statute of Rome.  
1252 Article 11(1) of the Malabo Protocol. See African Union “List of Countries which have Signed, 
Ratified/Acceded to The Protocol on Amendments to The Protocol On The Statute Of The African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights” (14-08-2018) https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7804-sl-
protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_hu
man_rights_5.pdf (accessed 14-08-2018).  
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hazardous waste. Other crimes include terrorism, piracy, “mercenarism” and the crime 
of unconstitutional change of government. The crime of unconstitutional change in 
government, for example, has been described as peculiar to the African continent1253 
and it can thus be successfully argued that the establishment of an African criminal 
court is necessary in this context as it seeks to address continental problems which 
fall outside of the limited substantive jurisdiction of the ICC. The criminal jurisdiction 
shall also not remain static and may be extended, through consensus1254 by the State 
parties, to reflect changes in international law.1255 Such extension must always be 
done with due cognizance of the principle of legality, especially the ius praevium 
doctrine. The crimes enumerated in Article 28 shall also not be subject to 
prescription.1256 The common theme to these crimes, is that most of them (if not all) 
have a strong transnational characteristic and to a large extent have “intractable 
connections”.1257 
The Malabo Protocol has no express crime relating to the participation in an 
organised criminal group despite the fact that it contains offences such as money 
laundering and drug as well as human trafficking, which are predominantly carried out 
by organised syndicates.  
The Malabo Protocol will be discussed further below in the context of the general 
principles concerning command responsibility.  
6 3 2  The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“the Statute of Rome”) was 
adopted on the 17th of July 1998, creating the first permanent international criminal 
court.1258 The court has, as mentioned above, jurisdiction over the most serious 
                                            
1253 See Abass “Background to the Malabo Protocol” in Werle & Vormbaum (eds) Malabo Protocol 
(2017) 18. 
1254 The term “consensus” is not defined in the Malabo Protocol itself. 
1255 Article 28A(2) of the Malabo Protocol. 
1256 Article 28A(3) of the Malabo Protocol. 
1257 Amnesty International Malabo Protocol (2016) 16. 
1258 See Article 1 of the Rome Statute; International Criminal Court “Understanding the International 
Criminal Court” International Criminal Court <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf> (accessed 29-07-2017).  
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international crimes – specifically crimes against humanity, war crimes, the crime of 
aggression and genocide.1259   
6 4  Modes of responsibility flowing from these instruments 
6 4 1  The doctrine of command responsibility 
The focus of this section will be Article 28 of the Rome Statute. Article 28 provides 
for the so-called doctrine of command and superior responsibility.1260 It is however 
imperative that this doctrine first be contextualised both historically and 
developmentally to obtain a comprehensive interpretive background.   
6 4 1 1 Introduction   
The doctrine of command responsibility has been applied in international tribunals 
to attribute responsibility to leaders of military and civil organisations for the actions of 
their subordinates.1261 Just as with the leaders of criminal organisations and gangs, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to hold a commander responsible for acts carried out by 
his or her subordinates due to the lack of physical participation in the crime. More 
specifically in the instance of commanders, is the imposition of responsibility to prevent 
instances of acquiescence in the face of atrocities occurring under their control.1262 
The most recent applications are at the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as proceedings before the International Criminal 
Court.1263 Although it appears that some scholars believe that the earliest 
manifestation of the doctrine appeared during the Nuremberg trials which were held 
between 1945 and 1946, its roots go much further back.1264 An Ordinance of Charles 
VII of France in 1439 proclaimed that captains and lieutenants are to be held 
                                            
1259 Article 5 of the Statute of Rome read with Article 6 (“Genocide”), Article 7 (“Crimes against 
humanity”), Article 8 (“War crimes”) and Article 8 bis (“Crime of aggression”).  
1260 These terms shall be used interchangeably throughout the text.  
1261 AM Danner & JS Martinez “Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, 
and the Development of International Criminal Law” (2004) 93 California Law Review 75. 
1262 See Werle & Jessberger Principles of International Criminal Law (2014) 221-222. 
1263 M Markham “The Evolution of Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law” (2011) 
PSJIA 52; 54-56. 
1264 See LC Green “Command Responsibility in International Law” (1995) 5 Transnational Law & 
Contemporary Problems 319 320-321. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 273 
 
responsible for the “abuses, ills and offences” of members of their company. 
“Responsible”, in this context, does not mean “liable” in a criminal law context. The 
word seems to allude that the captains and lieutenants must exercise control over their 
subordinates and are responsible in an employee-employer fashion and must facilitate 
punishment to “bring the offender to justice” for misdeeds committed under the control 
of the superior. The Ordinance however goes further in stating that in the case of the 
offender escapes and evades punishment, the captain shall be deemed to have 
committed the act himself and be liable for the punishment as if he had committed it 
himself.1265 Grotius also spoke of a principle reminiscent of command responsibility, 
stating, in 1615, that “(…) he who knows of a crime, and is able and bound to prevent 
it but fails to do so, himself commits a crime”.1266 These justifications are thus in 
harmony with the justifications in holding leaders of criminal organisations, as 
described above, responsible for their actions. 
Van Sliedregt notes the post-World War II (“WW II”) emergence of command or 
superior responsibility as an independent doctrine outside of its original application 
within military practice.1267 These WW II cases started to delineate three “constitutive 
elements” of command responsibility, namely a functional element; a cognitive 
element and an operational element.1268 The author notes that these elements were 
originally codified in terms of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(“Protocol I”), of 8 June 1977.1269 Article 86(1) places a positive duty to act on parties 
to the conflict to prevent “grave breaches” and take necessary measures to suppress 
such breaches or breaches of the Convention or the Protocol. Article 86(2) stipulates 
that superiors would not be absolved from breaches of the Convention or the Protocol 
if the superior knew or had information to his disposal which would have equipped him 
                                            
1265 See T Meron Henry's Wars and Shakespeare's Laws (1994) 149 (originally quoted in LG de 
Vilevault & L Brequigny Ordonnances Des Rois De France De La Troisième Race 306 (1782)); Green 
(1995) Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 321. 
1266 SC Neff Hugo Grotius on the Law of War and Peace: Student Edition (2012) 293.  
1267 E van Sliedregt “Article 28 of The ICC Statute: Mode of Liability and/or Separate Offense?” (2009) 
12 New Criminal Law Review 420 421.  
1268 Adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3. See Van Sliedregt 
(2009) New Criminal Law Review 421 as well as A Cassese International Criminal Law 2 ed (2003) 208 
where the author refers to “cumulative conditions”.  
1269 Van Sliedregt (2009) New Criminal Law Review 421. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 274 
 
at the time to conclude that a subordinate was committing or planning to commit such 
a breach and furthermore did not take “feasible measures within their power to prevent 
or repress the breach.” Article 87(3) also states that  
The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require any commander 
who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his control are going to commit 
or have committed a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps 
as are necessary to prevent such violations of the Conventions or this Protocol, and, 
where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof. 
Other instruments have recognised an obligation of superiors towards their 
subordinates but did not stipulate any criminal consequences due to non-
compliance.1270 Article 86(2) was therefore an innovation in this regard. 
The doctrine is a departure from the traditional dictates of criminal law where no 
liability attaches to omissions. The point of departure is that only positive acts attract 
criminal sanction. Only in exceptional circumstances, as necessitated by the legal 
convictions of the community, will omissions be punishable. Criminal liability for 
omissions will only ensue where there is a legal duty to act.1271 
It must be borne in mind that this section is by no means an attempt to give a 
comprehensive discussion of the superior or command responsibility: that is well 
beyond the scope of this study. The goal of this section is however to identify general 
principles of superior and command responsibility for potential adoptability as a 
mechanism to hold the leaders of criminal gangs responsible by imputing a legal duty 
to act on such leaders. This is especially relevant in situations where the size and 
organisational structures of criminal gangs resemble military or quasi-military 
hierarchical entities not dissimilar from what one would encounter in more formal 
military settings.  
                                            
1270 For example, Article 1 of The Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (adopted 18 
October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910); Article 43 of the Protocol I as well as Article 39 of 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention) (adopted 
12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135. See Y Sandoz, C Swinarski & B 
Zimmerman (eds) Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949 (1987) at 3540. 
1271 Burchell Principles 51-52; 78. 
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6 4 1 2  General principles  
Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute states that: 
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was 
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he 
knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or 
had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures 
to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
A virtually identical provision is found in the ICTR Statute.1272 
There are three elements, as noted above, that must be satisfied to incur criminal 
liability under this doctrine. The functional element entails a form of “effective 
command, control or authority” over the persons (perpetrators) committing the actual 
crimes.1273 Cassese refers to the ICTY appeal in in Prosecutor v Delalíc and others1274 
where the Appeals Chamber confirmed the finding by the Trial Chamber1275 where it 
was held that de facto control or authority was sufficient to satisfy this element.1276 
Formal appointment is thus not required. This is reminiscent of the management 
requirement under Chapter 2 of POCA where the manager of the enterprise does not 
have to be formally appointed in terms of South African labour law to satisfy the 
requirement.1277  
The Appeals Chamber also endorsed the view of the Trial Chamber that a civilian 
could also incur criminal liability under article 7(3). The Trial Chamber found that there 
                                            
1272 Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute states that  
[t]he fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed 
by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew 
or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and 
the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to 
punish the perpetrators thereof. 
1273 Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 208.  
1274 IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001) (“Delalić Appeal”).  
1275 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić, Mazim Delić, Esad Landžo IT-96-21-T (16 November 
1998) (“Delalić Trial”).  
1276 Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 208. Also see Prosecutor v Aleksovski IT-95-14/1-T (25 
June 1999) (“Aleksovski”) para 103. 
1277 See Kemp et al Criminal Law 519; 4 4 above. 
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is nothing in the language of Article 7(3) that precludes its application to civilians.1278 
Karibi J importantly refers to, amongst other authorities, the case of United States v 
Flick et al1279 where the Court held that civilian industrialists were liable for crimes 
against humanity and war crimes due to their involvement in a slave labour 
scheme.1280 Referring to the United Nations War Crimes Commission,1281 the judge 
further held that, although there is no explicit reference to the doctrine of superior 
responsibility, it is clear that the decision was founded on those very principles and 
specifically a duty to prevent harm.1282 It was thus concluded by the Trial Chamber 
that the doctrine may apply outside of military context to ordinary civilians.1283  
The second element relates to the requisite mens rea of the superior also known 
as the cognitive element. The superior must have known or possessed information 
that should have brought him or her to the conclusion that crimes were being 
committed or had been committed.1284 It is apparent that negligence would be a 
sufficient form of mens rea.1285 Danner & Martinez note that most of the doctrinal 
development surrounding the superior responsibility has revolved around this issue as 
well as the degree of negligence required.1286 This is due to various instruments 
implementing different wording and standards. Article 86(2) of Protocol I to the Geneva 
Convention states that superiors would incur criminal liability  
if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the 
circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a 
                                            
1278 Delalić Trial para 355. 
1279 1947 Vol. VI TWC.  
1280 Flick et al 1202. 
1281 See United Nations War Crimes Commission The United Nations War Crimes Commission Vol VI 
54.  
1282 Delalić Trial para 360. 
1283 Delalić Trial para 363; Aleksovski para 103. Also see C Meloni “Modes of Responsibility (Article 
28N), Individual Criminal Responsibility (Article 46B) and Corporate Criminal Liability (Article 46C)” in 
Werle & Vormbaum (eds) Malabo Protocol (2017) 139 149. 
1284 Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 209; Van Sliedregt (2009) New Criminal Law Review 
421.  
1285 Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 209. 
1286 Danner & Martinez (2004) California Law Review 125. 
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breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or 
repress the breach.1287 
There is however a “significant discrepancy” between the English and French texts.1288 
The relevant part of the French text translates to “information enabling them to 
conclude (…)" whereas the English text states “information which should have enabled 
them to conclude”.1289 It has been suggested that the French text should be followed 
because it encompasses both alternatives and gives effect to the purpose and objects 
of the treaty.1290 
6 4 1 3 Article 28 of the Statute of Rome 
Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute explicitly deals with command responsibility 
relating to military or quasi-military leaders and states that: 
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be 
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces 
under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the 
case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, 
where: 
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at 
the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such 
crimes; and 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit 
the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 
Article 28(b) makes separate reference to “superior responsibility” – therefore 
responsibility for relationships other than those described in article 28(a). The focus of 
the discussion of article 28 will be on article 28(a) due to the available authority 
                                            
1287 Own emphasis.  
1288 Sandoz et al Commentary 3545. 
1289 Own emphasis. The original French text reads “des informations leur permettant de conclure”. 
Translation from Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949 (1987) 3545. 
1290 Sandoz et al Commentary 3545. 
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interpreting this provision. Where possible, principles applicable to article 28(b) will be 
highlighted. The article holds that  
(b)  With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in 
paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective 
authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly 
over such subordinates, where: 
(i)  The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which 
clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to 
commit such crimes; 
(ii)  The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior; and 
(iii)  The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures 
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to 
submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and 
prosecution. 
Article 28(a) employs the doctrine of command responsibility by stating that military 
leaders or those effectively acting as such, shall be criminally responsible for crimes 
committed by military forces while under their “effective command and control” or 
“effective authority and control” where he or she failed to exercise proper control of 
those forces. The first instance under article 28(a) denotes instances where there was 
in fact formal appointment (“authority and control”), while the second instance pertains 
to instances where effective command is present and formal or legal appointment is 
not present but control is exercised through orders, directives and may be enforced by 
threats.1291 
Article 28(a) affirms and incorporates the control standard as applied in Delalíc 
where no formal appointment is required by explicitly stating that quasi-officials or 
those acting as such will qualify for responsibility. The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (“Bemba”)1292 furthermore affirmed the 
principles of the ICTY and ICTR tribunals by confirming that formal appointment is not 
required under article 28(a) irrespective of the rank of the accused or number of 
                                            
1291 K Ambos Treatise on International Criminal Law vol I (2013) 210.  
1292 ICC-01/05-01/08 (15 June 2009).  
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soldiers under their authority or control.1293  The level of control must not be negligible 
as it must constitute “effective control”. This effective control, despite the fact that the 
commander may wield a substantial1294 degree of influence over subordinates, must 
also include “the material ability to prevent and punish” the relevant offences.1295 The 
Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber appears to have added an additional requirement of 
causation: a link between the failure to exercise proper by the superior and the 
underlying crimes committed by his or her subordinates.1296 This is supported by the 
text of the Statute of Rome – “(…) shall be criminally responsible” and “(…) as a result 
of his or her failure to exercise control properly”. This view is supported as the text 
clearly indicates that the crimes occurred to the commander’s failure to exercise 
proper control and had they in fact done so, the vexed result would not have ensued. 
The causation however only pertains to the prevention-duty and not the duty to report 
or repress the crimes because the latter two instances can only occur during or after 
the execution of the crimes, thus avoiding the absurdity that the failure of those duties 
“retroactively cause the crimes to be committed”.1297  
Article 28 furthermore incorporates a variety of standards of mens rea. Article 28(a) 
states that commanders or persons acting as such incurs liability if they “(…) either 
knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known (…)” about forces 
currently committing or were about to commit such crimes and furthermore that they 
failed to take all necessary and reasonable steps within their power to prevent or 
repress such conduct or report it to the authorities.1298 Apart from actual knowledge, 
some form of negligence would seem acceptable due to the use of the words “should 
have known”. 
                                            
1293 Bemba para 408. The Pre-Trial Chamber further held at para 410 that these quasi-military 
commanders could potentially include police units, paramilitary units, armed resistance movements, 
militias (that follow a military structure or hierarchy and rebel groups.  
1294 The Bemba Trial Chamber para 415 in this regard also refers to Prosecutor v Enver Hadžihasanović 
& Amir Kubura IT-01-47-T (15 March 2006) paras 80 and 795 where the ICTY Trial Chamber found that 
“[t]he simple exercise of powers of influence over subordinates does not suffice”. 
1295 Bema para 415 approvingly quoting and relying on the Delalić Appeal para 197-199 especially (and 
therefore approving the interpretation by the Delalić Trial Chamber para 378). 
1296 Bemba para 423-424. 
1297 Bemba para 424. The Pre-Trial Chamber points out that this illogical reasoning caused the ICTY in 
the DelalićTrial Chamber (para 400) to reject this causal link “altogether”. Also see Werle & Jessberger 
Principles 232-234. 
1298 Article 28(a)(i) and (ii).  
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A duty to act (and therefore liability for an omission)1299 is therefore placed on 
commanders thus reducing the risk of being absolved of from criminal responsibility 
through ignorance (or acquiescence). Where a failure to act, repress or report occurs, 
it appears that although article 28 does not impute liability for the offences on the 
commander but rather creates a separate form of liability due to a failure to act.1300  
Article 28(b), with regards to superior responsibility, appears to add a higher 
standard or degree of negligence or recklessness as the superior must either have 
known “or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated” the 
commission of crimes by his or her subordinates.1301  
6 4 1 4 Article 46B(3) of the Annex to the Malabo Protocol  
Article 46B(3) of the Annex to the Malabo Protocol holds that 
The fact that any of the acts referred to in article 28A of the present Statute was 
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal 
responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about 
to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
Meloni points out that the drafters opted for language akin to that of the ICTY and 
ICTR Statutes rather than that of the ICC Statute.1302 This definition also departs from 
comprehensive and precise wording opted by the drafters of the ICC Statute.1303 
Despite not differentiating between superior and civilian responsibility (similarly to the 
ICC Statute), it is clear from the principles set out above from the ICTY and ICTR 
Statutes that the scope of superior transcends formal appointment as superior.1304  
The construction of mens rea is established either through actual knowledge (“he 
or she knew”) or through information that should equip or enable the superior with 
                                            
1299 See G Werle “Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute” 5 (2007) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 953 965. Here the author compares section 28 to another instance of 
liability for omissions under the Rome Statute, such as article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Statute of Rome 
(depriving civilians of food) required for survival.  
1300 Van Sliedregt (2009) New Criminal Law Review 429.  
1301 Article 28(b)(i). See Werle & Jessberger Principles 229. 
1302 Meloni “Modes of Responsibility” in Werle & Vormbaum (eds) Malabo Protocol 148. 
1303 Meloni “Modes of Responsibility” in Werle & Vormbaum (eds) Malabo Protocol 148. 
1304 Also see Meloni “Modes of Responsibility” in Werle & Vormbaum (eds) Malabo Protocol 149. 
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knowledge of crimes or potential crimes by subordinates (“had reason to know”). There 
is furthermore a positive obligation on the superior to take steps to prevent potential 
harm. Article 46B(3) can thus also be regarded as both a conventional mode of liability 
and an omissio per commissionem.1305 
6 4 1 5 South African perspective: Command responsibility and liability  
through omissions  
The discussion above (on international criminal law principles) provides a 
potentially useful dogmatic framework in terms of which the leader of a criminal gang 
may be held liable for the actions of his subordinates. It was illustrated in the previous 
section that there is a significant basis for holding leaders responsible for their own 
actions but also for the actions of their subordinates. Command responsibility in 
essence obligates the commander to take responsibility for the actions of his or her 
subordinates. This must be done through effectively controlling them or punishing 
them when they have acted outside of their mandate. It also requires the commander 
to, at all times, be aware of the activities of his or her subordinates. 
What about applicability in an unlawful organisation or gang? Does the general 
public or community require that these leaders take responsibility for and over the 
actions of their subordinates in a similar vein to military or civilian commanders? The 
answer might be evasive because these structures differ in the sense that military or 
civilian structures in the context of international law is legitimate, and criminal gangs 
are obviously not legitimate. Even when one is dealing with quasi-military structures 
such as rebel groups (as in the Bemba case before the ICC referred to above) the 
focus is not the legitimacy of the organisation as such, but rather the conduct of the 
superiors and subordinates. Thus, if asked, the legal convictions of the community 
would probably dictate that gang leaders should be held responsible for the deeds of 
their subordinates even where their own physical involvement cannot be proven, on 
the basis that the organisation is per se illegitimate because of its criminal aims and 
activities. 
The next question is whether there is an existing legal framework or structure to 
facilitate such an approach or would such an approach require the enactment of 
additional legislation? It is submitted here that considering the constitutional 
                                            
1305 See further the discussion omissio per commissionem at 6 4 1 5 2.  
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imperatives on courts to develop the common law and consider foreign and 
international law (as illustrated above) and existing common law measures, courts 
would be able to draw inspiration to hold leaders responsible for crimes committed by 
subordinates. A legislative response would however be more appropriate in order to 
avoid constitutional issues such as a violation of the ius praevium and ius certum 
facets of the principle of legality. There is also the democratic principle that drastic 
legal reform should be done by the representatives of the people, through the 
legislator, rather than from the bench by unelected judges.  
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to explore the applicability and possible adaptation of 
the general principles of criminal law considering the possible lessons from 
international and foreign law. The starting point is that the existence of a static gang 
within the ambit of section 1 of POCA is not required, and the focus is more on the 
control over a structure or system involved in criminal activities. The proposition is that 
where the crimes are vast and indiscriminate and where individual perpetrators cannot 
be properly identified or held responsible (think mass atrocities under international law, 
or consistent and widespread instances of violent crime in a metropolitan area such 
as the Cape Flats) but the leader or commander effectively in control over a certain 
geographical area or over a set class of subordinates is identifiable, such a leader 
should then be held responsible for creating the dangerous situation  (what we for 
present purposes can call “gangsterism”) and then failing to prevent harm.    
6 4 1 5 1 Normative framework 
As we know, South African criminal law historically did not attach liability for 
omissions. Certain categories have crystallised mainly through case law and in limited 
instances also legislation.1306 The crystallised instances do not form a closed list of 
legal duties but the underlying requirement is that the legal convictions of the 
community dictate such a requirement. In the context of the law of delict, Rumpff CJ 
                                            
1306 See for example (in the context of organised crime) section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act 38 of 2001 read with section 7A of POCA which creates a statutory obligation on business owners, 
managers or employees to report, inter alia, transactions they suspect are financed with proceeds of 
unlawful activities. See also Kemp et al Criminal Law 58; Burchell Principles 85-86. The authors point 
out a number of statutory obligations such those established in terms of the Inquests Act 58 of 1959 
and The Road Traffic Act 93 of 1996. 
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in Minister van Polisie v Ewels (“Ewels”)1307 set out the following general test (and 
broad) test:1308 
[T]he circumstances of the case are of such a nature that the omission not only incites 
moral indignation but also that the legal convictions of the community demand that the 
omission ought to be regarded as unlawful and that the damage suffered ought to be 
made good by the person who neglected to do a positive act.1309 
The court in S v Gaba1310 also adopted this broad test and thus has been embraced 
into criminal law as well. One must however question the continued reliance on this 
test in the constitutional era. In S v Makwanyane (“Makwanyane”)1311 the 
Constitutional Court rejected the reliance on public opinion as a decisive factor for the 
retention of the death penalty.1312 There it was held that the constitutional adjudication 
process would be rendered futile if the court had to answer to the will of the public. 
Chaskelson CJ also held that public opinion could also further marginalise or displace 
disenfranchised minority parties who in fact require the further protection.1313 The point 
is that the organic development of the law, as a reflection of public will or public opinion 
(which is often the perception of a judicial officer of such convictions and necessarily 
an empirical assessment), is necessary. This organic development should however 
be done with due consideration of the other demands and interests at stake, notably 
the principles noted in this chapter and others concerning the principle of legality. So, 
from a normative point of view, it is submitted here that the development of general 
principles, also under guidance of the legal convictions of the community, can be of 
assistance to embrace new notions such as command responsibility in non-military 
contexts, or liability for omissions by persons in de facto leadership roles, such as 
gang leaders. But this must be done with care, and always through the lens of the 
Constitution as a whole.  
                                            
1307 1975 (3) SA 590 (A). 
1308 See Kemp et al Criminal Law 56. 
1309 Ewels at 597 (translated). 
1310 1981 (3) SA 745 (O). 
1311 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
1312 See paras 87-89; Snyman Criminal Law 262-263 fn 55. 
1313 Makwanyane para 88. 
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6 4 1 5 2 Prior (positive) conduct 
One of the recognised instances of liability through omission is through a prior 
action that creates a dangerous scenario that might inflict harm to innocent parties. 
Where a person creates this potentially dangerous situation, there is a legal duty on 
him or her to prevent the potential harm from ensuing.1314 For this reason it is also 
referred to as omissio per commissionem (combined action and omission) because a 
person both acts positively through creating the dangerous scenario but also through 
omission by failing to prevent the potential harm from ensuing. Therefore, it cannot be 
considered to be a pure omission.1315  
It is submitted that a leader of a criminal gang falls under this category of liability. 
He or she creates a dangerous scenario by managing a criminal gang and instructing 
them to commit criminal gang activities which, of cause, may include derivative 
activities by the subordinates. These activities may be potentially or inherently violent 
and the leader subsequently fails to take measures to adequately instruct them to 
refrain from violence. It is submitted that this type of conduct quite patently falls under 
this recognised category of liability through omission. At the very least “the legal 
convictions of the community” would desire such a person to be held liable for his 
involvement and leadership in a criminal gang. This is quite clear if one considers the 
constitutional imperatives guaranteeing every citizen to be free of violence both from 
public and private spheres.1316 The preamble to POCA specifically mentions the 
difficulty in proving a link between leaders who instruct or dictate the commission of 
offences and the resultant crimes. Judgments such as S v Thebus and Another 
(“Thebus”)1317 give judicial expression that group or organised criminality is a 
“significant societal scourge”1318 and that deviation from the traditional standards of 
criminal liability is justifiable.1319 Positive risk-creating actions by the leader of a 
criminal gang, coupled with an omission to end or alleviate risky conduct and unlawful 
activities by subordinates, warrant criminal liability. 
                                            
1314 Burchell Principles 81; Kemp et al Criminal Law 59. 
1315 Burchell Principles 81.  
1316 See 5 2 above.  
1317 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC).  
1318 Thebus para 34.  
1319 See Chapter 3 above above for a comprehensive discussion on the Thebus judgement. 
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6 4 1 5 3 Overview: Prior positive conduct or liability for creating a  
dangerous situation and failure to prevent harm from ensuing  
Based on the discussion above with regards to command responsibility1320 as well 
as liability for omissions in general, a model will be proposed to hold the leaders of 
gangs responsible for crimes committed by their members or subordinates. 
Grounded in the legal convictions of the community, a legal duty may rest on gang 
leaders for creating a dangerous situation by operating a criminal gang. This differs 
from command responsibility where it appears from the earliest authorities that a 
special duty of care rests on the commanders to control and discipline their 
subordinates.  
Liability therefor ensues for creating the dangerous situation and secondly for failing 
to prevent the dangerous consequence from ensuing. Despite this being a novel 
application (rather than an extension) of this specific category of liability for omissions, 
it is justifiable by public policy.  
Also, considering that gangs often function in a quasi-military fashion, the extension 
of superior liability may also be warranted.  
6 4 2  Control through an organisation: Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute of Rome  
Article 25(3)(a) unambiguously states that (despite the principle of individual 
criminal responsibility laid out in article 25(2)), a person shall not escape criminal 
liability and subsequent punishment if he or she “[c]ommits such a crime, whether as 
an individual, jointly with another or through another person”.  
The liability of the accused under article 25(3)(a) is furthermore independent of “the 
other person” (a subordinate) mentioned in that article. Thus, liability may even attach 
where “the other person” attracts no criminal responsibility.1321 These are instances 
where the physical perpetrator’s (the subordinate’s) criminal responsibility cannot be 
proved or where liability is excluded on another basis such as age1322 or another 
                                            
1320 I am however cognizant of the fact that certain principles pertaining to command responsibility are 
still highly contentious, for example the standard of mens rea.  
1321 The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06 (29 January 2007) para 339. 
1322 Article 26 of the Statute of Rome has “no jurisdiction” over a person who committed an alleged 
crime while he or she was under the age of eighteen.  
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ground for excluding criminal responsibility.1323 This definition is thus broader than the 
perpetration-by-means model or the Anglo-American (and South African)1324 innocent 
agent doctrine where the physical perpetrator does not typically possess criminal 
capacity.1325 That said, the contribution of German criminal law doctrine, and more 
specifically the doctrine of Organisationsherrschaft, may present a better doctrinal 
basis for liability of individuals in leadership positions. 
6 4 2 1 A brief overview of Organisationsherrschaft 
The control theory or “indirect perpetrator” is not unknown to foreign legal systems 
and has its most prominent application and origins in German law.1326 It has been 
codified in section 25 of the German Criminal Code 1998 (Strafgesetzbuch – 
hereinafter “StGB”).1327 Section 25 defines a principal as including “[a]ny person who 
commits the offence himself or through another shall be liable as a principal”.1328 This 
type of principal is known as an indirect perpetrator (mittelbare Täter).1329 Neha points 
out that the use of the word “through” indicates that there is existence of two parties. 
The first party is the Hintermann or indirect perpetrator (also known as the individual 
in the background or the perpetrator behind the perpetrator) who uses or controls his 
                                            
1323 See especially Articles 31 and 32 of the Statute of Rome. Article 31(1)(a) excludes liability due to 
mental disease; Article 31(1)(b) excludes liability due to intoxication; Article 31(1)(c) excludes liability 
due to private defence and necessity and Article 31(1)(a) excludes liability due duress. Each of these 
grounds have their own set of requirements. Article31(3), read with Article 21 (applicable law) 
furthermore states that the Court may consider grounds other than those mentioned in Article 31 if that 
ground is derived from applicable law as per Article 21. Article 32 excludes liability in instances of a 
mistake of law. A mistake of law in terms of Article 32 shall only apply in instances pertaining to the 
mental element of a crime (Article 32(1)). Rule 145(2)(a)(i) of the Rules Procedure and Evidence of the 
International Criminal Court also allows the Court to take into account someone’s dismissed capacity 
at sentencing in instances where it falls short of completely excluding liability. See generally Werle 
Principles 239-244 for a discussion on the exclusion of liability under international criminal law.  
1324 See Burchell Principles 475-477; Kemp et al Criminal Law 260-261.  
1325 Jessberger & Geneuss (2008) Journal of International Criminal Justice 857.  
1326 See generally the work of Claus Roxin – C Roxin Tatherrschaft (2006).  
1327 See M Bohlander “German Criminal Code” (10-10-2013) Bundesministerium der Justiz und für 
Verbraucherschutz <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html#p0143> 
(accessed 28-08-2017).  
1328 The original German text states “Als Täter wird bestraft, wer die Straftat selbst oder durch einen 
anderen begeht”. 
1329 Neha (2011) CJIL 159.  
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pawn known as the direct perpetrator or Frontmann.1330 This Hintermann-Frontmann 
relationship is however distinguishable from other forms of participation because it 
presupposes some kind of dominance, manipulation or control by the Hintermann over 
the Frontmann and this power over the latter may also render him without criminal 
responsibility.1331 Organisationsherrschaft is a specific manifestation of the indirect 
perpetrator doctrine and whereupon the ICC seems to have construed its 
interpretation of article 25(3)(a) of the Statute of Rome.1332  
Organisationsherrschaft is also dependent on the existence of a hierarchal criminal 
structure (as will be discussed below) in which the direct perpetrators in the 
organisation are considered interchangeable and insignificant to the actual execution 
of the criminal plot. There is no form of dominance or manipulation over the indirect 
perpetrator per se but the execution of the criminal act is guaranteed through the 
immediate availability of a substitute providing execution if another is unwilling, while 
the authority over this process lies with the indirect perpetrator.1333 This will also be 
discussed in more detail below.  
Neha outlines the requirements or elements in Roxin’s original structure of 
Organisationsherrchaft. The first requirement is proof of the existence of a hierarchal 
structure. This structure must be equipped with a so-called “unlimited exchangeability” 
or fungibility of potential direct perpetrators to execute the criminal plan and finally that 
organisation must function outside of the law.1334 The first and second requirement 
                                            
1330 Neha (2011) CJIL 171. 
1331 See A Eser “Individual Criminal Responsibility” in A Cassese, P Gaeta & JRDW Jones (eds) The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary vol I (2002) 767 793; Neha (2011) 
CJIL 171. 
1332 See for example Katanga & Chui at para 515 where the Trial-Chamber describes indirect 
perpetration – specifically Organisationsherrchaft although not explicitly calling it by that title. See also 
S Manacorda & C Meloni “Indirect Perpetration versus Joint Criminal Enterprise:  Concurring 
Approaches in the Practice of International Criminal Law?” 9 (2011) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 159 164. 
1333 Neha (2011) CJIL 172. 
1334 Neha (2011) CJIL 173-174. See also H Radtke Goltdammer's Archiv für Strafrecht (2006). 
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have translated into ICC case law but not the final requirement.1335 The scope of 
Roxin’s Organisationsherrchaft also seems to have been extended or undergone 
permutation by the Federal Court of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof).1336  
6 4 2 2 Elements of Article 25(3)(a): Review of ICC case law 
According to the ICC Trial-Chamber in The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (“Katanga & Chui”),1337 the ICC statute envisages three modes 
of perpetrator liability in Article 25(3)(a).1338 That is, in the first instance, where the 
person has personally carried out all the physical or objective elements of the crime. 
Secondly, where the person has, together with another, has control over a crime due 
to tasks that were assigned to him or her – which would constitute a joint-commission 
of said crime with another. Lastly, a person will also be principally responsible where 
he or she “controls the will” of those who physically execute the objective elements of 
the crime. This will constitute the commission of a crime through another.1339  
This third type of liability acknowledges perpetrators in an objective-cum-subjective 
approach where principals can both contribute to the crime through contribution to the 
physical elements of the crime and includes those who control or are the masterminds 
behind the crimes – despite being physically removed from the scene of the crime.1340 
Thus, a “mastermind” may commit crimes through his or her organisation or (criminal) 
machinery without being physically present. The mastermind (with subjective intent of 
                                            
1335 See The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (“Ruto 
et al”) ICC-01/09-01/11-373 (05 February 2012) 313-332 where the (objective) requirements for holding 
the superior (or indirect perpetrator in Organisationsherrmchaft terms) responsible, were described as 
control over the organisation; that organisation must have a hierarchal and organised structure and the 
criminal plans must have an almost-automatic execution as described above and below. See also 
Katanga & Chui 515-518. 
1336 Neha (2011) CJIL 172-173. 
1337 ICC-01/04-01/07 (30 September 2008).  
1338 The same was found in the earlier matter of Dyilo 2007 para. The case pointed out out that direct 
perpetration, co-perpetration as well as indirect perpetration (the commission of a crime through another 
person or using them as an instrument to commit crime) are all modes of perpetration under section 
25(3)(a). Also see Eser “Individual Criminal Responsibility” in International Criminal Court 793. 
1339 Katanga & Chui para 488. 
1340 Dyilo 2007 para 330; 338-339. See above at 6 4 2 3 for a discussion on the on the debate 
surrounding the objective and subjective approach regarding criminal responsibility in German law.  
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having awareness of the circumstances)1341 orchestrates the crimes and the members 
of the organisation who physically perpetrate the crimes. Therefore, the traditional 
concept of co-perpetration “coincides” with joint control over the crime due to the 
“various contributions” essential to the commission of the crime.1342 
6 4 2 2 1 Objective elements  
The ICC Trial Chamber in Katanga & Chui embarked on a detailed discussion (and 
justification) of the objective-cum-subjective approach.  
The Trial Chamber first delineated the objective elements required to establish 
liability under section 25(3)(a).1343 The leader of the organisation must firstly have 
control over the organisation.1344 According to the Trial Chamber the control element 
manifests itself through the compliance by the subordinates with the orders of the 
leader. Compliance with these orders is ensured through a mixture of negative 
(punishment)1345 and positive (providing resources, payment1346 and employment) 
reinforcements as well as through violent and strict training to guarantee “automatic 
compliance” (which is the final requirement).1347  
                                            
1341 Dyilo 2007 para 331. 
1342 Dyilo 2007 para 341. 
1343 Also see Ruto et al para 313. 
1344 Katanga & Chui paras 500-510. Also see Ruto et al paras 292; 313-332. 
1345 See Ruto et al paras 324-325 where a witness submitted that people were forced to fight and 
[a]nyone who did not want to participate was considered a traitor and was to be killed”. Refusing the 
incentives discussed below (fn 1330) will be seen as suspicious and someone could be suspected for 
being a spy for such refusal. Physical punishment such as beatings would also take place to ensure 
compliance (see paras 325-326).  
1346 Ruto et al para 320. Here the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC points out payment incentives used to 
motivate subordinates for their participation in committing crimes against humanity. This usually 
occurred in two forms: firstly, through stipends or salaries to serve a motivation and the other form was 
given as a reward for killing people of a certain faction or destroying their property.  
1347 Katanga & Chui para 513; 518. The Trial Chamber points to the training regimes where minors are 
abducted and “taught to shoot, pillage, rape and kill”. Weigend argues that the Trial Chamber here felt 
“compelled” to add training regimes as a mechanism of control as because Roxin’s original model “(…) 
hardly lends itself to be applied to vaguely organized militias or rebel armies (…)” and that the Trial 
Chamber compensated for this by adding new requirements unique to the specific case (Weigend 
(2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 107). Manacorda & Meloni also share this sentiment – 
see Manacorda & Meloni (2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 171.  
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Control over an organisation may also be proved in less drastic fashion – such as 
evidence pertaining to an accused being on top of a hierarchal structure with 
commanders reporting to him, the giving of orders that would eventually reach the 
physical perpetrators, the assignment of commanders to specific areas, and the 
distribution of weapons.1348 
The second element, namely the existence of an “organised and hierarchical 
apparatus of power”, is also essential.1349 This is proven mainly by evidence of a 
superior-subordinate relationship. 1350 It is crucial that the leader exercises control and 
authority over subordinates in this relationship and that proof of such manifests in the 
compliance with the orders.1351  No proof of a common plan or objective is required.   
Thirdly, the orders must be complied with in a manner which is “almost 
automatic”.1352  This pertains to the manner described above – where the identity of 
the individual actor is irrelevant.1353 If one subordinate does not carry out the plan, 
another will take his or her place and execute the plan. And therein lies the “almost 
automatic” machinelike compliance. In this scheme, perpetrators are said to lose their 
individuality. Despite the fact that the subordinate is still acting as an autonomous 
agent, he or she is “an interchangeable figure” in the mind of the leader.1354 The ICC 
Trial Chamber goes further and holds that the organisation, in this context, develops 
a life independent of its individual members and thus a different kind of liability must 
attach than normal instances where criminal orders or instructions are given.1355 The 
Chamber reasoned that this automatic compliance is the reason for attaching principal 
liability and not accessorial liability. The control of the leader therefore transcends that 
of mere instruction. It is through the unassailable control over the organisation and the 
subordinate (the physical perpetrator) that the perpetration of the crime is also 
controlled and dictated.1356 
                                            
1348 See Ruto et al paras 197-198; 328. 
1349 See Katanga & Chui para 511. Also see Ruto et al paras 292; 313-332. 
1350 Katanga & Chui para 512. 
1351 Katanga & Chui para 513.  
1352 Katanga & Chui para 515. Also see Ruto et al paras 292; 313-332 
1353 Katanga & Chui para 515-517. 
1354 Katanga & Chui para 515 quoting Roxin Täterschaft (2006) 245.   
1355 Katanga & Chui para 517. 
1356 Katanga & Chui para 518. 
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The orders of a superior or leader can be effectuated by any person or subordinate 
who is considered to be replaceable or fungible (or a cog in the machinery) in the 
organisation which exists within a hierarchical structure.1357 This fungibility or 
replicability of members, although emphasised, is not a requirement but serves merely 
is evidence of the control of the leader, and smaller hierarchal and liability may be 
capable of being adapted for the criminal gang context.1358 
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II in The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (“Ruto et al”)1359 followed a substantially 
similar approach as in Katanga & Chui. In addition to enumerating the three objective 
elements as described in Katanga & Chui, the Pre-Trial Chamber in Ruto et al states 
that the requirements of the crime must have been carried out by the accused through 
a common plan or agreement with others and that the “suspects and other co-
perpetrator(s) must carry out essential contributions in a coordinated manner” which 
caused the material elements of the crime to be fulfilled.1360 This is in contrast to 
Katanga & Chui where the Pre-Trial Chamber addressed these as “additional objective 
elements” for the joint-commission of crimes.1361 It is therefore submitted that the PTC 
in Ruto et al failed to properly delineate the requirements for co-perpetration (of the 
superiors), on the one hand and, on the other hand, the elements for perpetration 
through another. It will be shown below that the ICC has amalgamated these concepts 
into one form of perpetration.  
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (“Dyilo 
2006”)1362 took a somewhat different approach and did not explicitly list the 
requirements for liability under Article 25(3)(a).1363 The Pre-Trial Chamber held that it 
had reasonable grounds to find the following: that Mr Lubanga was the president of 
the Union des Patriotes Congolais (“UPC”) and that he had founded the Forces 
Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (“FPLC”) which was the military wing of the 
                                            
1357 Katanga & Chui 512; 518. 
1358 Werle Principles 210. Also see M Osiel Making Sense of Mass Atrocities (2009) 103. 
1359 ICC-01/09-01/11-373 (05 February 2012). 
1360 Ruto et al para 292. 
1361 See Katanga & Chui paras 494; 519-526. 
1362 ICC-01/04-01/06 (24 February 2006).  
1363 Also see Jessberger & Geneuss (2008) Journal of International Criminal Justice 863; fn 48 where 
the authors describe the listing or elucidation of requirements as implicit. 
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UPC. He consequently became the commander-in-chief of the FPLC and “exercised 
de jure authority” based on a “hierarchal relationship” over members of the 
“hierarchically organised armed group[s]”.1364 This elucidates certain requirements. A 
group, which is organised in a hierarchal fashion, must exist. The accused must have 
control or authority over this group due to his or her position of authority, for instance 
there must be evidence that the accused “had the final say” regarding policies and 
practices of the UPC and FPLC.1365 The accused (leader) must finally also be “aware 
of [their] unique role within [the organisation] and actively use it”.1366 
If these elements or requirements had to be further synthesised, the requirements 
would be the existence of a hierarchically organised group over which the leader (or 
indirect perpetrator) actively exercises authority over his subordinates with knowledge 
or consciousness of this authority. 
It must however be noted, again, that the ICC has fused the notions of co-
perpetration and perpetration through another person in judgments implementing 
perpetration through another person.1367 The Pre-Trial Chamber in Katanga & Chui 
noted that the scenarios listed in Article 25(3)(a) utilised the disjunctive word “or”. An 
inclusive interpretation (meaning that either or all of the alternatives are possible) or 
exclusive (one of alternatives may be followed but not both) would result in a strict 
textualist approach.1368 Furthermore, the Chamber found that joint-commission of 
crimes through another person was “in accordance with the Statute”.1369 This 
approach was then furthermore succinctly formulated as follows:  
                                            
1364 Dyilo 2006 at paras 94-96.  
1365 Dyilo 2006 at paras 95. Also see Jessberger & Geneuss (2008) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 863; fn 48.  
1366 Dyilo 2006 at para 95. 
1367 See Ruto et al para 289 where it was noted that the Pre-Trial Chamber I “provided a dynamic or 
effective interpretation of the provision by way of merging the two modes of participation” and that this 
was in line the rules of interpretation as provided by article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969 entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331. See further 
Weigend (2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 92; Jessberger & Geneuss (2008) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 859; fn 29; Manacorda & Meloni (2011) Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 171-175.  
1368 Katanga & Chui para 491.  
1369 Katanga & Chui para 491 – quoting the last part of Article 25(2) of the Statute.  
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The Chamber finds that there are no legal grounds for limiting the joint commission of 
the crime solely to cases in which the perpetrators execute a portion of the crime by 
exercising direct control over it. Rather, through a combination of individual 
responsibility for committing crimes through other persons together with the mutual 
attribution among the co-perpetrators at the senior level, a mode of liability arises which 
allows the Court to assess the blameworthiness of "senior leaders" adequately.1370 
The Trial Chamber further held that where a leader has no (de facto or de jure) control 
over a subordinate who himself cannot be held liable, such a leader cannot be held 
accountable for committing a crime through the innocent subordinate. This person may 
however be held liable for committing a crime through another person where he or she 
acts jointly with another who does in fact have control over the physical perpetrator.1371 
For purposes of this study, the focus is on single control authorities or leaders who are 
not acting in collaboration with another superior and therefore only on the general 
principles of committing crimes through an organisation. The focus is only on the most 
high-ranking gang leaders – however this author is cognizant of the fact that multiple 
permutations of hierarchal structures are possible with more than one authority or 
instructing figure. This might be especially useful where a lower ranking member 
instructs the “directives” of a gang leader.  
6 4 2 2 2 Subjective elements  
The subjective elements are not focused on in literature dealing with indirect 
perpetration or perpetration through an organisation. The focus is mostly on the 
general objective or physical requirements.  
The Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC delineated certain subjective elements in Ruto 
et al – once again mostly in the context of indirect perpetration by means of joint-
perpetration. The accused must firstly satisfy the specific subjective elements of the 
crime perpetrated, which is defined in terms of Article 30 of the Rome Statute.1372 
Article 30(1) sets the standard of intent and knowledge. A person shall be deemed as 
having intent when that person “means to engage in the conduct”1373 and that person 
must mean for vexed consequences (for example genocide) to have occurred “or is 
                                            
1370 Katanga & Chui at para 492. 
1371 Katanga & Chui paras 493-494. 
1372 Ruto et al para 333. 
1373 Article 30(2)(a) (own emphasis). 
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aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events”.1374 The requisite knowledge 
is determined or inferred where the accused is aware “(…) that a circumstance exists 
or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events” and the terms “know” 
and “knowingly” shall both be interpreted in light of this meaning.1375 He or she must 
finally have awareness of factual circumstances that enable them to effectuate (joint) 
control1376 over the commission of crimes through other persons, specifically, the 
subordinates.1377 
6 4 2 3 A brief overview of problems with and criticisms against indirect  
perpetration1378 
Perpetration through an organisation has suffered criticism over the years. An 
obvious issue is the violation of the principle of personal guilt or individual criminal 
liability which dictates that only those who have personally contributed to the crime 
may be held criminally liable. This can also be traced back to the objective or 
subjective approaches to distinguish between principal or accessorial liability, which 
was subject to great debate in the German legal community.1379 An objective approach 
holds that only one who satisfies the objective or physical elements of the crime, can 
attract criminal liability. A subjective approach, on the other hand, holds that persons 
who satisfies the mental or subjective elements of a crime can be held responsible for 
a crime, even though he or she did not physically carry out any of the physical 
elements of the crime.1380 But in terms of Roxin’s doctrine, this problem is solved 
                                            
1374 Article 30(2)(b). See also Weigend (2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 108. 
1375 Article 30(3). 
1376 The Pre-Trial Chamber here refers to “joint control” because it was established that  
1377 Ruto et al 333. 
1378 The focus here will however mainly be on two of the conceptual or doctrinal issues. Another issue 
identified in case law was the existence of the doctrine of co-perpetration through another person in 
terms of in terms of customary international law. The Pre-Trial Chamber in Ruto et al para 289 did not 
find this argument persuasive as the main source of law for the ICC (per Article 21 of the Statute of 
Rome) is firstly, the Statute itself, the elements of crimes and the Rules of Procedure of Evidence of the 
Court. Then, according to the Pre-Trial Chamber, only if a lacuna exists in the Statute, will the Court 
consider other sources of international law, including those of other international or hybrid tribunals. It 
however found that this (combined) doctrine was consistent with the text of the Statute and Article 31 
of the Vienna Convention.  
1379 See Weigend (2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 95. 
1380 See Weigend (2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 94-95. 
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based on dominance and the power to secure automatic compliance with orders. This 
will establish principal instead of accessorial liability and thus an objective-cum-
subjective approach as described above.1381 This doctrinal approach is not known in 
South African criminal law; for the most part (the innocent agent doctrine being an 
exception),1382 intention or a subjective state of mind must be associated with at least 
some sort of physical or objective action to establish criminal liability. Only three types 
of principal liability are recognised in our law.1383 The first category relates to someone 
who has personally fulfilled all of the elements of the crime; secondly where someone 
instructs a person who may or may not be able to attract criminal liability (the “innocent 
agent” doctrine) such as a child under the age of 101384 or someone who has been 
subjected to coercion; and finally, a person who is liable under the common purpose 
doctrine.1385  
Although the innocent agent doctrine is recognised in South African law, it is unlikely 
that the dominance exercised by a gang leader will result in in a lack of criminal 
capacity. The doctrine is expressed in the maxim qui facit per alium facit per se (“qui 
facit doctrine”).1386  
The existence of true dominance in these organisations has also been questioned. 
Weigend argues that the concepts of dominance and interchangeability of persons 
should not be conflated.1387 Replacing one member of the criminal organisation due 
to unwillingness or the inability to execute a criminal order or plan, is not evidence of 
true dominance or fungibility.1388 Such a strict or inflexible structure might have been 
present in Nazi Germany but the existence of such a structure in African armed 
conflicts may be doubted1389 as the Trial Chamber in Katanga & Chui found that the 
                                            
1381 See Manacorda & Meloni (2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 172. 
1382 See also discussion at Chapter 3 3 above. 
1383 See Burchell Principles 475; Kemp et al Criminal Law 260-261. 
1384 Section 7(1) of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008. See also RC Whiting “Principals and Accessories 
in Crime” (1980) 97(2) South African Law Journal 199 202. 
1385 See Burchell Principles 475-476; Kemp et al Criminal Law 260-261.See Chapter 3 3 above for a 
comprehensive discussion on the common purpose doctrine.  
1386 See subsequent section.  
1387 See Weigend (2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 100-101. 
1388 See Weigend (2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 100-101. Compare Manacorda & 
Meloni (2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 170. 
1389 Manacorda & Meloni (2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 171; Weigend (2011) Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 107.  
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training and reward programmes employed by superiors resulted in some sort of 
(pseudo-)dominance over subordinates as referred to above.1390 “Organisation” and 
“structure” are thus terms in flux, and quite culture- and context specific.  
6 4 2 4 Applicability in a local context 
6 4 2 4 1 Interaction with existing modes of liability  
The indirect perpetrator doctrine or control of a crime through an organisation 
overlaps mostly with the innocent agent doctrine expressed by the qui facit maxim, 
which is recognised in South African law.1391 The maxim translates into “[a] person 
who commits an act through another person is taken as having committed it 
himself”.1392 Liability will be attributed (or imputed) to such a person and he shall be 
held responsible as a principal.1393 The question posed in S v Matseare and Others 
(“Matseare”)1394 serves as an example. In this case the Court considered whether 
section 4(1) of the Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 is only applicable to a person 
who handled the dangerous weapon himself. The Court however held that this 
question has to be answered in the negative and liability may also attach to persons 
using the dangerous weapon through another person. Such a person (committing the 
crime through another) will be liable in instances where he or she employed coercion, 
mandate, persuasion or threat which “virtually” amounts to the qui facit doctrine.1395 
The use of the word “virtually” is unhelpful: it is unclear what actions would then qualify 
as qui facit if not through coercion, mandate, persuasion or threat. It would seem that 
these instances would in fact be perfect examples of when a crime is committed 
through another, as seen also in the discussion of ICC case law above.  
Qui facit is however defective for the following reason: it requires proof of some sort 
of instruction to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. An argument for the use of qui 
facit would be in instances where criminal capacity is lacking, such as, for example, a 
                                            
1390 Katanga & Chui para 513; 518. Also see Manacorda & Meloni (2011) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 172; Weigend (2011) Journal of International Criminal Justice 107. 
1391 Burchell Principles 475-476; Kemp et al Criminal Law 260-261; Whiting South African Law Journal 
202. 
1392 S v Chirunga 1998 (2) ZLR 601 (H).  
1393 Whiting South African Law Journal 202. 
1394 1978 (2) SA 931 (T). 
1395 Matseare 932. 
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child under the age of 10. The lack of case law implementing this principle may also 
point to its difficulties. Similar difficulties are faced in proving the crime of incitement 
(and to a lesser extent conspiracy).1396  
It is due to this evidentiary difficulty that a model focusing rather on the existence of 
an organisation and the ability to control such an organisation becomes particularly 
useful. The focus moves away from proving specific instructions or plots to the general 
control over an organisation and a general criminal mandate. 
6 4 2 4 2  Case study:  S v Thomas1397  
Could a permutation of the indirect perpetrator or the doctrine of control over the 
organisation be used to hold the leaders of criminal gangs responsible for crimes 
committed by their subordinates? This section will investigate this possibility – 
predominantly in the light of the Thomas judgment.  
In order to prove indirect perpetration under ICC case law, there must firstly be proof 
of control over an organisation. In Katanga & Chui, the facts showed that the accused 
was on top of a hierarchal structure due to commanders reporting to him. This method 
was the least controversial in establishing that the accused was the leader, or more 
aptly, in control of the organisation.1398 Control may also be evidenced through (almost 
automatic) compliance with the orders of the superior. 
Proving control over the 28s gangs was successfully established on the facts in 
Thomas. Several of the crimes committed by (subordinate) gang members were found 
to have been committed on instruction of Accused 1.1399 There was also collateral 
evidence showing the authoritative position of Accused 1 within the structure of the 
28s gang. Evidence by a police officer (Barker) who gave evidence of the tattoos and 
slang also indicated Accused 1’s leadership role as well as his interactions with other 
accused persons.1400 It will be recalled from the discussion in Chapter 41401 that 
Accused 1 had several tattoos including one stating “Die Ou” in Afrikaans (which can 
                                            
1396 See Chapter 3 4 and 3 5 above. 
1397 2015 JDR 1932 (WCC). 
1398 See for example Ruto et al at paras 197-198; 328 and 5 4 2 2 1 above.  
1399 See Thomas paras 480; 509-510; 524-531, for example. This are however only a few of several 
instances of Accused 1’s criminal instructions.  
1400 See Thomas 481-485 especially.  
1401 4 5 1 1 1 & 4 5 1 1 3 above.  
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be translated as “The Man” in English) and, according to the witness, this was an 
indication of Accused 1 being a leadership figure.1402 Several witnesses also testified 
that he was an “inspector” – a person with a high rank within the 28s.1403 
Barker further testified that Accused 1 had a unique leadership style as he also 
committed crimes himself – which contributed to members of the community fearing 
him even more than they would an unseen yet menacing gang leader. This fear led to 
community members refusing to testify against him.1404 Another police officer 
(Bothma) testified of an instance where Accused 1 had returned from a court 
appearance and that some of the other accused had kneeled in front of him while he 
addressed them in their gang slang (Sabela).1405 There was also evidence of a further 
witness (Adonis) who testified about his perception of Accused 1 being the most 
influential member of the 28s during his stint in Goodwood prison and also that gang 
members on “street level” were loyal towards him.1406  
Due to this evidence and several other witness statements,1407 the Court 
established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Accused 1 was the leader of the 28s 
and also that he was in control of the enterprise as per section 2(1)(f) of POCA.1408 
It is therefore clear that it can successfully be established whether someone is in 
control of a criminal gang, thus satisfying the first element. Accused 1 was a 
domineering figure in a criminal gang context as well as within his community. It is 
submitted that gang members often “allow” for dominance to facilitate a perverse 
symbiotic relationship between the gang member and the gang leader. Pinnock has 
also stated in this context: “At what point (…) do we make a distinction between the 
                                            
1402 Thomas 481. 
1403 See for example Thomas 491, 496 and 502. Accused 1 however refuted that he was vested with 
this position and contended that he was rather a “sergeant 2” and even if he was an inspector, that 
position did not carry real authority as generals are the instruction-givers within the gang. See Thomas 
183; 502.  
1404 Thomas 482; 484-486. This fear was even present in officials such as a correctional officer who 
refused to testify against Accused 1 due to his seeming omnipresence in prisons. 
1405 Thomas 482. 
1406 Thomas 490-491. 
1407 See Thomas 481-512; 521-522 for the evidence against Accused 1 in this context. 
1408 Thomas 512. 
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activities of a gang and the survival strategies of the poor?”1409 This dominance 
ultimately ensures compliance with orders.  
Wijnberg utilises Maslow’s motivation theory and hierarchy of needs1410 in 
explaining how gangs fulfil the basic needs of an individual – needs that would have 
potentially been left unfulfilled were it not for an individual’s gang involvement.1411 This 
allows for dominance to fulfil needs. Gang members may be dominated not only by 
fear and violence but for basic needs such as food, housing, money as well as drugs 
which become a need after gang members become dependent as they are abused as 
a coping mechanism as well as a means of payment.1412 These constitute 
physiological needs.1413 Safety needs1414 are often met through the protection 
mechanisms gangs provide for their members due to the belief that belonging to a 
criminal gang will provide protection – at least from that specific gang. Gang members 
are however exponentially more likely to be exposed to violence and may often 
outweigh the “benefit” of receiving protection from a specific gang.1415 They are thus 
exposed to dangers from conducting business for said gang, such those illustrated in 
Chapters 2 and 4 (of this dissertation). The last need to be discussed here1416 is gang 
members’ need for belonging.1417  
Quasi-military/rebel group contexts such as in Katanga & Chui and Ruto et al 
illustrate that compliance with orders or submission may be ensured through positive 
(employment, resources or employment) or negative (punishment) incentives. 
Similarly, gang members may allow for dominance in order to fulfil their basic needs 
or in order to survive.  
                                            
1409 D Pinnock The Brotherhoods: Street Gangs and State Control in Cape Town (1984) 105. Also see 
Burchell Principles 909. 
1410 AH Maslow Motivation and Personality 3 ed (1987).  
1411 Wijnberg Exploration (2012) 41. 
1412 See, for example, Thomas 485. 
1413Maslow Motivation 15; Wijnberg Exploration (2012) 42-43. 
1414 See Maslow Motivation 19. 
1415 Wijnberg Exploration (2012) 43-44. 
1416 See further Wijnberg Exploration (2012) 45-46 where the author discusses the need for esteem as 
well as the need for self-actualisation. See also BE van Wyk Constructions of Gang Membership Among 
High School Youth MSc (Psychology) thesis University of Stellenbosch (2001) where the author 
investigates, predominantly, the reasons why members of the youth in the Western Cape join criminal 
gangs. See especially 16 ff.  
1417 Maslow Motivation 20. 
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The second element, which refers back to the first element, requires the existence 
of an “organised and hierarchical apparatus of power” and is established through a 
superior-subordinate relationship and compliance with the orders within the structure 
of the superior-subordinate relationship.1418 An organisational relationship was also 
established in Thomas where Accused 1 was on top of the hierarchal structure and 
conducted his criminal affairs through fear in such a manner that compliance with his 
orders would be guaranteed. It is however not argued that this fear resulted in a lack 
of capacity such as with an innocent agent. Once again, if the Court had found there 
to be no “enterprise” on the facts, a conviction in terms of section 2(1)(f) of POCA 
would not have been possible. An “organised and hierarchal apparatus of power” 
which is an admittedly flexible and broad concept, is sufficient under indirect 
perpetration.   
The third requirement (also mentioned in Katanga & Chui) is that there be an 
“automatic compliance” with the orders of the superior and if a subordinate (a mere 
“cog” in the machinery) is unable to execute a criminal task, another will execute it in 
his or her place.1419 This requirement was however not apparent in Dyilo 2006 and the 
third requirement, which was more of a mental element, was rather proof that the 
accused was aware of his role within the organisation and actively used his 
authoritative role.1420   
It is not apparent whether the orders given by Accused 1 in Thomas were exercised 
with “automatic compliance”. The level of fear of and respect for Accused 1 was 
however apparent as well as the power dynamics within the gang, and therefore an 
argument that such compliance was present, may be convincing. Wijnberg’s utilisation 
of Maslow’s motivation theory also illustrates the psychological control gang leaders 
have over gang members and their need to serve a gang. Compliance could arguably 
therefore be guaranteed by a gang member’s survival instinct and need to remain in 
the gang to fulfil his or her needs. 
The particular usefulness and application of this doctrine is centred on two reasons. 
Firstly, it does not rely on legal technicalities such as “criminal gang”; a “pattern of 
criminal gang activities”; enterprise or “pattern of racketeering activities”. A court must 
                                            
1418 Katanga & Chui para 511-513. 
1419 Katanga & Chui paras 515-517. 
1420 Dyilo 2006 at para 95. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 301 
 
merely establish the existence of a hierarchal organisation. The second important field 
of applicability is related to the first in that it imputes liability to the leader even in 
instances where there is an innocent agent (the subordinate gang member). This may 
also include youth gang members whose charges are diverted in terms of the Child 
Justice Act 75 of 2008. A gang leader could therefore, even in instances where no 
pattern (of racketeering or gang activities) could be established on the facts, still be 
held responsible.   
Also, where no one could be held legally liable for the underlying predicate offences 
– but factually crimes were committed within a criminal apparatus – liability could 
ensue if it can be established that gang leader had control over the criminal gang and 
thus committed crimes through that gang. Proving a pattern of criminal gang activity 
or racketeering activity in the context of bigger gangs such as the Americans, where 
certain off-shoots have reached over 5 000 members each (so-called 
“supergangs”),1421 may prove extremely problematic. Additionally, there is no need to 
prove that the gang leader had in fact instructed specific offences or a series of 
offences. His or her mere position of authority would be sufficient to establish criminal 
liability, which would therefore also resolve difficulties surrounding incitement and 
conspiracy.   
6 5 Evaluation: criminal responsibility of gang leaders through the lens of  
international criminal law 
The preceding discussion illustrates the potential for the development of South 
African criminal law, under the influence of international criminal law. Command 
responsibility and control through an organisation both have related, but dissimilar 
doctrines in South African law which may be developed to incorporate or 
accommodate modes of liability suitable for group-based and structural criminality, 
such as criminal groups and gangs. In this regard, the discussion under 6 4 1 5 3 
provided a framework for holding gang leaders responsible through command 
responsibility, founded in the legal duty emanating from the creation of a dangerous 
situation combined with failure to prevent harm from ensuing. The case of Thomas 
illustrates the type of factual matrix where liability based on the control-theory (or any 
                                            
1421 See 2 2, 4 4 1 as well as 4 5 1 1 1 above.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 302 
 
of the leadership modes of liability) would be most applicable and indeed useful in the 
fight against the structures that make criminal gangs possible.  
6 6 Alternative foreign law measures addressing involvement or participation 
in organised criminal groups 
This section investigates alternative models for criminalising or limiting participation 
in organised criminal groups. Some of these models do not in themselves carry 
criminal sanctions but involve the limitation of civil liberties by proscribing certain 
conduct with the hope of upsetting the effective functioning of the organised criminal 
group. Certain models may also be substantially similar to existing modalities under 
South African law but have not yet found application in the provincial or national anti-
gang strategies. The ultimate purpose is to gain insight into these models and make 
proposals for adoption into our legislative regime to either replace, develop or 
supplement the crimes contained in POCA as well as the common law.  
There are four main models addressing or criminalising organised criminal 
structures. These models1422 are the conspiracy model;1423 the participation model;1424 
the enterprise (or RICO) model1425 and the labelling/registration models. 1426  
POCA is constructed on the participation model, which, is based on STEP (which 
in turn is based on RICO). As Schloenhardt points out, legislation based on this model 
is based on two fundamental physical or objective elements: the existence of a criminal 
group or organisation and the participation therein.1427 These models shall not be 
                                            
1422 See A Schloenhardt Palermo on the Pacific Rim: Organised Crime Offences in The Asia Pacific 
Region (2009) 15-17. 
1423 As described in the Palermo Convention and found in Australia, Singapore and Malaysia. See 
Schloenhardt Organised Crime Offences (2009) 15. Also see R Earis “Participating in the activities of 
an organised crime group: the new offence” (2015) 10 Criminal Law Review 766 766-767. 
1424 Also found in the Palermo Convention, the US STEP Act, Canada, New South Wales, New Zealand 
and Taiwan. See Schloenhardt Organised Crime Offences (2009) 15. Also see Earis (2015) Criminal 
Law Review 767. 
1424 The most well-known example being the United States RICO Act. Also see Earis (2015) Criminal 
Law Review 767-769. 
1425 The most well-known example being the United States RICO Act.  
1426 Found in jurisdictions such as New South Wales, Hong Kong, Japan and South Australia. See 
Schloenhardt Organised Crime Offences (2009) 15. Also see Earis (2015) Criminal Law Review 769-
770. 
1427 Schloenhardt Organised Crime Offences (2009) 265. 
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discussed further in this Chapter as this model has been comprehensively discussed 
in Chapter 3, where prominent examples of the participation model such as STEP and 
the Canadian Criminal Code were discussed as comparative and interpretive tools for 
understanding Chapter 4 of POCA.1428 Suggestions for certain amendments to the text 
and structure of POCA are also based on nuances found in these models.  
The conspiracy model is also not unknown to South Africa and is manifested in 
section 18(2)(a) of the Riotous Assemblies Act 17 of 1956. Conspiracy-based liability 
is one of the accepted strategies to combat organised criminality, as is evident from 
the Palermo Convention, article 5(1)(a)(i). However, some commentators, like 
Schloenhardt find the inclusion of conspiracy-based strategies surprising, as was also 
pointed out in Chapter 3.1429 This criticism is based on the observation that it is 
generally difficult to secure a conviction under the conspiracy model due to lack of 
proof of an explicit agreement between the parties.1430 
The enterprise model is also known to South Africa and is found in Chapter 2 of 
POCA dealing with racketeering. The participation and enterprise models are 
substantially similar and STEP is in fact an off-shoot of RICO, which is the preeminent 
enterprise modality.1431 The focus here is the criminal enterprise and the criminal 
activities that flow therefrom.1432 Chapter 2 of POCA was also discussed in its 
application in the anti-gang context (being traditionally associated with white collar 
crime rather than gang, or “street” crime).1433 
It is clear that three of the four main models are sufficiently represented in South 
African law. There is therefore no need for a comprehensive discussion of these 
models in the context of this dissertation. As mentioned, they serve an interpretive 
function and nuanced provisions have been highlighted. The only models that do not 
                                            
1428 See 4 3 1 and 4 3 4 above.  
1429 See 4 3 above. 
1430 Schloenhardt Organised Crime Offences (2009) 264. 
1431 See SG Lebeya Defining organised crime: a comparative analysis LLD thesis UNISA (2012) 104; 
DC Van der Linde ŉ Patroon van kriminele bende-aktiwiteite: Die oplossing tot Suid Afrika se 
bendemisdaad of ŉ wit olifant? ŉ Kritiese, regsvergelykende en konstitusionele studie van Hoofstuk 4 
van die Wet op die Voorkoming van Georganiseerde Misdaad 121 van 1998 Unplublished LLM 
dissertation (2015) 9 fn 18. Also See 4 2 fn 497 above. 
1432 A Kruger Organised Crime and Proceeds of Crime Law in South Africa 2 ed (2013) 13; Schloenhardt 
Organised Crime Offences (2009) 269. 
1433 See 4 4 above.  
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find particular application are the labelling and registration models. These models will 
therefore be analysed in detail below.  
6 6 1  Labelling or registration model 
Recently there have been calls for the harsher criminalisation of gangs, including 
criminalising mere gang membership. 1434 In some foreign jurisdictions the strategy is 
known as “labelling” or “registration”; concepts not yet part of South African criminal 
law lexicon.  
A puzzling interaction during a meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on Police, 
which included a discussion on the anti-gang strategy of the country, took place on the 
23rd of August 2017. Deputy National Commissioner of Policing, Lieutenant General 
Masemola, indicated that there might be a need for stronger legislation dealing with 
the gang problem in the country. In response, acting National Police Commissioner, 
Lt Gen Mothiba, suggested that the answer could be “legislation which outlawed the 
formation and membership of a gang”.1435 An ANC MP, Mr Ramatlakane, was however 
“surprised” to hear of these suggestions and asserted (wrongly) that “[t]hese powers 
in law exist” and that there were over ten gangs that were subjected to this “law” 
including the Americans. The MP called for the implementation of these “judgments” 
and “precedents” by authorities.1436 The misguided views and assumptions expressed 
by this particular member of the legislature is perhaps indicative of a broader and 
deeper misapprehension of what tools South African criminal law currently has in 
terms of the prevention and punishment of criminal gang activities. POCA, the 
preeminent legislative tool in the fight against criminal gang activities, certainly does 
not criminalise mere gang membership, as we have seen throughout this dissertation. 
There is also no precedent under the common law through judicial pronouncement 
                                            
1434 Parliamentary Committee meeting on Police “Hawks Illegal Firearms Unit; SAPS Anti-Gang 
Strategy; Quarter 1 performance; Vetting Senior Management” Parliamentary Monitoring Group (23-
08-2017) <https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/24881/> (accessed 06-09-2017). Also see C Dolley 
“Police 'confused' over national gun probe and anti-gang law” (06-09-2017) News24 
<http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/police-confused-over-national-gun-probe-and-anti-gang-
law-20170906> (accessed 06-09-2017).  
1435 Parliamentary Committee meeting on Police “Hawks Illegal Firearms Unit; SAPS Anti-Gang 
Strategy; Quarter 1 performance; Vetting Senior Management” Parliamentary Monitoring Group.  
1436 Parliamentary Committee meeting on Police “Hawks Illegal Firearms Unit; SAPS Anti-Gang 
Strategy; Quarter 1 performance; Vetting Senior Management” Parliamentary Monitoring Group. 
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establishing such a principle.1437 The closest may be public nuisance remedies, but at 
the time of writing this dissertation, no judicial pronouncement could be found utilising 
public nuisance remedies in the anti-gang context.1438 But even a judgment based on 
public nuisance would not outlaw “the formation and membership of a gang”. This is 
something more reminiscent of a labelling model.  
Labelling and registration provide simple, yet arguably draconian methods to curb 
unlawful organisations by employing a “two-tier system”: firstly, prohibition of certain 
organisations or activities by name, and secondly the criminalisation thereof.1439  
The registration model is also described as the negative model while labelling is 
sometimes referred to as the positive model.1440 Registration creates a “negative 
prohibition” by criminalising unregistered organisations while labelling requires a 
government to actively declare an organisation as unlawful.1441 
Some comparative examples of these models are briefly discussed below. 
6 6 1 1 Registration (negative model): Singapore  
The Singaporean Societies Act 56 of 1966 (“Societies Act”) requires that all 
organisations within the jurisdiction be registered. Non-compliance with this 
requirement renders the organisation ipso facto unlawful.1442 The Societies Act places 
a legal duty on the types of societies listed in the Schedule to the Act (except those 
listed in section 2) to register such a society. Every unregistered society shall 
consequently be deemed to be an unlawful society.1443 A society is defined as 
including “(…) any club, company, partnership or association of ten or more persons, 
whatever its nature or object”, subject to the exclusions in section 2. A prominent and 
                                            
1437 Also see Dolley “Police 'confused' over national gun probe and anti-gang law” News24 where it was 
sensationally and erroneously reported that  
[t]wo of the country's top police officers, including the national commissioner, appear oblivious 
to stringent anti-gang laws, according to a report on a recent meeting [.] 
The author of that article is referring to the non-existent laws as described above.  
1438 See 6 6 1 5 1 for a discussion on public nuisance remedies in the South African context.  
1439 Schloenhardt Organised Crime Offences (2009) 272. 
1440 Schloenhardt Organised Crime Offences (2009) 273. 
1441 Schloenhardt Organised Crime Offences (2009) 272. 
1442 Schloenhardt Organised Crime Offences (2009) 273. 
1443 See section 14 of the Societies Act.  
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relevant ground for refusal is where the Registrar is satisfied that the particular society 
“is likely to be used for unlawful purposes or for purposes prejudicial to public peace, 
welfare or good order”.1444 
The Societies Act make use of several legal presumptions that place a reverse onus 
on the accused charged with being involved with an unlawful association that will 
alleviate the evidential burden of the prosecution. Section 21, inter alia, provides that 
any person in possession of accounts, banners, insignia, books, writings or seals 
(hereafter generically referred to as “paraphernalia”) relating or purporting to relate to 
an unlawful society, shall be presumed to be a member of that society.1445 That section 
furthermore states that a society shall also be presumed to be in existence at the time 
that the paraphernalia was found. An even harsher presumption is the subsequent 
provision which holds that a person found in possession of paraphernalia shall also be 
presumed to be involved in the management of the society.1446 
6 6 1 2 Labelling (positive model): New South Wales  
Anti-gang legislation is often inspired by a series of events which awakens public 
outcry, followed by governmental intervention, such as with California and South 
Africa.1447 In the case of New South Wales (“NSW”) in Australia, the Crimes (Criminal 
Organisations Control) Act 2009 No 6 was inspired by a single event, followed by a 
wave of similar legislation being passed throughout Australia.1448 An incident at the 
Sydney airport in 2009 where a member of a biker gang killed a rival gang member 
(which led to several public shootings) prompted the NSW Prime Minister to meet with 
the police commissioner the very next day to discuss legislative intervention to 
                                            
1444 Section 4(2)(b) of the Societies Act. 
1445 Section 21(1) of the Societies Act. 
1446 Section 21(2) of the Societies Act. 
1447 See Chapter 4 2 of this dissertation for the South African background and 4 3 4 for the Canadian 
context. 
1448 R Ananian-Welsh “'If at first you don't succeed...': Effectiveness and the evolution of preventive 
organised crime measures” in T Tulich, R Ananian-Welsh, S Bronitt & S Murray (eds) Regulating 
Preventive Justice: Principle, Policy and Paradox (2017) 177 181-183. 
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criminalise outlaw biker gangs.1449 The original version of the legislation (which has 
subsequently been repealed and replaced with the Crimes (Criminal Organisations 
Control) Act 2012 No 9 (“COCA”))1450 was broad and sweeping in its application; the 
aim of it was unambiguously stated as a legislative intervention to combat motorcycle 
gangs.1451 Remaining Australian states that did not adopt similar legislation soon did 
so in order to prevent being labelled as “safe havens” for these motorcycle gangs. 
These states could also no longer wait to act on the usual justification of “grave and 
imminent threats” presented by such gangs.1452 The legislation is based on the anti-
terrorism laws of Australia which in turn were crafted after those implemented by the 
United Kingdom, and provide a civil mechanism for disrupting organised crime 
structures.1453 And as Martin suggests, the focus of the Australian states has shifted 
away from combatting terrorism to curbing organised crime – under the guise of 
“preventative justice”.1454 
In order to effect the “labelling” of a criminal gang, a responsible authority would 
firstly label or declare certain organisations as unlawful. The commissioner of police 
                                            
1449 Debates of the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales of 2009: 2 April 2009; D Welch, L Kennedy 
& E Harvey “Bikie killed in Sydney Airport brawl” (23-03-2009) The Sydney Morning Herald 
<http://www.smh.com.au/national/bikie-killed-in-sydney-airport-brawl-20090322-95xc.html> (accessed 
17-07-2017); Ananian-Welsh “Preventative organised crime measures” in Regulating Preventative 
Justice 183.  
1450 Crimes (Criminal Organisations Control) Act 2009 No 6.  
1451 See T Gavin “Extending the Reach of Kable: Wainohu v New South Wales” (2012) 34 Sydney Law 
Review 395 396 where the author refers to the comments made by the former Prime Minister.   
1452 Ananian-Welsh “Preventative organised crime measures” in Regulating Preventative Justice 183. 
1453 See Division 104 of the Australian Criminal Code of 1900. See generally C Walker “The Reshaping 
of Control Orders in the United Kingdom: Time for a Fairer Go, Australia!” (2013) 37 Melbourne 
University Law Review 143; R Ananian-Welsh & G Williams “The New Terrorists: The Normalisation 
and Spread of Anti-Terror Laws in Australia” 38 (2014) Melbourne University Law Review 362 363-364. 
In a 2008 Australian News programme, Law Report, the former Premier of South Australia, Mike Rann, 
stated that “[w]e're allowing similar legislation to that that applies to terrorists, because these people 
are terrorists within our community” (Law Report “South Australia's plans to obliterate outlaw bikie 
gangs” (06-05-2008) ABC <http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/lawreport/south-australias-
plans-to-obliterate-outlaw-bikie/3254212#transcript> (accessed 04-09-2017)). Also see G Williams “A 
Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws” 35 (2011) Melbourne University Law Review 1136 1169. 
1454 G Martin “Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs and Secret Evidence: Reflections on the Use of Criminal 
Intelligence in the Control of Serious Organised Crime in Australia” 36 Sydney Law Review (2014) 
501 515-516. Also see Ananian-Welsh & Williams (2014) Melbourne University Law Review 365-375 
for an overview of Australia’s anti-terrorism approach.   
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may apply for an organisation (referred to as the “respondent”)1455 to be declared as a 
criminal organisation in terms of Part 2 of COCA.1456 The application must contain 
certain information but most importantly is the identification of the organisation; the 
description of the nature of that organisation as well as its distinguishing 
characteristics; the grounds on which the declaration is sought as well as information 
supporting those grounds.1457 The court must be satisfied of three things before 
making a declaration: that the respondent is an organisation;1458 the members of that 
organisation “associate for the purpose of organising, planning, facilitating, supporting 
or engaging in serious criminal activity”;1459 and finally that the continued existence of 
the organisation is “an unacceptable risk to the safety, welfare or order of the 
community in [NSW]”.1460 A declaration may be made in the absence of the respondent 
and regardless of whether any submissions are made by the respondent.1461  
The meaning of “associate with”, “member”, “organisation” and “serious criminal 
activity” are important in this regard. Persons “associate with” each other when they 
are in the company of one another or communicate by any means including mail, fax 
or “any form of electronic communication”.1462 A member of a criminal organisation, 
furthermore, is in the case of a body corporate a director or officer of said body 
corporate. In all other instances he or she may be an associate or prospective 
member; or a person who identifies themselves as belonging to that organisation or is 
treated by the organisation or persons belonging to that organisation in such a way as 
if he or she did belong to that organisation.1463 An organisation is any unincorporated 
or incorporated group, which is structured in any fashion and may consist of persons 
based outside NSW or persons not ordinarily resident in NSW.1464 “Serious criminal 
activity” refers mainly to an array of drug and drug trafficking offences and to a far 
                                            
1455 See section 5(1) of COCA.  
1456 Section 5 COCA.  
1457 Sections 5(2)(b)-(e) COCA. 
1458 Section 7(1)(a) of COCA. 
1459 Section 7(1)(b) of COCA. 
1460 Section 7(1)(c) of COCA. 
1461 Section 7(3) of COCA.  
1462 Section 3 of COCA. 
1463 Section 3 of COCA. 
1464 Section 3 of COCA. 
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lesser extent firearm-related offences and contact and financial crimes.1465 Obtaining 
a material benefit from the aforementioned conduct would also constitute a serious 
criminal activity – regardless of whether that person has been prosecuted and 
convicted, prosecuted and acquitted or even where he or she has been convicted and 
that conviction has been set aside.1466 A material benefit is money or contingent 
benefit.1467 
A court may regard a list of factors contained1468 in COCA for purposes of declaring 
an organisation a criminal organisation. This includes “any information” that suggests 
a link between the organisation in question to serious criminal activity in NSW1469 or 
the fact that there are recorded criminal convictions against any current or former 
members of said organisation in NSW.1470 The Act also confers a wide discretion to 
the judge allowing him or her to consider any other matter they deem relevant.1471 The 
jurisdictional application of COCA is wide considering it has extraterritorial operation 
“to the full extent of the extraterritorial legislative capacity of the Parliament”.1472 
Under Part 3 of COCA a court may make a control order against members or 
associates of a declared organisation. The court must be satisfied (based on sufficient 
grounds)1473 that the relevant person is a member of the particular declared 
organisation1474 or who purports to be a former member of said organisation but has 
                                            
1465 Section 3 of COCA read with section 6 of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act No 23 of 1990 (“the 
Recovery Act”). Subsections (2)-(4) are predominantly drug-related offences with a few exceptions such 
as section 6(2)(f) which states that a serious offence is an offence which carries at least a five-year 
prison sentence and where the crime involves acts such as violence, murder or financial crimes such 
as money laundering or fraud.  
1466 Section 3 of COCA. 
1467 Section 249A read with section 93TA of the Crimes Act 40 of 1900. 
1468 In section 7(2) COCA. 
1469 Section 7(2)(a)(i) COCA. 
1470 Section 7(2)(a)(ii) COCA.  
1471 Section 7(2)(b) COCA.  
1472 Section 4 COCA. 
1473 19(1)(b) of COCA. 
1474 Section 19(1)(a)(i) of COCA. 
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ongoing involvement with the organisation and its activities.1475 Procedures are also 
available for appeals,1476 variations1477 or relief in cases of hardship.1478 
The effect of the control order would seem to harshly impede the freedom of 
association of the named persons. The High Court of Australia in Wainohu v New 
South Wales (“Wainohu”)1479 however found that this impediment was associated with 
the legitimate governmental goal of targeting organised crime which has taken on a 
sophisticated nature, characterised by its high incidence.1480 The constitutionality of 
these measures will be discussed briefly below.1481 
The goal of these control orders is, at least ostensibly, to prevent individual 
members from associating with one another and consequently impeding the 
functionality of the criminal organisation.1482 In fact, it carries a two-year prison 
sentence when two members of a declared organisation under a control order 
associate with each other.1483 It is a separate offence for two controlled members of a 
declared organisation to associate with each other on three or more occasions within 
a period of three months. This carries a maximum prison sentence of three years.1484 
The NSW Legislature made sure that it was sending a clear message when it also 
                                            
1475 Section 19(1)(a) (ii) of COCA. 
1476 Section 24 provides the right of appeal. Both the Commissioner and controlled person may make 
this appeal. The heading of this section is somewhat misleading as section 24(2) restricts this “right”. 
The right of appeal however only pertains to a question of law. Leave to appeal has to be granted in 
order for a court to consider the appeal based on a question of fact. Section 24(4) furthermore makes 
it clear that lodging an appeal does not affect the operation of that control order. Section 24(5) states 
the control order may be confirmed, varied or reversed by the court of appeal and that court may also 
make “any consequential or ancillary order”.  
1477 Section 25 of COCA enables the Commissioner or affected person to apply for the variation of a 
control order. This variation may be granted (in terms of section 25(2)) if there has been “a substantial 
change in the relevant circumstances since the order was made or last varied”.  
1478 Section 18(1) and (2) of COCA provides for an expedited hearing if a controlled member of an 
organisation would suffer “extreme hardship” if the hearing were to take place on the original specified 
date.  
1479 (2011) 278 ALR 1.  
1480 Wainohu para 8. 
1481 See 6 5 1 5 3.  
1482 Muratore v Commissioner of Police NSW Police Force [2017] NSWCATOD 3 para 77.  
1483 Section 26(1) of COCA. Section 26(2) further holds that it is irrelevant (for the purposes of section 
26) whether the relevant member under a control order is associating with the same person or different 
people.   
1484 Section 26(1A) of COCA. 
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made it a separate offence for a controlled member of a declared organisation (after 
having been convicted of an offence under this section) to associate with another 
controlled member.1485 Recruitment of persons to join the declared organisation is also 
prohibited and carries a prison sentence of five years.1486  
COCA further impedes civil liberties by limiting a person’s freedom to partake in 
labour activities. Section 27 holds that any activity that requires some sort of 
authorisation (such as licences, registration or certifications)1487 to carry on a 
“prescribed activity”1488 is automatically suspended when an interim control order is 
granted against a person. A prescribed activity mainly relates to occupations that 
require governmental approval, involvement or regulation such as the sale of liquor or 
the operation of a casino or the possession of firearm or conducting business as a 
firearms dealer.  
A labelling model such as in NSW takes a distinctly pro-active approach in 
comparison to a model such as POCA. With POCA, there is nothing truly inhibiting or 
impeding the criminal structure – which is truly the aim with COCA. Once a group has 
been identified and declared as criminal, they greatly cease to be functional due to the 
severe restrictions placed upon them by the control orders. By comparison, gang 
members who are convicted under POCA (or other statutory or common law 
measures) are merely replaced by new recruits. Imprisoned gang members are then 
further recruited into prison gangs; only to continue the cycle of gangsterism upon 
release. 
                                            
1485 Section 26(1B) of COCA. 
1486 Section 26A of COCA. “Recruiting” is defined as including to “counsel, procure, solicit, incite or 
induce” in section 26A(2).   
1487 Section 27(6) of COCA.  
1488 The list of prescribed activities is listed in section 27(6)(a)-(m). Occupation is also defined (albeit 
somewhat circularly) in section 27(6) as “[meaning] an occupation, trade, profession or calling of any 
kind that may only be carried on by a person holding an authorisation”. Even though the scope of the 
crimes is relatively broad, it is not beyond the scope of what one would expect to be the encompassed 
in the activities of an organised criminal group, save for one or two curious inclusions. There is, 
interestingly, an absence of a prohibition on any careers involving interaction with pharmaceuticals. 
There is however a prohibition on carrying on a tattoo business or “performing body art tattooing 
procedures” (section 27(j1)) and participating or promoting in combat sports (section 27(l1)). The 
inclusion of these occupations or industries seems to be reinforcing certain stereotypes of gangs and 
criminal organisations rather than having a rational basis for inclusion.  
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Although the Australian approach is functional, even chilling, it is quite obviously 
draconian and limits several constitutional liberties. This shall be explored further 
below.  
6 6 1 3 Civil law injunctions 
A less invasive method than the above discussed COCA, is civil injunctions under 
US law. Civil law injunctions for gangs became vogue in the 1980s – just prior to the 
enactment of STEP.1489 These injunctions provide a mechanism in civil law to address 
“street gangs” by the lower (civil) standard of proof, compared to the procedural and 
constitutional safeguards enshrined in criminal law.1490 The ensuing sections empower 
civil law injunctions against gangs under the broad umbrella of public nuisance. Under 
the common law, actions would have constituted a public nuisance (as a tort or crime) 
if they interfered with some community interest such as interference with public health, 
safety, morals, comfort or another miscellaneous right.1491 The individual states of the 
US have largely codified their criminal law but it has been noted that public nuisance 
offences are often worded unconstitutionally broadly and even in some instances not 
defining the term “public nuisance” at all.1492 
Section 3479 of the Californian Civil Code (“the Californian Code”) defines the term 
“nuisance” as follows:  
Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of 
controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to 
the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or 
property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of 
any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, 
street, or highway, is a nuisance. 
Section 3480 further defines a “public nuisance” as: 
                                            
1489 LA Hughs & JF Short “Youth Gangs and Unions: Civil and Criminal Remedies” (2006) 9(4) Trends 
in Organized Crime 43 49.  
1490 ACLU “Gang Injunctions Fact Sheet” (05-2010) <https://www.aclunc.org/article/gang-injunctions-
fact-sheet> ACLU (accessed 25-06-2017); Hughs & Short (2006) TOC 50. 
1491 M Shiner Gang Injunctions: A Guide for Prosecutors (2009) 3. 
1492 Shiner Gang Injunctions 3-4. 
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A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or 
neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the 
annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal. 
City or district attorneys will gather evidence from police officers in the affected 
areas to establish their case against individual gang members.1493 This would usually 
include evidence of the criminal history of the individual gang members or suspected 
gang members. This is supplemented by statements by community members of 
affected areas and they are requested to illustrate specific instances of where the gang 
or gang members have acted in a way as to constitute a “public nuisance”.1494 The 
evidence from the aggrieved parties is then compiled and drafted into an injunction 
listing the names of the relevant (alleged) gang members who have been identified as 
a “public nuisance”. This draft injunction must then delineate the area which they may 
not trespass upon. The city or district attorney must then, also, include the prohibited 
conduct in which the persons named in the injunction may not participate or 
engage.1495  
A gang injunction may contain several types of provisions or prohibitions. In addition 
to quite obviously prohibiting illegal activities, the injunction may also aim to prohibit 
legal and innocent activities.1496  The American Prosecutors Research Institute 
(“APRI”) identified eleven of the most common provisions with the most effective being 
the so-called “do not associate” provision.1497 This provision strikes at a criminal 
gang’s ability to congregate, thus affecting the collective danger they pose. These 
provisions are however shockingly broad and prohibit an (alleged) gang member from 
“[d]riving, standing, sitting, walking, gathering or appearing, anywhere in public view 
                                            
1493 Section 731 of the Californian Civil Code of Procedure empowers to bring this action on behalf of 
the affected people. See Shiner Gang Injunctions 7; CL Maxson, KM Henningan & DC Sloane “"It's 
Getting Crazy Out There": Can a Civil Gang Injunction Change a Community?” (2005) 4 Criminology & 
Public Policy 577 580.  
1494 Maxon et al (2005) CPP 580. 
1495 Maxon et al (2005) CPP 580 
1496 Hughs & Short (2006) TOC 50. The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) for example points out 
that people spotted taking the bus or picking up someone from work would constitute a violation of the 
injunction. See ACLU “Gang Injunctions Fact Sheet” (05-2010) ACLU. This then has quite patent 
constitutional imperatives that will be discussed below. 
1497 Shiner Gang Injunctions (2009) 13. 
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or anyplace accessible to the public, with any known [gang] member (…)”.1498 This 
prohibition shall however not apply when the gang members are attending school or 
inside a church. It shall, nevertheless, still apply when travelling to or from those 
locations.1499  
A non-intimidation provision prohibits gang members from harassing, threatening, 
provoking, assaulting or battering persons that may be witnesses against a gang or 
who have made a complaint against such a gang.1500 A court may also issue an 
injunction containing a prohibition against forcible recruitment which includes verbal 
threats, acts of physical violence or property damage.1501 Gang members may also be 
prohibited from preventing a member from leaving a gang. This includes acts of 
physical violence or property damage towards such persons.1502  
Other restrictions include a prohibition on graffiti or the use of graffiti tools; abiding 
by a curfew (subject to legitimate exceptions such as the practice of an occupation or 
emergency); abstaining from drugs or alcohol; not trespassing on private property; and 
a catch-all provision which stipulates that all laws regarding a certain crime must be 
obeyed (for example all laws regarding murder, assault or rape must be obeyed).1503  
The APRI however does caution prosecutors to carefully draft injunctions which are 
specifically tailored to the specific gang in order to avoid vague and overbroad 
injunctions. Concerns about potential vagueness and overbreadth of injunctions will 
further be elaborated on below. 
A presiding officer may make a judgment based on the information provided to him 
or her by the interested parties mentioned above. The line between civil and criminal 
will be traversed as soon as the injuncted party violates the provisions contained in 
the injunction as they may face imprisonment or a fine.1504  
                                            
1498 Shiner Gang Injunctions (2009) 13. 
1499 Shiner Gang Injunctions (2009) 13. 
1500 Shiner Gang Injunctions (2009) 13-14. 
1501 Shiner Gang Injunctions (2009) 15. 
1502 Shiner Gang Injunctions (2009) 15. 
1503 Shiner Gang Injunctions (2009) 14-15. 
1504 Hughs & Short (2006) Trends in Organized Crime 50. 
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6 6 1 4 An overview of problems with control orders and civil law  
injunctions  
6 6 1 4 1  Control orders 
COCA utilises a model with very clear albeit constitutionally suspect definitions. All 
the key terms are defined with reasonable certainty which makes the opportunity for 
judicial or prosecutorial overreach less likely. The 2009 version of COCA was repealed 
in its entirety and replaced with the current version. The High Court of Australia in 
Wainohu1505 unanimously found that there was no violation of the right to freedom of 
association, which, it seems, is at most a corollary right flowing from the right to political 
communication and freedom of association.1506 It was additionally held that there were 
in any case protection mechanisms in the Act to prohibit such infringements if they 
should occur, such as the variation of the control order or an order permitting controlled 
members to associate with one another from “good reason”.1507 Heydon J also held 
that these implied constitutional rights only relate to the system of effective and 
responsible government and that no such general right exists.1508  
Several empirical studies have been conducted on the effectiveness of civil 
injunctions and thus the focus of the discussion will be on the problems related to 
them. Many of these critiques however apply equally to control orders due to the 
similarity between control orders and injunctions.1509  
6 6 1 4 2 Civil law injunctions 
The main problem with these injunctions is that they are ripe for prosecutorial 
abuse, partially due to the lower standard of proof as well as their overbroad 
application and infringement upon civil liberties. It has additionally been argued that 
                                            
1505 (2011) 278 ALR 1.  
1506 Wainohu paras 112-114 per Gummow J, Hayne J, Crennan J and Bell J; para 72 French CJ and 
Kiefel J concurring with the aforementioned conclusion. Also see the judgement of Heydon J coming to 
the same conclusion as the majority. 
1507 Wainohu paras 113; 186. 
1508 Wainohu para 186. 
1509 For a more detailed discussion on the issues with control orders, see Ananian-Welsh & Williams 
(2014) Melbourne University Law Review 362-408; D Hume “The Rule of Law in Reading Down: Good 
Law for the ‘Bad Man’ (2014) 37 Melbourne Law Review 620 651-659. 
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these injunctions in fact enhance cohesiveness within the gang and hostility toward 
police officials.1510 
Alleged gang members often reoffend, pointing towards the possible 
ineffectiveness of injunctions. Myers points to a review of gang injunctions that 
indicated that almost 80% of gang members listed in an injunction were convicted of 
a crime after said injunction was issued against them.1511 More than half of the 
aforementioned gang members committed a crime within the area in which the 
injunction was operative.1512 This points towards three problems. The first glaring issue 
is the re-offence rate despite having injunctions issued against alleged gang members. 
A second collateral issue is that gang members venture to areas adjacent to areas 
that they may have been injuncted to congregate in.1513 A third collateral issue 
(identified by law enforcement) is that, after injunctions have been issued, law 
enforcement officers are uncertain as to the whereabouts of gang members. It has 
been noted that police enforcement would at least, to a certain extent, be able to keep 
track of gang members if they are known to congregate at certain areas. After an 
injunction has been issued, they are required to disperse and seek new areas to 
congregate or enter new areas.1514 
Injunctions quite obviously give rise to constitutional issues considering the invasive 
and extreme impact on civil liberties. They may constitute a prima facie infringement 
                                            
1510 TA Myers “The unconstitutionality, ineffectiveness, and alternatives of gang injunctions” (2008-
2009) 14 Michigan Journal of Race and Law 285 287; J Greene & K Pranis Gang Wars: The Failure of 
Enforcement Tactics and the Need for Effective Public Safety Strategies (2007) 5. 
1511 Myers (2008-2009) Michigan Journal of Race and Law 297. 
1512 Myers (2008-2009) Michigan Journal of Race and Law 297; D Hale “Gang Injunction: 300 black 
men targeted” (20-10-2006) 
<http://www.streetgangs.com/injunctions/102006_300_black_men_targeted#sthash.NHKv2NY7.dpb> 
Streetgangs.com (accessed 30-09-2017).  
1513 Myers (2008-2009) Michigan Journal of Race and Law 297-299. The study conducted by the ACLU 
indicated that there was a sharp rise in crime within the four districts north of the district that had issued 
a gang injunction. The four districts saw an 86% increase from 55 (in February) to 108 (in June) violent 
crimes. See Greene & Pranis Gang Wars (2007) 38 (Figure 3-1). Myers also points out that the reporting 
district southeast of the injuncted district also saw a rise in violent crime and experienced more incidents 
the month the injunction was issued (April 1993) than the year prior to or after the injunction was issued. 
See Myers (2008-2009) Michigan Journal of Race and Law 298; Greene & Pranis Gang Wars (2007) 
26 (Figure 2-37). This assertion does however not seem to be accurate, as there was another spike in 
violent crime in July 1994.  
1514 Myers (2008-2009) Michigan Journal of Race and Law 297-298. 
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on freedom of association, which is protected by the Frist Amendment to the US 
Constitution.1515 The Supreme Court of California addressed this issue in People ex 
rel. Gallo v. Acuna (“Acuna”).1516 The Court held that the Constitution only provides a 
limited association right and not “a generalized right of ‘social association’”.1517 Brown 
J distinguished between intrinsic or intimate associations and instrumental 
associations. The latter associations are required in the exercise of political and 
religious expression while the former protect personal and familial affiliations such as 
marriage.1518 The Court rejected the proposition that specific street gangs fall within 
either sphere of these two categories or that they are formed for the purpose of 
participating in these protected activities.1519 The First Amendment could not be 
invoked to protect people “(…) ‘for the purpose of depriving third parties of their lawful 
rights.’”1520  
Attacks due to the overbroad and vague wording of an injunction may also arise. 
These attacks were raised by the defendants in Acuna. Concerning overbreadth, 
Brown J held that there was no overbreadth to speak of. For it to qualify as such, the 
ambit of the injunction must have a “chilling” effect on First Amendment Rights of third 
parties who were not named in the injunction or before the Court.1521 The Court noted 
that the injunction applied only to those listed in it and the particular prohibited conduct. 
It consequently did not have a chilling effect on the First Amendment Rights of 
others.1522  
The vagueness doctrine in US law (which is analogous to the same doctrine in 
South Africa), as discussed in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, is concerned with the 
                                            
1515 The First Amendment to the US Constitution holds that  
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
1516 14 Cal.4th 1090 (1997).  
1517 Acuna 1110 quoting Dallas v. Stanglin 490 U.S. 19 (1989) at 25. 
1518 Acuna 1110-1111. Also see Roberts v. United States Jaycees 468 U.S. 609 (1984) at 619. 
1519 Acuna 1111-1112. 
1520 Acuna 1112 quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
1521 Acuna 1113. Also see Thornhill v. Alabama 310 U.S. 88 (1940) at 97.  
1522 Acuna 1114. 
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adequate notice in terms of due process.1523 This means that persons who may be 
affected by a law must adequately be informed of the contents thereof.1524 The Court 
refers to guiding principles endorsed by the US Supreme Court. The first principle 
relates to the particular context1525 and the second relates to “reasonable 
specificity”1526 but “mathematical certainty” cannot be expected.1527 Brown J held that 
the injunction was not vague if one considers the purpose clause set out in the 
injunction and subsequently interprets the terms of the injunction in that context.  
6 6 1 5 Potential adoptability in South African law 
Neither control orders nor injunctions are known in South Africa. The closest 
analogue is the public nuisance notices, which are known domestically (through 
municipal ordinances and legislation and to a lesser extent the common law). This 
section shall briefly investigate to what extent South Africa currently has the legal 
framework to incorporate or adopt injunctions within our existing legal framework and 
whether these measures are compliant with our constitutional framework.  
6 6 1 5 1 Public nuisance in South Africa 
There appears to be no precise formulation of a public nuisance in South African 
law.1528 A useful definition appears from the Cape Municipal Ordnance 20 of 1974 
where it was stated: 
                                            
1523 Acuna 1115. 
1524 See 5 3 2 4 1 1 below for a comprehensive discussion in the South African context as well as a 
discussion relating to vagueness challenges to STEP.  
1525 See American Communications Assn. v. Douds 339 U.S. 382 (1950) at 412. 
1526 Acuna 1116-1117. Brown J quoting from the judgement in Coates v. City of Cincinnati 402 U.S. 611 
(1971) at 614.  
1527 Acuna 1117 quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford 408 U.S. 104 (1972).  
1528 See J Church & J Church “Nuisance” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 19 2 ed (2016) para 
212.  
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[a]n act or omission constitutes a public nuisance in South African law when said action 
is harmful or offensive to rights of the public at large and usually pertains to their health, 
comfort, safety or general well-being.1529  
The locus standi for a public nuisance would usually lie with the State considering that 
a public nuisance per definition usually pertains “to the rights of the public at large” 
and therefore every affected victim cannot reasonably be expected to pursue legal 
action.1530 This would both be impractical and unfair to the affected person and the 
person causing the alleged nuisance. It seems that the prosecution of instances of 
common law public nuisance has fallen into disuse due to nuisance offences mainly 
being regulated through statute or the prohibited conduct constituting independent 
crimes (which are not described as a “nuisance”).1531  
Samuels however notes that certain instances of public nuisance have been 
received into the common law and can be categorised into one of three manifestations, 
evidenced by three distinct series of cases.1532 The first category, applicable to this 
discussion, is in line with the original intent of this remedy, namely to protect public 
health and safety.1533 In the case of R v Paulse (“Paulse”), 1534 for example, the 
Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope dealt with a case where the appellant was 
operating a brothel which was apparently in full view of the public and therefore caused 
                                            
1529 Section 1; Church & Church “Nuisance” in LAWSA 19 2 para 214 fn 6; A Samuels The history, 
development and future of public nuisance in light of the Constitution LLM thesis Stellenbosch University 
(2010) 27-28. Samuels points to the confusion and conflation between public and private nuisance. The 
author refers to Abrams & Washington who point to the three most significant differences or 
distinguishing factors between the two. According to Abrams & Washington, public nuisance relates to 
public health and safety, annoyance or substantial inconvenience to the public. This is in contrast to a 
private nuisance which relates to the enjoyment of private property. Secondly, public nuisance is an 
annoyance or violation shared among the general public, thus, not just a particular individual or 
household for example. The third reason relates to locus standi. Public nuisances are mainly perused 
by public authorities (save for the example of an action in tort for a public nuisance). See R Abrams & 
V Washington “The misunderstood law of public nuisance: A comparison with private nuisance twenty 
years after Boomer‟ (1990) 54 Albany Law Review 359 364-365. 
1530 See Church & Church “Nuisance” in LAWSA 19 2 para 212 referring to Diepsloot Residents’ and 
Landowners Association and Others v Administrator, Transvaal, and Others [1993] 1 All SA 132 (T). 
1531 Church & Church “Nuisance” in LAWSA 19 2 para 214-215; Samuels Public nuisance 73-74. 
1532 A Samuels “Note on the use of public nuisance doctrine in 21st century South African Law” (2015) 
De Rebus 181 181. 
1533 Samuels (2015) DR 181 182. 
1534 (1892) 9 SC 422. 
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“great damage and common nuisance of persons there residing and passing”. The 
Court furthermore stated that the conduct of the participating parties was “disgraceful 
and disgusting”.1535 De Villiers CJ cited Van der Linden to support the finding that the 
keeping of a brothel constituted an “indictable offence” but the prosecution of the crime 
was rare during that time (which was 1892) save for “flagrant” instances. The Court 
agreed with the decision of the court a quo and upheld the conviction and the appeal 
was consequently dismissed.1536 
Samuels points out that public nuisance is mostly utilised by municipalities in an 
anticipatory fashion to prevent certain harms from occurring or as a form of 
punishment after the harm or conduct has ensued. A person may then be punished 
either through criminal sanction or an injunction requesting the violating parties to 
cease interference with the rights of the affected parties.1537  
US gang injunctions are clearly an amalgamation of these two options: an injunction 
requesting the relevant parties to cease their unlawful behaviour and the imposition of 
a criminal sanction due to non-compliance with the injunction.  
6 6 1 5 2  Possible approaches 
There is nothing preventing the Western Cape Government (for instance) from 
enacting a statutory nuisance law or relying on the common law public nuisance. The 
model for achieving this can be substantially similar to that of the US, namely by 
prosecutors gathering evidence from affected communities. Sufficient evidence must 
be followed by proscribing the type of conduct that the (alleged) gang members may 
not engage in and/or areas they may not trespass. Such an approach requires active 
policing of an area. 
Considering the particularly violent nature of gangs in the Western Cape, the 
efficiency of injunctions is however doubted. The potential usefulness may lie in 
violating the injunction. This sets a low threshold and standard for proving guilt – albeit 
for a comparably insignificant offence compared to the business of criminal gangs. 
This might serve to unnerve – even if temporarily – the business of criminal gangs.  
                                            
1535 Paulse 422-423.  
1536 Paulse 422-423.  
1537 Samuels Public nuisance 71-72. 
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Control orders transcend mere injunctions due to the declaration of the particular 
group as unlawful and does not require individual members to be injuncted from 
associating with the association. The association itself is unlawful and not only the 
participation in unlawful activities, which is largely what POCA is based upon. Control 
orders may be used in a similar vein. This scheme however has the additional value 
of targeting the gang structure directly by making it a crime through associating with 
outlawed groups. There is admittedly room for abuse of such a measure. The initial 
declaration of a group must be done with close scrutiny of all the evidence in order to 
avoid declaring otherwise lawful associations as unlawful. The Singaporean approach 
of requiring the registration of all associations may be a more onerous option. This 
might require an overhaul of legislation dealing with the registration of companies1538 
or the enactment of additional legislation and placing additional obligations over and 
above those imposed by the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 read with the 
relevant provisions in POCA.1539 On the other hand, it could serve as an additional 
mechanism to weed out unlawful associations but would not necessarily target the 
criminal gangs in the desired fashion.  
6 6 1 5 3  Constitutional and doctrinal issues 
The labelling/registration models might constitute the most blatant apparent 
infringement on constitutional rights and freedoms. The NSW labelling model infringes 
especially the right to freedom of association1540 and the Singaporean registration 
model infringes on the presumption of innocence of an accused.1541 The right of 
freedom of association was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.1542 
Control orders will undoubtedly be extremely controversial given the history of 
South Africa, which saw numerous pieces of legislation criminalising free 
association.1543 This included the Separate Amenities Act 49 of 1953; the Group Areas 
                                            
1538 Such as the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
1539 See section 7A of POCA especially.  
1540 Section 18 of the Constitution.  
1541 Section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution. 
1542 5 4 above.  
1543 S Woolman “Freedom of Association” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2 ed (OS 06-08) 44.2-6 fn 3. 
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Act 41 of 1950;1544 the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949; the Suppression 
of Communism Act 44 of 1950; the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 and the Prohibition 
of Foreign Financing of Political Parties Act 51 of 1968. Most analogous to control 
orders is the repealed Unlawful Organizations Act 34 of 1960 (“the UOA”). This Act 
empowered the Attorney General (“AG”) to, without notice, declare “all branches, 
sections or committees” including “all local, regional or subsidiary bodies” of the 
African National Congress or the Pan Africanist Congress as unlawful organisations if 
such AG was satisfied that safety of the public or maintenance of public order were 
seriously threatened or likely to be seriously threatened by these organisations.1545 
These pieces of legislation were enacted to criminalise intimate and societal 
relations between different races and to hamper political protest of the apartheid 
regime. Woolman submits that the criminalisation of certain organisations would be 
“uncontroversial” but the author is however mindful of how legislation could be used 
to discriminate rather than to protect, thus undermining the legitimate goal of protecting 
society. He also submits that legislation criminalising associations must be subjected 
to careful scrutiny.1546 This author does not fully agree that the criminalisation of 
organisations would be “uncontroversial” due to the fear of the general public that any 
type of association (including that of an intimate nature with family members or 
romantically) with an unlawful organisation might be construed as a criminal act. That 
is why a declaration of unlawfulness would, in essence, be of no practical effect unless 
it is coupled with some sort of activity that may be construed to further the activities of 
the outlawed organisation. A control order prohibits people belonging to a declared 
organisation from associating with one another; with the underlying assumption being 
that this would disrupt the criminal structure and activities of said group. Criminalising 
the mere belonging to a group would be controversial because belonging to a group 
does not per se mean that you are furthering their criminal agenda.  
It was referred to above that there was some backlash from human rights 
organisations initially regarding POCA, including a potential violation of the freedom 
of association. The original Prevention of Organised Crime Bill 118 of 1998 [B 11S-
                                            
1544 See 2 3 above for a discussion of the influence of the Group Areas Act on the development of 
criminal gangs in the Cape Flats.  
1545 Section 1 of the UAO.  
1546 Woolman “Freedom of Association” in CLOSA 44.2-1; 44.2-6 fn 3. 
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981 (“the Organised Crime Bill”) also contained several presumptions but those 
presumptions never made it into the final version of POCA,1547 due to the unfavourable 
position towards legal presumptions in the post-constitutional era (this will be 
discussed more in detail below). It is therefore not so obvious that the criminalisation 
of criminal gangs would be “uncontroversial”. 
A further problem is the operation of the presumptions under the Singaporean 
model. Presumptions operate against a person who is found to be in possession of 
paraphernalia related to an unlawful society. That person is not only presumed to be 
a member of the unlawful society but shall also be presumed to be involved in the 
management of said society.1548 Legal presumptions and reverse onuses have largely 
fallen in disfavour since the advent of the Constitution and a crescendo of judgments 
by the Constitutional Court ensued, declaring them to be unconstitutional.1549 The 
most notable is S v Coetzee (“Coetzee”)1550 and S v Zuma (“Zuma”).1551 The crux of 
these judgments was that the imposition of a duty by a statutory provision on the 
defendant to disprove an element of the crime, while reasonable doubt existed as to 
their guilt, such a provision would constitute a reverse onus and violate the 
presumption of innocence of an accused and in a broader context their passive 
defence rights.  
These types of models are probably not in line with the models in terms of the 
Palermo Convention and therefore do not, on their own, fulfil South Africa’s obligations 
in terms of the Convention. Thus, labelling and registration could not be the only 
mechanisms addressing organised criminal groups.   
6 7 Concluding remarks: alternative measures addressing gang activity  
under foreign and international law 
The preceding analysis of foreign and international criminal law provides a range of 
alternative models for holding the leaders or the members of criminal gangs criminally, 
                                            
1547 See above at 4 2 and 4 5 1 1 3. 
1548 Section 21(2) read with section 21(2) of the Societies Act.  
1549 See PJ Schwikkard & SE van der Merwe Principles of Evidence (2016) 553-561 for an overview of 
these judgements; GP Kemp “Die Grondwetlikheid van statutêre vermoedens” (1998) 9 Stellenbosch 
Law Review 106-114 for a discussion of Coetzee.  
1550 1997 (3) SA 527 (CC). Also see a discussion of the ratio decidendi at 3 3 4 above.  
1551 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC).  
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and in some instances, civilly, responsible. These models, despite having parallels in 
South African law, offer unique ways in dealing with criminal gang activities. Unlike 
most provisions of POCA, they do not merely codify existing common law measures.   
More severe punishment is required especially for gang leaders, as their conduct is 
considered to be exponentially more reprehensible despite the lack of physical 
contributions to the crimes perpetrated by gang members.1552 The foreign and 
international models discussed above all have South African parallels which would 
provide a foundation for their incorporation into South African law – preferably through 
a carefully drafted statute.  Mere duplication of laws is however strongly discouraged 
as this was the error made during the drafting of POCA.1553 There is however also 
room for judicial development, as per the constitutional mandate of the courts (an 
aspect discussed in the introductory section).1554 Development of the common law 
must however always take place cognizant of the principle of legality.1555  
  
                                            
1552 See 6 2 above.  
1553 See Chapter 4 2 above.  
1554 See 6 1 above.  
1555 See 5 3 2 above.  
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Chapter 7 
Recommendations and concluding remarks 
7 1  Review of research aims 
It must, in conclusion, be evaluated whether this study has achieved its research 
aims. 
7 1 1  The state of gang activity and the protection of individual rights  
This dissertation, an academic project, is premised on a painfully obvious and harsh 
reality:  many South African communities are terrorised by criminal gangs on a daily 
basis, thus affecting the lives of real people in a very real way. Chapters 1 and 2 
provided an overview of the current state of the gang crisis in South Africa, but in 
particular the Cape Flats in the Western Cape, which serves a grim reference point for 
this dissertation. This grim reality is juxtaposed with an evidently imperfect legal 
response, which is even more glaring if viewed through the prism of a transformative 
Constitution that seeks to make South Africa a better place to live for all its people and 
communities.  
The preamble of POCA, amongst other things, notes that “(…) the Constitution 
places a duty on the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights” and that gangs have infringed on those rights that the State is obliged to 
protect. Gangs are specifically referenced, and it is stated that every person has the 
right “(…) to be protected from fear, intimidation and physical harm caused by the 
criminal activities of violent gangs and individuals” and further also that gang violence 
has “the potential to inflict social damage” and that gang members’ “pervasive 
presence” in communities are harmful to those communities.   
An important theme in this dissertation was the protection of individual rights: both 
those of the accused as well as those of the communities affected by gang activity.1556 
The preamble does not reference the rights of the accused at all (these rights are, of 
course, pertinently protected in the Constitution, relevant legislation and the common 
law) but the rights of individuals and communities as victims of crime are positioned 
                                            
1556 See Chapter 5 2 and 5 3 especially. 
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centrally as a rationale for the promulgation of the Act. The available data shows a 
high incidence of gang-related crimes, which are often violent in nature and claim the 
lives of innocent bystanders and which are responsible for the systematic terrorisation 
of the Cape Flats communities. The SAPS has indicated a large number of gang-
related arrests between 2016 and 2017 but these arrests did not translate into a high 
number of convictions. Chapter 2 referenced how dissatisfied members of Cape Flats 
communities are with the lacklustre State intervention. Severe police understaffing in 
the areas most affected by gang activity further aggravates this problem. This 
dissatisfaction is also justified by the fact that almost one in every five murders is 
attributed to gang activity. The majority of gang wars, furthermore, have occurred after 
the enactment of POCA without any sign of significantly increased conviction rates. 
This therefore points to a significant failure by the State. 
This dissertation does not pretend to be a comprehensive socio-legal study of the 
origins, causes and incidence of gangs and criminal gang activities as criminal 
phenomena. Where appropriate, the relevant socio-economic, socio-political and 
socio-legal contexts were taken note of, not for interest sake, but to serve the purpose 
of contextualising developments in criminal law as they pertain to the legal strategies 
dealing with criminal gangs. The task at hand was thus to critically examine the most 
prominent anti-gang legal strategy in South Africa, namely Chapter 4 of POCA, with 
reference to relevant general principles and specific offences under South African 
criminal law, foreign law and general principles as developed in international criminal 
law.  
7 1 2  An analysis of Chapter 4 of POCA and the common law relating to group  
criminality  
The main objective of this study was to provide, as the title and introduction suggest, 
a critical and comparative analysis of South Africa’s anti-gang legislation. This was 
achieved in Chapter 4 by analysing and deconstructing the elements of the offences 
and sentences enumerated in Chapter 4 of POCA, as well as the associated 
definitions in POCA Chapter 1. The overarching conclusion is that Chapter 4 of POCA 
is no more than a collection of statutory iterations of the previously existing common 
and statutory laws of South Africa. As pointed out in Chapter 4, if one operates from 
the assumption that POCA Chapter 4 was enacted due to the ineffectual common and 
statutory laws; and if POCA emulates these very common law offences, then POCA 
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is equally as ineffective at combating gang-related crime and is therefore largely 
superfluous.1557 The structural and legal similarities were highlighted in Chapters 3 
and 4 of the dissertation. The analysis in Chapter 3 of the common law and statutory 
measures that pre-existed POCA showed the ineffectiveness in disrupting the 
functioning of criminal gangs. It is submitted that measures such as the common 
purpose doctrine remains constitutionally and doctrinally contentious but serves an 
useful function in criminal prosecutions in South Africa. Certain suggestions are 
however made for the development of the common purpose doctrine, especially in the 
light of important developments in the UK concerning the doctrine of joint criminal 
enterprise.1558  
It was argued that there are very limited differences between the common 
modalities available in addressing group-based crime and Chapter 4 of POCA. These 
differences include the sentence enhancements1559 and the fact that POCA section 9 
adds an additional layer of criminalisation for gang-related offences over and above 
existing common law and statutory offences for which gang members might be 
prosecuted. Only1560 section 9(2)(c) is innovative in that it criminalises gang 
recruitment. While it would certainly constitute conspiracy, incitement or fall under the 
common purpose doctrine to recruit someone to join in a gang-related crime, gang 
membership is not in itself a crime and the aforementioned measures require the 
planned commission or commission of an offence. Save for the innovation under 
section 9(2)(c), the enhancements could have been relegated to a schedule as the 
rest of POCA. Chapter 4 adds no significant value and the rest of the Chapter could 
have been left out completely.  
From the analysis above, it becomes clear that Chapter 4 of POCA adds nothing to 
disrupt the criminal structure of gangs. An additional form of punishment that may 
prohibit gangs from operating “freely” may be the answer. Punishing gang members 
                                            
1557 See 3 7 and 4 6 especially.  
1558 See R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8; Chapter 3 3 6 1 3 above. 
1559 Sections 10(2) and 10(3) of POCA. 
1560 Snyman also argues that section 9(2)(a) goes far beyond the scope of the common and statutory 
law due to its potential broad application. Although this author does agree that the section is broad in 
scope, it is not agreed that is of the wide-ranging nature which Snyman describes. See CR Snyman 
“Die nuwe statutêre misdaad van deelname aan 'n kriminele bende” (1999) 12 South African Journal of 
Criminal Justice 213 220-221; Chapter 4 5 2 4 1 above. 
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for gang-related offences does nothing to disempower the gang. Chapter 6 of POCA, 
for example, empowers the forfeiture of property. This disrupts and disempowers the 
proper functioning criminal enterprise (which may also be a gang).  
Chapter 4 of POCA was drafted during a period rife with gang conflict and was 
therefore drafted in reaction to this conflict. It is suggested here (based on the 
legislative history and contemporary debates in parliament) that this legislation was 
drafted as political appeasement in response to the complaints from the affected 
communities, like those on the Cape Flats. POCA can however not be said to have 
been drafted in bad faith and the Legislature seems to have had at least some intention 
of drafting powerful legislation to battle the gangs. This is evidenced by statements by 
former President Nelson Mandela during the parliamentary debates regarding the 
Organised Crime Bill 118 of 1998 [B 11S-981] where it was said that the State would 
“fight fire with overwhelming fire” when it comes to gangs and that they would face 
“heavy prison sentences”. 1561 Similar parliamentary threats have re-emerged in 2017 
when the then Minister of Police, Fikile Mbalula, addressed gangs directly and warned 
“I am coming for you hard – enough is enough.”1562 Reactions to the genuine outcry 
of the Cape Flats communities must, however, not just be met with grandiose 
proclamations or ambitious policies or projects such as Project Fiela,1563 24-hour 
drone surveillance1564 and the National Anti-Gasterism Plan.1565 Although the newly 
established 95-member Anti-Gang Unit (operating within Bishop Lavis, the Nyanga 
cluster as well as Bonteheuwel) is greatly welcomed, this author is concerned about 
                                            
1561 Debates of the National Assembly of 1998: 14 September to 6 November vol 21 8051. 
1562 Parliamentary Committee on Police “Crime Statistics 2016/17: SAPS briefing” Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group (24-10-2017) <https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/25303/> (accessed 26-10-
2017).  
1563 See 2 2 above. 
1564 Parliamentary Committee on Police “Crime Statistics 2016/17: SAPS briefing” Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group. 
1565 See discussion in Chapter 1 4 above. 
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its sustainability considering the general understaffing of police stations and lack of 
new recruits.1566 A sustainable and principled legal strategy is called for. 
Chapter 4 and especially Chapter 1 of POCA contain provisions which are 
constitutionally suspect. Chapter 1 enables a court to make a finding that a group 
constitutes a “criminal gang”; or has committed a “pattern of criminal gang activity”, by 
utilising a “nontechnical” meaning of these terms. Section 9(2)(a) also utilises the 
phrase “pattern of criminal gang activity” in its text. This is in violation of the fair warning 
doctrine as well as the principles under ius certum and ius strictum. This author is 
uncertain to what extent this problem has manifested due to the lack of reported case 
law. In S v Jordaan and Others WCC 16-11-2017 case no CC20/2017 (“Jordaan”), 
Binns-Ward J however acknowledged the uncertainty relating to the definition of 
“pattern of criminal gang activity”.1567 Binns-Ward J appeared to acknowledge both the 
statutory and nontechnical definitions as legitimate alternatives (even though it was 
held that the State failed to adduce sufficient evidence of the requisite pattern under 
either construction).1568 It is however troubling that by 2018, almost twenty years after 
the enactment of POCA, there is still no legal certainty regarding two of the key 
definitions in the Act.  
These definitions therefore require amendment to create legal certainty and fair 
warning and to affirm the principles of ius certum and ius strictum. Section 10(3) 
furthermore violates freedom of association and provides for increased sentences for 
merely being a member of a criminal gang, without a link to gang-related offences or 
there being proof that said gang member actually contributed to the gang in any 
fashion. For example, where a gang member is found guilty of a traffic offence, having 
                                            
1566 See Plato “MEC Dan Plato:  Briefing on provincial policing needs and priorities” Western Cape 
Government; JM Pienaar, W Du Plessis & NJJ Olivier “Onrus en Geweld: 2014 (2)” (2014) 29 Southern 
African Public Law 566 566; DA “50% decline in Police Academy graduates is shrinking already under-
staffed SAPS” (16-05-2016) DA <https://www.da.org.za/2016/05/50-decline-in-police-academy-
graduates-is-shrinking-already-under-staffed-saps/> (accessed 21-03-2017); L Daniel “Cape Flats gets 
new anti-gang unit thanks to national police ministry” (01-11-2018) The South African 
<https://www.thesouthafrican.com/cape-flats-gang-unit-national-government/> (accessed 02-11-
2018); EWN “Cele Hails Success of Cape's New Anti-Gang Unit” (15-11-2018) Eyewitness News 
<https://ewn.co.za/2018/11/14/cele-hails-success-of-cape-s-new-anti-gang-unit> (accessed 15-11-
2018). 
1567 Jordaan paras 134-136; Chapter 4 5 1 2 and 4 5 2 4 1 above. 
1568 Jordaan paras 134-136. 
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no relation to the gang or its activities at all, such a gang member could be liable for 
increased punishment. Such a position is wholly untenable, irrational and 
unconstitutional and requires immediate amendment. These amendments shall be 
discussed in the following section.  
7 1 3   Alternative measures in holding gang leaders and gang members  
criminally responsible 
A further research aim of this dissertation was to investigate alternative models for 
the criminalisation of organised criminal groups under foreign and international law 
and compare these models to the South African regime. The purpose of this exercise 
was to evaluate whether any of these means could be used to supplement or replace 
the current South African approach.  
It is strongly suggested, firstly, that more invasive measures be implemented to 
disrupt the organisation and functioning of gangs. Merely punishing gang members 
does not disrupt the criminal structure or functioning of the gang. Convicted members 
are merely replaced and are forced or allocated into prison gangs. Secondly, it is 
suggested that there be harsher punishments for gang leaders and that they should 
be held directly accountable for unlawful acts committed by subordinate gang 
members. 
This author submits that while many of the jurisdictions that implement anti-gang 
legislation or measures compare favourably with the South African approach, and 
while there are certain measures that could prove useful, some would nevertheless be 
controversial. Labelling of criminal gangs may prove to be an infringement of freedom 
of association as well as of the presumption of innocence and may place a reverse 
onus on gang members who want to challenge a finding that he or she is a gang 
member – or if such a person wants to have the so-called control order (which limits 
the liberties of the accused) amended. The registration model, as followed in 
Singapore, which compels all associations to be registered and criminalises failure to 
do so (such as gangs who do not fall within the registrable categories) may prove to 
be too administratively laborious and could prove disastrous in a South Africa already 
struggling with an overburdened administrative state and criminal justice system.  
Civil injunctions could furthermore be issued against gangs. This would prohibit 
them from associating with other (known) gang members and from operating in certain 
areas. This would potentially infringe on freedom of association as well as the freedom 
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of movement of gang members. These injunctions may also prove to be ineffectual or 
impracticable due to the severe understaffing of police stations in gang hotspots.  
More fruitful findings were made in relation to the direct criminal accountability of 
gang leaders. Potential models for holding gang leaders responsible were found in the 
general part of international criminal law, Australian and German criminal law. The 
models were analysed in the context of accountability for organised crime leaders, and 
this dovetails nicely with the sentiments expressed in the preamble of POCA, which 
fails to follow through in the operative part of the statute with specific modes of liability 
for gang leaders.1569 The doctrine of command or superior responsibility, which holds 
superiors or commanders responsible for unlawful acts of their subordinates, is 
especially appropriate in this regard. Again, the submission is not that principles of 
international criminal law are directly applicable to the criminal phenomenon of 
gangsterism in South Africa. There is no direct criminal liability for gangsterism under 
international law (compared to, say, war crimes or crimes against humanity). The 
proposition in this dissertation is that the gravity and scale of gangsterism in areas like 
the Cape Flats are such that the phenomenon is indeed comparable to some of the 
serious structural and hierarchical crimes under international law, such as war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. Indeed, the numbers and impact of gangs in 
Metropolitan Cape Town is such that the governing party in the Western Cape 
Province has asked for the deployment of the military, thus transforming a criminal 
justice response into a quasi-military response.1570 The merits of a military response 
to the problem of gangsterism will not be debated here, but the request to deploy the 
military illustrates the fact that the criminal gangs operate on a scale and with 
hierarchies and command structures reminiscent of rebel groups or quasi-military 
organisations. And the conduct of these groups is subject to the general principles and 
modes of liability provided for in international criminal law instruments, such as the 
Rome Statute of the ICC. The submission is that there are lessons to be learned that 
                                            
1569 Section 2(1)(f) criminalises the management of a “criminal enterprise” as a racketeering offence. 
This carries a heavy punishment of R1 000 million or up to life imprisonment. This offence however 
carries a heavy evidentiary burden and not hold the gang leader directly accountable for crimes 
committed by subordinates.  
1570 R Davis “DA wants to send the army into the Cape Flats – communities, not so much” (19-07-2018) 
Daily Maverick <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-07-19-da-wants-to-send-the-army-into-
the-cape-flats-communities-not-so-much/> (accessed 19 August 2018).  
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can benefit the development of South African criminal law as it responds to the 
structural problems of organised crime and gangsterism. In short: gangs, especially 
supergangs, simply fall apart without leaders. Modes of liability which focus on 
leadership are thus indispensable in terms of a comprehensive legal strategy to 
combat gangs and criminal gang activities.  
Command or superior responsibility, as developed in international criminal law, 
can be employed to create criminal liability for gang leaders for the unlawful acts 
carried out by subordinates. This would be different from modes of liability currently 
available under South African criminal law, such as conspiracy and common purpose. 
The essence of command or superior responsibility is the element of effective control. 
This is especially apt for criminal gangs as they often operate in a pseudo-military 
fashion. Control through an organisation, where liability for unlawful acts can be 
attributed to the control of a certain gang leader of the gang, is equally as appropriate. 
This doctrine could prove useful where individual gang members may not be criminally 
liable for a crime but is factually responsible, as this doctrine does not require legal 
guilt on the part of the subordinates in order for liability to ensue for their leader.  
This author is cognizant of the fact that these alternative measures are 
constitutionally problematic, possibly even more so than the textual problems in POCA 
Chapter 1 and the issues with section 10(3). However:  if courts are willing to 
repeatedly acknowledge the common purpose doctrine as constitutionally sound 
despite its glaring constitutional issues, on the basis that it is justifiable on the grounds 
of policy considerations (to deal with the “significant societal scourge” of group 
criminality),1571 then these alternative means should equally be justifiable. This author 
also acknowledges that the constitutional issues discussed in Chapter 5 of this 
dissertation may be justified if the State were to adopt stricter mechanisms, as 
suggested above, to deal with gangs. This refers back to the constant tension 
described in Chapter 5 between the fair trial and related constitutional rights of the 
accused and the rights of the inhabitants of the state to be protected from all forms of 
violence.  
The conclusion of this dissertation is not that POCA Chapters 1 and 4 should be 
repealed. The baby should not be thrown out with the bathwater. The ensuing sections 
shall provide suggestions as to the textual amendments to Chapters 1 and 4 of POCA 
                                            
1571 S v Thebus and Another 2003 (6) SA 505 (CC) para 34. 
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and provide suggestions as to how the measures as suggested above should be 
drafted.  
7 2  Amendments to the text of Chapters 1 and 4 of POCA 
It was emphasised in the preceding chapters that certain important textual 
amendments are required to render certain provisions in Chapters 1 and 4 of POCA 
constitutionally sound. The changes in Chapter 1 are minor and ensure compliance 
with the ius certum and ius strictum principles; provide fair warning to potential 
accused as well as legal certainty. Constitutional jurisprudence has shown us the 
standard for statutes to comply with constitutional norms.1572 Chapters 1 and 4 of this 
dissertation illustrated that a legal definition for a gang is elusive and wide-ranging; the 
notion of a criminal gang is comprised of a set of characteristics. It is therefore 
dangerous to rely on a nontechnical definition of a gang as such a definition is not 
susceptible for reasonable interpretation and application.1573  
It is proposed that the definition of “criminal gang” should read as follows: 
'criminal gang' includes [means] any formal or informal ongoing organisation, 
association, or group of three or more persons, which has as one of its activities 
the commission of one or more criminal offences, which has an identifiable 
name or identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or 
collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity; 
The definition of a “pattern of criminal gang activity” should be amended in a similar 
way to read:  
'pattern of criminal gang activity' includes [means] the commission of two or 
more criminal offences referred to in Schedule 1: Provided that at least one of 
those offences occurred after the date of commencement of Chapter 4 and the 
last of those offences occurred within three years after a prior offence and the 
offences were committed 
(a) on separate occasions; 
                                            
1572 See Chapter 5.  
1573 See Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Others para 133; 5 3 2 2 1 
above.  
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(b) on the same occasion, by two or more persons who are members of, 
or belong to, the same criminal gang; 
In addition to these amendments, the following provision should be added to Chapter 
4, preferably as section 9(3):1574 
[The court may hear evidence, including evidence with regard to hearsay, 
similar facts or previous convictions, relating to offences contemplated 
in subsections (1) and (2), notwithstanding that such evidence might 
otherwise be inadmissible, provided that such evidence would not render 
a trial unfair.] 
There is no reason for not including a similar provision empowering the use of these 
otherwise inadmissible types of evidence such as with section 2(2) of POCA. The 
inclusion of such a provision could also avoid possible future attacks on Chapter 4 as 
it has no empowering provision to allow for the use of (especially) previous convictions.  
It can be argued that previous convictions are permissible, generally, through 
section 211 of the CPA (because the predicate offences may be considered “an 
element of any offence with which an accused is charged”) and hearsay evidence 
through the exceptions listed under section 3(3) of the Law of Evidence Amendment 
Act 45 of 1988 (“the LEAA”). There is however no indication whether similar fact 
evidence or hearsay evidence is permissible in these gang-related cases such as with 
racketeering cases. Section 2(2) is broader in application and lowers the admissibility 
threshold because it allows for these vexed categories of evidence where they are 
usually inadmissible (save for the qualification of not rendering the trial unfair). Similar 
fact evidence is nonproblematic in this regard because the predicate acts can be 
justified as elements of another offence under section 211 of the CPA. The threshold 
for hearsay under the LEAA is arguably much higher than that of POCA and great 
judicial care should be taken in allowing hearsay in POCA Chapter 4 cases – and it 
should under the current legal framework only be allowed under the LEAA exceptions. 
Courts should therefore take care in using the correct legislative framework in allowing 
these types of evidence and not treat allowing it as a matter of course because it is a 
POCA-related case. Legal certainty and streamlining of POCA is therefore required.  
                                            
1574 This text is based on section 2(2) of POCA.  
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There is no reference to a “serious” offence or crime in the definition of a “pattern 
of criminal gang activity” such as with other comparable legislation or instruments. 
Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision by the Council of the European Union 
2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the Fight Against Organised Crime (“the 
Framework Decision”) requires a “criminal organisation” to have committed “(…) 
offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a 
maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty”. The Canadian Code in 
section 467.1(1) also provides that a  
serious offence means an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament 
for which the maximum punishment is imprisonment for five years or more, or another 
offence that is prescribed by regulation. 
STEP does not make reference to the seriousness of the offence or minimum prison 
sentences, but the offences are at least, prima facie, relating to gang activity. The 
Palermo Convention (also bearing in mind that the wording of the Convention is not 
binding on its member states) requires in article 2(a) that an “organized criminal group” 
shall have “the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences (…)”.1575 A 
“serious crime” is further defined as conduct punishable by a minimum of four years 
deprivation of liberty “or a more serious penalty”.1576 
Items 21 (“offences relating to the coinage”) and 26 (“any offence relating to 
exchange control”) of Schedule 1 of POCA are out of step with the rest of the items 
contained in Schedule 1. Section 34(1)(f) of the South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 
1989 served as an example and was criticised above.1577 This provision makes “the 
act of defacing, soiling, damaging or attaching drawings to any coin which is legal 
tender” an offence. The punishment for this offence is a fine not exceeding R250.1578 
Considering the other types of offences in listed in the Schedule 1 and the specific 
inclusion of the term “serious offence” or “serious crime” in comparable instruments, it 
is submitted that the retention of Items 21 and 26 become unjustifiable and they should 
be removed from Schedule 1. It is further submitted that persons who might be 
subjected to Chapter 4 of POCA cannot with reasonable certainty be expected to 
                                            
1575 Article 2(a) of the Palermo Convention. 
1576 Article 2(b) of the Palermo Convention. 
1577 See 4 5 1 1 1 as well as 5 3 2 2 1 above.  
1578 Section 34(iv) of the Reserve Bank Act. 
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ascertain how they should adjust their conduct in order to avoid prosecution and this 
is therefore also in violation of ius certum.1579 
Further, POCA section 10(3) must be amended in the following manner, based on 
the corresponding sentence enhancement under section 186.22(b)(1) of STEP:  
If a court, after having convicted an accused of any offence, other than an 
offence contemplated in this Chapter, finds that the accused was a member of 
[or active participant in] a criminal gang at the time of the commission of the 
offence [and committed such offence for the benefit of, at the direction of, 
or in association with any criminal gang], such finding shall be regarded as 
an aggravating circumstance for sentencing purposes. 
Such an enhancement would be justifiable, and it would punish statutory and common 
law crimes other than the crimes committed in Chapter 4 of POCA while having a 
rational link between the crime and the furtherance of gang-related activity. There is 
also no apparent reason why active participants to a gang should not be punished 
under such a sentence provision – either in the original or amended form. An “active 
participant” in a gang logically has at least contributed to the gang in some way but 
that is not necessarily true of a gang member. The inclusion of the term “or active 
participant” justifiably expands the scope of the criminal net to include those who 
contribute to the criminal gang.  
The current application of POCA section 10(3) is to punish mere association. No 
rational link exists between punishing persons for crimes that are not gang-related. 
There is no law prohibiting membership to a criminal gang, including POCA. Therefore, 
punishing persons (by increasing their sentences) based on membership alone 
constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of association and is 
arbitrary and irrational. This author is cognizant that this right is not unlimited. 
However, it can surely not be argued that merely belonging to a criminal gang – without 
proof that someone has in fact furthered the objectives of such a gang by committing 
criminal offences – and increasing the punishment of such a person is justifiable. 
Whether criminal organisations are even deserving of constitutional protection under 
section 18 of the Constitution is still subject to academic debate1580 but there is no 
                                            
1579 See 5 3 2 2 1 above. 
1580 See 5 4 1 above. 
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judicial or legislative basis supporting such an argument currently in South Africa. If 
this is in fact the case (which this author submits it is not), POCA section 10(3) would 
have to be justified through section 36 of the Constitution. It was however submitted 
above1581 that section 10(3) would not be justifiable under section 36 as the legitimate 
governmental objective in curbing criminal gang activity is not achieved through the 
sentence enhancement.  
What is certain, however, is the principle of personal guilt. There is nothing justifying 
a violation of this principle because there is no evidence that the person involved has 
contributed to the activities of the gang and that there will in fact be an influence felt in 
the gang due to the absence. Deterrence as a theory of punishment is also insufficient 
here because the person is not being convicted for a gang-related crime.  
7 3  Modes of liability, leadership and the need for direct criminal  
responsibility 
It was argued in this dissertation that gangsterism relies on leadership, and that the 
scale of gangs in, for instance, metropolitan Cape Town is such that these gangs 
resemble rebel groups or quasi-military organisations. As such there is a lot to learn 
from the modes of liability as developed in international criminal law, where the 
emphasis often falls on the liability of leaders. It was also noted that 
gangsterism/criminal gang activities are not crimes under international law (yet) and 
the relevant international criminal law modes of liability cannot simply be applied to 
criminal gangs. Either courts will have to develop the law (which is not ideal in terms 
of the principle of legality) or the democratic principle should apply whereby parliament 
would take the necessary action to reform South African criminal law in response to a 
complex problem. Rather than taking the longer and more uncertain route of 
development of modes of liability under the general principles of South African criminal 
law, it is suggested that the following offences be included in the text of Chapter 4 of 
POCA in order to hold gang leaders directly responsible for the unlawful actions of 
subordinates:  
[A leader or person effectively acting as such, of a criminal gang, shall be 
criminally responsible for crimes committed by subordinates/gang 
                                            
1581 See 5 4 3 above. 
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members under his or her effective command and control, or effective 
authority and control, where: 
(a) That gang leader or person either knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known that the gang 
were committing or about to commit such crimes, and 
(b) that gang leader or person failed to prevent 
subordinate/gang members from committing or attempting 
to commit such crimes.] 
There are certain benefits to such an offence. To hold the leader of a criminal gang 
responsible would only require proof of the existence of a criminal gang (as defined in 
the amended POCA) and not require the gang leader to have personally contributed 
to the pattern of criminal gang activity – which is in any case not a requirement for 
most of the other offences. There should only be proof of effective control or command. 
Such an offence would also solve the difficulties faced in proving conspiracy and 
incitement where proof of a conspiratorial plan is required or where proof of incitement 
influencing the mind of the incitee is required. All that is required (which may 
nevertheless prove difficult, but not as difficult as the aforementioned crimes) is proof 
of the role of the accused as at least a de facto leader of the gang. This person also 
does not have to be the only leader and may merely be acting as such or may have a 
lower rank with equally effective authority. Accountability here is based on liability for 
omissions, either for creating a dangerous situation through the activities of the gang 
and then liability should ensue for the failure to prevent or at least restrict unlawful 
activities from ensuing. The legal basis of this crime can also be founded upon the 
legal convictions of the society that want to hold gang leaders directly responsible for 
the actions of their subordinates – another established ground for liability for 
omissions.  
This crime goes somewhat further than the common purpose doctrine by imposing 
a legal duty on a gang leader (based on the fact that he or she has created a 
dangerous scenario and must therefore be held liable for unlawful acts that occur as 
a result of creating such a scenario or failing to exercise control over it). As mentioned 
above, if the common purpose doctrine is justifiable on policy considerations, then 
such a measure can equally be justifiable. 
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Apart from the more direct route of creation of a new crime, one could, again, rely 
on general principles to achieve the aim of combating criminal gangs and gang 
activities. If POCA is amended to include a gang leadership crime, reliance on the 
doctrine of control through an organisation may be useful and there is authority 
indicating that such a doctrine is not incompatible with existing South African criminal 
law principles. The maxim qui facit per alium facit per se holds that “[a] person who 
commits an act through another person is taken as having committed it himself”.1582  
A model, inspired by the German Criminal Code1583 as well as the application of the 
doctrine in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (“Dyilo 2006”),1584 is suggested here:  
[A gang leader shall be liable as a principal offender for an offence he or 
she has committed through another gang member or a person who 
actively associates with such a gang. Such liability will depend on: 
(i) the existence of a hierarchically organised group over which 
the leader actively exercises authority over his subordinates 
with knowledge or consciousness of this authority.] 
7 4  Concluding remarks  
The rights of the inhabitants of the State to be protected from violence and the rights 
of the accused to have a fair trial are seemingly on two diametrically opposite ends of 
the constitutional spectrum; creating a constitutional dichotomy. As Harms J put it in 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v King (“King”)1585 
There is no such thing as perfect justice (…) Fairness is not a one-way street 
conferring an unlimited right on an accused to demand the most favourable possible 
treatment but also requires fairness to the public as represented by the state. This 
does not mean that the accused’s right should be subordinated to the public’s interest 
in the protection and suppression of crime [.]1586 
This dissertation grappled with the above-mentioned dichotomy, oscillating 
between fairness towards the accused to be free from arbitrary punishment, unfair or 
                                            
1582 S v Chirunga 1998 (2) ZLR 601 (H).  
1583 section 25 of the German Criminal Code 1998 (Strafgesetzbuch). 
1584 ICC-01/04-01/06 (24 February 2006). 
1585 2010 (2) SACR 146 (SCA).  
1586 King para 5 (footnotes omitted).  
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uncertain laws; and the protection of communities (such as the Cape Flats) severely 
affected by the pervasive presence and activities of criminal gangs. 
Harms J was correct in stating that perfect justice does not exist. This however does 
not mean that courts, the legislature and the public should be discouraged from the 
pursuit of perfect justice. This dissertation’s contribution to the pursuit of justice for the 
people of the Cape Flats and elsewhere is a proposal for the amendment of POCA as 
outlined above, and as fleshed out in the preceding chapters. It is submitted that this 
proposal is not only defensible in terms of the general pursuit of a more safe and just 
South Africa, but also in terms of the doctrines and principles of South African, 
comparative and international criminal law. 
________ 
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Addendum A 
Schedule 1 to the Prevention of Organised Crime 
Act 121 of 19981587 
 
1.  murder; 
2.  rape or compelled rape as contemplated in section 3 or 4 of the Criminal Law 
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007, respectively; 
3.  kidnapping; 
4.  arson; 
5.  public violence; 
6.  robbery; 
7.  assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm; 
8.  sexual assault, compelled sexual assault or compelled selfsexual assault as 
contemplated in section 5, 6 or 7 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007, respectively;  
9.  any offence contemplated in Part 2 of Chapter 3 or the whole of Chapter 4 of 
the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 
2007; 
10.  any offence under any legislation dealing with gambling, gaming or lotteries; 
11.  contravention of section 20 (1) of the Sexual Offences Act, 1957 (Act 23 of 
1957); 
                                            
1587 Note that the 38th item on this Schedule is not numbered and appears after Item 34. This appears 
to be a formatting error. 
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12.  any offence contemplated in Part 1 to 4, or section 17, 18, 20 or 21 (in so far 
as it relates to the aforementioned offences) of Chapter 2 of the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004; 
13.  extortion; 
14.  childstealing; 
15.  breaking or entering any premises whether under the common law or a 
statutory provision, with intent to commit an offence; 
16.  malicious injury to property; 
17.  theft, whether under the common law or a statutory provision; 
18.  any offence under section 36 or 37 of the General Law Amendment Act, 1955 
(Act 62 of 1955); 
19.  fraud; 
20.  forgery or uttering a forged document knowing it to have been forged; 
21.  offences relating to the coinage; 
22.  any offence referred to in section 13 of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act, 1992 
(Act 140 of 1992); 
23.  any offence relating to the dealing in or smuggling of ammunition, firearms, 
explosives or armament and the unlawful possession of such firearms, 
explosives or armament; 
24.  any offence in contravention of section 36 of the Arms and Ammunition Act, 
1969 (Act 75 of 1969); 
25.  dealing in, being in possession of or conveying endangered, scarce and 
protected game or plants or parts or remains thereof in contravention of a 
statute or provincial ordinance; 
26.  any offence relating to exchange control; 
27.  any offence under any law relating to the illicit dealing in or possession of 
precious metals or precious stones; 
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28.  any offence contemplated in sections 1 (1) and 1A (1) of the Intimidation Act, 
1982 (Act 72 of 1982); 
29.  defeating or obstructing the course of justice; 
30.  perjury; 
31.  subornation of perjury; 
32.  any offence referred to in Chapter 3 or 4 of this Act; 
32A.  any specified offence as defined in the Protection of Constitutional Democracy 
against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 2004; 
33.  any offence the punishment wherefor may be a period of imprisonment 
exceeding one year without the option of a fine; 
33A.  any offence under Chapter 2 of the Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in 
Persons Act, 2013; 
33B.  Any offence referred to in section 3 of the Criminal Matters Amendment Act, 
2015; 
34.  any conspiracy, incitement or attempt to commit any offence referred to in this 
Schedule; 
offences referred to in section 4 (1) and (2) of the Prevention and Combating of 
Torture of Persons Act, 2013. 
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